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Ph.D. DISSERTATION

**MOULDING AND REMOULDING OF THE INDIVIDUAL IN THE
EIGHTEENTH-AND NINETEENTH-CENTURY MYTHS OF WESTERN
CIVILIZATION: *ROBINSON CRUSOE, FRANKENSTEIN, AND DRACULA***

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
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
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ABSTRACT

MOULDING AND REMOULDING OF THE INDIVIDUAL IN THE EIGHTEENTH-AND NINETEENTH-CENTURY MYTHS OF WESTERN CIVILIZATION: *ROBINSON CRUSOE*, *FRANKENSTEIN*, AND *DRACULA*

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This study explores the moulding of the individual in three eighteenth-and nineteenth-century canonical myths of Western civilization. *Robinson Crusoe* (1719), *Frankenstein* (1818), and *Dracula* (1897) are read and analysed as literary historical documents that chronicle the metamorphosis in the mould of the individual and his relationship with society and others. This study lines up the three novels on a continuum with what Ian Watt labels as the Renaissance myths of individualism when he refers to the tales of Faust, Don Quixote, and Don Juan. What the resulting sequence of stories have in common in addition to their modernized mythical nature is that they all give primacy to the individual and embrace the implicit assumption that the individual's unique and idiosyncratic apprehensions and experiences are valuable enough to be the subjects of popular literature. While Ian Watt examines individuality during the Renaissance, this study extends the scope to chart the Western cultural expression of individuality in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. As far as the method of analysis is concerned, this study begins by theoretically proving that the three novels are in many respects akin to classical mythology and that they are the contrivance of the innate myth-making human mental faculty. As such, the study argues, these narratives are very informative and

illuminating about the concealed individual and collective archetypes and mental representations; they are more revealing about the masked cultural tensions and anxieties. This study locates the individuals and the collective groups in the three novels within their own contemporary historical atmospheres of disenchantment, the decline of aristocracy, the rise of the middle-class which consists of stereotyped average people, and the capitalist industrial revolution. In three separate chapters, this study analyses each novel independently within the framework of the nineteenth-century prominent philosophical doctrines which deal with the individual and his relationship to other individuals and collective groups. In each novel, the individual and the society are examined from the perspectives of Durkheim, Hegel, Marx, and Nietzsche respectively. Other secondary theoretical frameworks are also employed to explain several relevant individual and cultural phenomena in the three novels. This study finds out that, much like the Renaissance, the cultures of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries punish individualist singularity and single-mindedness. Yet, while the early eighteenth century worldview tolerates and even eventually bestows atonement and reward upon Robinson Crusoe for his earnestness and economic autonomy, the collective cultural representations in *Frankenstein* and *Dracula* demonize, condemn, and mercilessly destroy and demolish the individual single-mindedness and autonomous self-sufficiency which Victor Frankenstein and Count Dracula stand for. While Ian Watt attributes the Renaissance antagonism towards individualism to the Counter-Reformation movement, this study comes to the conclusion that the ascending hostility towards the individual in the post-Reformation eras of the three novels are due to serious cultural and social apprehensions and anxieties concerning the anticipated threatening dissonance and non-conformity of the singular society members. Thus, like the tales of individuality of the Renaissance, *Robinson Crusoe*, *Frankenstein*, and *Dracula* keep individualism within the confines of mythical discourse signifying that it is a myth of Western culture.

Key words: Individualism, English Novel, Mythology, Disenchantment, Capitalism, Industrialization

ÖZ

18. ve 19. Yüzyıl Batı Medeniyeti Mitoslarında Bireyin Yeniden Hayat Bulması: *Robinson Crusoe, Frankenstein ve Dracula* Örnekleri

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Bu tez 18. ve 19. yüzyıllarda yazılmış ve batı medeniyetinin başyapıtları olarak adlandırabileceğimiz mitoslarda bireyin oluşumunu inceleyen bir çalışmadır. *Robinson Crusoe* (1719), *Frankenstein* (1818) ve *Dracula* (1897) eserleri bireyin tarihi süreç içinde uğradığı metamorfozu gösterir birer edebi-tarihi metin olarak ele alınmış ve bireyin bütüncül yapıyla olan ilişkisi bu eserler üzerinden sorgulanmıştır. Bu üç eser Ian Watt'ın Rönesans mitosları olarak tanımladığı Faust, Don Quixote ve Don Juan efsanelerinin kronolojik olarak devamıdır aslında. Bu güncellenmiş mitosların ortak noktalarına bakacak olursak; her üç hikaye de bireyi önelemekte ve bireyin kendine has doğasının ve tecrübelerinin edebiyatın konusu olacak ölçüde değerli olduğunu ifade etmektedir. Ian Watt, Rönesans döneminin bireyselliğini tanımlıyorken, bu tez Ian Watt'tan yola çıkarak batı kültüründe bireyselliğin kapsamını 18. ve 19. yüzyılları içerecek şekilde genişletmektedir. Tezde kullanılan analiz yöntemine gelince; tez, kuramsal anlamda söz konusu eserlerin klasik mitoslara benzerliğinden yola çıkmakta ve bu eserlerin insan doğasının mitos oluşturma becerisinin bir sonucu olduğunu iddia

ederek başlamaktadır. Dolayısıyla, çalışmada bu anlatıların bireysel ve kolektif arketipler bağlamında ortaya çıkan yansımalarının bilgilendirici ve aydınlatıcı olduğu savunulmakta; açığa çıkamayan ama varlığı bilinen kültürel gerilim ve kaygılar hakkında bilgi verilmektedir. Çalışma, üç romanda yer alan bireyleri ve kolektif yapıları kendi tarihsel atmosferleri içerisinde, yani; aristokrat sınıfın etkisinin azalması, orta sınıf erklerin yükselişe geçmesi, sıradan insanın ortaya çıkışı gibi olguları kapitalist sanayi devrimi içerisinde konumlandırır. Üç ayrı bölümde, her bir roman bir diğerinden bağımsız olarak, felsefi doktrinler çerçevesinde bireyi ve onun diğer bireylerle ve kolektif yapılarla olan ilişkisi incelenmektedir. Her bir romanda birey ve toplum sırasıyla Durkheim, Hegel, Marx ve Nietzsche'nin bakış açılarından incelenmiştir. Üç romanda da karakterleri ve kültürel olguları açıklamak için ikincil teorilere atıfta bulunmaktadır. Bu çalışma, tıpkı Rönesans gibi, on sekizinci ve on dokuzuncu yüzyılların kültürlerinin bireyselliği cezalandırdığını ortaya koymakta, ancak bazı farklılıklar olduğunu da dile getirmektedir. 18. yüzyılın başlarındaki dünya görüşü, ekonomik özgürlüğü için yola çıkan Robinson Crusoe'yu ödüllendirirken, 19. yüzyıl dünya görüşü ise Frankenstein ve Dracula karakterlerinin bireyselliğini ve onların temsil ettikleri dünya görüşünü ve kendi kendine yeterlilik anlayışını kabul etmemektedir. Ian Watt, Rönesans karşıtlığını Reform karşıtlığına bağlarken, çalışmada üç romanın da Reform sonrası dönemde bireye yönelik artan düşmanlığın kültürel ve sosyal kaygılardan kaynaklandığı sonucuna varılmıştır. Birey baskı altındadır, çünkü ayak takımının iktidarında toplumlar sıradanlığın ahlakını kucaklar; Frankenstein ve Dracula'nın temsil ettikleri üst insan olma çabalarına ve soyluluk algısına ya da bunların kalıntılarına saldırır. Rönesans döneminin bireysellik hikayeleri gibi, *Robinson Crusoe*, *Frankenstein* ve *Dracula* da bireyciliği konu edinmekte; Batı kültürünün efsaneleri olan bu eserler kurgusal söylemlerini mitos sınırlarının içinde tutmaktadır.

Anahtar kelimeler: Bireycilik, İngiliz Roman, Mitoloji, İnanç Yitimi, Kapitalizm, Sanayileşme

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INTRODUCTION

In all ages and in all types of communities there have been self-oriented, egocentric, exceptional, autonomous, or conspicuously unique people who are independent of the common assumptions of their society. Since every human being has a self that exists in detachment from the environment which surrounds it, this alienation (and integration) has become an issue of concern in social sciences and literature. Although the sense of subjectivity has deep roots in history, the concept of individualism is relatively a contemporary notion that gained prominence in the nineteenth-century. Since then, many comments have been made concerning the nature of individualism.

The word 'Individualism' came into existence after a variety of historical developments. Steven Lukes says that "[i]t is variously traced to the Reformation, the Renaissance, the Enlightenment, the Revolution, to the decline of the aristocracy or the church or traditional religion, to the Industrial Revolution, to the growth of capitalism or democracy" (53). The concept took its multiplicity of meaning and dimension from those various historical frameworks which contributed to its rise, and from the attitude towards it. Shanahan (1992) says that "[i]t should not surprise anyone familiar with the subject that the term 'individualism' has been used in a variety of ways, none of them necessarily in accord with the other" (13). According to Watt (1957) individualism "posits a whole society mainly governed by the idea of every individual's intrinsic independence both from other individuals and from that multifarious allegiance to past modes of thought and action denoted by the word 'tradition'" (59). And for Tocqueville (1847) "[i]ndividualism is a novel expression to which a novel idea has given birth. Our fathers were only acquainted with egotism" (104). Tocqueville differentiates between egotism and the terminological meaning of individualism when he says:

Egotism is a passionate and exaggerated love of self, which leads a man to connect everything with his own person, and to prefer himself to everything in the world.

Individualism is a mature and calm feeling, which disposes each member of the community to sever himself from the mass of his fellow creatures, and to draw apart with his family and his friends; so that, after he has thus formed a little circle of his own, he willingly leaves society at large to itself. (104)

Individualism is also a state of self-recognition which coincides with the spread of the self-centred attitudes during industrialization and urbanization. It is a crucial phase and point of reorientation in the evolution of individuals and societies, and it has various social, economic, and psychological manifestations. This study argues that antagonism between individualism and collectivism is often anticipated because society is based on union and conformity of thought and behaviour, while individualism is based on non-conformity and detachment.

As such, individualism essentially pertains to the relation between the individual and the collectiveness. Forsyth and Hoyt consider the relation between the individual and the group as the most essential issue of social life. They characterize this relation by saying:

Healthy adult human beings can survive apart from other members of the species, yet across individuals, societies, and eras, humans consistently seek inclusion in the collective, where they must balance their personal needs and desires against the demands and requirements of their group. Some never sink too deeply into the larger collective, for they remain individualists who are so self-reliant that they refuse to rely on others or concern themselves with others' outcomes. Other people, in contrast, put the collective's interests before their own personal needs, sacrificing personal gain for what is often called the greater good. (1)

Shanahan notes that “the rise of individualism is indeed an exciting spectacle and the opportunities it has opened to humankind dazzling [and thus, he believes that] the examination of individualism's genealogy is an invigorating process” (12). Therefore, the exploration of individualism in different historical periods represents fertile and informative topic of research.

As far as the thesis aims and statements are concerned, this study sets out to contribute to the research which tries to survey the development of individualism across history through the analysis of the literary heritage in specified periods of time. In accordance with Ian Watt's *Myths of Modern Individualism* (1996), in which he locates

Robinson Crusoe on a continuum with what he labels the three Renaissance myths of individualism, namely, the myth of Faust, Don Quixote, and Don Juan, this study aims to highlight the origins and permanence of individualism in the fiction of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.

In his work, Watt shows that, in their original forms, the three Renaissance myths are punitive tales which signify the anti-individualism of their time because Faust and Don Juan are sent to hell, and Don Quixote is severely mocked. He says:

We do not usually think of *Robinson Crusoe* as a novel. Defoe's first full-length work of fiction seems to fall more naturally into place with Faust, Don Juan, and Don Quixote, the great myths of our civilization. What these myths are about is fairly easy to say. Their basic plots, their enduring images, all exhibit a single-minded pursuit by the protagonist of one of the characteristic aspirations of Western man. Each of them embodies an arête and a hubris, an exceptional prowess and vitiating excess, in spheres of action that are particularly important in our culture. (xiii)

The individualism of these sixteenth and seventeenth century figures brings about their own downfall because the society of their own time condemns individualistic aspirations. Watt attributes these unflattering portrayals to the Counter-Reformation movement "when the forces of tradition and authority rallied against the new aspirations of Renaissance individualism in religion, in daily life, and in literature and art" (1996, xiv).

A century later, Watt argues that *Robinson Crusoe* comes to reward and celebrate individualism of its dissonant and non-conformist titular character. Watt attributes this favourable consideration of the individual to the social approval of singularity. Such a shift is indicative of a historically new social paradigm. This study colligates *Frankenstein* and *Dracula* with Watt's consecution of stories for the sake of exploring the configuration of individuality in such mythical narratives in the latter periods. Such integration with Watt's work would result in an extended survey of individualism in literature which covers the Renaissance, in addition to the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. This study re-examines *Robinson Crusoe* as a novel and as a myth of individualism because it marks the transition to a new genre and a new paradigm of

thought. Then, it examines *Frankenstein* and *Dracula* from the same perspective respectively.

Put together, Ian Watt's Renaissance myths and the three selected novels have much in common. They all give primacy to the individual ego. When juxtaposed together, the Renaissance myths of Faust, Don Quixote, and Don Juan, with the three later-period stories of Robinson Crusoe, Frankenstein, and Dracula, all exhibit striking parallels with each other. As far as individualism is concerned, Watt's characterization of the Renaissance stories applies also to the three novels. Thus, the protagonists in all these stories "are incredibly single-minded; they concentrate all their psychological resources on one basic line of distinction"; moreover, Watt adds, they are all "by their own free wish, travellers largely stripped of any family connection: either they have no recorded parents, siblings, wives or children, or they are alienated from other family members . . . Effectively, then, all . . . of our protagonists exist in a domestic vacuum" (Watt, 1996, 122-123). One can add to this domestic vacuum the lack of constant matrimonial life. Thus, while the Renaissance protagonists do not undertake a conventional marriage, Robinson Crusoe and Frankenstein get married. However, the conjugal domesticity is repressed through the marginalization of Crusoe's late marriage¹ and through the elimination of Frankenstein's spouse Elizabeth in the very day of their joint life. In the case of Count Dracula, the three female vampires who live in his castle signify promiscuity and annihilation of the entire institution of marriage.

The other characteristic of the three Renaissance individuals which Watt draws attention to is the "striking coincidence [that] all of them form their only close tie with a male servant" (123). This coincidence, Watt asserts, goes beyond the mere use of the literary device of the servant-foil which provides the hero with someone to talk to. In fact, "in the present context, [the male servant] also allows the hero to retain a strong degree of isolation from the wider world around him" (Watt, 1996, 123). Interesting enough, the tie to the male servant in *Robinson Crusoe* is sustained through the role of Friday. In *Frankenstein*, the tie to the servant is replaced by a tie to a loyal and honest male friend, exhibited by the Frankenstein-Clerval friendship, which is replaced later,

¹ In *Robinson Crusoe*, the marriage of the protagonist is exceptionally marginalized by being mentioned just once with the only detail that Crusoe had three children.

after the murder of Clerval, with the Frankenstein-Walton friendship. In *Dracula*, the individual's tie to the male servant takes another, more abstract, mould. The tie to a servant is manifested by the mysterious and complex relationship between Dracula and Renfield, where Dracula completely controls the mind of Renfield, and where Renfield venerates Dracula and submissively performs his master's wishes. In addition to implementing the individualist seclusion of the protagonists, these male-to-male relationships are necessary for self-identification and recognition as this study argues in the following chapters. These parallels justify viewing the whole set of narratives as belonging to the same category of Western cultural expression of individuality in the Renaissance and post-Renaissance eras.

Accordingly, this study suggests that *Robinson Crusoe*, *Frankenstein* and *Dracula* are the myths of Western Post-Renaissance individualism. While Watt, in his book, charts the uniformities and fluctuations in the characterization of individualism in the Renaissance, this study extends the chart to include the representation of individuality in the three English eighteenth and nineteenth-century canonical works which qualify for the attribute of Western modern myths of individualism.

Initially, this study adopts Watt's "working definition of myth [which states that myth] is a traditional story that is exceptionally widely known throughout the culture, that is credited with a historical or quasi-historical belief, and that embodies or symbolizes some of the most basic values of a society" (1996, xvi). Then, this study sets forth to show that *Robinson Crusoe*, *Frankenstein*, and *Dracula* are modern myths in a more literal sense and that they have much in common with classical myths. The study also demonstrates that the examination of such category of narratives is informative and rewarding in revealing the content of the collective and individual consciousness and the worldview of the cultures which produce them. Hence, this study explores the patterning and presentation of individuality in each novel independently by using the philosophical doctrines which deal with the individual and his relation to the collective body. It examines the individual himself, his modes of self-consciousness, his relations with other individuals, and his relations with the community.

Although a detailed examination of political and economic debates concerning the equality of rights, the personal liberties, the free market economy, and the doctrine of *laissez-faire* are beyond the scope of this thesis, these debates will be touched upon during the analyses of the novels where relevant. Such debates are relevant because they essentially arise in response to the assumption that the individual initiative is crucial for the progress and prosperity of communities. At the same time, these debates also recognize that individualistic initiatives are fearsome and threatening to the cohesion of the collective body which has been very necessary for the survival of humanity throughout history. The following chapters contribute to these debates through exploring the intensity of the social cohesion and the extent of pluralistic reaction against the freedom of personal initiative in different periods.

The following chapters present a background about individualism and examine the historical atmospheres which influence its status and conditions in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. The interaction between individualistic and pluralistic inclinations is detected through the analysis of the three selected literary works by applying the prominent contemporaneous philosophical doctrines which scrutinize the nature of individuality and the patterns of the communal and social functions.

CHAPTER I

THEORETICAL FRAMEWORKS

1.1 The History of Individualism and the Rise of the Novel

Individualism has its own course of evolution across the history of humankind. In its most basic and universal form, the word ‘individuality’ denotes human consciousness about the self. Julian Jaynes explores this type of elementary consciousness and introduces the concept of ‘the analogue I’ when he says that “[a] most important feature of this metaphor world is the metaphor we have of ourselves, the analog ‘I’, which can move about vicarially in our imagination, doing things that we are not actually doing” (62-63). For Jaynes, the subjective conscious mind is an analogue of the real world. In this way, “Consciousness is an operation rather than a thing, a repository, or a function. It operates by way of analogy, by way of constructing an analog space with an analog ‘I’ that can observe that space, and move metaphorically in it . . . conscious mind is a spatial analog of the world and mental acts are analogs of bodily acts” (65-66). Jaynes suggests that the homo-sapiens of the period before the first millennium B.C. had bicameral minds, and consequently were not self-conscious. He argues that within the first millennium B.C., the bicameral mind witnessed a gradual process of break-down and the subjective consciousness gradually emerged. Such emergence is related to the development of language and the course of historical events. Jaynes seeks evidence for the presence or absence of such consciousness in the earliest written literary records. He examines *The Iliad* and declares that he finds no words which refer to consciousness or mental activities and that “The words in *the Iliad* that in a later age come to mean mental things have different meanings, all of them more concrete” (69). Jaynes concludes that “There is in general no consciousness in *the Iliad*” (69), and adds:

Iliadic man did not have subjectivity as we do; he had no awareness of his awareness of the world, no internal mind-space to introspect upon. In distinction to our own subjective conscious minds, we can call the mentality of the Myceneans a bicameral mind. Volition, planning, initiative is organized with no consciousness whatever and then 'told' to the individual in his familiar language, sometimes with the visual aura of a familiar friend or authority figure or 'god', or sometimes as a voice alone. The individual obeyed these hallucinated voices because he could not see what to do by himself. (75)

Jaynes's hypothesis of the bicameral mind suggests that four millennia ago, human nature was split into two; the person, and a bicameral voice which accompanies him. The bicameral voice, which is located in the right hemisphere of the brain, uses the stored-up admonitory wisdom of the person's life and tells him what to do in reaction to the everyday challenges of life. With the passing of time, and in a kind of layering process, the physiological words in the vocabulary become more abstract, and the voices, which were once thought to be divine, become metaphors, resulting in more self-awareness and subjectivity. For Jaynes, although the two spheres of mind are split now and the human beings are completely self-conscious, there are still vestiges of the bicameral mind in the real world as in the cases of schizophrenia and possession; and there is still an unconscious human nostalgia for the 'divine' voices which used to instigate feelings of awe and wonder for people. The theory of the bicameral mind and the analogue "I" is used in chapter four in explaining the vampire's bite and the subliminal irresistibility of Count Dracula in addition to explaining the madness of Renfield.

On the psychological level, Jung (1980) also views the acquisition of individuality as a dynamic process: "I use the term 'individuation' to denote the process by which a person becomes a psychological 'in-dividual', that is, a separate, indivisible unity or 'whole'" (275). Such a dynamic view of individualism supports the assumption endorsed in this study that the transition towards independence and self-autonomy is an evolutionary process and not a sudden shift into a different state of alteration.

Nevertheless, some authors specify particular historical periods for the flourishing of individualistic awareness in the West. For Burckhardt, the middle ages veiled the sense of subjectivity among the individuals in Europe; "The veil was woven

of faith, illusion, and childish prepossession, through which the world and history were seen clad in strange hues. Man was conscious of himself only as a member of a race, people, party, family, or corporation – only through some general category” (129). The Renaissance removed this veil. Particularly “[i]n Italy this veil first melted into air; an objective treatment and consideration of the state and of all the things of this world became possible. The subjective side at the same time asserted itself with corresponding emphasis; Man became a spiritual individual, and recognized himself as such” (Burckhardt 129). Thus, Burckhardt specifies the Renaissance as the period which witnessed the rise and the flourishing of what he calls ‘the free personality.’

Individualism, according to Shanahan, “was a technology developed in response to a universal need that emerged as early civilizations proved themselves too inflexible to maintain coherence as size increased” (9). Thus, “[i]n place of the rigid, hierarchical, and elite social structures that had proven to be highly useful technologies as the species moved out of its nomadic, tribal phase, self-motivation, a self-directing strategy was gradually adopted that put a powerful tool at humans` disposal: personal initiative” (Shanahan 9-10). As a point of departure for the self, Shanahan asserts that “Individualism presupposes a self that is conscious and able to make decisions about the nature of truth, an interior self” (23). Shanahan agrees with Fromm (1966) that the Hebrews were behind the formation of the earliest forms of individuality because they “evolved a unified image [of divinity] with which they could identify and which, since it could not be physically represented, must have by implication resided in the psyche of the individual. This image became the dominant force of their individual existences” (Shanahan 25). Christianity took individuality one step further and added further individualistic bias to the western consciousness. Thus,

The emergent self, which freed the individual from immersion in experience, allowed reflection on the question of what he or she might or might not do, but which still relied a great deal on externalized norms (laws) for guidance, is now credited with the power of making its own judgements about the rightness or wrongness of an action. Christianity does not abolish the written Law, but it does make it a somewhat redundant artefact; true moral behaviour in the Gospels springs, not from externalized codes or pronouncements, but from the inherent ability of the self to distinguish right from wrong. (Shanahan 38)

While the Middle Ages witnessed an emphasis on self-examination and confession, the significant shift in the status of individuality took place during the Renaissance: “The uniqueness of the Renaissance for the purposes of this discussion lies in the fact that it represents the celebration of the fulfilment of existence, specifically, the fulfilment of the authorized self” (Shanahan 50-52). Later, the Reformation “allowed the emergence of a secularized self, empowered to make its own judgements” (Shanahan 65). Weber (2001) attributes much of the effect of the Reformation upon the metamorphosis of individuality to the doctrine of predestination:

In its extreme inhumanity this doctrine must above all have had one consequence for the life of a generation which surrendered to its magnificent consistency. That was a feeling of unprecedented inner loneliness of the single individual. In what was for the man of the age of the Reformation the most important thing in life, his eternal salvation, he was forced to follow his path alone to meet a destiny which had been decreed for him from eternity. No one could help him. (60-61)

Thus, this loneliness in Calvinist theology, in addition to the consequent remoteness and detachment of the divinity from the dilemmas which the individual faces in his everyday life, led the individual towards the realization that the “moral and ethical judgements must be made individually, without the sanction of a supernatural power which is indifferent to the individual’s circumstances anyway” (Shanahan 66). This realization led to the emergence of the empowered self who is capable enough to set the standards whereby truth and falsehood can be measured. Moreover, the Protestant’s notion of the calling has an essential role in shaping the ethos of capitalism. Shanahan agrees with Weber about “the fact that the capitalist bias was an ethos; that the ethical aspects of capitalism sprang from Luther’s conception of the calling; and that the fusion of that calling with the worldly asceticism of Calvin set the stage for the triumph of the spirit of capitalism in the West” (Shanahan 65). This capitalist spirit liberated the materialistic drives and gave permission to the individuals to pursue profit.

This atmosphere of Reformation also essentially contributed in shaping the empowered self. The diminishing role of the church and priesthood resulted in lack of mediation between people and divinity. The Reformation doctrine distanced divinity and radically reduced the prospects of divine support in the worldly hardships which

confront the person. This situation put the individual in a state of loneliness that forced him to become independent and self-reliant, and consequently led to the emergence of the empowered self. *Robinson Crusoe*, *Frankenstein*, and *Dracula* depict different forms of such empowered selves. The loneliness which instigates independence and self-sufficiency is exemplified by Crusoe's solitude in his prolonged sojourn on the island, where he is left on his own to struggle with the unfriendly elements of nature. Although he ostensibly venerates the Scripture, Crusoe himself sets the standards of right and wrong which serve his circumstantial needs, and which eventually leads to his success. In his loneliness, he invests the concept of the calling and deems himself as the chosen one entitled to operate as an ultimate arbiter of right and wrong, sometimes instantaneously, and sometimes after extended internalized self-to-self dialectics. Victor Frankenstein, on the other hand, extends the limits of self-empowerment beyond the domain of the known boundaries between right and wrong. He meddles in a principal exclusive divine assignment and creates a conscious life. As a result, he is severely punished to affirm a message that self-empowerment should have limits. Ceasing the chance of the turn of the century, *Dracula* subverts all the limits that might chain the hand of the empowered individual and defies the existing Victorian paradigm. Society, represented in the vampire hunters, reacts in a war-like fashion to curb this prodigious danger and eventually destroys it. Thus, the three novels chronicle the emergence of empowered and autonomous self and the counter attempts of collectivism to curb the aspirations of the individual.

Narration is not only capable of registering the conflict of the individual with collectiveness as in the case of the three novels discussed in this study, it also can function as a valuable guide in measuring the evolution of self-consciousness and the degree of individuality. Referring to the human ability to narrate and recount, Jaynes points out that "narratization" is an essential feature of consciousness when he says, "In consciousness, we are always seeing our vicarial selves as the main figures in the stories of our lives . . . The assigning of causes to our behaviour or saying why we did a particular thing is all a part of narratization" (63-64). It is noteworthy to mention in this context that individualism is a Western conception. According to Morris, Western individualism is a peculiar characteristic of the Western world: "Western individualism

is far from expressing the common experience of humanity. Taking a world view, one might almost regard it as an eccentricity among cultures” (2). As such, Morris claims that individualism was behind the rise and the flourishing of the literary forms which explore the individual, such as the novel form, particularly in the West. For him, “It is therefore natural to find that Western literature has shown a strong interest in personal character. Europe has developed literary forms specially devoted to the exploration of the individual and his relationships, such as, biography, autobiography, and the novel; forms which are unknown, or relatively undeveloped, in other cultures” (Morris 4). Thus, individualism and the novel form are interlinked, and they both represent defining peculiar characteristics of Western culture.

According to Watt (1957), the primary distinctive feature of the novel is that it gives prominence to unique individual experiences and depicts images of the individual apprehensions of reality:

[t]he novel is the form of literature which most fully reflects this individualist and innovating reorientation. Previous literary forms had reflected the general tendency of their culture to make conformity to traditional practice the major test of truth . . . This literary traditionalism was first and most fully challenged by the novel, whose primary criterion was truth to individual experience – individual experience which is always unique and therefore new. (Watt 12)

In opposition to the classical preference of the general and universal, the novelists valorise personal experience and pay great attention to the particularization of their characters through a process of ‘individuation’, which includes realistic and detailed presentation of their personal life, giving them existence at a particular locus in time and space.

In fact, for Ian Watt, the prominence of individualistic awareness was behind the rise of the genre itself; “From the Renaissance onwards, there was a growing tendency for individual experience to replace collective tradition as the ultimate arbiter of reality; and this transition would seem to constitute an important part of the general cultural background of the rise of the novel” (Watt, 1957, 13). The inseparable interrelation between individualism and the novel form is noted by Watt when he says,

The novel's serious concern with the daily lives of ordinary people seems to depend upon two important general conditions: the society must value every individual highly enough to consider him the proper subject of its serious literature; and there must be enough variety of belief and action among ordinary people for a detailed account of them to be of interest to other ordinary people, the readers of novels . . . both [conditions] depend on the rise of a society characterized by that vast complex of interdependent factors denoted by the term 'individualism'. (Watt 59)

Accordingly, this study uses the novel form to investigate, chronologically, the metamorphosis in the image of the individualistic figure in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries through analysing the representations of the protagonists in the three canonical works of the bicentennial period, namely, *Robinson Crusoe*, *Frankenstein* and *Dracula*. These representations will be investigated in terms of self-recognition, the character's relation with collectivity, personal initiative, alienation, rebelliousness, isolation, uniqueness, and lack of ability to comply with the assumptions of society.

1.2. Disenchantment

The transition to civil life and the process of intellectual rationalization led to the gradual emergence of the disenchanted individual during and after the Enlightenment. Weber says, "Our age is characterized by rationalization and intellectualization, and above all, by the disenchantment of the world. Its resulting fate is that precisely the ultimate and most sublime values have withdrawn from public life" (2004, 30). Disenchantment means in principle that "we are not ruled by mysterious, unpredictable forces, but that, on the contrary, we can in principle control everything by means of calculation" (Weber, 2004, 13). In civil life, people need no longer to have recourse to magic or control of spirits. Such an attitude, in turn, implies more consciousness about the falsehood of myths, and the treatment of their themes as belonging to the realm of the superstitious and the incredible. Accordingly, the novels considered in this study deal with what Ian Watt (1957) calls, "the particulars of experience by the individual investigator, who, ideally at least, is free from the body of past assumptions and traditional beliefs" (7). Among the questions addressed in this study are the following: how can literary works, with considerable mythical content like *Robinson Crusoe*, *Frankenstein*, and *Dracula*, appear and flourish in an increasingly disenchanted world?

Do such works signify a tendency towards re-enchantment? Do they signify attempts to replace the old sublime values, which Weber refers to, with more practical and mundane ones? Or, do they simply represent an endeavour to assign meaning to the emerging civil life?

In fact, the three novels exhibit characters with various individualistic aspirations. The three characters come as different reactions to the decline of aristocracy and the rise of the faceless plebs and anonymity. In *Robinson Crusoe*, the life on the island is a hypothetical world with zero social ties and where the self becomes the primary mode of survival. From this elementary scratch of individuality, the story constructs the *homo economicus* man who mainly stands for economic individualism. The story presents the doctrine of *laissez-faire* in the narrative form. *Frankenstein* and *Dracula* mark a shift of attitude. Unlike *Robinson Crusoe*, *Frankenstein* and *Dracula* tackle the apprehensions and the serious concerns of collectiveness towards individualistic aspirations. This study shows that these two novels idealize the social paradigm. The two novels embrace the implicit assumption that adherence to society and traditions is the only means of establishing harmony, order, cooperation, association, and communication in the community. Individualism in this case is a threat to the welfare of the community. *Frankenstein* discusses the commitment to science and commitment to family members, including the Monster. The novel sheds light on the rise of scientific individualism and the endeavour to achieve an unprecedented scientific breakthrough. The story suggests that such issues might very well lead to catastrophic results. As far as *Dracula* is concerned, the warning is against the social atomization and anarchy which might come as a result of unrestrained individualistic freedom and egotism. Such a threat, embodied in the character of Count Dracula, can only be defeated through the unifying and the harmonizing of collective efforts and through social fraternity. Thus, both novels signify the anxiety and unease of the nineteenth-century towards the increasing significance of the individual.

In addition to the significance of the chronological order, the consecutive order of the three stories is also informative. The sequence of the stories sketches the progression of individualism from a harmless sentiment at its early stages into pure self-

indulgence and greed which threaten the pluralist social order. Steven Lukes quotes Alexis de Tocqueville as saying that individualism is “a deliberate and peaceful sentiment which disposes each citizen to isolate himself from the mass of his fellows and to draw apart with his family and friends, abandoning the wider society to itself. At first, it saps only the virtues of public life; but, in the long run, it attacks and destroys all others and is eventually absorbed into pure egotism” (Lukes 52). The overwhelming materialist nature of *Robinson Crusoe* and his seclusion are still peaceful and do not cause severe damages to others. Such inclinations are deemed, at least from Defoe’s perspective, as benign and consequently rewarded. The case in *Frankenstein* and *Dracula* is completely different. The apathetic withdrawal of the individual from the family and the community life into personal and private sphere is presented as threatening and damaging to the individual and the group. The self-centeredness and egotism of Victor Frankenstein and Count Dracula are shown as resulting in destructive attacks directed towards the life and the existence of others; and consequently punished by the destruction of the two characters.

The three stories present images of the emerging individualist society which is shaped by two main revolutionary historical frameworks, namely, “the rise of modern industrial capitalism and the spread of Protestantism, especially in its Calvinist or Puritan forms” (Watt 59). The decline of the feudal, religious, and chivalric codes is the general background within which the stories are set. The burgeoning industrial society, the consequence of the rise of the middle classes, and the rush from the rural areas to the urban centres constituted a new cultural locus. These radical changes increased the individual’s freedom of choice and maximized his chances of achieving personal autonomy irrespective of his social status or personal capacities. Consequently, “the effective entity on which social arrangements were now based was no longer the family, nor the church, nor the guild, nor the township, nor any other collective unit, but the individual: he alone was primarily responsible for determining his own economic, social, political and religious roles” (Watt 60). This aspiration to play such various roles is more explicit in *Robinson Crusoe* which represents a literary approval of economic individualism. Defoe’s protagonist literally supplies all his needs by himself during the twenty-eight years of his sojourn on a tropical island. The island in this case can be seen

as a utopian alternative, or “an idyllic inversion of metropolitan excess” (Pearl 76). Such independence and autonomy in *Frankenstein* are depicted in more metaphorical terms. Victor Frankenstein challenges the very basic standards of biological and social lives, and gives himself the liberty to create a human being; thus approximating the motif of independent procreation. In *Dracula*, the egocentricity of the noble Count goes to the furthest extremes and threatens the existence of the whole Victorian society. The novel depicts a situation in which human blood, which stands in this case for excess, becomes an objectified consumable commodity

Individualism also has much to do with self-consciousness, self-certainty, and the relationship with others. As such, it is dynamic, progressive, and multifarious. Dewey says that “Individuality is at first spontaneous and unshaped; it is a potentiality, a capacity of development. Even so, it is a unique manner of acting in and with a world of objects and persons. It is not something complete in itself like a closet in a house or a secret drawer in a desk, filled with treasures that are waiting to be bestowed on the world” (151). This means that individuality is a pliable notion that can take different forms and shapes according to the impacts of the world. “Since individuality is a distinctive way of feeling the impacts of the world and of showing a preferential bias in response to these impacts, it develops into shape and form only through interaction with actual conditions; it is no more complete in itself than is a painter’s tube of paint without relation to a canvas” (Dewey151). As such, individualism cannot be dealt with from a singular perspective. Such multiplicity of dimension is better approached through compatible multiplicity of position.

Shanahan criticises the approaches which reduce individualism into a limited set of units which often correspond to the political concepts of equality and liberty, and says, “one must again wonder how complete a picture can be painted when the subunits of individualism are subsumed under political categories that may not even have existed in the Middle Ages when . . . individualistic tendencies were already emergent” (16). Shanahan also criticizes reducing individualism to the policy of *laissez-faire*, and says, “When one takes individualism to be nothing more than a benevolent ‘hands-off’ policy dictated by an existential value placed on human life and subscribed to by all, one begs

the question of what human beings are valued for, and one also ignores what the coming together of individuals that is not ‘groupism’ may tell us about the nature of the individual” (17). In fact, for a better understanding of individualism, one needs to answer a variety of questions that go beyond the limited political domain; “these difficult questions force us back to an examination of many of our basic premises about human nature. But just as clearly, any discussion of individualism must be willing to engage these questions, and most political analyses of individualism fail to engage them at all” (Shanahan 17). In this way, Shanahan evidences that the “analyses that take the political perspective are incomplete”, and consequently points out that “it would seem to make sense to turn to the individual perspective itself, to look through the eyes of the creature that has caused all the fuss and learn something about the nature, changing or otherwise, of individualism as seen from that perspective. Unfortunately, there is little contemporary comment” (Shanahan 16-18). Therefore, steering clear of the political approaches which reduce individualism to the discussions and the debates about the status of the individual within liberal democracies, would lay the ground for the exploration of the sub-units of individualism that are often overlooked. Therefore, this study aims to contribute to the knowledge about the topic through exploring the unnoticed and subsidiary ingredients of individualism that mostly pertain to the modes of self-consciousness and the relation with other singular individuals and groups.

Individuality, in this fluid and versatile sense, is systematically expounded by Hegel, Marx, and Nietzsche respectively. These three approaches in particular are chosen, on the one hand, because they are themselves, like the three literary works chosen, revealing and representative as far as the status of the individual in society is concerned during the targeted period; on the other hand, Hegel, Marx and Nietzsche look at the individual from different angles; thus the combination of the three views provide an integrated and three dimensional image of individualism. Hegel provides an idealistic view of individualism because he believes that human minds deal with processed mental ideas and not rough perceptual images. His approach is also essentially social because he believes that these entertained ideas in the minds of individuals are shaped by society. Karl Marx does not deny individualism, but he calls for a transcended version of it. For him, individualism, in the capitalist sense, is essentially destructive for

the individual himself. Marx describes the predicament of the individual under the rule of capitalism and his relationship to society in more concrete and materialistic terms, and suggests that communism is the only possible protector of individualism. On the other hand, Nietzsche rejects the earlier approaches and preaches for superior individuals who would lead humanity out of the state of evolutionary stagnation which the societies go through. Accordingly, the individuality of Robinson Crusoe, Victor Frankenstein, and Count Dracula will be investigated through the perspective of these three prominent schools of thought.

This study also suggests that individualism is better defined if viewed as a reaction to the different collective forces that constantly try to suppress its surface manifestations. Thus, individualism can very well be defined in terms of its opposing counterpart, namely, collectivity. Accordingly, individualism is determined and shaped in accordance with the type of collective representations that it is supposed to interact with. In other words, better understanding of individuality can be achieved through better understanding of collectivity because it is the opposing and determining counterpart of individuality. The conflict between individuality and collectivity is extensively dealt with by Emile Durkheim, who is one of the pioneering sociologists drawing attention to the significance of collectivity and its influence on the individual in his analysis of social relations. Therefore, the opposing reactions of the characters in the stories towards collective representations are also investigated in the light of Durkheimian sociological framework.

Such relational approach to individuality would essentially be labelled as structuralist. Lévi-Strauss (2001) simplifies such structuralist understanding of individualism by relating it to the perception of one's own identity, or to the feeling which is related to the pronoun 'I', when he says, "Each of us is a kind of crossroads where things happen. The crossroads is purely passive; something happens there. A different thing, equally valid, happens elsewhere. There is no choice, it is just a matter of chance" (1). In comparing the individual with a crossroads, Strauss means that the individual has no complete existence in himself. His existence is derived from his position and function of connecting and relating with other individuals and groups. In

other words, the individual in collectivity is like an element in any structured system; he is purely passive. He acquires activity and existence through his interactions with other elements in the system

1.3. Individuality and Myths

This research suggests that approaching *Robinson Crusoe*, *Frankenstein*, and *Dracula* as modern myths is more rewarding in revealing the *Weltanschauung* of the society and deciphering the coded principles and the concealed concerns which prevail in it. Ellwood argues that “The special significance of a myth lies in the way [it] represents in narrative form the basic worldview of a society . . . It encodes in story the fundamental principles: [the] social organization and way of life; [the society’s] essential rituals, taboos . . . dreams and dears” (2008, 8). Therefore, “More than ordinary stories, good or profound, real myth sets up a whole network of associations that may deeply dye many areas of one’s life” (Ellwood 8). Hence, the mythical narratives of a culture are more informative and revealing than other types of narratives. Moreover, myths evolve and update themselves within time. Campbell says that “the typical situation has been that a society’s myths do provide role models for that society at that given time. What the mythic image shows is the way in which the cosmic energy manifests itself in time, and as the times change, the modes of manifestation change” (2008, x). Myths provide relevant and present-illuminating visions about certain historical periods, though they are not history themselves. As Campbell suggests, “Myth is not the same as history; myths are not inspiring stories of people who lived notable lives. Myth is the transcendent in relation to the present” (Campbell xiv). The characters in a myth are transparent because there is always a transcendental model and “life becomes transparent to the transcendent” (Campbell xiv). In other words, the mythical perspective makes the characters transparent and amenable because it sets them against transcendent abstracted ideals. The surface transcendent in *Robinson Crusoe* is the deity; but the masked transcendent, against which Crusoe becomes transparent, is the capitalist spirit and the impulse to accumulate wealth. The transcendent in *Frankenstein* is the emerging science, the concomitant desire for discovery, and the achievement of esoteric breakthroughs. The manifest transcendent in *Dracula*, on the other hand, is an

amalgamation of all the values and the ideals that Van Helsing and his friends stand for, which include theology, rationalism, science, and society.

According to Ellwood (1999), classical “[m]yths provided models for the world around, yet at the same time offered avenues of eternal return to simpler primordial ages when the values that rule the world were forged” (1). In a similar mythical pattern, the three novels provide archetypal models for the world and invoke different modes of primordial situations which take the reader to earlier ages in order to serve some modern needs. The bleak island in *Robinson Crusoe* is a microcosmic fictional vision of the primordial uninhabited world. Abandoned by his creator at the moment of birth, Frankenstein’s Monster is put into a situation in which he experiences the most primordial patterns of confrontation with nature, and later, with the populated world. In *Dracula*, the vampire confronts the civilized Victorians with the inhibitions of the medieval past which is loaded with primeval forms of blood-shed and archaic attitudes towards sexuality.

The success of the literary works which mythologize the contemporary reality can be attributed to a general tendency, that acquired maximum quantum in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, to return to the pre-modern world. Referring to scholar mythologists like Jung, Eliade and Campbell, Ellwood says that “Like the nineteenth century romantics, whose world of the spirit was their true home, they believed first and final truth to be located in the distant and the past, or in the depths of the self. The return to the supposed world of mythology was a return really to the pre-modern world as envisioned by the modern world” (1999, 7). Ellwood also adds that “Mythology . . . was grounded on the modern world’s fantasy of the pre-modern. For the mythologists, as for their romanticist progenitors, the mythological revival meant spirituality that was close to nature and the soil, that was symbol based, that expressed itself in accounts of heroes and other archetypes rather than individual figures” (7). Thus, the interest in mythology, whether through the revival of ancient myths or through authoring modern ones, is a trend akin to Romanticism, which attempts to understand the contemporary world through discovering and examining its roots in the forgotten and mysterious past. Moreover, although they depict the life of individual persons, mythical

fictions present archetypes that extend beyond the singularity of specific individualized figures. Much like completely Romantic figures, such extra-ordinary archetypal figures derive considerable validity from the fact that they excite human feelings and set free the constrained rational imagination.

Myths are as informative and instructive for the mythologist as dreams for the psychiatrist. In both cases, motifs and ideas are transferred “from the mental sphere of rational ideation to the obscure subliminal abyss out of which dreams arise” (Campbell, 2002, xiv). In fact, for Campbell:

myths and dreams . . . are motivated from a single psychological source – namely, the human imagination moved by the conflicting urgencies of the organs (including the brain) of the human body, of which the anatomy has remained pretty much the same since c. 40,000 B.C. Accordingly, as the imagery of a dream is metaphorical of the psychology of its dreamer, that of a mythology is metaphorical of the psychology posture of the people to whom it pertains (xiv)

Jung expresses a similar view when he says, “In myths and fairytales, as in dreams, the psyche tells us its own story, and the interplay of the archetypes is revealed in its natural setting” (1980, 217). This means that the myths of a culture can be seen as collective dreams which are indicative of the psychological posture of the community to which they belong.

Moreover, “a mythology is a control system, on the one hand framing its community to accord with an intuited order of nature and, on the other hand, by means of its symbolic pedagogic rites, conducting individuals through the ineluctable psychological stages of transformation” (Campbell, 2002, xxiii). Thus, functioning mythology is an insightful system of verbal narratives that controls the society through its struggle with the challenging elements of the world, and guides it during the transitional periods which are often associated with potentialities of substantial change.

By studying the three canonical novels from the point of view of mythology, this study explores the masked subliminal collective conscious of the English community in three different points in history. The reason is that the culture’s specific collective archetypes are best shown in the myths of that culture:

By collective conscious Jung meant mental contents shared with others, either the entire human race or a subdivision of it, such as a culture or nationality. Being unconscious, this collectivity obviously did not mean a people`s articulated beliefs, ideas, or vocabularies, but rather pointed to the preconscious mental energies that activated them . . . those powerful forces could express themselves only in camouflage, usually through emotions bearing symbolic archetypal forms. In a traditional society, these images were best found in its myths and symbols (Ellwood, 1999, 44).

This means that studying these novels sheds light on a new emerging type of collective consciousness. Ellwood says that “The emergence of modern consciousness came about when, as history moved ahead, changing circumstances brought the gradual withdrawal of projections and a consequent increase in individual awareness, together with enhanced knowledge of both self and world in the West” (47). This signifies the initiation of a new, Jungian stage which represents a first step in the de-spiritualization of the world and which echoes “Max Weber`s concept of disenchantment” (Ellwood, 1999, 47). Therefore, this study examines the newly emerging collective consciousness of the de-spiritualized world.

In the Jungian sense, the term ‘archetype’ applies to collective subliminal mental representations. The term “designates only those psychic contents which have not yet been submitted to conscious elaboration and are therefore an immediate datum of experience” (Jung, 1980, 5). According to Jung, the collective unconscious is genuinely distinct from the personal unconscious because it originally does not owe its existence to personal experience and acquisition. In other words:

While the personal unconscious is made up essentially of contents which have at one time been conscious but which have disappeared from consciousness through having been forgotten or repressed, the contents of the collective unconscious have never been in consciousness, and therefore have never been individually acquired, but owe their existence exclusively to heredity. Whereas the personal unconscious consists for the most part of complexes, the content of the collective unconscious is made up essentially of archetypes. (Jung, 1980, 42)

Knowing that a “well-known expression of the archetypes is myth and fairytale” (Jung, 1980, 5), one can assume that approaching *Robinson Crusoe*, *Frankenstein*, and *Dracula*

as modern myths would provide access to the archetypes which constitute the universal and impersonal content of the collective unconscious of the peoples who lived in the eighteenth and the nineteenth centuries.

It is worth mentioning in this context that according to Jung, “There are as many archetypes as there are typical situations in life When a situation occurs which corresponds to a given archetype, that archetype becomes activated and a compulsiveness appears, which, like an instinctual drive, gains its way against all reason and will” (1980, 48). This suggests that the new motifs and archetypes that modern myths invoke are not utterly new in the literal sense. Their forms are already engraved into the human psyche, but they are not filled with content. The transformations and shifts in the conditions of life activate new archetypes and such archetypes are often manifested in the forms of expression that are not falsified by conscious purposes, such as dreams and mythical narratives which correspond to the world of fantasies and active imagination. Thus, although the three works which are dealt with in this study are products of deliberate and conscious concentration, they are still rich in archetypes because they are fantasies. The reason is that “the resultant sequence of fantasies relieves the unconscious and produces material rich in archetypal images and associations” (Jung, 1980, 49). The authors of these works are completely conscious about the process of writing and deliberate in choosing their characters and contriving their plots; but they are often unconscious about the projection of their psychic content. This is because such “projection is an unconscious, automatic process whereby a content that is unconscious to the subject transfers itself to an object, so that it seems to belong to that object” (Jung, 1980, 60). This means that the mythical and fantastic narratives, whether ancient or modern, are valuable sources of unconscious projected psychic content of the collective mentality of the community in which such narratives emerge and flourish.

Accordingly, this study deals with Robinson Crusoe, Victor Frankenstein, and Count Dracula as archetypal characters. The figures and the themes that are dealt with here correspond to mythical archetypes in various degrees. They all seem to be motivated by an urge to establish their identities in order to acquire recognition. The

characters seem to be continuations of mythical figures, but in quite new depictions and within new settings. They are not only taken as supernatural, extraordinary, abnormal, or fantastic, but they can also be viewed as mythical characters. And, in fact, they are not less mythical than the characters of the ancient myths and legends. At the basic theoretical level, this study considers these figures as the products of the same human mental faculty, which produced the earlier myths and legends of the ancient world. According to Bertram:

The psychologically visible process of this kind of legend formation is determined by laws that can be observed operating in the same manner in the most varied types of legends. No fundamental procedural difference exists . . . the process by which the form of a personality becomes legendary adheres to a typical pattern and, despite its varying external form determined by the character of a particular time, is always basically the same (2009, 2)

However, the main difference seems to be that the ancient myths were the products of perceptual minds while the newer ones are produced by conceptual and more deliberate minds. Moreover, “myths in the past express complete union with nature. Man participates in life without questioning, since an ego, a consciousness capable of such questioning, does not exist yet” (Carotenuto, 1985, 120). Although the transition of human mentality from perception to conception and the increase of self-awareness mandate changes in the formation of myths, the underlying structure of myths is still the same.

The heroes in the modern myths are archetypal and representative figures in a further, new world sense. They stand for the aspirations and concealed tendencies of the emerging ‘mass man’. According to Ellwood, commerce and industry degenerated and depressed the collectivity in modern cities: “in the modern world . . . collectivity simply became ‘mass man’. Glory lay with the individualism of one who, patterning himself on ancient hero myths, won solitary triumphs on behalf of all. Modern humanity was no longer the primordial well of collective inspiration, but had seriously fallen from it into ‘mass man’” (Ellwood, 1999, 28). Consequently, “Out of that pit salvation can only be individual, yet it must reflect values larger than the individual if the mythic dimension of the modern hero’s calling is to have any meaning” (Ellwood, 1999, 28). Thus, though they transcend collectivity, the modern archetypes also affirm the society’s intrinsic rich

collective consciousness which is threatened by the emergence of the faceless 'mass man'. Considerable portion of the attraction which marks *Robinson Crusoe*, *Frankenstein*, and *Dracula* comes from the fact that they signify salvation from the pit of the mass-man. Robinson Crusoe and Frankenstein belong to the masses, but at the same time they are not mass-men. They are illustrative of mass-men who spare no effort and pain to give face and distinguished identity to the ordinary man. Count Dracula, on the other hand, is not a mass man in the first place. He stands, with his legendary past and distinguished noble name, in sharp contrast with the mass convictions which Van Helsing and his friends adhere to.

The function of a living mythology, according to Campbell, is "to reconcile consciousness to the preconditions of its own existence; that is to say, to the nature of life" (2008, 1). Therefore, myths might very well predict the emergence of potential and monstrous challenges in a particular age for the sake of preparing the individuals to face them. For Campbell, an important purpose of mythology is "to evoke in the individual a sense of grateful, affirmative awe before the monstrous mystery that is existence" (2008, 7). The monstrous, then, is the anticipated defiance that the world might pose in front of the individual during his life. The monstrous in *Robinson Crusoe* is represented in the dangers of the sea and the unfriendly elements of nature on the island. The Monster in *Frankenstein* stands for the monstrous consequences of irresponsible scientific research in the age of scientific breakthroughs. The monstrous in *Dracula*, on the other hand, encompasses the concoction of the fears and anxieties of the *fin de siècle*, such as mortal decay, disease, fear of the past, and the fear of reverse colonization.

It is worth mentioning in this context that the concept of individualism itself is mythical to a considerable extent. According to Shanahan, individualism should be thoroughly examined because it plays an essential role in the mythological thinking of the West: "Our ability to recognize the short comings of one of the major myths of Western civilization may indicate that we have developed the ability to scrutinize our myths and assess where they enrich and where they deplete the quality of human life" (Shanahan 11). In a similar pattern, the three novels scrutinize three different mouldings of the myth of individualism in Western Civilization. The novels assess the

consequences and the assumed impact of individuality through depicting three imagined possible worlds in which singular men strive to achieve personal autonomy and independence.

Therefore, the works analyzed in this study are mythical at a variety of levels. Chris Baldick includes the three novels within a list of literary works which he refers to as 'modern myths' and says: "That these myths exist, though, in forms much stronger than the everyday sense of myth as mere fallacy, seems undeniable if we consider the lasting significance in Western culture of the stories of Faust, Don Quixote, Robinson Crusoe, Frankenstein, Jekyll and Dracula" (1990, 2). The three stories can be seen as representing refurbishments of ancient motifs, themes and archetypes to comply with the social, economic, and intellectual changes of their time. Aldo Carotenuto says that myth is a way through which "man tried to interpret and explain what was happening in the world", and adds: "Myth is a way of responding to the apparent absurdity of existence. That is to say, it brings order to chaos" (10). This means that the stories are attempts to impose order upon the conflicting and quickly changing aspects of the world. Divergence from the traditional archetypal patterns mostly pertains to the nature of the conflict in those myths and the intellectual trends and aspirations that the figures implicitly represent. This research analyzes the three stories as being the representations of different dimensions of individualistic aspirations which characterize the age in which these stories appeared. The three canonical works also offer rich interpretive possibilities and multiple readings that complement each other and accordingly shape a clear cut image of individuality at the times in which these works were composed

Despite the biblical themes and motifs in these stories, the three mythical protagonists themselves are neither biblical nor classical; and this reflects the tendency to explore the independence of non-sacred and mundane individuals. Moreover, despite the sometimes unflattering representations of these figures, they still display considerable degrees of courage and persistence; and accordingly, they earn different degrees of admiration, whether in direct or indirect ways. The punitive element found in these works indicates the resistance exerted by collectivity to neutralize the aspirations

of individualism; and it reflects the view which deems individualism as equal to anarchy and chaos.

1.4. Autonomy and Independent Propagation in the Three Novels

The three stories create illusions of autonomous selfhood through depicting diverse forms of solitude and independence. Solitude is the apotheosis of individualism. The existence of an isolated place, for this reason, whether in the literal or metaphorical sense, (Crusoe's island, Frankenstein's laboratory, and Dracula's castle) represents escapist projection towards isolated space, and detachment from social ties. Although the three characters in the stories seem to be attempting to crowd their isolation, they are, in fact, implementing their singularity and solitude.

One special covert result of solitude and individualistic singularity in the three novels is the fear of extinction which breeds a tendency to propagate and create multiplicity. The stories present three forms of independent procreation that do not follow the natural pattern which requires the presence of a female. Such tendency is denoted in the three stories by celibacy and the suppression of the role of the female in various ways. Celibacy, as an acme of individualism, characterizes the protagonists in *Robinson Crusoe*, *Frankenstein* and *Dracula*. Referring to the attitude towards masculine autonomy and independence in the eighteenth century, Karremann says that the social indifference which characterized independent masculine individuals "emphatically extended to the needs and pleasures of the body, demanding an independence from sexual desires in particular" (2011, 110). Moreover, marriage is an institutionalized social pattern of life which requires conviction and conformity; and men with individualistic aspirations prefer to be free of such commitments. Marriage and normal propagation are herd issues contradicting with the tendency to be exceptional. In addition, celibacy implies controlling and mastering the operation of human drives and directing them towards superior ends beyond the ends of the group².

² This is the reason behind the preference of celibacy among priests and people of religion in the first place. Pickstock asserts that marriage distracts the focus on transcendental purposes, and that this is the reason why "Celibacy was the basis for an entirely ritualized existence" (2002, 30).

This study suggests that capitalism and the modes of money increase provided an exemplary paradigm of independent propagation for the authorial thought of the period. In a capitalistic age, money not only governs the main aspects of social life, but it also influences the structures of thinking and imagination of society. Money has its own pattern of independent proliferation and increase which implicitly affects the fantasies of procreation and increase in the three stories. The idea that money has influence upon authorial thought is supported by Jochen Hörisch`s discussions in which he highlights the role played by finance in shaping the social, cultural and intellectual aspects of life. Hörisch explores the function of money in understanding modern literature and says that “money makes the world legible. For money rules and structures the world: it orients it toward that which is limited, efficient, and expensive. And money also makes the world frankly, coldly, and indifferently legible” (Hörisch, 2000, 54). What money and literature “have in common, once one begins to examine this question, is limitless . . . Literature and money also share something that became fashionable in nineteenth-century realistic literature: they establish and regard relationships in ways that can stop common sense in its tracks (77). Further, Hörisch argues that money has a perverse masculine characteristic procreation through which it can increase out of its own accord. Unlike other valuable materials, money, counter to nature, has the potential of reproducing and yielding independently out of its own accord.

This study argues that the patterns of autonomous and independent procreation and increase in the three novels mimic the mechanisms of capital increase. Robinson Crusoe is a symbol of greed. In fact, he strives to turn every action and every relationship into material profit. Koç (2005) says that “Crusoe despises other nations, other races, and other sex. He is, therefore, a figure representing the eighteenth century masculine mentality of progress” (16). For example, establishing a personal relationship with a woman would not yield profit; on the contrary, such a relationship would consume profit. Thus, although Crusoe eventually gets married, this event is considerably marginalized by a singular and very brief reference in the novel. Crusoe says, “In the meantime, I in part settled myself here; for, first of all, I married, and that not either to my disadvantage or dissatisfaction, and had three children” (Defoe 285). By

these few words, Crusoe minimizes the significance of marriage which is supposed to be essential and life-changing event.

Therefore, Crusoe himself can be viewed as a symbol of capital, who can prosper and flourish alone and out of his own accord. The patterns of money propagation are imitated and projected upon a variety of themes and events in the story. The pattern of money increase is set out and emphasized with specific numbers at the very beginning of the story. Crusoe has only 40 pounds before the beginning of his successful voyage to Guinea: "I carried about 40 pounds in such toys and trifles as the captain directed me to buy", and when he returns to London, this 40 pounds yields him "almost 30 pounds" (Defoe 16). The same pattern applies to the plantation in the Brazils which turns into a fortune with the passing of time which Crusoe spends on the island. In the same way, "ten or twelve grains of corn" (73) yield tens of bushels of rice and barley, and few goats become a herd. In this way, Crusoe not only satisfies his daily needs but also produces surplus. With such inclination to accumulate, Crusoe becomes a hoarder and collector. He has a sense of emptiness as far as wealth is concerned. His venture is essentially about filling the lacuna of his life with money.

As Watt suggests, Victor Frankenstein is a romantic version of "Faustus, the great knower, whose curiosity, always unsatisfied, causes him to be damned" (1996, xiii). He is a scholarly figure who is not satisfied with the ordinary study of science. Alchemy is an inevitable resort for such a figure because it has the potential of providing answers for the questions pertaining to the essence of propagation and origin of things. After all, alchemy promises to turn base and cheap metals into gold. As such, it basically symbolizes earning, interest, and propagation of wealth. In the same fashion, Frankenstein uses zero-value body parts to create valuable life. Moreover, the creation of the Monster amounts to a male's attempt to procreate independently, without the need of the female procreative apparatus. Self-reproduction and the feminized nature of Victor Frankenstein have parallels with the undetermined gender of money and its yielding mechanisms.

In *Frankenstein*, the surface attitude is not materialistic, pecuniary, nor industrial, but many essential themes in the story are influenced by such historical

frameworks. The assembling of a body and the making of the Monster is tantamount to production. Victor Frankenstein intended to create a human being. After all, “*Frankenstein* is a book about what happens when a man tries to have a baby without a woman. As such, the novel is profoundly concerned with natural as opposed to unnatural modes of production and reproduction” (Mellor, 2007, 45). The theme of producing life is a projection of the industrial atmosphere and style of life. In fact, Frankenstein and capital are both contra-natural in this respect. Capital breeds capital, and Frankenstein breeds a man. The production of the creature has parallels with the unrestrained nature of the monstrous capital enlargement in the capitalist world. The offspring of a capital can become bigger and stronger than the parent capital, and can become difficult to control. Marx compares capital with “an animated monster which begins to work, as if its body were . . . possessed” (Marx, 1980, 302). The antagonism and the struggle between the Monster and Frankenstein invokes the hostility between strong and weak capitals where “the larger capitals beat the smaller [and where the] competition rages in direct proportion to the number, and in inverse proportion to the magnitude, of the rival capitals [and where] It always ends in the ruin of many small capitals” (Marx, 1980, 777). In a similar fashion, the mighty Monster destroys William, Frankenstein’s youngest brother, Frankenstein’s best friend Henry Clerval, his fiancé Elizabeth, and eventually Frankenstein himself.

Written during the second industrial revolution, the influence of industrialization and capitalism in *Dracula* takes a more abstract form. The consumption of blood is an excess which can very well have allegorical allusions to the excesses of the age like commodification and consumerism. The concept of vampirism also has affinity with the capitalist state of thinking. Gender for vampires is something which belongs to their previous state of existence before they became un-dead. Vampirism blurs the boundaries between the genders. For vampires any living human being is a potential prey regardless of his or her gender. Dracula loses control at the sight of blood: “his eyes [blaze] with demoniac fury”, and he grabs at Jonathan’s throat when he sees a drop of blood on Jonathan’s chin (Stoker 29). The vampire’s preference of the opposite sex seems to be mainly for ease of seduction. Thus, with their undetermined and perverse sexuality,

vampires also propagate, counter to nature and in a capital-like fashion, independently without a need for a partner.

In fact, it is particularly the independent and unrestrained proliferation capability of vampires, which is the symbol of utmost individualism, that makes Van Helsing anxious. Referring to vampires, he says: “they cannot die, but must go on age after age adding new victims and multiplying the evils of the world; for all that die from the preying of the Un-dead become themselves Un-dead, and prey on their kind. And so the circle goes on ever widening like the ripples from a stone thrown in the water” (Stoker 243). Such a capacity for unrestricted proliferation is a threat to the entire human race. With his mysterious and extraordinary powers, Dracula plans to transform the human species and create a new race. Such a deep concern represents the discomfort of the community towards the increasing individualistic aspirations.

In this respect, Dracula is a symbol of masculine singular greed. During his past life he had a thirst for learning and knowledge, and he also learned alchemy and black arts. Referring to Dracula, Van Helsing says: “he was in life the most wonderful man. Soldier, statesman, and alchemist. Which latter was the highest development of the science knowledge of his time . . . and there was no branch of knowledge of his time that he did not essay” (Stoker 343). This Faustian background characterization resembles the depiction of Frankenstein and indicates the Faustian male greed. Dracula’s aspirations to dominate and control the world represent the popular concerns about the rise of the role of capital during the second industrial revolution. The mysterious and superhuman abilities of Dracula are abstractions of the opacity of the power of finance. Dracula has many extraordinary characteristics which can support the pecuniary allegory suggested above. In addition to his superpowers, Dracula has other peculiarities, such as not casting a shadow, not having a reflection on mirrors, not having a specific shape, and his ability to melt into thin air. Such characteristics permit non literal interpretations of his character. These features can be seen as allusions to the elusive and invisible nature of the influence of money upon the society of the late nineteenth century. The weaknesses of Dracula, on the other hand, indicate that after all, the power of capital is not absolute. For instance, Dracula cannot enter a place without being invited. This feature in

particular suggests that if one can resist the lure of money, he can make himself immune to its consuming and hazardous effects.

1.5. Mythological Aspects in the Three Novels

This section is devoted to the theoretical discussion pertaining to the affinity between mythology and fiction in general and to the mythological aspects found in *Robinson Crusoe*, *Frankenstein*, and *Dracula*. It discusses the prominent characteristics of archaic myths and the existence of these characteristics in the novels which are dealt with in this study. This section explains the secularity of the characters and the themes in the three novels despite their mythical nature. It argues that the three novels discussed are the products of the same human faculty which produced ancient myths, and that the relation between mythology and ancient religions is coincidental. It also explores the issues of credulity, truth, historicity and authority of such mythical texts in an age which is characterized by disenchantment, rationalism, and scientific thought. Moreover, the section discusses the parallels in the function of mythology and fiction in addition to the role of magic and the concept of monomyth.

Mythology occupies a central position among a variety of major fields; a topic that has been dealt with exquisitely and thoroughly by the most renowned philosophers and academics of the world. Myths represent a valuable source of knowledge in relation to the patterns of thinking and behavior of human beings. Freud (1938) says, “I believe that a large portion of the mythological conception of the world ... is nothing but psychology projected to the outer world” (163). In a similar vein Jung (1989) argues that “[w]hat we are to our inward vision ... can only be expressed by way of myth. Myth is more individual and expresses life more precisely than does science [the reason is that] science works with concepts of averages which are far too general to do justice to the subjective variety of an individual life” (3). Moreover, “[m]yths can be compensation for that which is lacking in a psyche or a civilization, and so provide clues to the nature of the lost” (Ellwood, 1999, 50). However, myths do not convey factual events. Myth is “a name for a form of story characteristic of primitive people and thus defined . . . as a purely fictitious narrative usually involving supernatural persons, actions or events, and embodying some popular idea concerning natural or historical phenomenon” (Fowler,

2009, 369). Thus, the fictitiousness and lack of truth are among the defining characteristics of mythical narratives.

Surprisingly, despite the common falsehood and lack of historicity concerning the accounts in such narratives, the mythology of a community carries its own reality. Myths can be viewed as the rich records which contain valuable information about the frames of thinking and the common aspects of social life in different communities. The content of such narratives might show contradiction to rationality and reason; but such lack of matching between the contents of myths and contemporary reasoning does not render them illogical. In fact, such stories provide access to ancient forms of reasoning. Eliade refers to a kind of transcendental reality in mythologies when he says: “neither the objects of the external world nor human acts, properly speaking, have any autonomous intrinsic value. Objects or acts acquire a value, and in so doing become real, because they participate, after one fashion or another, in a reality that transcends them” (1959, 4). Thus, an object, an action, or a being becomes saturated with being and reality when it is associated with a mythical idea. Robinson Crusoe, Frankenstein, and Dracula are fictional, unreal, and mythical characters, but they acquire reality because they participate in a reality that transcends them.

However, there is an essential theoretical obstacle that hinders the inclusion of the three novels within the category of myths. This obstacle is that archaic mythical figures and themes are usually sacred and religious while the protagonists in the three novels are mundane and secular. The following argument suggests that the relationship between religions and mythology is coincidental. The benefit of this argument is that it would negate the attribution of sacredness to all kinds of myths and confirm the kinship of this form of narrative with the other, essentially non-sacred, forms of storytelling like legends, fables, folktale and fairytales. Such a view would also affirm the relation of mythology to fiction in general, and to the novel form in particular.

According to Eliade (1956 and 1959), all significant acts and objects in the archaic world are sacred; and the difference between that world and the modern one is that those acts have already undergone a long process of desacralization and became profane. Frazer (2009) also relates myths to rituals and religious beliefs in his cultural

approach to the study of ancient human religions. Contrary to the opinions of Eliade and Frazer, this study suggests that the relation of myths to sacred cults and religious rituals is not a defining characteristic. In fact, Eliade's account is essentially applicable to specific types of myth; namely, the myths of origin and those that have cosmic themes and motifs; and thus, Eliade's exposition has little to say concerning the myths that have little to do with origin and cosmic themes. Moreover, Frazer's comparisons of different cultures are not sufficient enough to derive a universal law about the relation between mythology and rituals. Even Emile Durkheim, who also opts for the inseparability of religion and mythology, recognizes at one point in his argument that there are other mythical forms with least affinity to religious beliefs: "Apart from myths proper, there certainly have always been fables that were not believed or, at least, were not believed to the same degree and in the same manner and that for this reason were not religious in character" (Durkheim, 1995, 80). Thus, while it is true that ancient rituals and sacred beliefs are based on myths, there are also a lot of myths that are not associated with such cults. In other words, while the sacred nature of certain types of myths is acknowledged, there is a need to separate mythology from cults and deal with it independently as belonging to a separate phenomenon of human expression.

In fact, mythology and elementary religious beliefs are overlapping topics and they both represent topics of unsettled debates. Durkheim discusses two theories concerning the origins of religious and mythical thought. The first is the animist theory which simply states that "the idea of soul was suggested to man by the poorly understood spectacle of the double life that he normally leads, on the one hand while awake, on the other while asleep" (47). Seeing other people and other worlds gave the primitive man the impression that a double, or another self exists in each person. Thus, the idea of the soul emerged, and, by the passage of time it evolved into a spirit³. Later, the theory roughly states, the ideas of deities, genies, and demons were derived. The second theory is the naturism theory which claims that the spectacles and infinity of nature are behind the triggering of religious and mythical thought. However, although these theories might account for the emergence of the religious thought, they would fail to account for the whole phenomenon of mythology. The two theories explain the

³ According to Durkheim, death adds a sacred status to the soul.

emergence of the sacred mythical ideas and characters, but they fail to explain the detailed elaborations in which these ideas were presented, the contrived plots of mythical narratives, and the extended biographies of the created figures. In fact, the intricate and detailed elucidations of mythical narratives are the products of another human intellectual faculty. While other factors might contribute to the formation of the mythical characters, this faculty particularizes and individualizes them. This faculty supplies the character with life and history. Fueled by a natural desire to tell stories, such human natural faculty is behind the creation of ancient sacred myths and modern secular narratives such as *Robinson Crusoe*, *Frankenstein*, and *Dracula*.

There is an early approach which supports the view presented here. Max Müller differentiates between mythology and religious beliefs, and stresses the literary and poetic nature of the myth making human faculty through relating it to the evolution of language and thought. According to him, language and thought are absolutely inseparable. The early stages of life before the invention of language were thoughtless, and consequently had no stories. During those times, Müller argues, humans used the percepts that were supplied to them by their senses. The transition from the stage of perception to the stage of conception accompanied the introduction and the development of language, a sophistication that led to the rise of mythology. Müller also supports the view that myths possess cohesion and hidden logic, despite their apparent state of flux and confusion. As far as the relation between mythology and sacredness is concerned, Müller casts doubts upon the necessity of such relation and suggests that it is rather an impression that people had as a result of reading the school books which talk about Greek and Roman mythology:

Not very long ago Greek mythology meant Greek religion, Roman mythology meant Roman religion As mythology was taught at schools chiefly from manuals, a very general impression prevailed that the legends collected in them existed in this collective form in Greece and Italy, that they formed in fact a complete system, and were known as such by every Greek and Roman, man, woman and child: the fact being that hardly a single Greek or Roman could have passed in examination in our manuals of mythology. (Müller 1907, 412)

Müller argues that the Greek deity names, such as ‘Athene’ and ‘Zeus’ are mere modifications of earlier linguistically expressed concepts, and we are not always sure

whether they were really held by the natives as established systems of beliefs. Durkheim summarizes Müller's point of view when he says that for Müller "the belief in Zeus, was religious to the extent that the Greeks saw Zeus as a supreme God, father of humanity, protector of laws, avenger of crimes, and so forth. But everything about the biography of Zeus, his marriages and his adventures, was only mythology" (Durkheim, 1996, 79). This claim indicates that the prominent Greek deity names have both sacred and poetic dimensions.

This means that sacredness is not a necessary condition for the human poetic propensity to create myths. Affirming such line of thinking, Watt (1996) says, "[m]ost myths known in the Western world are based on biblical or classical figures and stories. I can still remember being excited by the fact that Faust, Don Quixote, and Don Juan were neither classical nor biblical, but modern creations" (xiv). The same applies to Robinson Crusoe, Frankenstein, and Dracula who became established mythical and prototypical names, in spite of their mundane nature

Such a view suggests that mythology is mainly a form of story-telling with literary value, akin to legends, sagas, folktales, fairytales, and other more recent forms of narrative. This view facilitates tracing the evolution and the branching of narrative forms through history. Modern literary forms such as romances and novels are not rootless. Their roots extend back to mythology.

Thus, *Robinson Crusoe*, *Frankenstein*, and *Dracula* are mythical and secular stories at the same time; and none of the characters in them are divine or sacred. The religious in the stories belongs to the social. For Robinson Crusoe, belief can be seen as his only available connection to the domain of collectivity. In fact, he manipulates religion and uses it as a source of consolation during his prolonged times of distress. Crusoe suspends his belief the moment he finds a rational explanation for an event which amazes him, or when belief stops providing comforting answers to his questions. Crusoe cuts down his thankfulness to God after discovering that the growth of rice and barley stalks beside his cave is not miraculous, and that it took place as a result of shaking the husks of corn out of an empty bag under the rock beside his house. Describing his thoughts at this moment, Crusoe says, "the wonder began to cease; and I

must confess my religious thankfulness to God's providence began to abate, too, upon the discovering that all this was nothing but what was common" (Defoe 73). Fear also affects Crusoe's confidence in Providence. As a result of his extreme fear after coming across the foreign foot print on his island, Crusoe says, "Thus my fear banished all my religious hope, all that former confidence in God, which was founded upon such wonderful experience as I had had of his goodness; as if He that had fed me by miracle hitherto could not preserve, by his power, the provision which He had made for me by His goodness" (Defoe 148). Such instances indicate insincerity and superficial attachment to religious beliefs. They also indicate that for Crusoe, any phenomenon is divine as far as it has no logical explanation.

The separability of mythology from theology is best illustrated in *Frankenstein*. Mary Shelley's originality lies in creating a myth of creation, corresponding in essence to the fashioning of life in the Greco – Roman and Judeo – Christian narratives, without recourse to any specific system of religious beliefs. *Frankenstein* is completely secular. Baldick says that "Mary Shelley's novel is set in the Age of Reason itself and explores the godless world of specifically modern freedoms and responsibilities" (1990, 1). The absence of theology can be easily noticed in the solemn vows of the Monster and Victor Frankenstein. Though the Monster is very well acquainted with the culture and religion of human beings, he swears by the earth and by Victor Frankenstein: "I swear to you, by the earth which I inhabit, and by you that made me, that with the companion you bestow I will quit the neighbourhood of man and dwell, as it may chance, in the most savage of places" (Shelley 147). Later, the Monster swears "by the sun, and by the blue sky of heaven, and by the fire of love that burns [his] heart, that if [Frankenstein] grant [his] prayer, [Frankenstein] shall never behold [him] again" (Shelley 148). The oaths of Victor Frankenstein, on the other hand, are also not less secular than the Monster's. Frankenstein kneels on the grass and kisses the earth, and with quivering lips he exclaims: "By the sacred earth on which I kneel, by the shades that wonder near me, by the deep and eternal grief that I feel, I swear; and by thee, O night, and the spirits that preside over thee, to pursue the daemon who caused this misery, until he or I shall perish in mortal conflict" (Shelley 206). Thus, although it explores the creature-creator

relationship, *Frankenstein* does not build upon any established system of theological beliefs.

In *Dracula*, the appeal to religion is genuinely different from the use of religion in ancient mythology. None of the characters in the story is divine or has direct correspondence to a Biblical figure. As far as Count Dracula is concerned, Koç and Demir say: “[a]lthough, in the novel, Dracula represents the medieval codes of loyalty and chivalry, he has no connection with religion or religious institutions” (436). In *Dracula*, the divine mainly represents the social. Beliefs stand for the deep rooted and firm social traditions which used to preserve the society, and which are threatened by the morbid consequences of modernity. One of the dangers which the story deals with is the increasingly dominating method of strict scientific reasoning which does not acknowledge the status and the influence of the old public beliefs. *Dracula* challenges rationality, which was the most extolled Enlightenment virtue of the nineteenth century. The complexity of the human experience, including religion, outweighs the explanatory power of rationalism. Van Helsing blames modern science for detaching people from unexplainable phenomena. Addressing John Seward, Van Helsing says: “You are clever man, friend John; you reason well, and your wit is bold; but you are too prejudiced. You do not let your eyes see nor your ears hear, and that which is outside your daily life is not of account to you. Do you not think that there are things which you cannot understand?”; then he adds: “it is the fault of our science that it wants to explain all; and if it explain not, then it says there is nothing to explain” (Stoker 216). The divine in the novel belongs to the domain of the unexplained old social traditions which should not be abandoned and forgotten during the current social changes. Furthermore, religion is part of the settings of Gothic fiction. Baldick asserts that Gothic novels carry on “retrospective flirtations with feudal and papal power” (1). The presence of religion in *Dracula* is part of the Gothic tradition. As such, it has a structural rather than theological function. Religious phenomena belong to the supernatural, and in Gothic, “Supernatural presences posed a particular problem, for if they were explained away, one would ask whether similar explanations might be found for the supernatural aspects of religion itself” (Cox, 2002, 132). Moreover, Catholic Christianity in particular is used in the novel because it articulates foreign and otherness imports for the English public; and as

such, Catholicism represents a source of anxiety and tension for the psyche of the English.

Mythology is a genuine aspect of the human mind and has much less to do with ancient times than most people think. “[m]yths, construed as manifestations of the free functioning of the mind, reflect the mind’s innate modes of operating” (Wiseman, 2009, 170). As such, restricting the use of the word ‘myth’ to exclusively describe a type of narrative which belongs to ancient cultures would do injustice to the concept, on the one hand, and would isolate the people who belong to mythopoeic cultures from the timeless cosmic cycle of human species. Baldick criticizes the arguments which define myths by their exclusive anteriority to modern cultures and says:

‘Myth’ – the singular state posited in these discussions – is a lost world, to which modern writers may distantly and ironically allude, but in which they can no longer directly participate. Myth is, so the argument goes, exclusively a product of pre-literate cultures, from which the alienated and fragmented modern world of money, books, politics, and above all, scientific rationality is by definition cut off. (2)

Consequently, Baldick argues for the existence of ‘modern myths’ and says that they are not recognized as such because “[m]odern myths are marginalized by rational discourses”, and that the problems of according mythic status to some stories are “problems of distinguishing myths from literary texts” (2). Accordingly, if we remove elaborations, digressions, dialogues, scenic descriptions and secondary characters, we can retrieve the skeleton story which carries the myth. Baldick applies this procedure to Mary Shelley’s novel *Frankenstein*, and suggests that the skeleton of the story which carries the myth consists only of the following two statements: “Frankenstein makes a living creature out of bits of corpses. The creature turns against him and runs amok” (Baldick 3). This analysis bears resemblance to Strauss’s analysis of classical myths and his use of the concepts of mytheme and bricolage: “The characteristic feature of mythical thought is that it expresses itself by means of a heterogeneous repertoire which, even if extensive, is nevertheless limited. It has to use this repertoire, however, whatever the task in hand because it has nothing else at its disposal. Mythical thought is therefore a kind of intellectual ‘bricolage’” (Strauss, 1966, 17). This analysis is useful because it helps in locating the mythical content within lengthy narrations and expositions.

Following the same procedure, it is also possible to determine the mythical content in *Robinson Crusoe* and *Dracula* and reduce it into a two statement form for each. In case of *Robinson Crusoe*, the myth can be put as follows:

- Crusoe survives a ship wreck in which everybody else is killed.
- Crusoe lives alone on a deserted island for twenty-eight years and ends up winning lots of money.

In the same fashion, the myth in *Dracula* can go as follows:

- Count Dracula is an un-dead vampire who preys on living humans and turns them into vampires like himself.
- A group of people unify their efforts and destroy him.

The above propositions have certain characteristics which make them distinct from their encompassing literary texts. Though these economical propositions are malleable and open to different adaptations and elaborations, they preserve a unique stability of meaning through time. Amendments and changes usually touch the characterizations, the dialogues, the digressions and stylistic aspects, but not the core of the myth itself. Moreover, it is through this economical form that myths survive and pass through time and cultures. It is worth adding that such skeleton mythical content is easily translatable to different languages with the least loss in meaning. Commenting on the translatability of myths, Lévi-Strauss says:

Myth is the part of language where the formula *traduttore, traditore*⁴ reaches its lowest truth value . . . [unlike poetry which] is a kind of speech which cannot be translated except at the cost of serious distortions . . . the mythical value of the myth remains preserved, even through the worst translations. Whatever our ignorance of the language and the culture of the people where it originated, a myth is still felt as a myth by any reader anywhere in the world. Its substance does not lie in its style, its original music, or its syntax, but in the story which it tells” (1998, 51).

Thus, the above short two-sentence forms represent the migrating cross-cultural meaning of the stories that is intelligible to people all over the world.

⁴ Traduttore, traditore is a famous Italian expression used in the field of translation theory to mean ‘translator is a traitor’.

The three novels also carry the mythical elements of the unified formula which Joseph Campbell calls the monomyth. Thus, “[t]he composite hero of the monomyth is a personage of exceptional gifts” (2004, 35). The main characters in *Robinson Crusoe*, *Frankenstein*, and *Dracula* have exceptional gifts. At variance with ancient myths, these gifts mostly involve intellectuality or good use of reason and mind faculties.

Robinson Crusoe is a layman and average person, but he is gifted as far as his mind is concerned. He is a talented learner: “I got a competent knowledge of the mathematics and the rules of navigation, learned how to keep an account of the ship's course, take an observation, and, in short, to understand some things that were needful to be understood by a sailor” (Defoe 16). In fact, Crusoe's survival and success is not due to his physical strength and manual skills. His strength many times fails him, and he often expresses dissatisfaction about the final shapes of his products. Crusoe's real gift lies in his exquisite calculations and good use of his brain.

In case of *Frankenstein*, the gift is completely intellectual. Victor Frankenstein has the mental faculties that elevate him above the level of other people. When listing “the extraordinary merits of this wonderful man”, Walton says:

Sometimes I have endeavoured to discover what quality it is which he possesses that elevates him so immeasurably above any other person I ever knew. I believe it to be an intuitive discernment, a quick but never-failing power of judgment, a penetration into the causes of things, unequalled for clearness and precision; add to this a facility of expression and a voice whose varied intonations are soul-subduing music. (Shelley 18)

Walton appreciates Victor Frankenstein because he himself is an intellectual. Walton is passionately fond of reading, and his heart is full of enthusiasm towards the acquisition of knowledge because he believes that “nothing contributes so much to tranquilize the mind as a steady purpose – a point on which the soul may fix its intellectual eye” (Shelley 4). Unlike ancient monsters, Shelley's Monster is mentally gifted. He figures out the ways of survival in the wilderness alone within a few days after his creation. He learns a language through observing the small family who live in the cottage which is attached to his hovel. He benefits from the instructions given by Felix to the Arabian girl Safie and learns much about history, society, and culture. The monster climbs the ladder

of knowledge step by step. He says, “[e]very conversation of the cottagers now opened new wonders to me. While I listened to the instructions which Felix bestowed upon the Arabian, the strange system of human society was explained to me” (Shelley 116-117). He enters the domain of intellectuality when he finds “on the ground a leathern portmanteau containing several articles of dress and some books”; the talented monster expresses his delight with the books when he says: “I eagerly seized the prize and returned with it to my hovel”; his precious prize “consisted of Paradise Lost, a volume of Plutarch’s Lives, and the Sorrows of Werter”; then the enlightened Monster adds: “The possession of these treasures gave me extreme delight; I now continually studied and exercised my mind upon these histories” (Shelley 125). For Victor Frankenstein, the intellectuality of the Monster adds to his malice and evil. He warns Walton against the Monster’s luring eloquence and persuasive skills. Referring to the Monster, Frankenstein addresses Walton saying, “[h]e is eloquent and persuasive, and once his words had even power over my heart; but trust him not . . . Hear him not” (Shelley 212). The possession of a luring skill is an allusion to the Greek myth of the Sirens, the monstrous nymphs who lure the sailors to their death with bewitching songs. Remembering Frankenstein’s warning, Walton guards his emotions and refuses to be touched by the speech of the Monster when he meets him in person after the death of Frankenstein: “I was at first touched by the expressions of his misery; yet, when I called to mind what Frankenstein had said of his powers of eloquence and persuasion, and when I again cast my eyes on the lifeless form of my friend, indignation was rekindled within me” (Shelley 223). Nevertheless, the gifted and eloquent Monster wins the last argument before leaving the ship to his unknown destination. He maintains his dignity by telling Walton that he does not seek his sympathy. The Monster also confronts Walton with a sequence of perplexing questions that Walton cannot answer.

Dracula is also a gifted hero. He enjoys many supernatural and extra human capabilities. But these abilities are compromised by a list of weaknesses and limitations, which, if used properly by his enemies, can lead to his destruction. However, Stoker’s monster has mighty mental and intellectual capabilities. Van Helsing says that Dracula was “no common man; for in that time, and for centuries after, he was spoken of as the cleverest and the most cunning”; then he adds: “[t]hat mighty brain and that iron

resolution went with him to his grave, and are even now arrayed against us” (Stoker 273). Dracula’s brain is so strong that “in him the brain powers survived the physical death” (Stoker 343). The Count has a library in his castle which contains books “of the most varied kind – history, geography, politics, political economy, botany, geology, law – all relating to England and English life and customs and manners” (Stoker 23). Stoker’s monster likes reading. Referring to his books, the Count says that they “have been good friends to [him], and for some years past, ever since [he] had the idea of going to London, have given [him] many, many hours of pleasure” (Stoker 23). In *Dracula*, knowledge and information are used by Van Helsing and his team to destroy the Count. Thus, like the ancient heroes of old myths, the heroes in the three novels carry the monomyth element of gift; they are gifted but in a modernized way. They are presented as belonging, or not cut off from, the age of reason and disenchantment.

The other feature of the composite hero of the monomyth is that the hero “and/or the world in which he finds himself suffers from a symbolical deficiency” (Campbell, 2004, 35). Robinson Crusoe’s essential deficiency is money. The boon he seeks consists of material prosperity and ownership. This aim is obscured in the novel through being described as unexplainable inclinations and “rambling thoughts” (Defoe 3).

In *Frankenstein*, the deficiency is in the world of Victor Frankenstein. He belongs to a prosperous and loving family. He has everything that can make a person happy. He says, “[n]o human being could have passed a happier childhood than myself” (Shelley 28). His desire to learn does not include ordinary topics like the structure of languages or the code of government. His aim is to discover the secrets of the world: “[i]t was the secrets of heaven and earth that I desired to learn” (Shelley 28). He is not satisfied with the current state of science in the world in which he lives. He says, “[i]n spite of the intense labour and wonderful discoveries of modern philosophers, I always come from my studies discontented and unsatisfied” (Shelley 30). He thinks that Science should add something useful to the world. The boon which Victor seeks is “the elixir of life” (Shelley 31). The world would be great if science could conquer death. Frankenstein reflects, “what glory would attend the discovery if I could banish disease from the human frame and render man invulnerable to any but a violent death!” (Shelley

31). He wants to defeat disease and death because they are the threats which can jeopardise the prosperous life which he has been enjoying. Like Victor Frankenstein, Walton also perceives a deficiency in the world. His boon to the world is to meet such perceived deficiency through the discovery of “the wondrous power which attracts the needle and may regulate a thousand celestial observations” (Shelley 4). Addressing his sister, Walton says “you cannot contest the inestimable benefit which I shall confer on all mankind, to the last generation, by discovering a passage near the pole to those countries” (Shelley 4). The Monster’s deficiency, on the other hand, consists of lack of company and the need for compassion. Upon failing to compensate for the deficiency, the Monster desperately resorts to revenge and destruction.

In *Dracula*, the deficiency which the Count claims to be suffering from is the lack of civil social life. When talking to Jonathan Harker, Count Dracula expresses his desire to live in London: “I long to go through the crowded streets of your mighty London, to be in the midst of the whirl and rush of humanity, to share its life, its change, its death, and all what makes it what it is” (Stoker 23). However, the boon which the Count carries is symbolic. His aim is to compromise the influence of the established social bonds and institutions, and to free people from the burdens of collective assumptions. Dracula threatens the sacred religious system. He targets in particular the barriers between the genders which are imposed by society and fortified by religion. Biting people and turning them into vampires, indirectly implies neutering them and changing them into a different species. Thus, like the heroes of the ancient myths, each of the main characters in the three stories has a deficiency which he needs to supply for, and a boon which he seeks to bestow, and each in his own way.

Journey is another important element which corresponds to the standard pattern of mythological adventures and monomyth. Describing the journey of the hero, Campbell says, “[a] hero ventures forth from the world of common day into a region of supernatural wonder: fabulous forces are there encountered and a decisive victory is won: the hero comes back from this mysterious adventure with the power to bestow boons on his fellow man” (2004, 28). The wanderings, voyages, and journeys in the

three stories have their bricolage roots in the archetypal adventures of Odysseus which are portrayed in the *Odyssey*.

In this respect, *Robinson Crusoe* adheres rather literally to the standard mythological pattern. Crusoe abandons the tedious, ordinary and predictable world, and ventures towards an undetermined world of wonders. Like the ancient heroes, he encounters different fabulous forces and succeeds in overcoming them. The essential boon which he acquires is wealth. The boons which he bestows on others include the domestication of the wilderness and turning the rough island into habitable place for the fellow human beings who come to settle on the island. The literal journey is accompanied by an abstract journey of thought in search for a system of religious beliefs that can easily harmonize with the capitalist aspirations of the eighteenth century world.

Frankenstein exhibits a variety of non-stop journeys. In the story, the point of departure from the traditional pattern of mythology is that the main journey of Victor Frankenstein is more symbolic. The hero's strenuous venture towards the mysterious world of science aims at providing the world with grandiose solution to the human vulnerability. He fails, and his efforts result in catastrophe. Expressing his disappointment after infusing life into the body of his creature, Frankenstein asks himself blamefully, "[h]ow can I describe my emotions at this catastrophe, or how delineate the wretch whom with such infinite pains and care I had endeavoured to form?" (Shelley 49). Shelley reverses the boon which is meant to embetter the world, into a curse which endangers the world. Consequently, the other, more concrete, journey which Frankenstein makes is also a reverse one. The journey of creation is countered by a journey towards destruction. Frankenstein makes a solemn vow to remove the evil which he created from the surface of the earth:

By the sacred earth on which I kneel, by the shades that wander near me, by the deep and eternal grief that I feel, I swear; and by thee, O night, and the spirits that preside over thee, to pursue the daemon who caused this misery, until he or I shall perish in mortal conflict. For this purpose I will preserve my life; to execute this dear revenge will I again behold the sun and tread the green herbage of earth (Shelley 206)

The journey of the Monster towards a position among human beings is also doomed to failure. Moreover, locating the whole story within the context of Walton's voyage to the north pole alludes to the mythical element of journey. The failure of Walton's mission to cross the frozen sea puts the journeys of the three characters in *Frankenstein* within a unified category of failing ventures.

In *Dracula*, the venturesome journey of the Count to settle in London does not succeed because he fails in encountering the resisting forces of Van Helsing and his team. His journey back to Transylvania is an escape. Interpreting Dracula's reaction after the confrontation with the men, Van Helsing says, "[h]e meant escape. Hear me, escape! He saw that with but one earth box left, and a pack of men following like dogs after a fox, this London was no place for him. He have take his last earth box on board a ship, and he leave the land. He think to escape, but no! We follow him" (Stoker 355). With these words, the journey of pursuing and hunting the vampire begins. The success in destroying Dracula and the three vampire women is the boon which Van Helsing and his friends bestow upon humanity.

However, the heroic figure seems to be always subject to constant morphing in any process of myth recycling. The modernized mythical heroes and the patterns of heroism in *Robinson Crusoe*, *Frankenstein*, and *Dracula* diverge from the ancient forms in a variety of respects. The first thing to notice is that the heroes in the three stories are so far from being absolute and monolithic. While the formula in ancient mythology consists of formidable heroes opposing formidable forces, the formula in the three modern myths consists of non-formidable, and sometimes fragile heroes opposing formidable forces. Compared to the mythical heroes, the heroes in the new myths are more prone to the physical world; and they suffer from fears, weaknesses and anxieties. Robinson Crusoe is "Defoe's most heroic character, but there is nothing unusual about his personality or the way he faces his strange experiences" (Watt, 1959, 77). Describing his fear after seeing the foreign foot print on his island, Crusoe says, "fear of danger is ten thousand times more terrifying than danger itself" (Defoe 151). Robinson Crusoe is heroic mainly through his autonomous essence. He represents the antithesis of need and interdependence. In the case of *Frankenstein*, an essential departure from the archetypal

pattern, which marks Shelley's originality, is that her hero is physically weak and fearful. Frankenstein is an unshielded and defenceless Promethean hero. He is a petrified hero. In fact, from the perspective of tragedy, cowardice seems to be the hamartia which leads to the downfall of Frankenstein. In *Dracula*, heroism goes through another transformation. The heroic in the story is no longer the province of a singular hero. Stoker distributes bravery among a group of people who share one common aim. Van Helsing, Jonathan Harker, John Seward, Arthur Holmwood, Quincey Morris, and Mina Murray represent a sample of common civil community people who can coordinate individual efforts to fight and destroy Count Dracula. Thus, it can be noticed that in the new myths, heroism and bravery take more interactive and dynamic forms, and the hero is not necessarily an idealized and singularised being.

The second transformation of the image of the hero in the three stories is that the heroic becomes social. The hero becomes more inclined to think and act on behalf of others. The rise of the heroic social coincides with the diminishing of the principles and codes of medieval chivalry, and the formation of civil city life which is based, in principle, upon equality and justice. The change towards social heroism increases gradually in the three stories respectively.

In *Robinson Crusoe*, the heroic is still considerably chivalric. Crusoe exhibits bravery in cases like the saving of Friday, Friday's father, and the Spaniards, in addition to his role in resolving the mutiny issue of the English ship. This bravery is not heroic in the strict sense because it lacks the element of sacrifice. With his weaponry and ammunition, Crusoe is presented as a knight who uses his power for good purposes, and who acts in accordance with his system of religious and moral beliefs. The saving of people in these situations amounts to the bestowing of life on the weak ones. Crusoe either owns the ones whom he saves, or he gives himself the right to influence their decisions in return for his favour.

In *Frankenstein*, the heroic social takes more solid shape. Destroying the female creature before the eyes of the Monster is an act of ultimate social and human heroic value. Victor Frankenstein risks, and eventually sacrifices, his life and the lives of the ones he loves in response to the following question: "[h]ad I right, for my own benefit,

to inflict this curse upon everlasting generations?"; Frankenstein expresses deep concerns about the future generations when he says: "I shuddered to think that the future ages might curse me as their pest, whose selfishness had not hesitated to buy its own peace at the price, perhaps, of the existence of the whole human race" (Shelley 168). The Monster, on the other hand, originally has innate tendency to social heroism. In one instance, he assists the labour of the cottage family through secretly collecting fire wood, and putting it in front of their door for their daily use. The Monster enjoys observing the reactions of the cottage people when they discover the anonymous gift: "I remember, the first time that I did this, the young woman, when she opened the door in the morning, appeared greatly astonished on seeing a great pile of wood on the outside. She uttered some words in a loud voice, and the youth joined her, who also expressed surprise. I observed, with pleasure, that he did not go to the forest that day" (Shelley 108-109). However, the Monster also narrates traumatic experiences which result from his spontaneous urge to serve and save others. In one voluntary act of heroism, the Monster saves a young girl from drowning in the river. To the utmost distress and anguish of the Monster, this heroic act is requited very negatively. Upon seeing the girl in the hands of the Monster, the man who was accompanying the girl before her fall rushes towards the Monster, snatches the girl from his arms, and hastens towards the wood; then he aims his gun and shoots the Monster. This scene is twice damaging for the Monster. In addition to the physical injury of the gun shot, this event is psychologically traumatic because it completely destroys his communal instinct through the savage rejection of his noble heroism. Describing his pain, the Monster says, "[t]his was then the reward of my benevolence! I had saved a human being from destruction, and as a recompense I now writhed under the miserable pain of a wound which shattered the flesh and bone". And as a result, the Monster vows eternal vengeance to all human beings: "[t]he feelings of kindness and gentleness which I had entertained but a few moments before gave place to hellish rage gnashing of teeth. Inflamed by pain, I vowed eternal hatred and vengeance to all mankind" (Shelley 140).

The adulation of the social-heroic peaks in *Dracula*. The goodness of the vampire fighters is idealized through the blood transfusion scenes. Lucy's fiancé, the rejected suitors, and Van Helsing, all donate their blood voluntarily for the sake of

restoring Lucy's life. Expressing his delight in giving his blood to Lucy, John Seward says: "[n]o man knows till he experiences it, what is it to feel his own lifeblood drawn away into the veins of the woman he loves" (Stoker 146). Stoker valorises heroism for the sake of society through the triumph of good over evil and through the grandiose death of Quincey Morris in the struggle. Thus, the three novels mark the transformation of mythical heroism into social heroism where the individual acts on behalf of the others.

The historicity of the characters and the events in the mythical stories is an issue which has direct relevance to realism and fiction. Referring to archaic societies, Eliade says that "although they are conscious of a certain form of history, they make every effort to disregard it" (1959, xi). This means that the disregard of actual history was intentional in those societies. Then, he says that "the historical character of the persons celebrated in epic poetry is not in question. But their historicity does not long resist the corrosive action of mythicization" (Eliade, 1959, 42). This suggests that the process of historicity loss, whether concerning characters or events, is progressive, and that historicity is in reverse relation with the passage of time. In other words, "In the background of every myth it is possible to imagine a point at which the original story was liberated from its concrete historical roots, becoming open to all interested forces and traditions, human, divine, or diabolical. Usually such a moment lies in the distant past: historical details are buried and cannot be recovered" (Baron, 1992, 1). This means that myths can be seen as distorted versions of real historical events and figures. Such consideration also applies to the novel form which often excavates history, and "hardly relies on purely fantastic events" (Koç 3). Like the protagonists of classical myths, Robinson Crusoe, Victor Frankenstein and Count Dracula are more or less distorted versions of real individuals that underwent a process of mythification.

As far as historicity is concerned, there is strong evidence that Daniel Defoe used the real story of the Scottish castaway Alexander Selkirk as a source of inspiration when he wrote *Robinson Crusoe*. In fact, Andrew Lambert claims that "Robinson Crusoe emerged into the daylight on 1 February 1709, when an English boat crew encountered 'a Man clothed in Goat Skins' on the beach of a distant island. The goatskin-clad

castaway, Alexander Selkirk (a Scot), had been marooned on Juan Fernandez Island for four years and four months” (2016, 1). The story of this man and his island not only caught the imagination of Defoe, but also “caught the imagination of a newly forged British nation, tired of continental wars and despotic monarchs” (Lambert 1). Therefore, although the plot and the events of the story are fictitious, Robinson Crusoe is not without roots in real history⁵. He is a mythified and distorted version of another man in the real world.

In spite of the substantial divergences between the two figures, one still cannot resist the temptation to locate parallels between Victor Frankenstein and Dr. Faust. Referring to Goethe’s *Faust*, Dirk Dunbar says: “Faust shares many of the Romantic qualities that fuel Shelley’s Victor Frankenstein . . . Both protagonists seek knowledge in all realms, beginning with philosophy, theology, and conventional science. As each reaches out to unveil the mysteries of nature through alchemy, galvanism, and even magic, they become pathologically obsessive in their quest” (2017, 158). In fact, Victor Frankenstein can also be seen as a Romantic mutation, resulting from the process of mythicization of the sixteenth century Faustian legend, which is in itself a distortion of the biography of the German doctor, theologian, and astrologer Dr. George Faust who lived between 1466 and 1541. The Faustian mythical phenomenon started after the publication of the anonymous and mysterious book *Historai von D. Johann Fausten* in 1587, which is also known as *Historia*, and also *Faustbuch*. As far as the real Faust is concerned, Frank Baron says:

Reliable sources cite the birth of the historical Faustus (first name: Georg, Georgius, or Jörg) in Helmstadt near Heidelberg, in about 1466 . . . This young man began his studies at the

⁵ In fact, Defoe talks about the historicity of his protagonist in his preface to the third volume of *Robinson Crusoe*’s trilogy which is called the *Serious Reflections of Robinson Crusoe* (1720). In this preface, Defoe responds to his critics’ “envious and ill-disposed . . . objections against the two first volumes, on pretence that the story is feigned, that the names are borrowed, and that it is all a romance”, and declares “that the story, though allegorical, is also historical” (Defoe 2). To controvert the accusations of being fictitious, Defoe hints that the novel is an allegorical portrayal of his own biography.

University of Heidelberg in 1483. He quickly gained academic degrees as a bachelor in 1484 and as a master (*magister*) of philosophy in 1487. At the age of about twenty-one, the required age for the master's degree, he accomplished what was in his time a major academic achievement. He was proud to call himself *magister*, philosopher, and doctor. (2013, 43)

The mythologizing of historicity often takes place in transitional periods and at the times of social or political anxieties and tensions. In case of Faust, unreal and mythical characteristics are added to his biography as a result of Lutheran Reformation and the witch craze in the German Empire of the sixteenth century; “[d]uring the period of the great witch craze, authorities managed a myth-creating mechanism that shaped the perception of reality in the general populace” (Baron, 1992, 3). In the *Historia*, Baron says, “[t]he narrator succeeds in restructuring Faustus's life almost beyond recognition of its historical origins” (1992, 4). Thus, like Victor Frankenstein, the biography of Faust “intimates the hidden pitfalls of academic study [and indicates that] the acquisition of knowledge of nature is more than a hard bargain on the devil's terms” (Weeks, 2013, 21); and like the Faustian archetype, Frankenstein is depicted as an unsatisfied scientist about the status of science in his time who “[i]n spite of the intense labour and wonderful discoveries of modern philosophers, [he] always came from [his] studies discontented and unsatisfied” (Shelley 30). In fact, Mary Shelley succeeds in masking the Faust myth and, at the same time, in giving its main themes new realizations. Watt says that “[t]here is, perhaps, nothing more difficult in literature than to give reality to the three basic themes of the Faust myth – the excitement of knowledge, earthly beauty, and spiritual damnation” (1996, 29). Therefore, in spite of the undisputed and acknowledged originality of Mary Shelley's *Frankenstein*, her modernized mythical protagonist is not without roots in history. Such roots of historicity extend back to the Renaissance of the sixteenth century.

Count Dracula is a distorted version of the figure of Vlad III, the cruel Wallachian prince who lived and ruled during the fifteenth century. Koç and Demir assert that “Stoker draws a distorted picture of the past, and a distorted portrait of Vlad III . . . Yet, this comprehensive depiction of the past is more embracing and more insightful compared to a historian's scholarly synthesis” (2018, 429-430). McNally and Florescu contend that “Dracula was in fact an authentic fifteenth-century Wallachian

prince who was often described in the contemporary German, Byzantine, Slavonic, and Turkish documents and in popular horror stories as an awesome, cruel, and possibly demented ruler. He was known mostly for the amount of blood he indiscriminately spilled” (1994, 8). Therefore, the transference and retelling of certain real historical accounts, whether biographies, events, or anecdotes across generations, might gradually transform them into legends and myths. The mythicization of historicity takes place in response to the changes in the cultural tendencies through time.

One further significant aspect which characterizes ancient myths is authority. By the word ‘myth’, Bruce Lincoln “designate[s] that small class of stories that possess both credibility and authority” (1989, 24). Having suggested that authority is a defining characteristic of myths, Lincoln defines authority as follows: “a narrative possessed of authority is one for which successful claims are made not only to the status of truth, but what is more, to the status of paradigmatic truth” (24). Kevin Schilbrack further explains Lincoln’s concept of authority and says: “[b]y ‘authority’, Lincoln refers to a feature of a myth’s status as a paradigm. Certain stories come to exercise such a compulsion and moving quality that people have the sense that the meaning of their lives depends on the significance of the story, its re-enactment, or its remembrance” (2002, 8). In other words, unlike the narratives which have no claims to truthfulness, such as fables and fairytales, myths often have different degrees of implied, rather than stated, truth-claims and persuasive powers that make them gain credibility and acceptance in the societies in which they sprout. In the case of the classical myths, this authority is considerably related to the affinity of the mythical narratives to the systems of unquestioned beliefs of the community in which the story is told. Thus, one of the most challenging tasks for the fantastic modern fiction in the disenchanted world is persuasiveness. The stories need to reproduce and approximate the credibility which the ancient myths offered to their recipients. Fiction creates “maximum vividness through forcing the imagination of the audience, and take the audience into a world where illusion and reality would merge” (Koç 2). The novel form reproduces considerable portion of ancient myth authority through the illusion of reality. At the beginning of the eighteenth century, authors discovered that the illusion of reality can very well be a source of authority and credulity for their narratives; their long fictitious prose is characterized by realism. According to

Watt, “the historians of the novel have been able to . . . determine the idiosyncratic feature of the new form . . . they have seen ‘realism’ as the defining characteristic which differentiates the work of the early eighteenth-century novelists from previous fiction” (1959, 9). In addition, the Industrial Revolution played a role in reshaping the patterns of life. The public became more pragmatic and utilitarian and people had more appreciation for the realities of life. Thus:

The age of revolutions created the positivist middle classes. They were attached to facts, to a realistic interpretation of the world. Middle class realism of the eighteenth century, therefore, opposed the aristocratic idealism of the seventeenth century . . . The bourgeoisie did not want to see in literary works characters with absurd ideals. The dream world was what they despised. They wanted to see their own lives reflected through literature. (Koç 7)

The authors of *Robinson Crusoe*, *Frankenstein*, and *Dracula*, exhibited artistic talent in implementing realistic presentations and furnishing their texts with authorial credulity. In *Robinson Crusoe*, Defoe successfully put his prose in autobiographical form in order to enhance realism. The early readers of the story thought that they were reading a travelogue. He also added considerable degree of didacticism in order to embellish his text with practical utility for the sake of gaining more acceptability among the utilitarian reading public of his time. Defoe was a journalist with modern and practical education. He knew much about the life of people of his time. Koç notes that Defoe “was as common as the people in the street, and as intellectual as the statesman in parliament. He had already discovered the personality traits of the reading public: he knew that middle class people were mad about making fortune and changing class” (12). In fact, Defoe himself was after material wealth and after rising up on the social ladder. He realised the change that the new economic system had done to people. Defoe also realised that Capitalism needed independent individuals who are less attached to the values of the old paradigm; and he structured his narratives accordingly. In this way, Defoe succeeded in reproducing the authority which old mythical narratives enjoyed and also succeeded in establishing the basis of the whole genre of the novel form.

The unrealistic and supernatural element in the Gothic genre poses a serious challenge to authoritative credulity. Before the rise of the Gothic form, the reading public of the novel was only familiar with the realistic depictions of everyday life, and

“[a]s far as sophisticated eighteenth-century readers were concerned, the supernatural was fit only for the nursery. Serious grown-ups did not bother with stories of giants, dragons, and devils” (Lynch, 2010, 3). Hogle indicates that “Gothic exaggerates its own extreme fictionality”, and that it “does so through long-lasting and creatively changing techniques” (2002, 14). Hogle adds that “[t]he hyperbolic unreality, even surreality, of Gothic fiction” can become “subject to parody and critique” (14). Thus, in Gothic, the failure in convincing would mean failure in horrifying the reader; and in such case, the work would run the risk of becoming abject and comic. In fact, in *Frankenstein*, Mary Shelley, in a sophisticated technique, stresses the incredulity of her story and uses it as an element in her plot. Shelley chooses the grandiose and sublime scenery of the frozen ocean as a setting to instigate believability in what is going to be told, through suggesting that the world is still full of mysterious and unbelievable things. Before telling the story of the Monster, Frankenstein informs Walton and the reader that what is going to be said is scarcely credible:

Were we among the tamer scenes of nature I might fear to encounter your unbelief, perhaps your ridicule; but many things will appear possible in these wild and mysterious regions which would provoke the laughter of those unacquainted with the over-varied powers of nature; nor can I doubt but that my tale conveys in its series internal evidence of the truth of the events of which it is composed (Shelley 19)

And after listening to the whole story, towards the end of the novel, Walton says, “[t]hus has a week passed away, while I have listened to the strangest tale that ever imagination formed” (Shelley 213). While telling Walton that he discovered the secret of life, Frankenstein wholeheartedly affirms the truthfulness of his accounts and says, “[r]emember, I am not recording the vision of a madman. The sun does not more certainly shine in the heavens than that which I now affirm is true” (Shelley 43). In fact, one of the reasons which prevents Victor Frankenstein from informing others about his Monster is his realization that his story is unbelievable. When telling the magistrate about the Monster, Frankenstein says: “[i]t is indeed a tale so strange that I should fear you would not credit it were there not something in truth which, however wonderful, forces conviction” (Shelley 201). However, the magistrate does not believe the story: “[h]e heard my story with that half kind of belief that is given to a tale of spirits and

supernatural events; but when he was called upon to act officially in consequence, the whole tide of his incredulity returned” (Shelley 202). The disbelief of the magistrate asserts the incredulity of the story.

To handle the issues of credulity and realism Shelley uses special narrative techniques. The use of the epistolary form as a frame establishes a more convincing voice. Shelley uses nested or framed narrative voice in which the narratives of Victor and the Monster are embedded in the narrative of Robert Walton. Koç says that nested narrative voice facilitates progression from naiveté to pure intellect and increases suspense; and he adds, “the common sense way in which Walton concludes the novel creates an impression of verisimilitude and authenticity, lending credence to the fanciful occurrences described” (133). According to Koç, Victor Frankenstein is not a reliable narrator because his narration is anti-sentimental. Victor’s exposition needs to be filtered through the perception of Walton, the more sentimental narrator. On the other hand, “Walton’s narrative allows the rational reader to accept Frankenstein, his story, and the Monster as true” (Koç 134). Thus, through Walton, “Mary Shelley builds a bridge between the positivist worldview of her age and the abstract impressions of the tale itself” (134). The vivid description of Walton’s nature and his passion for exploration and discovery provides him with considerable reliability as the narrator of an unbelievable story. Walton is the exemplary romantic exponent who can be trusted by the reader, and by using him as a narrator, Shelley adds more credulous authority to her story.

On the other hand, Shelley also maintains an atmosphere of objectivity and non-commitment to the truthfulness of her exposition through such multiple layers of hearsay narrative. Gamer says that *Frankenstein* “displays a narrative structure that buries its story under multiple layers of hearsay testimony”; then he adds, “[r]esembling Chinese boxes, the novel begins with Margaret Saville receiving letters from her brother Robert Walton. Within Walton’s discourse is the story of Victor Frankenstein, and within Victor’s account are the narratives of his creature, the De Lacey family, and, finally, Felix De Lacey’s betrothed, Safie” (2002, 101-102). As a result of this technique, the reader is distanced from the events of the story on purpose. As a result, “we find

ourselves often two or three times removed from the events of the novel, making the question of interpretation hopelessly vexed” (Gamer 102). Through her embedded narrative, Shelley also stimulates the interpretive, and the reality searching, capabilities of her readers:

Aside from shrouding Victor`s incredible story within a series of second-hand accounts told by implacable enemies, Shelley creates a situation in which it becomes impossible to know the reliability of a given narrator, let alone determine the credibility of the other testimonies contained within a given narrator`s discourse. This reading experience, in turn, leads us to examine our own processes of interpretation, since as readers we are confronted by psychological challenges similar to those faced by Shelley`s characters. (Gamer 102)

When Frankenstein finalizes the recitation of the events of his story, Walton puts forward an objective attestation in favour of the truthfulness of what has been mentioned by Victor Frankenstein:

His tale is connected and told with an appearance of the simplest truth, yet I own to you that the letters of Felix and Safie, which he showed me, and the apparition of the monster seen from our ship, brought to me a greater conviction of the truth of his narrative than his asseverations, however earnest and connected. Such a monster has, then, really existence! I cannot doubt it, yet I am lost in surprise and admiration. (Shelley 213)

However, after the death of Frankenstein, the meeting between Walton and the Monster serves the purpose of affirming the truthfulness of Frankenstein`s narrative. Walton testifies that the Monster is real and he is extremely hideous. Upon seeing the Monster in the cabin of his ship, Walton says, “Great God! What a scene has just taken place! I am yet dizzy with the remembrance of it. I hardly know whether I shall have the power to detail it” (Shelley 221). Furthermore, Walton explicitly states that the truth conditions of what he has conveyed so far to his sister would not be complete without concrete verification of what has been said by Victor: “yet, the tale which I have recorded would be incomplete without this final and wonderful catastrophe” (Shelley 221). It is worth noting in this context that Walton`s description of the Monster is congruous with Victor`s description: “I entered the cabin where lay the remains of my ill-fated and admirable friend. Over him hung a form which I cannot find words to describe – gigantic in stature, yet uncouth and distorted in its proportions” (Shelley 221). At the

same time, and in the same scene, the Monster confirms the narrative of Victor Frankenstein about the killings. Talking to Walton, the Monster instantly admits his crimes against Frankenstein's family. Referring to the dead body of Victor, the Monster says, "[t]hat is also my victim. In his murder my crimes are consummated; the miserable series of my being is wound to its close" (Shelley 222). After this confirmation of Frankenstein's story, Shelley removes any chance for further verification of what has been mentioned. For this purpose, the Monster promises to instigate his own death: "I shall collect my funeral pile and consume to ashes this miserable frame". With the death of the creature and the creator, no trace of the mentioned episodes will remain. The Monster explains, "[h]e is dead who called me into being; and when I shall be no more, the very remembrance of us both will speedily vanish" (Shelley 225). Consequently, we are left with no other proof about Frankenstein and his Monster, other than the sole testimony of Walton.

While *Frankenstein* criticizes irresponsible science and technology, *Dracula* displays considerable reverence for science and logical thinking. In fact, the authorial credulity of Stoker's myth is nested around a lax and indeterminate vision of science. One of the main implied ideas in *Dracula* is that science should be flexible enough to account for the bizarre and supernatural phenomena of the natural world:

Bram Stoker's *Dracula* (1897), whose characters include two doctor/psychologists, describes its vampire in terms explicitly borrowed from criminal anthropology, degeneration theory, and alienism, late -Victorian sociomedical disciplines that worked to classify and comprehend the abnormal human subject. Though these sciences of the criminal, the unfit, and the insane fail to account for the vampire's longevity or shape-shifting abilities, Dr. Van Helsing has faith that science will explain even these things some day. (Hurley, 2002, 192)

For Van Helsing, Dracula has been made by nature and not by supernatural power. Trying to explain the Count's extra human characteristics, Van Helsing says that in case of Dracula, "all forces of nature that are occult and deep and strong must have worked together in some wondrous way" (Stoker 374); then he claims that Transylvania:

is full of strangeness of the geologic and chemical world. There are deep caverns and fissures that reach none know whither. There have been volcanoes, some of whose openings still send

out waters of strange properties, and gases that kill or make to vivify. Doubtless there is something magnetic or electric in some of these combinations of occult forces which work for physical life in strange way. (Stoker 374)

Thus, the role of the trustworthy Van Helsing is to provide a rationale for the existence of vampires.

Moreover, the theme of vampirism has his own unique characteristic of blurring the boundaries between reality and fiction. Aspasia Stephanou says that “[t]he rich metaphors of blood create, innovate and redesign the vampiric world. They establish new boundaries and transform reality” (2014, 2). With the metaphors of blood and the folk beliefs in vampires, Stoker creates a world of quasi-science for his narrative.

Stoker also exploits the fact that scientific understandings have fictional characteristics and amalgamates science with fantasy. Stephanou asserts that “scientific understandings are fictional, representing the world through claims to truth. Scientific explanations of vampires and blood are created in such a way as to be convincing and give the illusion that order is natural” (2). Thus, Stephanou continues, “vampire narratives reveal that science’s authority is repeatedly threatened by the imagination, metaphor and monstrosity. Empirical language is confounded by the presence of the vampire, the strange stirrings of the blood, and the occulted mysteries of the bite. Vampire gothic disturbs the transparency of the scientific language (2). Therefore, such amalgamation between science and fiction obscures the boundaries between them and establishes further credulity.

Like Mary Shelley, Bram Stoker also enhances credulity through his narrative technique. He artistically dissociates himself from the truthfulness of what is said through putting his story in episodic and epistolary form, which gives voice to a variety of narrators. The use of different fragmented textual documents, which consist of diary entries, letters, newspaper excerpts, and memoranda, provides an atmosphere of immediacy and authenticity to the very improbable events. It also allows the reader to consider the events from different perspectives. Through the compatibility and agreement in content among these various narratives, the author creates a situation in which each narrative testifies for the truthfulness of the other.

To further enhance credulity with realism, Stoker furnishes his fantastic story with minute details. Relating the style of Stoker to his profession as a clerk and accountant, Gail says, “[e]ssentially, the structure of the novel itself is a strict accounting, and its reliance on shorthand is similar to the accounting format that Stoker recommended for clerks of petty sessions” (2005, 122). Like a clerk, Van Helsing encourages Seward to take notes: “[t]ake then good note of it. Nothing is too small. I counsel you, put down in record even your doubts and surmises. Hereafter, it may be of interest to you to see how true you guess” (Stoker 137). By this amalgamation of realism and the supernatural, Stoker puts his characters and readers, who know only the laws of nature, in confrontation with incredible events. In this way, the author creates a fantastic text which “depicts the collision of two models of reality: the incursion of extra-normal events, or seemingly extranormal events, into the everyday world” (Hurley, 2002, 204). This collision produces a state of hesitation and uncertainty, and consequently results in the anxiety and fear which characterize Gothic and distinguish it from other genres. Hurley contends that “[t]he extended moment of uncertainty, horror, anxiety, and dismay that results when the character or reader is unable to classify those events enables us to distinguish the fantastic from kindred genres like the fairy tale or science fiction, in which marvellous events are the norm” (Hurley 204). This kind of convulsive uncertainty which results from the character’s inability to interpret an event can be exemplified in the scene in which Harker witnesses the Count crawl down the castle wall like a lizard. Describing his reaction to this view, Harker says, “my very feelings changed to repulsion and terror when I saw the whole man slowly emerge from the window and begin to crawl down the castle wall over the dreadful abyss, face down with his cloak spreading out around him like great wings” (Stoker 40). Expressing his hesitation and inability to believe his eyes, Harker adds, “[a]t first I could not believe my eyes. I thought it was some trick of the moonlight, some weird effect of shadow, but I kept looking, and it could be no delusion. I saw the fingers and toes grasp the corners of the stones . . . and by thus using every projection and inequality move downwards with considerable speed, just as a lizard moves along a wall” (Stoker 40-41). This incredible vision makes Harker doubt his own senses and thinks that he is in a state of delirium caused by the haunted castle. Thus, Harker wonders, “[w]hat manner of man is this, or

what manner of creature, is it in the semblance of man? I feel the dread of this horrible place overpowering me. I am in fear, in awful fear, and there is no escape for me. I am encompassed about with terrors that I dare not think of” (Stoker 41). With this ambivalence between believability and un-believability, the novel unfolds its mystical and haunting content.

The human tendency to accept narratives as true has its roots in the times of ancient mythologies. Joseph Campbell talks about the innate human inclination to believe stories and engage in festivals which include a game of belief that gives feelings of delight. Such “a highly played game of ‘as if’ frees our mind and spirit, on the one hand, from the presumptions of theology . . . and, on the other from the bondage of reason, whose laws do not apply beyond the horizon of human experience” (Campbell, 1960, 28). In fact, the propelling element within the different forms of story-telling, including the novel form, corresponds to such a built-in disposition towards such games of make-believe. This desire explains the credulous attitude of people towards the fictitious content of fiction in the age of rational thinking. People willingly and cooperatively agree to be involved in such a game when they listen to, or read a piece of fiction.

Being among the earliest pioneers in novel writing in the eighteenth century, Daniel Defoe was not sure about the readiness of the public to believe. Due to his serious concerns about the community’s aversion to fictitious expositions, Defoe claims that his first novel is historical and real. Moreover, he carefully contrives his story doing his best to be realistic enough and not to challenge the belief capacity of his readers. With the passage of time authors of the newly emerging genre of fiction realized the readiness of the public to be involved in this new type of literary make-believe game. As a result, these authors did not hesitate to present more fanciful characters and events. Thus, while the early readers of *Robinson Crusoe* would most probably wonder whether they were reading a piece of fiction or a real autobiographical account, the readers of *Frankenstein* and *Dracula* were completely aware that the protagonists and the events of these two novels are fanciful and fictitious. Nevertheless, the readers embraced the

created illusion as real, and this indicates that the people of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries were not less responsive to mythical accounts than the people of ancient times.

Thus, tantamount to classical myths, the novels in question can be seen as literary festivals of games of belief “where fun, joy, and rapture rule in ascending series” (Campbell, 1960, 28). These feelings are the by-products of the entertaining game of storytelling. Once triggered and experienced, those feelings become inseparable from the human consciousness. The rapturous experiences might include a range of feelings such as fear, happiness, pity, sympathy, empathy, sadness, enthusiasm, pride and patriotism; when powerful enough, such feelings can have physical manifestations in the form of tears, cries, bursts of laughter, wrath, and so on. Readers of *Robinson Crusoe* experience a range of feelings throughout the story. They feel the fear of the protagonist in the critical situations, and they feel happy when he overcomes the difficulties. Readers even envy him. English readers must have enjoyed the feelings of pride, enthusiasm and patriotism because the success of Crusoe is the success of Englishness, and the habitation of the island is the new land being conquered by the English industriousness. The readers of *Frankenstein* divide their sympathies between Victor Frankenstein and the Monster, and they enjoy the fear which accompanies the gothic exposition in the story. While in case of *Frankenstein* the reader is outside the circle of the threat, in *Dracula*, however, Bram Stoker successfully achieves more reader involvement and drags the reader inside the circle of threat as a potential victim through depicting the Count as an expansionist and infectious danger.

Like mythology, modern modes of story-telling have their own functions in society. Ancient myths had messages to carry to their target audiences. Referring to ancient man in earlier history, Eliade asks the following question: “What does living mean for a man who belongs to a traditional culture?”, then he answers saying, “[a]bove all, it means living in accordance with extra human models, in conformity with archetypes” (1959, 95). Mythical figures, indeed, provide archetypal models and standards for people despite the fictitious nature of such figures. Man “is powerless against cosmic catastrophes, military disasters, social injustices bound up with the very structure of society, personal misfortune, and so forth. Thus, it would be interesting to

learn how this 'history' was tolerated by archaic man; that is, how he endured . . . sufferings that entered into the lot of each individual and each collectivity" (Eliade 95). In other words, as they are supposed to be accounts of previous events in history, myths represent samples of the lives of earlier people and their reactions against different kinds of challenges and sufferings. As such, one of the main communicative function of such narratives seems to be didactically instructive, relating to the moderation and control of behaviour of people confronting the difficulties of life. Interestingly, it is feasible to note here that such communicative function of fiction is still operative in the contemporary world. The modern world is not so much different from the ancient one. There are disasters, social injustices and different types of personal misfortunes. This means that people nowadays still appreciate the samples of other people's lives and experiences through different types of narratives. Acquaintance with such samples through stories can provide a sort of standard situation against which people can measure their own lives and experiences; and, the deliberation and reflection upon other people's predicaments may provide a source of comfort for the suffering souls. *Robinson Crusoe* depicts a predicament of the castaway who suddenly finds himself on a desert island and completely cut off from the inhabited world. Such predicament was of particular interest to the reading public of eighteenth century due to the increase in ship travels, expeditions and the potentiality of shipwrecks at that time. The story can also be read as a manual for the reader in case of becoming a castaway himself. *Frankenstein* deals with the predicament of "the romantic entrepreneur whose philanthropic schemes, after the creation of the Monster, turn into nightmare" (Koç 134). The story is didactically informative because it displays the unforeseen catastrophic consequences which might arise as a result of benevolent and enlightened endeavour to conduct research and achieve scientific breakthroughs. *Dracula* is also instructionally informative because in one way or another, it describes the ideal pattern of cooperative reaction which is supposed to take shape in case of general and catastrophic threats against civil welfare and stability.

Hence, myths are useful. Ellwood asserts that "we need to listen to the mythologists in their wisdom, and make the world safe for myth and dream . . . We ought also to read the signs of the times and extrapolate from them our own myths of the

future, enjoying the same freedom as the people of the beginning to decide for ourselves what the best human future would be like” (Ellwood, 1999, 178). In other words, such stories put the current generations in a position analogous to the position of the ancient communities that viewed their present and future through the myths they produced.

Therefore, the three novels tackled here have all the necessary requirements to be classified as modern myths. In fact, Watt’s characterization of modern Western myths applies to the three novels considered here. They are “less sacred, less authoritative, and less universally accepted than myths in the societies of non-literate people”; at the same time, the protagonists of these myths are different from the characters of other novels in that they “all exist in a kind of limbo where they are seen not as actual historical persons perhaps but not merely as invented fictions either” (Watt, 1996, xv). A final note to mention in this respect is that unlike the ancient myths which were mostly about circumstances, the modern myths are akin to the Western tragedy in that the individual character has a greater role and contribution in determining his own fate. Morris says that “[t]here is also much truth in the view that the Greek tragedy was drama of circumstances, whereas Western tragedy is essentially a drama of character” (2004, 4). The characters in the three canonical novels are the authors of their own destiny. Crusoe brings about his own suffering by choosing seafaring, and Frankenstein and Count Dracula effectuate their own destructions.

CHAPTER II

ROBINSON CRUSOE AND ECONOMIC INDIVIDUALISM

Robinson Crusoe is a story of the journey towards discovering, recognizing, and establishing the self. The novel emphasizes the role of individuals in the age of industrial revolution, and it can be seen as a declaration of personal freedom and individualism. Watt says:

Daniel Defoe whose philosophical outlook has much in common with that of the English empiricists of the seventeenth century, expressed the diverse elements of individualism more completely than any previous writer, and his work offers a unique demonstration of the connection between individualism in its many forms and the rise of the novel. This connection is shown particularly clearly and comprehensively in his first novel, *Robinson Crusoe*. (Watt, 1959, 61)

In addition to marking the rise of a new genre, *Robinson Crusoe* marks the rise of a new ideological paradigm. In this respect, “Robinson Crusoe can be seen as an articulate spokesman of the new economic, religious, and social attitudes that succeeded the Counter-Reformation [when], with the increasing dominance of the new individualism, the punitive elements in the Counter-Reformation plots were removed” (Watt, 1996, xv). Defoe’s character marks the beginning of a new age which requires different attitudes and assumptions. The story’s unique dedication to the individual strains the social, religious, and moral fabric of the Western culture at that time. Crusoe’s adventures counterpose “[t]he medieval idea that it was the individual’s religious and moral duty to stay within his assigned place in the social hierarchy” (Watt, 1996, 36). The protagonist comes as a response to the need of a new way of looking at the world. He is a prototype

of the eighteenth century economic man who created and contributed to the capitalist industrial revolution. Defining individualism and the proclamation of *laissez-faire*, Lukes says that “[t]he principle of individualism is that which, taking a man out of society, makes him sole judge of what surrounds him and of himself, gives him a heightened sense of his rights without showing him his duties, abandons him to his own powers” (1971, 51). This definition can very well be at the same time a compact abstraction and summary of the central theme of *Robinson Crusoe*. In fact, the story exhibits individualism in different forms and shapes. The realism of Defoe’s narrative is mainly achieved through individualism because it is completely dedicated to the exposition of the relationships and experiences of a singular ordinary man. John Richetti asserts that “Defoe’s realism as a novelist comes in his vivid evocation of individuals as they examine the conditions of their existence and explore what it means to be a person in particularized social and historical circumstances” (2008, 121). Defoe invents a personalized voice for his character and offers a self-revelatory discourse that tries to fashion a distinctive identity for his character.

This chapter investigates the presentation of individualism in the novel form from various perspectives. First, it discusses the conflict between the non-conformist individual and the group which burdens its members with collective representations; Crusoe rebels against the common collective social assumptions. He ignores the considerable extent of moral and ethical codes. And, he reforms the sacred beliefs and assumptions which he has inherited from his community to make them suitable to the ambitious and unstoppable economic man. Second, this chapter considers the patterning of subjectivity, self-consciousness, self-certainty, and possession in the story. Third, it explores the common characteristics of the emerging industrious man, such as industriousness, self-reliance, perseverance, masculinity, independence, sovereignty, and autonomy, and the incarnation of such characteristics in the personality of Robinson Crusoe. Fourth, the chapter examines the status of the individual in the capitalist world which is represented in the story, through the perspective of Marx’s theory. Fifth, the chapter sheds light on the eighteenth century conception of the distinguished and superior man who is inclined to tackle the responsibility of revolutionary reforms, through the examination of Crusoe’s characteristics of supremacy and his will to power.

To begin with, it is worth mentioning that the autobiographical form in which the story is written is itself a way of representing and asserting the self. In Defoe's first novel, "the autobiographical memoir is as defiant an assertion of the primacy of individual experience in the novel" (Watt, 1959, 14). The autobiographical form is a way of authorizing the singular self. Authorization of the self is a historical stage in the emergence of a particular stratum of the self which came into fashion "[b]y the end of the third century [when] Christianity had suddenly flooded the . . . world with its own claims to authorization and began to dissolve into itself many of the then existing . . . practices" (Jaynes, 2000, 346). At this stage, "the analogue self comes to credit itself, not only with an innate capacity to distinguish between good and evil, but with the potential for partaking of the divine . . . this feature of the Christian tradition is nothing less than an authorization of the analogue self to continue its process of expansion and what we might today call 'self-realization'" (Shanahan 39). Thus, *Robinson Crusoe* comes in accordance with an already existing tradition which grants authorization rights, and encourages the cultivation of a higher self for the sake of achieving spiritual fulfilment.

As far as the authorization of the self is concerned, *Robinson Crusoe* imitates the fashion initiated by Augustine's *Confessions*. Shanahan quotes Freccero as saying that Augustine's *Confessions* imply "the resurrection of the self as author" and that it represents the first "literary self-creation of an individual seen as both subject and object" (Shanahan 40). The parallels between *Robinson Crusoe* and *Confessions* do not only include the autobiographical and confessional nature of both works, they also include themes like parental disobedience and independent existence. Confessing his disobedience to his mother and his insistence upon embarking on a long journey, Augustine says, "[b]ut why I went hence, and went thither, thou knewest, O God, yet showedst it neither to me, nor to my mother, who grievously bewailed my journey, and followed me as far as the sea. But I deceived her, holding me by force, that either she might keep me back or go with me, and I feigned that I had a friend whom I could not leave, till he had a fair wind to sail" (Augustine, 2004, 104). But, while Augustine authorizes a fifth century model self, the authorial self in *Robinson Crusoe* uses this already established stage of individuality as a scratch, and sets forth towards extending

the limits, and setting new standards for the individualistic self. The novel creates a new idealized self that not only functions as a model for the eighteenth century subject but also for many generations to come.

2.1. Crusoe and Society

Robinson Crusoe is a story of rebellion against communal traditions. The protagonist devalues the status of the network of ties which keep the individual linked to all the forms of collectiveness for the sake of bettering his economic conditions. This is an expected consequence because “[t]he hypothesis of the economic motive logically entails a devaluation of other modes of thought . . . the various forms of traditional group relationship, the family, the guild, the village, the sense of nationality – all are weakened” (Watt, 1959, 63). In fact, the intricate system of relationships between the individual and the communal groups is expounded by Emile Durkheim. According to Durkheim (1995), the group constantly produces intellectual and moral uniformity to ensure that everything becomes stereotyped and common to everyone. Conformity of conduct should reflect conformity of thought, because the group does its best to pull all individual consciousness along a unified current.

Communities strive to achieve uniformity of attitude and behaviour through collective representations. The collective representations of a society are formidable because they are the outcomes of the community’s accumulation of experience and knowledge throughout history.

Collective representations are the products of an immense cooperation that extends not only through space but also through time; to make them, a multitude of different minds have associated, intermixed, and combined their ideas and feelings; long generations have accumulated their experience and knowledge [together, these representations assemble] A very special intellectuality that is infinitely richer and more complex than that of the individual (Durkheim 1995, 15).

The non-conformity of thought with the prevailing collective representations can be observed through the discourse of Crusoe in the very early pages of the novel when he mentions that “[his] head began to be filled very early with rambling thoughts” (Defoe 3). This means that Crusoe realizes the irregularity and the confusion of his thoughts

because they go against the stereotypical communal assumptions. The fact that these assumptions are becoming old is indicated in Crusoe's statement that his father "was very ancient" (Defoe 3); a statement which also indicates that Crusoe's father represents the old paradigm.

In Defoe's work, the collective representations which enjoy privileged status and forceful power that can extend beyond empirical logic are reduced mainly in the figure of the caring father. The father stands for the society, and the father's will represents the will of God. Referring to the character of the father in the story, White says that "the father/patriarch is the representative of God giving voice to Providential Design" (2011, 20). The forceful and sacred nature of the father's wills are indicated when Crusoe describes his father's wills as "commands", while describing the wills of his mother and his friends as "entreaties and persuasions" (Defoe 3). However, Crusoe has an unexplained internal urge to escape from the confines of the father figure. Paradoxically, he acknowledges the wisdom of his father and positively values his "good counsel" (Defoe 37), when he says, "[m]y father, a wise and grave man, gave me serious and excellent counsel against what he foresaw was my design" (Defoe 4). At the same time, Crusoe negatively values his own individualistic aspirations and describes them as "misfortunes" and "wickedly taken" resolutions (Defoe 5-11). Nevertheless, Crusoe commits filial disobedience and goes against the 'good counsel' of his father, the 'entreaties' of his mother, and attributes his urge to non-conformity to his ill fate.

Durkheim suggests that collective representations lead to a kind of duality in human nature. Thus, "man is double. In him are two beings: an individual being that has its basis in the body and whose sphere of action is strictly limited by this fact, and a social being that represents within us the highest reality in the intellectual and moral realm" (Durkheim, 1995, 15). This duality has consequences on the level of practice and the level of thought of the individual. In "the realm of practice, the consequence of this duality in our nature is the irreducibility of the moral ideal to the utilitarian motive; in the realm of thought, it is the irreducibility of reason to individual experience [and] As part of society, the individual naturally transcends himself, both when he thinks and when he acts." (Durkheim, 1995, 16). This duality variably puts the individual into a

state of ambivalence about recognizing his own self within the group. Such duality of character is clearly exhibited in the following reflection of Robinson Crusoe which gives the impression that, inside, he has two selves, and neither of these selves understands the other:

But my ill fate pushed me on now with an obstinacy that nothing could resist; and though I had several times loud calls from my reason and my more composed judgement to go home, yet I had no power to do it. I know not what to call this, nor will I urge that it is a secret overruling decree, that hurries us on to be the instruments of our own destruction, even though it be before us, and that we rush upon it with our eyes open. Certainly, nothing but some such decreed unavoidable misery, which it was impossible for me to escape, could have pushed me forward against the calm reasonings and persuasions of my most retired thoughts, and against two such visible instructions as I had met with in my first attempt. (Defoe 13)

In the realm of practice, the moral ideal, which consists of obedience and compliance with the father's will, does not yield any utilitarian benefit for Crusoe. In the realm of thought, the collective reason cannot be reduced to the personal reason of the character. That is why Crusoe transcends himself and attributes his personal inclinations to an ill fate which cannot be resisted. What he calls "my reason", which is the calm reason, is the collective reason of compliance. And what he calls "the secret overruling decree" is his personal aspiration. The result is a double personality which characterizes the protagonist in *Robinson Crusoe* throughout the story. While in the above quote he attributes the duality inside him to the conflict between his ill fate and the inner sound of reasonable judgement, he expresses this duality later in the story by the conflict between his head and his body when he says, "but my unlucky head, that was always to let me know it was born to make my body miserable" (Defoe 183). At the beginning of the story, Crusoe perceives the duality inside him as the doubleness of the self; and later, after the sufferings and hardships, he perceives the same duality as an opposition between his body and his mind.

In fact, the above duality can further be explained knowing that Durkheim views collectivity as a heavy weight which burdens and constrains the freedom of individuals. Society rarely tolerates the free choice of its members. In order to live, a certain level of consensus with the standards is needed. Thus:

in order to prevent dissidence, society weights on its members with all its authority. Does a mind seek to free itself from these norms of all thought? Society no longer considers this a human mind in the full sense, and treats it accordingly. This is why it is that when we try, even deep down inside, to get away from these fundamental notions, we feel that we are not fully free; something resists us, from inside and outside ourselves. (Durkheim 16)

In other words, resistance is felt from outside because of an external opinion that constantly judges the individual, and an internal resistance is, at the same time, felt because society is also represented within the individual. The heavy burden which constrains the freedom is felt when Crusoe, referring to his father, says, “he pressed me earnestly, and in the most affectionate manner, not to play the young man, nor to precipitate myself into miseries which nature, and the station of life I was born in, seemed to have provided against” (Defoe 5). In order to prevent dissidence, society confers upon people its own assumptions and raises these assumptions to the status of “nature”, and any mind which tries to resist the dominance of these assumptions is viewed as acting against nature. Crusoe rejects conformity with the values of the group which are summed up in the father’s advice and his designs for the future of his son. In order to escape the pressure and the control of his father, Crusoe chooses the sea: “I would be satisfied with nothing but going to the sea” (Defoe 3). The sea is the zone of freedom. It is the domain which is administered by entirely different rules. Crusoe chooses the sea because it is beyond the dominance and the control of the burdening collective assumptions.

The fact that society has an existence and reality that supersedes the individual “does not mean that individual representations or minds can be overlooked. Collective representations depend on them. There can be no society without individuals who stand at its base” (Pickering, 2000, 16). This means that in addition to the collective representations, which are often unquestionably accepted without proof or prior examination, there are individual representations which might vary from one person to another. In other words:

Each person has a particular set of representations which is never identical to that of society. The distinct personality of each individual modifies the collective consciousness accordingly. Thus, the process of socialization is never perfect in that individuals completely accept the

collective representations of their society. If this were so it would deny the notion of autonomy which was so central to Durkheim's thinking. (Pickering, 2000, 15)

Thus, unlike the rigid and uniform collective representations which are of a much higher order and superior to individual representations, the individual representations are more flexible and various, especially for autonomous and dissonant people. From this perspective, *Robinson Crusoe* can be seen as the story of a journey in which the major character finds and validates new individual representations.

Among the representations which enjoy the status of the highest rank for the society and the individual are religious representations. Because of their sacred nature and established credibility, religious representations "express collective realities" (Durkheim, 1995, 9). One of the essential aspects of Crusoe's journey is that it discusses and suggests key metamorphoses in the collective and individual sacred representations. Accordingly, *Robinson Crusoe* sets forth to evaluate the position of the singular individual in his relationship to divinity with the complete absence of any church or priest mediation. The protagonist of the novel is left entirely alone to have the chance to become the ultimate arbiter of truth. The story fulfils a required transition of individuality from its Renaissance condition to its capitalist condition. Such transition, according to Shanahan, also requires secularization. Therefore, "the belief that the individual is the final arbiter of truth requires a secularization that, while it may have for all intents and purposes existed for many in the Renaissance, cannot be said to have pervaded the moral landscape" (Shanahan 57). Thus, *Robinson Crusoe* suggests a new, more worldly and secularized, version of the *Bible* that matches and suits the rising spirit of industrialization and capitalism. The novel presents a world where prayers and supplications take the form of bargains and mercantile contractual arrangements.

In this sense, Defoe's novel is a significant step towards individuality because it investigates the modern status of subjectivity and the metamorphosis of the sacred collective and individual representations. By giving more voice to the aspirations of subjectivity, the story marks the emergence of a new self, a self, authorized enough to measure personal subjective values against the values of divinity. The new emerging self is also authorized enough to form the new age's *metanoia* and to secularize the scripture.

The new individual is also authorized enough to recreate the biblical motifs and themes and measure the self against the consecrated figures.

Accordingly, *Robinson Crusoe* is thronged with biblical allusions and prophetic incarnations which serve as references against which Crusoe tries to identify in his search for a new identity. Within this context, the father's "truly prophetic" (Defoe 6) predictions about Crusoe having "leisure hereafter to reflect upon having neglected his counsel" (5), and about becoming "the most miserable wretch that ever was born" (7), literally take place, at least during his stay on the island. Thus, "in an ill hour", he submits to the "allurement of seafaring" (7) and decides to leave. The wanderer who has little knowledge about God assumes a confessional and self-criticizing attitude from the very beginning. He admits his guilt of filial disobedience when he says, "I consulted neither father nor mother anymore, nor so much as sent them word of it; but leaving them to hear of it as they might, without asking God's blessing or my father's" (7). The punitive consequences of such sinful acts, which he calls misfortunes, start very soon after his departure on board of the ship. The wind blows, the sea rises in a frightful manner, and he starts reflecting upon his wicked deeds of breaching his duties towards God and towards his father. Terrified of being swallowed by the big waves, he makes sacred vows, "I made many vows and resolutions that if it would please God to spare my life in this one voyage, if ever I got once my foot on dry land again while I lived, that I would take his advice, and never run myself into such miseries as these anymore" (8). Though God fulfils his part of the deal, Crusoe does not. The promises, which he describes as wise and sober during the storm, are forgotten the next day when the sea calms down and smooths its surface. Thus, Crusoe follows the voice of his inner 'I', rather than the voice of divinity, and continues his journey.

The doctrines of predestination and election in the Calvinist theology create "the spiritual aristocracy of the predestined saints of God within the world" (Weber, 2001, 75). Crusoe enters into this spiritual aristocracy by a personal act of will and asserts his own election as a chosen servant of God. The Calvinist system of belief is flexible enough to allow such entry. Thus, "as a bit player in the dramatic unfolding of divine will, the individual could only assume that he or she was chosen and therefore imbued

with all the spiritual acumen allowable to human kind” (Shanahan 68). Accordingly, the story continues in a series of misfortunes which give the impression that Crusoe is being rebuked for his sins. It is worth mentioning in this context that “Crusoe’s ‘original sin’ is really the dynamic tendency of capitalism itself, whose aim is never merely to maintain the status quo, but to transform it incessantly. Leaving home, improving on the lot one was born to, is a vital feature of the individualist pattern of life” (Watt, 1959, 62). Thus, though the hardships and the misfortunes he faces are serious and life threatening, his predicaments are always overcome, and he is often rewarded eventually with success and material benefit at the end.

Crusoe goes through difficulties that resemble the predicaments of the Biblical prophets who are chosen and destined to fulfil contrived divine plans. The captain of the sunken ship gives a prophetic speech interpreting the misfortune which they witness to the presence of Crusoe on board of the ship. The captain says, “[p]erhaps this has all befallen us on your account, like Jonah in the ship of Tarshish” (13). This speech directly compares Crusoe to Jonah and provides extra prophecy concerning his present situation and his future. Like the speech of the father, the speech of the captain foreshadows the utmost punishment of the shipwreck and the castaway of Crusoe alone on the island. Like Jonah, who “set out to flee to Tarshish from the presence of the Lord” (Bible, Jonah 1, 1853), Crusoe escapes from the dominance of his father and ends up being thrown into the sea and then on dry land, hardly alive. Crusoe could not believe that he is saved and he addresses the Lord saying, “Lord, how was it possible I could get on shore” (43). The image of Jonah continues when he describes his state after his deliverance and says, “I was wet, had no clothes to shift me, nor anything either to eat or drink to comfort me” (43). Crusoe’s refuge to the tree has parallels with the plant mentioned in the scripture which is particularly provided to protect Jonah: “The Lord God appointed a bush, and made it come up over Jonah, to give shade over his head, to save him from his discomfort” (Bible, Jonah 4, 1856). The bush tree, which he spends his first night on, provides a similar refuge. Crusoe says, “[a]ll the remedy that offered to my thoughts at that time was to get up into a thick bushy tree like a fir, but thorny, which grew near me” (43). Upon much thinking and reflection, he starts pondering the miracles which follow the miracle of his deliverance. For example, the shipwreck moves forward

in the night and comes to be within his reach. All “the ship provisions were dry and untouched by the water, and being very well disposed to eat” (46). Some of his wishes come true on the spot. Crusoe says, “I hoped to find some creek or river there, which I might make use of as a port to get to land with my cargo. As I imagined, so it was” (48). Thinking about the death of all his comrades, he starts to think that he has been chosen to be saved. He reflects, “I walked about on the shore lifting up my hands, and my whole being, as I may say, wrapped up in a contemplation of my deliverance; making a thousand gestures and motions, which I cannot describe; reflecting upon all my comrades that were drowned, and that there should not be one soul saved but myself” (43). Gradually, Crusoe starts thinking that he has been saved for a purpose and that he is the chosen one.

Another form of duality in Crusoe`s character takes shape during his stay on the island. On the one hand, some of his statements cast doubts upon his belief in divine benevolence. For example, he wanders, “why Providence should thus completely ruin his creature” (58). On the other hand, he expresses faith and thankfulness when he remembers the benevolence of his survival. Addressing himself, he wonders, “where are the rest of you? . . . where are the ten? . . . why were you singled out?” (58). He always comes to the conclusion that it is all the determination of Heaven, and that he is chosen and supported by Providence.

Setting the biblical themes and motifs as reference in Crusoe`s search for an identity continues. The motif of the promised food for the selected ones is referred to more than once in the novel, whether in direct, or in indirect ways. When he discovers the stalks and the ears of barley on the side of his fortification, he becomes amazed. He says, “after I saw barley grow there, in a climate which I knew was not proper for corn, and especially that I knew not how it came there, it startled me strangely, and I began to suggest that God had miraculously caused His grain to grow without any help of seed sown, and that it was so directed purely for my sustenance on that wild, miserable place” (72-73). The image of finding food and sources of nourishment on the island resembles the Biblical promised food and the miraculous spread of the table in the wilderness to the chosen people. Moreover, he also thankfully compares the miracle of having food on

the island with the miracle of feeding Elijah⁶. Thus, he thinks that he ought to give his daily thanks for the daily bread which is brought to him by a crowd of wonders and “[he] ought to consider [he] had been fed even by a miracle, even as great as that of feeding Elijah by ravens” (125). The miracle of feeding comes next to the miracle of surviving the shipwreck, and it represents a further evidence of Providence care.

In addition, Crusoe ascertains his spiritual integrity and demonstrates evidence for the certainty of his election through implying divine images upon specific island contexts and experiences. The reason is that “Calvinism afforded individuals the ability to interpret personal experience selectively in such a way as to reassure themselves of their spiritual integrity” (Shanahan 77). Thus, one does not need exceptional effort to notice that the image of paradise prevails in Crusoe’s descriptions of the island. In fact, the whole island is generally presented as a rough Eden, “and Crusoe turns this rough Eden into rough England” (Koç 15). As far as the paradise image is concerned, there are certain places within the island that instantly invoke paradisiacal visions. After repenting and becoming closer to God, Crusoe is rewarded with an earthly paradise. Upon surveying the island, he discovers that it is rich beyond his imagination. He finds a “brook of running water, very fresh and good” (93), which stands for the River of Eden. Moreover, he finds different types of plants, which include:

a great deal of tobacco . . . melons upon the ground, in great abundance, and grapes upon the trees . . . The vines had spread, indeed, over the trees, and the clusters of grapes were just now in their prime, very ripe and rich [and] abundance of cocoa trees, orange, and lemon, and citron trees [the place] appeared so fresh, so green, so flourishing, everything being in a constant verdure or flourish of spring that it looked like a planted garden.” (93-94-95)

The difference between this garden and the Garden of Eden is that this garden does not belong to the Lord. It is a mundane paradise that belongs to Crusoe. It is his private property. The spiritual is mixed with the material. The island is the worldly paradise of the emerging capitalist individual. Crusoe says that it is a pleasure “to think that this was

⁶ Elijah (the Latinized form Elias) was a Hebrew prophet who lived in the ninth century BC. He was bestowed with different miracles; the most famous of which was his feeding by ravens. Concerning this event, Feldman mentions that “The Bible is very specific in stating exactly what the ravens brought Elijah, namely bread and meat, and how often they came, namely in the morning and in the evening.” (298)

all [his] own; that [he] was king and lord of all this country indefensibly, and had a right of possession; and if [he] could convey it, [he] might have it in inheritance as completely as any lord of a manor in England” (95). Thus, Crusoe`s paradise is divine and worldly at the same time, and in both cases the paradise confirms the spiritual and economic singularity, and his election.

As a further sign of election, the chosen Crusoe is also depicted as a king. The description in the scene, in which Crusoe sits to take his dinner and imagines his animals to be his subjects and courtiers, gives such an impression. Invoking the image of kingdom, Crusoe says, “there was my majesty the prince and lord of the whole island; I had the lives of all my subjects at my absolute command; I could hang, draw, give liberty, and take it away, and no rebels among all my subjects” (141). Owning the powder and the guns Crusoe boosts the authority and the power to decide who lives and who dies on the island. Crusoe creates the means of living on the island from scratch. The saving of Friday`s life amounts to the bestowing of life. The gratitude of Friday, in return, is undisputable, for Friday`s “affections were tied to [Crusoe], like those of a child to a father” (196). Later, Crusoe peoples his island, not through his own breeding, but through the settling of others and providing the necessary elements for living. In this way, he creates his miniature kingdom and affirms his status as a governor and king.

Through the series of events and experiences which Crusoe goes through, he strives to validate his existence and his own thoughts. The problem is that “contemporary doubts about individualism seem to suggest that, while thought may validate existence, it cannot validate itself: the individual`s own perceptions may not provide sufficiently reliable information for the conduct of life” (Shanahan 20). Such doubts about the validity and the truth of one`s thought force the individual to ask the following question: “I think, therefore I am, but since I am not at all certain about the validity of what I think, how can I be certain about what I am?” (Shanahan 20). To account for the validity of thought, Shanahan suggests a definition of individualism which takes into consideration this significant issue. Thus, individualism is “that system of beliefs in which the individual is not only given direct status and value but becomes the final arbiter of truth” (Shanahan 20-21). Therefore, Robinson Crusoe does not only

affirm his individualistic existence through thinking, he also painstakingly negotiates the validity of his thoughts throughout the novel, and casts his own approval upon them. In other words, for Crusoe, to think is not enough to exist; in order to further affirm his existence and achieve his moral worth, he appoints himself as an arbiter of truth. He validates most of his thoughts through the novel. A particular point of failure in this respect comes when he is puzzled by Friday's innocent and natural question about the existence of the devil in spite of God's omnipotent dominance and power. Crusoe evades the question and says, "I therefore diverted the present discourse between me and my man, rising up hastily, as upon some sudden occasion of going out; then sending him for something a good way off" (207). In this occasion, he attributes his failure to validate his opinions to his lack of knowledge, saying, "I had, God knows, more sincerity than knowledge in all the methods I took for this poor creature's instructions" (207). During his stay on the island, he validates his actions, his thoughts, and his own morality. It is worth mentioning in this context that the process of thought validation becomes burdensome to Crusoe's mind when he thinks about the issues which have no direct relationship to him or to his situation within the confines of his island. In such cases, he thinks that arguments and disputes are useless and the best thing to do in such complex situations is to appoint the word of God, again, as the final arbiter of truth. Thus, Crusoe thinks, "[a]s to all the disputes, wrangling, strife, and contention which have happened in the world . . . they were all perfectly useless to us . . . We had the sure guide to heaven, viz. the Word of God . . . leading us to all truth" (209). Such a contention admits the limits of the individual as a constant arbiter of ultimate truth. It also represents a setback in Crusoe's individualist enterprise in this respect, because it casts doubts upon the designated primacy of the human perception which he stands for.

Viewing Crusoe's life on the island as a reward for his righteousness, the paradox inside him is resolved. His endeavour is eventually blessed: "I acquiesced in the dispositions of Providence, which I began now to own and to believe ordered everything for the best" (103). The filial disobedience is not a sin anymore. The untamed desire to achieve economic success is acknowledged by Providence. The buying and selling of slaves and the appropriation of lands are not acts of evil nature in the new capitalist world. Accordingly, he wins both, the materialist mundane world and the Divine world.

Crusoe preaches a new more relaxed religion, so to speak. He suggests a system of belief in which the long list of sins which entitle one to be burned in the lake of fire is reduced. He is a greedy miser and covetous hoarder, and still, he is a blessed one. Although money is worthless on the island and not worth “the taking off the ground” (54), he still reflects that “it was a great pity that the other part of this ship had not come to my share: for I am satisfied I might have loaded my canoe several times over with money” (182). For him, the best cure for Covetousness is richness: “The most covetous, gripping miser in the world would have been cured of the vice of covetousness if he had been in my case; for I possessed infinitely more than I knew what to do with” (122). His system of beliefs allows him to plunder the two ships, and to empty the pockets of drowned sailors without any sense of guilt. His system of belief also allows the shedding of blood for the sake of self-preservation and the protection of material gain.

As far as his relation to collectiveness is concerned, Crusoe treasures his individuality and his separation from society. He says, “I gave my humble and hearty thanks that God had been pleased to discover to me that it was possible I might be more happy in this solitary condition than I should have been in the liberty of society, and all the pleasures of the world” (107). In fact, he is independent of any collective unit since he has no family, no church, and no other social interaction or responsibility on the island. In fact, other people for Crusoe fall into one of the four following categories. They are either enemies to be fought, or to take precautions against, working hands to help in achieving ambitious projects, slaves to be loyal and submissive, or good and generous people who help him in an unconditional way. Crusoe`s claims for desiring company do not represent real inclinations towards collectivity because he does not seek the company of an equal, he seeks the company of a subject. Thus, Crusoe is a non-conformist figure who “stands for the new independent individual and his materialist aspirations” (Koç 16).

One of the disadvantages of singularity and separation from collectiveness is fear. Fear accompanies Defoe`s protagonist since the very beginning of the story. Crusoe lives under the dread of impending mischief. Fear is maximized after the discovery of the foot print: “All this labour I was at the expense of, purely from my apprehensions on

account of the print of a man`s foot . . . I had now lived two years under this uneasiness, which, indeed, made my life much less comfortable than it was before, as may be well imagined by any who know what it is to live in the constant snare of the fear of man” (156). The conveyed message is that fear is the price the autonomous individual pays for his freedom. The reason is that:

every forward step taken to free ourselves from whatever is holding us back is marked by fear. Everything that does not belong to the past and does not form part of our introjected experience necessarily presents itself as something threatening, because we have no ready categories by which to recognize what is happening. These categories are provided by the group, and thus every time we are afraid it may be that we are trying to do something individual. Where instead fear is absent, we are unconsciously submerged in the group and in the teachings of the past. (Carotenuto 18-19)

Having the spirit of capitalism, Crusoe has little or no space for emotions, personal bonds, or pangs of conscience. The collective assumptions that are social and moral are all also adjusted to serve his desire for materialistic success. Paradoxically, he acknowledges those assumptions in some statements, and he shatters them in other statements. For example, while he displays an extent of civility in trying not to harm the Moor after tossing him clear overboard into the sea, in his next comment, he uses a discourse which exhibits total disregard towards human life when he says, “I could have been content to have taken this Moor with me, and have drowned the boy, but there was no venturing to trust him” (21). Unwritten bonds have low value for Crusoe. He addresses the Moorish boy, Xury, and gives a good promise: “Xury, if you will be faithful to me, I will make you a great man” (21). He then sells him to the Portuguese captain for sixty pieces of eight. As usual, Crusoe has momentary scruples. He recognizes the moral guilt: “I was very loth to sell the poor boy`s liberty, who had assisted me so faithfully in procuring my own” (31). But upon second thoughts, he justifies his action and presents it as harmless and normal. Interesting enough, when he later regrets selling Xury, he does so because Xury would have become of great value for him as a working hand in the farm.

2.2. Individuality and the Relation with Others

One of the early philosophers who best theorized about the fashioning of individuality and represented the period of the eighteenth century is Hegel. Hegel's thought represents the era during which he lived and not his personal life. In other words, "[i]t is probably right that priority in considering Hegel's work should be given to the times in which he lived, rather than to his life and character: for his work was more obviously shaped by this, than by biographical circumstances" (Stern, 2013, 2). Individualism, subjectivity, self-consciousness, self-certainty and otherness are the concepts which are systematically discussed by Hegel. For him, the simplest form of individuality is shaped with the formation of organic life. Singularity starts with the formation of individualized bodies which "are singular individuals that through their cycle of changes acquire their own particular, specific character" (Ferrini, 2011, 209). According to Hegel, collectivity transcends the individuals and determines their thinking and behaviour. Enlightenment, urbanization and industrialization brought about economic individualism and assigned great value to the freedom and the rights of the subjects in the communities; thus providing more satisfaction to the subjectivity of individuals. In fact, Hegel's approach maps and traces the changes in the societies and individuals through history and explores the state of individuality through the continuum of time. He also suggests an image about the structures of the future societies. In his *Phenomenology of Spirit*, he anticipates the spirit of evolution, which took shape at the beginning of the nineteenth century, when he talks about the evolution of the human consciousness according to different stages in history. Hegel's "phenomenology is a concrete history of consciousness, of its departure from the cave and its ascent to science" (Hyppolite, Cherniak, and Heckman 1974, 13). The key issue in the journey of consciousness is experience. Thus, "[i]n the course of its development, consciousness loses not only what it held to be true from a theoretical point of view, but also its own view of life and of being, its intuition of the world" (Hyppolite, Cherniak, and Heckman, 13). Hegel suggests a three stage transition process of the human consciousness from a full dependence on perception in grasping the world to the formation of 'spirit', a term used by Hegel to refer to the self-consciousness of the society which binds individuals in a community. According to Hegel, consciousness of the world necessarily implies self-

consciousness: perceiving the objects presupposes a conscious subject. The subject is also conscious of the other subjects in a community. Hence, the point of particular interest to this study is that “self-consciousness is desire in general” (Hegel, 1977, 105). Such consciousness is shaped and determined by other members of the community to a great extent. The individuals in a society tend to see themselves through the eyes of others. Hegel says, “in point of fact self-consciousness is the reflection out of the being of the world of sense and perception, and is essentially the return from otherness” (Hegel, 1977, 105). In other words:

[Self-consciousness] is only the motionless tautology of ‘I am I’; but since for it the difference does not have the form of being, it is not self-consciousness. Hence otherness is for it in the form of a being, or as a distinct moment; but there is also for consciousness the unity of itself with this difference as a second distinct moment. With that first moment, self-consciousness is in the form of consciousness, and the whole expanse of the sensuous world is preserved for it, but at the same time only as connected with the second moment, the unity of self-consciousness with itself; and hence the sensuous world is for it an enduring existence. (Hegel, 1977, 105)

This self-consciousness is independent; and “by negating its own immediacy, this same individual self-consciousness does not distinguish itself from others but instead recognizes itself in them” (James, 2007, 12). Thus, self-consciousness can be viewed as a dynamic social process that is inherently connected to the position or the status of the individual in the group. That is to say that individuality is determined by collectivity. The subordinate or the inferior is always conscious of his position and status through the eyes of the superior or the master. At the same time, the superior assumes his status and self-image through negating the consciousness of the subordinate.

In accordance with the above characterization of self-consciousness, *Robinson Crusoe* can be seen as a depiction of the evolution of the dynamic process of self-recognition. Crusoe finds in the enlightened capitalist spirit of the time a chance to go out of the orbit of collectivity which controls and determines the thinking of the individual. As such, the beginning of the story presents an already evolved stage of self-awareness. The life on the island, on the other hand, puts on display the process of self-recognition from scratch. The life on the island displays the history of Crusoe`s

consciousness and the formation of his subjectivity. Defoe's novel, then, is a journey of the formation consciousness through experience, which leads to the formation of what Hegel calls the "spirit". The regaining of consciousness after the shipwreck amounts to a new birth, and consequently represents the acquisition of the most elementary form of self-consciousness which is related to the recognition of the sensuous and immediate world. Later, the need for the other arises and increases gradually. The other is essential to Crusoe for two reasons: First, the other is indispensable for the formation of the integrated self-consciousness; and second, he needs, through the other, to assume his autonomous status.

Paradoxically, therefore, although *Robinson Crusoe* celebrates the complete autonomy of the individual, the novel at the same time, indicates explicitly enough that the formation of integrated subjectivity is not possible without the existence of others. The self-consciousness cannot recognize itself without the others. For a long period of time on the island, Crusoe sees himself through his non-human companions. He is a master for his dog, cats, parrots and goats. After the castaway of another ship near his island and the perishing of its crew, he feels "a strange longing" in his soul for company and breaks out saying, "Oh that there had been but one or two, nay, or but one soul saved out of this ship, to have escaped to me, that I might but have had one companion, one fellow creature, to have spoken to me and to have conversed with . . . In all the time of my solitary life I never felt so earnest, so strong a desire after the society of my fellow-creatures, or so deep a regret at the want of it" (Defoe 177-178). After a long time of loneliness on the island, Crusoe is on the verge of losing his sense of subjectivity. The 'I' has no meaning without others. This explains this sudden, intense yearning for company. This unexpected desire for company is extensively described by Defoe. It is presented as a moment of rapture of emotions and spiritual collapse. In this context, Crusoe describes his "secret springs in the affections" which are "violent [and] unsupportable" by using the most earnest discourse:

Such were these earnest wishings that but one man had been saved. I believe I repeated the words "Oh that it had been but one!" a thousand times; and my desires were so moved by it, that when I spoke the words my hands would clinch together, and my fingers would press the palms of my hands, so that if I had had any soft thing in my hand I would have crushed it

involuntarily; and the teeth in my head would strike together, and set against one another so strong, that for some time I could not part them again. (178).

Intoxicated with his precious autonomy, he cannot understand his own feelings of longing for others: “Let the naturalist explain these things, and the reason and the manner of them. All I can do is to describe the fact, which was even surprising to me when I found it” (178). In fact, this scene represents the failure of total and complete individualism. The scene shows that human beings are social creatures and that complete severance from collectivity cannot be tolerated for long. Crusoe achieves complete independence. He copes with the lack of working hands through doing the tasks over long periods; and his guns and powder compensate for the need of collectivity for defence. But he fails on the emotional level. He earnestly needs to socialise and interact with his species. David Hume expresses the indispensability of others for individual human beings in an approximation to the situation of Crusoe on the island:

We can form no wish, which has not a reference to society. A perfect solitude is, perhaps, the greatest punishment we can suffer. Every pleasure languish when enjoyed a-part from company, and every pain becomes more cruel and intolerable . . . Let all the powers and elements of nature conspire to serve and obey one man. Let the sun rise and set at his command. The sea and rivers roll as he pleases, and the earth furnish spontaneously whatever may be useful or agreeable to him. He will still be miserable, till you give him some one person at least, with whom he may share his happiness. (Hume, 1966, 363)

On the other hand, the severe anxiety which inflicts Crusoe after the discovery of the foot print arises from the fear of others. Others not only represent a threat to ownership, they also represent a threat to his subjectivity, particularly if he is ignorant about their nature. Describing his reaction after seeing the print of a man`s naked foot on the shore, he says, “I stood like one thunderstruck, or as if I had seen an apparition” (146). This scene demolishes his peace on the island and makes him take extreme defensive measures. After the realization that the print belongs to the savages, his fear multiplies. Knowing that the savages are cannibals, he sees his subjectivity through their eyes and naturally assumes that his own body represents food for them: “I rather prayed to God as under great affliction and pressure of mind, surrounded with danger, and in expectation every night of being murdered and devoured before morning” (156). The

fearful predicament of the cannibals invokes the significance of one of the most basic utilities of collectiveness, namely, the collaboration in opposition to potential danger. Singularity is a disadvantage in this case. The barbarous other not only represents a negation of his self-consciousness, but also a negation of his own very biological existence.

Crusoe favours the others whose self-consciousness is easily negated. The negation of the self-consciousness of others is particularly evident in the master-slave relationship between Crusoe and Friday. He assumes his master status through negating every aspect of his servant's consciousness. The subjugated slave, on the other hand, views his own self through the eyes of his master, and consequently complies and displays absolute loyalty. The scene which describes Friday's behaviour after being saved by Crusoe exemplifies the total negation of subjectivity. Referring to Friday, Crusoe says, "he kneeled down again, kissed the ground, and laid his head upon the ground, and taking me by the foot, set my foot upon his head" (191-192); then he adds that Friday "made all the signs to me of subjection, servitude, and submission imaginable, to let me know how he would serve me so long as he lived" (194). Crusoe describes the selflessness of Friday by saying that he is "without passions, sullenness, or designs, perfectly obliged and engaged . . . and I daresay he would have sacrificed his life to save mine upon any occasion" (196). This means that Friday does not only submit his subjectivity to his master, but he is also ready to submit his physical self. Upon such submissiveness, Crusoe takes absolute control: "I let him know his name should be Friday . . . I likewise taught him to say Master; and then let him know that was to be my name" (194). Thus, Friday's individuality is completely negated, and his self-certainty is dissolved in the character of his master. In fact, Crusoe's need for Friday is more than Friday's need for Crusoe. Crusoe is eager to have the awareness of his own self. He needs to perceive his own subjectivity and self-consciousness. This can only be achieved through a relation with another person. The reason is that "self-consciousness achieves its satisfaction only in another self-consciousness" (Rockmore, 1997, 63). Interestingly, "[t]he master is not dominant but is instead dependent on the slave for recognition" (Rockmore 71). Thus, although Crusoe chooses to establish his self-consciousness in the

form of a master and he displays power and dominance in his interaction with his slave, he is in fact more dependent than his slave.

The sojourn on the island satisfies Crusoe's yearning for self-recognition. In addition to viewing himself as a lord and a king before the arrival of Friday and the other men, after their arrival he becomes a master, a commander, a leader of an army, and a governor. Crusoe eventually turns back to society, but with a different spirit. He returns with a more self-centred and subjective spirit.

One important characteristic of the capitalist age is possession. And, one aspect of establishing individualism is related to satisfying the subject's desire for possessing. Possession is an aspect of the newly emerging empowered self. As "the religious trappings of Calvinistic logic were shed, the empowered-self began to test and expand its powers in terms of the individual's ability to acquire and possess" (Shanahan 77). According to Hegel, in order to be, one must be free. And significant way of fulfilling this freedom is the possession of property. Hegel claims that "[t]he person must give himself an external sphere of freedom in order to have being as an Idea . . . Not until he has property does the person exist as reason" (Hegel, 1991, 73). In *Robinson Crusoe*, possession is literal. Crusoe buys as much land as possible during his stay in Brazils: "[he] purchased as much land that was uncured as [his] money would reach" (32). Moreover, the island itself represents an utmost capitalist endeavour for the possession of property. It is a miniature world that belongs to one person, a world that is adjusted in size to suit the convenience of one individual to handle. Despite its vastness, the island is still small enough for Crusoe to own and to toy with. He likes to determine the limits and the boundaries of his properties. He prepares for a cruise around the island for the purpose of knowing how far his estate can extend: "being eager to view the circumference of my little kingdom, I resolved upon my cruise" (130). The island belongs to him even after leaving to his home country. He visits 'his colony' and provides his successors, whom he considers his subjects, with necessary provisions to maintain life there: "I left them supplies of all necessary things" (285). And although "[Crusoe] shared the lands into parts with them [but he] reserved to [himself] the property of the whole" (285).

Crusoe`s obsession with fencing, hedging and enclosing signifies possession and ownership. In addition to the double fence around his habitation, he plants trees “in a double row, at about eight-yard distance from” his first fence (100), thus surrounding his home with multiple hedges. He allocates and encloses different areas on the island for different purposes, which include a bower that is used as a summer house; and he constantly uses the possessive pronoun ‘my’ to refer to any of the areas that he encloses and invests.

The hardships he faces and the effort he exerts in settling and in taming the wild nature there represent the difficulties of earning and self-making. Crusoe earns his own world; he does not inherit it like an aristocrat. In a capitalist world every person has a chance of ownership if he works hard enough. Most of the tasks on the island require ‘infinite’ and ‘inexpressible’ labour. Throughout the story, Defoe suggests that hard work and struggle legitimatises ownership. Once again, the finding of the naked foot print on the island has further significance. This event inflicts in him lots of pain because it signals a threat to his singularity of ownership. Other people are allowed on Crusoe`s island only on the solemn oath of acknowledging his complete ownership of the island. Newcomers “should swear upon the holy sacraments and gospel to be true to” him (230). His first condition to the English men who will stay on the island is that they “will not pretend to any authority here” (239). With such strict measures, he guarantees the complete possession of the whole island.

2.3. Industriousness and Perseverance of Individuals

Industrialization and the transformation of society from agricultural into manufacturing mode of life represent a point of departure in history. The industrial revolution radically changed the social life and the structure of societies. The span of time between *Robinson Crusoe* in 1719 and *Dracula* in 1897 is perfectly located within, and almost covers the period which is called the first industrial revolution in Britain. Phyllis Deane supports the claim that “[t]he rise of industrialism in Great Britain can be more properly regarded as a long process stretching back to the middle of the sixteenth century and coming down to final triumph of the industrial state towards the end of the nineteenth, than as a sudden phenomenon associated with the late eighteenth and early

nineteenth centuries” (1979, 2). This revolution led to the rise of a new social stratification and the replacement of the aristocracy with the new ruling class or the bourgeoisie class. This industrious broad band of the population, which included businessmen, entrepreneurs, shopkeepers, managers, government officials and civil servants, started to gain wealth and political power. Despite the variation and divergence in wealth, the nature of work and background within this class, people of this group have certain characteristics in common. They display determination, thrift, prudence, self-reliance, and competence⁷. With their earnestness and devotion, they established competition and progress in economy. According to Max Weber, “[l]abour is an approved ascetic technique . . . Unwillingness to work is symptomatic of the lack of grace” (2001, 105). Weber believes that the Puritan spirit has an essential role in kindling the passion for work and labour at that time:

the pursuit of wealth as an end in itself [is] highly reprehensible; but the attainment of it as a fruit of labour in a calling was a sign of God’s blessing. And even more important: the religious valuation of restless, continuous, systematic work in a worldly calling, as the highest means to asceticism, and at the same time the surest and most evident proof of rebirth and genuine faith, must have been the most powerful conceivable lever for the expansion of that attitude toward life which we have here called the spirit of capitalism. (Weber, 2001,116)

Thus, this logic fuelled the energies of capitalism and, at the same time, allowed the capitalist secular activities to overwhelm the theological principles which produced them.

In a similar fashion, Samuel Smiles talks about the spirit of self-help which characterizes the English people. He says, “[t]he spirit of self-help, as exhibited in the energetic action of individuals, had in all times been a marked feature in the English character, and furnishes the true measure of our power as a nation. Rising above the heads of the mass, there were always to be found a series of individuals distinguished beyond the others” (Smiles, 1908, 6). In addition, Smiles adds that “[o]ne of the most strongly marked features of the English people is their spirit of industry, standing out prominent and distinct in their past history, and as strikingly characteristic of them now

⁷ These features were at the same time among the virtues of Puritans who belonged to the English Protestant reformation movement during the sixteenth and the seventeenth centuries.

as at any former period. It is this spirit, displayed by the commons of England, which has laid the foundations and built up the industrial greatness of the empire” (32). The attitude of the industrial age ascertains the public beliefs that “no bread eaten by man is so sweet as that earned by his own labour, whether bodily or mental [and] fortune is usually on the side of the industrious, as the wind and waves are on the side of the best navigators” (Smiles 33-111). The accumulation of such attitudes among the public add elements of sacredness and blessing to hard work and persistence.

Perseverance, determination, patience and industriousness are traits that one can easily detect in the characterization of the protagonist in *Robinson Crusoe*. Ian Watt says that “Defoe’s attitude here exhibits a confusion of religious and material values to which the Puritan gospel of the dignity of labour was peculiarly liable: once the highest spiritual values had been attached to the performance of the daily task, the next step was for the autonomous individual to regard his achievements as a quasi-divine mastering of the environment” (1959, 73). Watt also suggests that this same Puritan conception of the dignity of labour “helped to bring into being the novel’s general premise that the individuals daily life is of sufficient importance and interest to be the proper subject of literature” (73). Robinson Crusoe, who belongs to the rising middle class, is a symbol of his period. He displays much determination and self-help before and during his stay on the island. He has a desire to learn and to acquire knowledge. He learns mathematics and the rules of navigation during his “successful” voyages. And while his friend, the captain, takes delight to instruct him, he takes delight in learning. In addition to being a good merchant and a trader, he learns planting during his stay in Brazils. He lives there for four years, during which time he thrives and prospers upon his plantation. He manages to preserve his life and to survive alone in direct contact with the most unfriendly aspects of nature. He becomes a carpenter, engineer, ship builder, and agriculturist. He succeeds in settling down and in establishing a life for himself.

The value of perseverance and labour in the novel seems to be an implementation of the puritan motto which states that “heaven helps those who help themselves” (Smiles 1). The story is thronged with legendary examples of hard work. Crusoe transfers the necessary contents of his ship alone within thirteen days and through twelve trips to the

shipwreck. Nevertheless, he thinks that “[he] should have brought away the whole ship, piece by piece” (Defoe 53). Curving symbolises labour and patience in the story. He enlarges his house through curving in the stone. Another example of curving is when he needs an iron shovel or spade. He finds a tree which is called “the iron-tree, for its exceeding hardness”. With great labour, and almost spoiling his axe, he cuts a piece, and brings it home with much difficulty because it is exceptionally heavy. Due to “[t]he excessive hardness of the wood, and [his] having no other way, made [Crusoe] a long while upon this machine, for [he] worked it effectually by little and little into the form of a shovel” (68). Such instances set Robinson Crusoe as an emblem of patience and determination in labour and the performance of hard tasks.

Determination is displayed through the making of the big boat which is “big enough to have carried six-and-twenty men, and consequently big enough to have carried” Crusoe and his all cargo. (Defoe 120). Crusoe uses words and expressions such as ‘pains’, ‘toil’, ‘infinite labour’ and ‘prodigious deal of pains’ in his description of the process of making the boat and the futile attempts to move it and set it into the sea. Despite his deep grief about his failure to move the boat, and the loss of all his effort in making it, he does not give up; and he considers this as a lesson in life: “This grieved me heartily; and now I saw, though late, the folly of beginning a work before we count the cost” (121). He considers the big boat a ‘memorandum’ to remind him to be wiser in the future. It is worth mentioning in this context that according to the Calvinist thought, useless good work is a means of attaining salvation. Max Weber says, “however useless good works might be as a means of attaining salvation, for even the elect remain beings of the flesh, and everything they do falls infinitely short of divine standards, nevertheless, they are indispensable as a sign of election. They are the technical means, not of purchasing the salvation, but of getting rid of the fear of damnation” (2001, 69). Thus, for Crusoe, if hard work is fruitless, it is not a total loss. He can count it as a means to alleviate his fear of damnation.

Taking into consideration such sanctified nature of industriousness and labour, *Robinson Crusoe* can be read as a story of a sinner⁸ who, through his determination and hard work, succeeds in regaining divine providence and support. The whole punitive predicament of ship wreck on the island is turned into a blessing through industriousness. Drawing attention to the rewarding of Crusoe, Pearl notes that towards the end of the story, money pours in from every direction, and Crusoe collects the accrued profits of his twenty-eight-year adventure. Accordingly, “[w]e will not be shocked to learn that original sin⁹ can be immensely profitable” (Pearl, 2014, 79). With hard labour, he not only gains atonement of his sins, but also gains material compensation for his sufferings.

It is worth noting in this context that *Robinson Crusoe* implies that the admired attributes of the independent and autonomous individuals in the early eighteenth century are male specific. Isabel Karremann states that “[t]he dominant ideal of masculinity in the early eighteenth century was that of Augustan manliness. Drawing on the discourse of civic humanism, this ideal privileged the traditionally masculine attributes of reason, virtue, and autonomy.” (2011, 109). As far as the capability of valid thinking is concerned, “[r]eason had been a gendered attribute since antiquity; in the early eighteenth century, rationality became an exclusively male prerogative, even synonymous with manliness” (Karremann 109). In fact, *Robinson Crusoe* puts male rationality through a series of hard tests, and such rationality passes the tests successfully. Crusoe’s calculations and judgements concerning the weather, the sea conditions and navigation are thorough. His reasoning concerning money, profit, and investments, is celebrated in the story. His extensive reflections about the legitimacy of blood-shed and the killing of savages summarize the male rationality of his age.

Concerning the attitude towards manly independence in the eighteenth century, Karremann mentions that “Autonomy was the most comprehensive requirement for manliness: it meant, first and foremost, financial independence and, based upon this, independence from political or social opinion; such moral integrity was supplemented by

⁸ The sin of disobeying the father’s will, and the sin of breaking the vow about not setting his foot on board a ship again, if he survives the storm.

⁹ Crusoe’s disobedience amounts to Adam’s original sin.

an independence from the emotional ties that bind a man to this world and its trivial occupations” (109). Thus, the viewpoint of the eighteenth century is that manhood and autonomy are inseparable, and such a viewpoint perfectly matches the attitude presented in *Robinson Crusoe*.

2.4. The *Homo Economicus* Individual

Robinson Crusoe is not only a story of adventures. It is a story of a *homo economicus* who succeeds in establishing a sound economy alone and in rising to the status of a successful capitalist. It is a story of a man whose economic motives obliterate his human feelings and direct them towards one single aim, and that aim is to establish economic individual independence. Defoe's novel has been a source of inspiration for economic scholars. For this reason, “Robinson Crusoe has been very appropriately used by many economic theorists as their illustration of homo economicus. Just as the ‘the body politic’ was the symbol of the communal way of thought typical of previous societies, so ‘economic man’ symbolized the new outlook of individualism in its economic aspect” (Watt, 1957, 62). Thus, Crusoe represents the embodiment of the economic individualist who emerges in response to the capitalist ethos of his time. After all, in terms of the Puritan theology, economic success is considered as a sign of election. Shanahan says, “Calvinistic logic effectively allowed economic success to become a sign, perhaps even the sign, by which the faithful could identify election. And since such signs were really acts of will, conviction, and self-assertion, the economic domain very quickly became one of the primary domains in which the newly empowered-self came to operate” (1992, 77). Within an economic spirit, even the sin of disregarding “those measures of life, which nature and Providence concurred to present [him] with” (Defoe 35), and choosing wandering abroad, is based upon calculating and comparing the material advantages between staying at home and seafaring. Referring to Crusoe's ‘original sin’ of dissatisfaction with the state wherein Providence and nature has chosen, Watt says that “Crusoe's ‘original sin’ is really the dynamic tendency of capitalism itself, whose aim is never merely to maintain the status quo, but to transform it incessantly” (1957, 64). Within the same economic point of view, the travels and the adventures of Robinson Crusoe are not merely those of a footloose who seeks

dissociation and freedom from social bonds and ties. Crusoe`s adventures are primarily motivated by an implicit recognition that the pursuit of gain is associated with mobility and change of place. Setting a subtle demarcation between the travels of Robinson Crusoe and the travels of other characters in literary history, Watt says:

Defoe`s plot, then, expresses some of the most important tendencies of the life of his time, and it is this which sets his hero apart from most of the travellers in literature. Robinson Crusoe is not, like Autolycus, a commercial traveller rooted in an extended but still familiar locality; nor is he, like Ulysses, an unwilling voyager trying to get back to his family and his native land: profit is Crusoe`s only vocation, and the whole world is his territory. (1957, p.66)

Thus, it is reasonable to assume that Crusoe`s travels are essentially for the sake of earning capital. The rise of capitalism accompanied the industrial revolution. Before the emergence of Marx`s theories, the concept of `capital`, in the sense of material wealth, acquired positive economic and social connotations. Deane (1979) says:

The other factor of production whose development was crucial to the British industrial revolution was capital. The reason why the citizen of an industrialized country enjoys a higher standard of living than his counterpart in a pre-industrial country is that he produces more goods and services for each hour of effort; and one of the reasons why he can do this is that he typically has the advantage of a larger stock of capital to assist him in his productive activity. (165)

Therefore, the novel unhesitatingly celebrates the accumulation of richness. One of the outcomes of Crusoe`s long and adventurous journey is the making of a capital. Wealth is calculated in terms of money. Even the value of his land in Brazil is calculated in terms of its capital: "I was now master, all on a sudden, of above five thousand pounds sterling in money, and had an estate, as I might well call it, in the Brazils, of above a thousand pounds a year" (Defoe 268). This capital makes him a master who can live comfortably and prosperously for the rest of his life.

In fact, the story positively contributed in kindling the capitalist spirit which led to progress and prosperity. Capitalism and industrialization go hand in hand with individualism. The industriousness of individuals stands behind the leap towards prosperity and progress. The era of the industrial revolution in England demonstrated,

more or less, that capitalism is a condition for economic and social growth. Opposite to the common negative attitude concerning life in a capitalist society, such a society provides much to the average individual; that is because “[t]he community in which he lives possesses more mechanical equipment, more miles of road or railway or canal, more ships and vehicles, more buildings and more altogether of the kind of goods that are used to produce other goods.” (Deane, 1979, 165). In addition to the possibility of enjoying the fruits of civility that are available to everybody and all the classes of the public, the individual can also expect to enjoy a rise in his standard of living if he improves his capabilities or works more hours. What has been negatively evaluated in the criticisms of the novel in later periods was very positive at the beginning of the eighteenth century. For example, enclosing, using, and inhabiting unused and neglected land are among the tasks that Crusoe performs on the island. The parallel real-life schemes of urbanization and enclosures of common land, which are usually cited as drawbacks of capitalism and privatization, were, in fact, essential to maintain sound and constant economic growth. The contribution of such schemes in revolutionizing the economic growth in England is described by Deane:

It is clear, for example, that the enclosure movement was associated with new investment in hedging, ditching, drainage and generally in the sort of works required to bring commons and waste¹⁰ into permanent cultivation. Urbanizing involved investments in buildings, street paving and lighting, water supply and sanitation. Improvements in communications entailed substantial capital expenditure on roads, bridges, river navigations and canals. (1979, 166)

Moreover, the concept of enclosure, which was a type of legal reform that allowed the fencing of common land, has itself a direct relationship to individualism. Singularity requires sovereignty. The strive for sovereignty is a natural instinct in human beings, and it is common also in animal kingdom. The enclosure of lands perfectly simulates the human yearning for sovereignty and privacy. The island in *Robinson Crusoe* is a big enclosure. Within the confines of this big space, the protagonist of the novel makes other secondary enclosures through allocating, fencing and surrounding

¹⁰ ‘Waste’ in England is a subtype of common land, which is usually uncultivated. In addition to its use for common pasture, common people use it also to gather wood, gorse, heather and other shrubs.

specific areas for his personal use. He displays keen consciousness concerning the sovereignty, independence, and privacy of these enclosures. Describing the fence around his habitation, Crusoe says, “this fence was so strong, that neither man nor beast could get into it or over it” (Defoe 55). Moreover, the fence is complete and encompassing. It has no entrance. He uses a ladder to cross his fence and enter his habitation. In this way, he is “completely fenced in and fortified . . . from all the world” (55).

However, industrialization and capitalism are not without disadvantages. The rise of middle classes changed the structure of the society. The ownership of means of production, surplus, and accumulation of profit led to different, mainly materialistic or economic, stratification of society. As a result, a new type of conflict came into existence. The approach which significantly highlights the materialistic nature of the industrialized age and the contrast between individualism and collectiveness, is significantly provided by Marx. Like Hegel, Marx believed that passage of time affects the nature and the status of the relationship between the individual and the community, and that the progress in time transforms the human nature towards more recognition of the human individualistic self. But unlike Hegel, who is classified as an idealist¹¹, Marx was a materialist. And, while Hegel asserted that the evolution of consciousness is governed by social interaction, Marx believed that evolution is determined by class conflict, and that this evolution moves towards an unavoidable direction; and that direction is a revolution directed by the suffering working class in order to achieve socialism; thus, for him, the whole process of change, whether in the past, the present or the future is determined by economy.

Robinson Crusoe depicts the flattering earlier stages of capitalism. Written at the very beginning of the eighteenth century, the novel naturally does not display awareness about the drawbacks of capitalism. However, the side effects of capitalism lurk in the secondary motifs and themes which constitute the background of many events and scenes in the novel. The relationship between the capitalist and others might very well involve tension. In his *Philosophic Manuscripts*, Marx describes the mechanism of the antagonism and imbalance in the relation between the capitalists and the working class

¹¹Idealism is essentially the belief that human beings perceive the world indirectly through shaping mental images and concepts about it in their minds.

in his time and says that “[w]ages are determined through the antagonistic struggle between capitalist and worker. Victory goes necessarily to the capitalist. The capitalist can live longer without the worker than can the worker without the capitalist. Combination among the capitalists is customary and effective; workers` combination is prohibited and painful in its consequences” (1844, 19). The mutiny on board of the English ship very well foreshadows the dissatisfaction and the rebellion of the working class. And the collaboration of Crusoe and the captain of the ship stands for the collaboration of the capitalists against the protesting workers. This rebellion is strongly vanquished because it is a threat to the capitalist spirit. The leaders of the mutiny are described as rogue and genuinely evil. They are beyond reform and they need either be killed or put under control. Referring to the two leading mutineers on the island, the captain of the English ship says, “those two were incorrigible villains, and had been the authors of all the mutiny in the ship, and if they escaped, we should be undone still, for they would go on board and bring the whole ship`s company, and destroy us all” (Defoe 240). Having its own ‘authors’ and considerable number of supporters, the mutiny is not without reasonable basis. As such, the mutiny is a minimized depiction of a potential revolution.

Interestingly enough, Defoe`s protagonist is the capitalist and the worker at same time. As a worker, Crusoe is sometimes put into the worker`s predicament of endless and futile labour. Marx indicates that in the capitalist economy, the worker becomes in a situation in which he “must sell himself and his human identity” (1844, 25). The worker does not only sell his own self out of complete consent, but also competes for it. As such, the worker not only becomes a commodity, but he also “becomes indeed the most wretched of commodities; that the wretchedness of the worker is in inverse proportion to the power and magnitude of his production” (Marx 1844, 69). Such a theme of endless and futile labour is akin to the predicament of Sisyphus, the Greek mythical figure who is condemned by Zeus to serve the most severe punishment contrived by a deity because the deities “had thought with some reason that there is no more dreadful punishment than futile and hopeless labour” (Camus, 1955, 76). It is the punishment of performing futile, and frustrating repetitive labour for eternity. The accomplishment of nothingness reduces the existence of the labourer to absurdity. In fact, Camus equates the condition

of the worker in a capitalist world with the condition of Sisyphus, when he says that “[t]he workman of today works every day in his life at the same tasks, and this fate is no less absurd.” (Camus, 1955, 77). In *Robinson Crusoe*, the making of the big boat invokes the motif of Sisyphean labour. When cutting the huge cedar-tree Crusoe wonders “whether Solomon ever had such a one for the building of the Temple of Jerusalem” (Defoe 120). Describing his labour in this futile project Crusoe says:

It was not without infinite labour that I felled this tree; I was twenty days hacking and hewing at it at the bottom; I was fourteen more getting the branches and limbs and the vast spreading head cut off, which I hacked and hewed through with axe and hatchet, and inexpressible labour; after this, it cost me a month to shape it and dub it to a proportion, and to something like the bottom of a boat, that it might swim upright as it ought to do. It cost me near three months more to clear the inside. (120)

But after all this extreme toil, Crusoe fails to get his boat into the water despite his strenuous attempts to do so. The futility of this task grieves him heartily, but he takes it as a lesson about “the folly of beginning a work before we count the cost, and before we judge rightly of our own strength to go through with it” (121). The immovable and unused heavy boat stays on the island as a monument to Crusoe’s labour.

Unlike the labourer of Marx’s theory, Crusoe does not suffer the plight of alienation and detachment from his own products. In the process of production, the worker puts his human self in the commodity; “[t]he product of labor is labor which has been congealed in an object, which has become material” (Marx, 1844, 71). The fact that the worker loses the object after finishing it amounts to the loss of the self. This realization leads to loss of reality, estrangement and alienation. Thus, the object becomes an alien to its maker. In fact, alienation is aggravated during the process, and that is because “the more the worker spends himself, the more powerful the alien objective world becomes which he creates over-against himself” (Marx, 1844, 72). Consequently, the estrangement between the worker and the objective world which he creates turns into a state of antagonism. The reason is that “[t]he alienation of the worker in his product means not only that his labor becomes an object, an external existence, but that it exists outside him, independently, as something alien to him, and that it becomes a power on its own confronting him; it means that the life which he has conferred on the object

confronts him as something hostile and alien. (Marx, 1844, 72). On the one-man island, Crusoe puts his own labour, and his own self, into the objects he produces. From the very early hours of his castaway on the island, he engages himself with toiling physical work. He makes his tasks with “a great deal of labour and pain” (Defoe 46-47). For the labourer Crusoe, the carpenter chest is among the most valuable things that he salvages from the shipwreck, “[a]nd it was after long searching that [he] found out the carpenter`s chest, which was, indeed, a very useful prize to [him], and much more valuable than a shipload of gold would have been at that time” (47). The value of the carpenter chest comes from the fact that it contains the tools which stand for the means of production. The fact that Crusoe is at the same time the employer and the employee, creates a situation in which the relation between the labourer and the product is maintained. The objects into which Crusoe congeals his ‘infinite’ labour remain his own. He is not separated or alienated from them. The attachment of Crusoe to his products is exhibited through his use of the possessive pronoun ‘my’ whenever referring to a product of his labour and hard work. His attachment to his products is a natural result of his recognition that they carry within them part of his own self. Thus, *Robinson Crusoe* creates a unique situation in which the labourer is not detached or alienated from his own products.

The devaluation of human status and human-human relationships is another drawback of capitalism. Crusoe treats human beings in terms of their commodity value, because “the increasing value of the world of things proceeds in direct proportion the devaluation of the world of men” (Marx, 1844, p.71). The devaluation of people in *Robinson Crusoe* is an aspect which is considerably related to the primacy of the economic motive which logically entails the devaluation of other modes of conduct and thought that are related to feelings and attachment to other individuals and groups. Xury is a clear example of the commodified and devalued human being. Crusoe sells his faithful Moorish servant to the Portuguese captain along with the other objects which include the boat, the case of bottles, and two of his guns. And, “in a word, [Crusoe] made about two hundred and twenty pieces of eight for all [his] cargo” (Defoe 32). Commenting on the selling of Xury among the other objects, Hymer says, “[c]ommodities are things and cannot go to market by themselves. They have to be

taken, if they are unwilling, they can be forced” (1971, 45). Commodification is also indicated in the discourse used to describe the acquisition of the working hands in the story. After settling in the Brazils, Crusoe says, “I bought me a negro slave, and an European servant also – I mean another besides that which the captain brought me from Lisbon” (35). The objectification of human beings is also clearly exemplified in Crusoe’s discourse concerning the slaves. The voyage to Guinea which leads to the castaway of Crusoe is designed for the purpose of bringing negroes to the Brazils because all the plantations, including the plantation of Crusoe “were straightened for nothing so much as servants [and] that it was a trade that could not be carried on, because they could not publically sell the negroes when they come home, so they desired to make but one voyage, to bring the negroes on shore privately, and divide them among their own plantations” (36). Crusoe accepts the deal because it is a profit promising trade “at that time, not only not entered to, but, as far as it was, had been carried on by assientos, or permission of the king of Spain and Portugal, and engrossed in the public stock: so that few negroes were bought, and these excessively dear” (36). With this discourse of objectification, the devaluation of humanity is normalized and treated as a matter-of-fact affair.

Robinson Crusoe can be read as a fanciful exposition of the economic anthropology of human history. It depicts a pre-capitalist mode of life, and traces the progression of human economy and the early sequence of human modes of production, like gathering, hunting, pastoralism and agriculture, thus putting the individual in various roles and occupations. In his novel, Defoe “sets back the economic clock, and takes his hero to a primitive environment, where labour can be presented as varied and inspiring” (Watt, 1959, 71). The story pictures earlier stages of economic patterns with no division of labour and specialization. On the island, Crusoe is the independent farmer and the free craftsman. The form of land ownership is even pre feudal or tribal, where one owns the areas which he encloses. The novel shows that concepts like value, labour, exchange and capital existed long ago before the rise of capitalism. Capitalism only combined these concepts into a coherent system of commodified social relations. Keith Hart says that “[h]uman evolution before capitalism is marked by two processes: the individuation of the original animal herd and the separation of social life from its

original matrix” (2012, 23). As such, *Robinson Crusoe* does what Karl Marx does later when he “lays out a vision of human history in which capitalism is seen as the final dissolvent of those forms of society linking us to an evolutionary past that we share with animals” (Hart, 2012, 23). Thus, *Robinson Crusoe* can be read as an anthropological exposition of human economy. Through the sequence of events, one can notice Crusoe’s change of attitude towards the island and towards his possessions there. The coming of Friday signifies the formation of a society and the shaping of unequal attitude towards the other. The story discusses the progression and evolution of early modes of human economic behaviour. The transition from the gathering to the agrarian mode of life, and the appropriation of land lead to peasantry and feudalism. With the passage of time, the temporarily hibernated capitalist inside Crusoe awakens again, and capitalism emerges. However, despite the allusions to the immanent threats to the system, Marx’s predictions about the inevitable¹²collapse of capitalism are not foreshadowed in the story, because Defoe celebrates the utopia of individualism and capitalism. Thus, both Daniel Defoe and Karl Marx play the role of the economic anthropologists and chart the evolution of human economy, each in his own way.

In fact, Marx refers to *Robinson Crusoe* in different occasions. For example, Marx talks about a phenomenon which he calls ‘Robinsonades’ to refer to the multiplicity of roles that the individual assumes in the primitive economic systems.

Individuals producing in society – hence socially determined individual production – is, of course, the point of departure. The individual and isolated hunter and fisherman with whom Smith and Ricardo¹³ begin, belongs among the unimaginative conceits of the eighteenth century Robinsonades, which in no way express merely a reaction against over-sophistication and a return to a misunderstood natural life, as cultural historians imagine. . . This is the semblance, the merely aesthetic semblance, of the Robinsonades, great and small. (Marx, 1973, 83)

However, for Marx, the word ‘production’ implies the existence of a society. This means that the production of one’s own needs, as in the case of *Robinson Crusoe*, is not

¹² According to Marx, capitalism is self-destructive and the transition from capitalism to socialism is inevitable.

¹³ Marx refers to Adam Smith and David Ricaedo who both use the persona of Robinson Crusoe when they describe and illustrate the simplest economic model.

counted as production in the strict Marxist sense. The point of departure which Marx mentions is the moment of gathering into a group to form a society. It is when the group is shaped and the individual starts producing for others. After the saving of Friday, Crusoe starts considering producing at a higher level. Crusoe “began now to consider, that having two mouths to feed instead of one, [he] must provide more ground for [his] harvest, and plant a larger quantity of corn than [he] used to do” (Defoe 201). This step not only represents a transition to production in the modern economic sense, but also a step towards the division of labour. Crusoe starts dividing labour and assigning duties to Friday who willingly complies. Referring to Friday, Crusoe says, he “let me know that he thought I had much more labour upon me on his account than I had for myself; and that he would work the harder for me if I would tell him what to do” (201). The need for further production arises when other men arrive on the island to shape a rudimentary society.

According to Marx, the rise of civil societies is a prerequisite for the rise of individuality. Thus, “[o]nly in the eighteenth century, in ‘civil society’, do the various forms of civil connectedness confront the individual as a mere means towards his private purposes, as external necessity” (Marx, 1973, 84). As such, despite his unique autonomy, Crusoe is not individualist in the strict Marxist sense, at least before the arrival of Friday and the later formation of civility on the island. According to Marx, isolated figures like Robinson Crusoe are the products of civil societies to highlight the animal-like aspects of human beings; and in reality, accounts of such figures float the fact that human beings are social beings. Put in Marx’s words, “the epoch which produces this standpoint, that of the isolated individual, is also precisely that hitherto most developed social relations. The human being is in the most literal sense a *zoon politikon*¹⁴, not merely a gregarious animal, but an animal which can individuate itself only in the midst of society” (Marx, 1973, 84). In this statement, Marx, reiterates his claim that real individuality can only be achieved in a community.

Within the same context of economic history, Stephen Hymer draws attention to the fact that *Robinson Crusoe* can also be read as representing what economists call ‘the

¹⁴ The expression ‘*zoon politikon*’ is used together with ‘*zoon logikon*’ by Aristotle in his characterization of human nature to mean ‘political animal’ and ‘rational animal’ respectively.

period of primitive accumulation'. Primitive accumulation is a historical and prior stage which clears the way for the capitalist system to get started. This period usually involves the process of concentration of wealth and means of production in the hands of capitalists. Hymer says that "Robinson Crusoe's story can be told in terms of a series of cycles, some running simultaneously, through which he accumulates capital" (2011, 44). Crusoe is frugal and frugality is a typical characteristic in the stage of primitive accumulation of wealth. Crusoe blames himself for spending his resources upon unnecessary things. When he and Xury kill the wild animal, Crusoe says, "[t]his was game indeed to us, but this was no food; and I was very sorry to lose three charges of powder and shot upon a creature that was good for nothing to us" (26). Primitive accumulation is also exemplified in Crusoe's plundering and hoarding tendency. He enlarges his cave to accommodate the heap of goods he had collected. The second cave, on the other side of the island is another and safer store for wealth. For Crusoe, the security of wealth amounts to the security of the self: "I had got home to my little tent, where I lay, with all my wealth about me, very secure" (54). In fact, Crusoe's dissatisfaction with the satisfactory state of life in his plantation is attributed to his desire for faster primitive accumulation. This can be clearly noticed in Crusoe's following regretful reflection:

What business had I to leave a settled fortune, a well-stocked plantation, improving and increasing, to turn supercargo to Guinea to fetch negroes, when patience and time would have so increased our stock at home, that we could have bought them at our own door from those whose business it was to fetch them? And though it had cost us something more, yet the difference of that price was by no means worth saving at so great hazard. (184)

However, despite the shipwreck and the long twenty-eight years which Crusoe spends on the island, the mission of quicker primitive accumulation is achieved successfully. In fact, "Robinson has succeeded in accumulating much faster than if he had remained content, for he adds a new fortune from his island economy to the growth of his plantation" (Hymer, 2011, 46). The suffering on the island is the suffering of the wealth accumulator in the newly emerging materialist world. True, "he must suffer a long period of isolation, but in many ways his solitary sojourn represents the alienation suffered by all under capitalism – those who work and receive little, as well as those like

Robinson who accumulate and always must go on” (Hymer, 2011, 46). This interpretation makes the novel a story of success and financial breakthrough.

In *Capital*, Marx describes the elementary nature of the economic system that Crusoe constructs alone on the island. Referring to Robinson Crusoe, Marx says, “[u]ndemanding though he is by nature, he still has needs to satisfy, and must therefore perform useful labours of various kinds: he must make tools, knock together furniture, tame llamas, fish, hunt and so on” (Marx, 1982, 169). Marx draws attention to the technical economic peculiarities which *Robinson Crusoe* exhibits. Defoe’s protagonist displays an awareness about the multiplicity of the tasks that he is compelled to perform. Further, Crusoe displays awareness of the Marxist idea of measuring the value of things in terms of the time spent in making them:

Despite the diversity of his productive functions, he knows that they are only different forms of activity of one and the same Robinson, hence only different modes of human labour. Necessity itself compels him to divide his time with precision between his different functions. Whether one function occupies a greater space in his total activity than another depends on the magnitude of the difficulties to be overcome in attaining the useful effect aimed at. Our friend Robinson Crusoe, learns this by experience, and having saved a watch, a ledger, ink and pen from the shipwreck, he soon begins, like a good English man, to keep a set of books. His stock book contains a catalogue of the useful objects he possesses, of the various operations necessary for their production, and finally of the labour-time that specific quantities of these products have on average cost him. (Marx, 1982, 170)

However, lacking the two essential conditions of capitalism, i.e. society and civility, Crusoe’s world on the island is twice removed from capitalism in the strict Marxist sense. Nevertheless, the story excellently displays the early crude shape of the concepts which are central to Marx’s theory of economy, such as property, value, exchange, labour, reification and commodity fetishism. For example, Marx measures the value of the products in terms of the labour-time spent in making them. In the story, one of the ways in which Crusoe often measures the value of his products and achievements is by referring to the ‘time and labour’ exerted in making them. Referring to the fence around his habitation, Crusoe says, “[t]his cost me a great deal of time and labour, especially to cut the piles in the woods, bring them to the place, and drive them into the

earth” (Defoe 55). But Crusoe`s labour has zero profit value during his stay on the island. His work has only use-value. In the story value takes its basic and original shape when it is estimated according to the degree of its need and its scarcity in particular circumstances. Through many practical instances, the story explicates the distinction between value in use and value in exchange which reads as follows: “The things which have the greatest value in use, have frequently little or no value in exchange; and, on the contrary, those which have the greatest value in exchange have little or no value in use” (Ricardo, 2001, 8). Crusoe`s reaction upon seeing the money in his shipwreck subsumes the distinction between the exchange value and the use value: “I smiled to myself at the sight of this money: ‘O drug!’ said I, aloud, ‘what art thou good for? Thou art not worth to me – no, not the taking off the ground; one of those knives is worth all this heap; I have no manner of use for thee – e`en remain where thou art, and go to the bottom as a creature whose life is not worth saying” (53). The same applies to gold and silver, which, like money, have zero use on the island:

I had a parcel of money, as well gold as silver, about thirty-six pounds sterling. Alas! There the sorry useless stuff lay; I had no more manner of business for it; and often thought with myself that I would have given a handful of it for a gross of tobacco-pipes; or for a hand-mill to grind my corn; nay, I would have given it all for a sixpenny-worth of turnip and carrot seed out of England, or for a handful of peas and beans, and a bottle of ink. As it was, I had not the least advantage by it or benefit from it; but there it lay in a drawer, and grow mouldy with the damp of the cave in the wet seasons; and if I had had the drawer full of diamonds, it had been the same case – they had been of no manner of value to me, because of no use. (122)

An important characteristic of the pre-industrial age, which is found in *Robinson Crusoe*, is the lack of specialization. Deane says that “the worker in pre-industrial economy is generally engaged in a variety of occupations and even a variety of industries. He is typically a ‘jack of all trades” (1979, 15). *Robinson Crusoe* demonstrates an economy with zero division of labour. In fact, Marx negatively views the division of labour. He “thinks that the division of labor creates very serious harms that appear to outweigh its benefit” (Scharding, 2018, 116). It is harmful because it renders the worker ever more one-sided and dependent, and it “impoverishes the worker and reduces him to a machine” (Marx, 1988, 26). As such, Crusoe is in a privileged state

when he performs multitasks and non-repetitive labour that improves his skill and retains his human independent nature. Such variation in economic roles makes Crusoe an exceptionally appealing character.

Crusoe is appealing because the division of labour has already negatively influenced the civilized culture. And “Defoe was certainly aware of how the increasing economic specialization which was a feature of the life of his time had made most of the ‘mechanic arts’ alien to the experience of his readers” (Watt, 1957, 71). While improving the quality of goods and facilitating production, the constant division of labour makes people lose their completeness. Specialization is behind the lack of variety and stimulation in human daily life. It is largely responsible for the unprecedented dependence of the individual in civil culture upon the substitute experiences provided by the printed material. Thus, while reading *Robinson Crusoe*, the reader lives the fantasy of complete independence where the individual stands for a whole collectiveness and performs the tasks that require multiple specialized hands. Crusoe refers to the need for specialized hands even in making a simple thing like bread. After producing his own grains out of which he can make bread, Crusoe says, “yet here I was perplexed again, for I neither knew how to grind or make meal of my corn, or indeed how to clean it and part it; nor, if made into meal, how to make bread of it; and if how to make it, yet I knew not how to bake it” (Defoe 111). In order to master the craft of making bread, Crusoe employs all his “study and hours of working to accomplish this great work of providing” himself with corn and bread (111). Bread is set as an example of a common product that though standing simple in itself, there is still unnoticed series of specialized tasks that need to be done before producing it. Crusoe remarks, “I believe few people have thought much upon the strange multitude of little things necessary in the providing, producing, curing, dressing, making and finishing this one article of bread” (111-112). By determination and trial and error, Crusoe often succeeds in overcoming the problem of specialization. Thus, Crusoe’s ability to overcome the division of labour considerably contributes to the formation of his autonomous and individualistic image.

The rise of the capitalist individualism in the eighteenth century is accompanied by a rise of a new era of slavery. *Robinson Crusoe* presents a clear image about the

revival of slavery at the beginning of the eighteenth century. It is a new type of slavery in comparison with the slavery of the ancient times. Patnaik says, “[t]he revival of modern slavery as a major form of class exploitation over a millennium after the slavery of ancient world was the dubious gift of the rise of the capitalist mode of production” (Patnaik, 2012, 50). Chronologically, *Robinson Crusoe* covers the preliminary stages of capitalism, when the increasing demand for labour revived the market of slaves and re-kindled the spirit of master among the capitalists. The interpersonal master-slave relationship is uniquely represented through the relationship between Crusoe and Friday. The emergence of slavery as a new coefficient in economy is emphasised in the story through many occasions. Crusoe himself is enslaved for some time in North Africa during his journey. He later sells his slave companion to the Portuguese captain in order to get money. He also embarks on his special voyage with the purpose of collecting slaves from West Africa and that is because of their considerable economic worth. Crusoe’s establishment of a plantation in Brazil is a reference the capitalist phenomenon of plantations in foreign countries which is based on enslaved labour. Thus, Crusoe’s economic individualism also includes a propensity for enslaving others.

2.5 Robinson Crusoe and the Nietzschean Revolutionary Individual

The other approach which deals with individuality and the relationship between the individual and collectivity is suggested by Nietzsche. Unlike Hegel and Marx who had hopes and expectations about the future of humanity, Nietzsche was rather pessimistic¹⁵. Nietzsche predicts that the recession of the old values in the modern and civil world would result in morality void. Thus, “[n]ow that the shabby origin of these values is becoming clear, the universe seems to have lost value” (Nietzsche, 1967, 10). Unfortunately, the rising spirit of science and logical reasoning does not provide an alternative to the old values. Therefore, Nietzsche warns against a state of inevitable negative nihilism if humanity does not find a positive purpose that affirms life. Nietzsche calls for a positive manipulation of the nihilistic feelings through setting big

¹⁵ Schopenhauer is the father of philosophical pessimism. “The central thesis of Schopenhauer’s pessimism is as simple as it is shocking: that life is not worth living. Nothingness is better than being, death is preferable to life” (Beiser, 2014, 159). Schopenhauer’s pessimism is negative while Nietzsche’s pessimism is positive.

aims and exerting all the power to achieve them. It is to aim at something and think that this thing “is a hundred times more important than the question of whether we feel well or not.” (Nietzsche, 1967, 19). That means “[i]n sum, that we have a goal for which one does not hesitate to offer human sacrifices, to risk every danger, to take upon oneself whatever is bad and worse: the great passion” (Nietzsche, 1967, 19). According to Nietzsche, the individual who sets such a goal for himself belongs to the higher species. Such higher species contrasts with “[t]he lower species (herd, mass, society) [which] blows up its needs into cosmic and metaphysical values” (Nietzsche, 1967, 19). As such, the lower species vulgarize the existence. For Nietzsche, it is a basic error and profound misunderstanding to ascribe a higher rank to the herd than to the individual, or “to place the goal in the herd and not in single individuals” (Nietzsche, 1967, 403). In this way, Nietzsche encourages the individuals who belong to the higher species to separate themselves from the influence of their communities because “[i]n so far as the mass is dominant it bullies the expectations, so they lose their faith in themselves and become nihilists.” (Nietzsche, 1967, 19). However, Nietzsche acknowledges that loneliness is among the greatest challenges that the individual might face, when he says that “for the longest period of humanity’s existence there was nothing more frightful than feeling alone. To be alone, to experience things by oneself, to neither obey nor rule, to represent an individual – that was no pleasure back then, but a punishment; one was sentenced to be an individual” (Nietzsche, 2001, 117). Nietzsche’s individual challenges the loneliness of separation from the herd and defeats all the difficulties for the sake of a superior aim.

Robinson Crusoe pictures one exceptional form of self-imposed male individuality and solitude. The story exemplifies Nietzsche’s distinction between higher and lower species. Crusoe is an example of the higher species. His insistence to leave his country is, in the first place, an indication of his refusal to belong to the low species of the public who live ordinary lives and work in tedious jobs. The resistance of his parents’ requests and orders represents refusal of the society’s pressure to keep the individual within its circle. The lecture of Crusoe’s father about the benefits of staying in the ‘middle station’ in life, in fact, reflects the society’s preference of mediocrity. According to Nietzsche, mediocrity is a threatening condition which afflicts the mass

and herd cultures because it hinders progress and leads to the decline of human species. The implicit message which Crusoe's father wants to convey accords with the Nietzschean opinion which states that "[o]ur entire sociology simply does not know any other instinct than that of the herd, i.e., that of the sum of zeros – where every zero has 'equal rights', where it is virtuous to be zero" (Nietzsche, 1967, 33). The speech of Crusoe's father represents the voice of the herd instinct. Nietzsche says that "[t]he herd instinct speaks. It wants to be master . . . It will allow value to the individual only from the point of view of the whole, for the sake of the whole, it hates those who detach themselves – it turns the hatred of all individuals against them" (Nietzsche, 1967, 157). In fact, Nietzsche particularly refers to the collectivist ideology which favours the middle position in life when he says, "[t]he instinct of the herd considers the middle and the mean as the highest and more valuable . . . The herd feels the exception, whether it be below or above it, as something opposed and harmful to it" (Nietzsche, 1967, 159). Thus, Crusoe's father insistently recommends the middle state in life because "[f]ear ceases in the middle: here one is never alone; here there is little room for misunderstanding; here there is equality; here one's own form of being is not felt as a reproach but as the right form of being; here contentment rules. Mistrust is felt toward the exceptions; to be an exception is experienced as guilt" (Nietzsche 1967, 159). With all these advantages and merits, the middle state in life is naturally viewed as the zone of safety and comfort.

However, Crusoe refuses to be a mediocre and a zero. He rejects the middle state which neutralizes his individuality. He wants to be an exception. He abandons the mass culture which attempts to enslave him and bully his expectations. This means that Crusoe was not merely motivated by a desire for adventure and exploration. He is propelled by his spirit of freedom and refusal to be socially enslaved. He refuses to be among the herd and chooses to be a shepherd.

Robinson Crusoe registers the beginning of the corrosion of morality in society. According to Nietzsche, "[t]he moral man is a lower species than the immoral, a weaker species" (Nietzsche, 1967, 205). Crusoe is strong. Deep inside, he is not afraid of his own immorality. He does not deny his strong drives for the sake of morality. There are

many instances in the story that mark the gradual corrosion of herd morality of weakness in the character of the Christian and civilized protagonist. For example, when he decides to leave, Crusoe embarks on his journey against the will of his parents and without informing them about his departure. When the wind blows and the sea rises in a frightful manner, Crusoe instantly takes this as a sign of heaven's judgement and punishment for his wicked deed of disobeying his parents, and promptly vows to go home and never to set his foot onto a ship again if he survives this predicament. But when the sea beautifully calms the next morning, Crusoe ignores all his vows and promises. Again, the selling of Xury to the Portuguese captain becomes a significant indicator as far as morality is concerned. While selling his loyal companion, Crusoe is aware of the fact that he sells the freedom of the boy who faithfully assisted him to procure his own freedom. He evades the moral guilt through procuring a word from the captain "that he would give the boy an obligation to set him free in ten years, if he turned Christian" (31-32). Crusoe's non-egalitarian nature and advocacy for orders of rank are significantly emphasised through his attitude to Friday. The aspects of immorality in *Robinson Crusoe* serve the purpose of showing that the protagonist is strong. The implicit assumption is that the ignoble is higher and morality is "an opposition movement against the efforts of nature to achieve a higher type" (Nietzsche, 1967, 216). Crusoe succeeds in passing the tests that nature imposes and proves that he is the higher type of the new industrial world.

Therefore, with such multifarious representations of individualism, Defoe's novel marks the rise of the economic individual and the initiation of a new age. By locating Crusoe on an uninhabited island, the novel annihilates all the network of traditional relationships which keep the person circling in the orbit of collectiveness. The old paradigm values are shipwrecked, and Crusoe is granted the chance to form the new standards which harmonize with the newly emerging spirit of capitalism. The novel celebrates autonomous individuality through attaching quasi-divine value to the performance of everyday tasks. At the same time, the story secularizes the sacred domain and adjusts it to suit the demands of the new age.

CHAPTER III

THE FRAGMENTED INDIVIDUAL IN *FRANKENSTEIN*

Frankenstein is one of the most significant myths of Western civilization. As Mellor suggests, “Mary Shelley’s waking nightmare on June 16, 1816, inspired one of the most powerful horror stories of Western civilization. It can claim the status of a myth . . . So deeply does it probe the collective cultural psyche of the modern era that it deserves to be called a myth, on a par with the most telling stories of Greek and Norse gods and goddesses” (2007, 43). At the same time, the novel is a remarkable milestone in the history of literature. It can be cited as a prominent example of Romanticism, Gothicism, and science fiction at the same time. At the Romantic level, the story uniquely depicts one of the most ideal ambitions of individualism through the splendour of the free working of the mind, and the independent scientific thinking of Walton and Frankenstein. Describing the delight of thinking and inquiry for an individual, Dewey says, “[b]ecause the free working of mind is one of the greatest joys open to man, the scientific attitude, incorporated in individual mind, is something which adds enormously to one’s enjoyment of existence” (1999, 177). In fact, Romanticism proclaims the dawn of a new age of individualism. Endorsing such a view, Shanahan explains, “the Romantics saw the eighteenth century as having over-rationalized the universe at the expense of the individual’s personal and emotional side and that they strove to redress that imbalance by reinstating the emotive and spiritual dimensions of the self to their rightful place” (90). Thus, Romanticism places the emphasis on the individual and considers him as a supreme value in himself. By depicting passionate and rebellious Romantic heroes, the Romantics exalt the individual and the empowered self. In *Frankenstein*, Frankenstein, Walton, and the Monster exhibit their power of self-

awareness to the utmost. Each one of them considers himself to be the source of truth and acts accordingly. They are also powerful characters. Each is exceptionally powerful in his own distinguished way. In spite of his physical weakness, Frankenstein is a powerful scientist. The Monster, on the other hand, is physically mighty and intellectually competent in spite of his lack of regular education.

On the other hand, although Romanticism “bestowed its benediction on a rich individualism that exalted in personal dreams, raptures, and agonies, and which offered much scope for the fulfilment of the hero’s calling in accordance with one’s own vision”, it also, at the same time, “possessed . . . warm feelings about community, especially primordial organic communities” (Ellwood, 1999, 31-32). In other words, in Romanticism, “[i]diosyncratic individual heroic dreams could only be regarded with deep suspicion in the ironclad societies of totalitarian salvation” (Ellwood, 1999, 32). This ‘warm feeling’ towards the society and its established ethics indicates the Romantic distrust in complete autonomous individualism and explains the novel’s attitude which casts serious doubts upon Frankenstein’s venture to achieve an unprecedented level of individualistic independence.

As a Gothic novel, the story is further informative because it chronicles the historical and social circumstances of the individual at the beginning of the nineteenth century. The reason is that “the Gothic can serve as a sort of historical or sociological index: if the genre serves to manage a culture’s disturbances and traumatic changes, its thematic preoccupation will allow us to track social anxieties at one remove in the register of supernaturalism” (Hurley, 2002, 197). Thus, the analysis of *Frankenstein* as Gothic locates it in its proper historical context and illuminates the explicit and the subliminal peculiarities of the individual and social life within that context.

This chapter explores the presentation of individuality in Shelley’s myth from different points of view. It discusses the situation of the empowered self through examining the degree of self-authorization accorded to the individual in presenting his own biographical exposition. It also sheds light on the predicament of the fragmented and disenchanting individual and his search for alternative enchantments in nature and science. The chapter suggests that *Frankenstein* marks the rise of the devoted and

specialized scientist. The novel sheds light on the crisis of the scientist's departure from the old paradigm of alchemy, and the later, similarly out dated, Renaissance academic paradigm in which the scholar can very well be a physician, a theologian, an astrologer, an occultist, and a magician at the same time. The chapter unfolds the individual-collectiveness relationships in the novel in terms of Durkheim's theory of sociology, in addition to the Hegelian mechanisms of self-consciousness fashioning through the interaction of the individual and the 'other'. The chapter examines and explains the crisis of the abject and undesired individual which is reduced in the rejection of the Monster by Frankenstein and the society. This chapter also shows that *Frankenstein* yields meaning when viewed from the perspective of the economic theory. The manufacturing of a human body marks the influence of industrial capitalism which commodifies the individual, giving rise to repressed feelings of body panics among the public. And finally, the chapter looks at the protagonist of the novel from an appreciative perspective. Victor Frankenstein can be viewed as a revolutionary Nietzschean freethinker and free doer who does not abide by the regressive herd morality. He is the superior innovator who sets an ultimate aim for himself, and sets forth towards achieving it in spite of all the sacrifices.

3.1. The Self-Authorized Individual

Like *Robinson Crusoe*, *Frankenstein* gives voice to the individual empowered self through self-authorization, but only in more developed narrative technique. Though the expositions of Victor Frankenstein and the Monster are technically reported speeches, they are essentially autobiographical and intricately self-revealing. By this embedded system of autobiographies, Mary Shelley gives a chance to each of the three main characters to become an author, and to place his own self-awareness under the scrutiny of the reader. Referring to the metamorphosis in self-authorization in the Romantic period, Shanahan asserts that "[t]he self is no longer, as it was with Augustine, 'authorized'; the self is author" (1992, 92). This means that the Romantic self, with its powers of perception, is qualified now to write about both itself and the universe. In *Frankenstein*, Shelley departs from the Augustinian form of autobiography which is used by Defoe in *Robinson Crusoe*, and which focuses on the process of transformation

of the individual. While the self-exposition in *Robinson Crusoe* takes the form of the Godward journey of the soul, the multiple autobiographies in *Frankenstein* represent a step forward towards subjective individualism where the interior features of consciousness are more thoroughly explored. Such exploration holds up the individual as worthy of attention and exquisite pondering of the readership, in spite of the individual's detachment from theological contexts. Thus, the novel is an occasion in which the subjective consciousness of each of the main three characters, i.e., Walton, Frankenstein, and the Monster, reflects extensively on itself. In other words, the subjectively conscious characters make their self-awareness the object of attention. The conflict in such a self-reflective narrative can be seen as resulting from search for the validation of one's own thought. In fact, the self-authorization in *Frankenstein* exceeds the sense of being able to describe the self. Self-authorization is pushed to its ultimate limits when Frankenstein and the Monster appoint themselves as arbiters of two opposing truths. They both appropriate for themselves the determination of the right and wrong and behave accordingly. Thus, Frankenstein gives himself the right to create sane and conscious life, and the Monster gives himself the right to kill innocent people for the sake of ruining his creator.

Frankenstein marks the apex of interest in science after it had begun to flower in the Renaissance. Transition of focus from *Robinson Crusoe* to *Frankenstein* represents the historical metamorphosis of the emergence of the intensified interest in science as a result of earlier emphasis on possession and the material world. In this historical context, Shanahan says that "the tangible consequence of Calvinism's emphasis on the material world as the medium through which the all-important signs of election were to be discovered. That emphasis on the material world was a major contribution to the emergence of scientific inquiry and to the organization of scientific knowledge in a systematic fashion" (1992, 79). Thus, while Crusoe tests the abilities of the empowered and elected self through ownership and materialistic prosperity, Frankenstein exercises his empowerment in another domain. He looks for signs of election through his venture in the direction of accomplishing a scientific quantum leap.

3.2. The Fragmented Individual

The increasing influence of industrialization and capitalism in the nineteenth century becomes threatening to the integrity of the individual and his relationship with the community. With “the rise of capitalism and the concomitant demise of the household as the centre of the economy, the subject became fragmented and compartmentalized, a self-haunted at home as well as at work” (Houston, 2005, 3). The individuals in the capitalist world become psychologically ill and fragmented. The “capitalist compartmentalization produced haunting psychic superstructures that would require the new (capitalist-produced) profession of psychology to medicate the alienated, disoriented (capitalist-produced) homo economicus” (Houston 3). In *Frankenstein*, Shelley depicts fragmentation, disorientation, and compartmentalization of individuals in a variety of forms.

Uncertainty and hesitation are symptoms of disoriented fragmentation. Walton neglects his study for the sake of reading the voyage books in his uncle's library. Then, upon his father's refusal of seafaring, Walton's earlier visions decline, and he becomes a poet only for one year, Walton remarks, “[t]hese visions faded when I perused, for the first time, those poets whose effusions entranced my soul and lifted it to heaven. I also became a poet and for one year lived in a paradise of my own creation” (Shelley 4-5). To his great disappointment, Walton fails in poetry. Then, after inheriting the fortune of his cousin, his thoughts “were turned into the channel of their earlier bent” (Shelley 5). Even after starting his journey towards his aim, he suffers the same hesitation and uncertainty. “[his] courage and [his] resolution is firm, but [his] hopes fluctuate, and [his] spirits are often depressed” (Shelley 5). Telling his sister about his divided emotions, Walton writes, “I cannot describe to you my sensations on the near prospect of my undertaking. It is impossible to communicate to you a conception of the trembling sensation, half pleasurable and half fearful, with which I am preparing to depart” (Shelley 9). With such ambivalence and indeterminacy, Walton continues his journey towards the north pole where he meets Victor Frankenstein and the Monster.

Victor Frankenstein is not less fragmented or disoriented than Walton. By introducing Walton, Shelley, in fact, indirectly introduces Victor Frankenstein and

prepares the appropriate atmosphere for accepting his story¹⁶. Frankenstein incarnates the crisis of the scientist in the beginning of the nineteenth century. The rise of a variety of scientific fields and the clash between old and new paradigms created fragmented and compartmentalized scientists. When Frankenstein tells Krempe, the professor of natural philosophy, about the authors which he had studied, the professor says, “[h]ave you really spent your time in studying such nonsense? . . . every instant that you have wasted on those books is utterly and entirely lost. You have burdened your memory with exploded systems and useless names” (Shelley 36). Professor Krempe tells Frankenstein that he must begin his studies entirely anew. However, this information is not disappointing to Frankenstein because he had already come to the conclusion that those old authors are useless. His problem is that he is not content with the results promised by modern professors of natural science either. Lack of clear cut boundaries among the fields of science at that time was another source of fragmentation for scientists. The other professor, M. Waldman, tells Frankenstein that it is not enough to be specialized in one field, saying, “[a] man would make but a very sorry chemist if he attended to that department of human knowledge alone. If your wish is to become really a man of science and not merely a petty experimentalist, I should advise you to apply to every branch of natural philosophy, including mathematics” (Shelley 39). Such indeterminacy of study causes distraction and lack of proficiency. In fact, the making of the Monster involves tasks which belong to different fields of science; and the negative final result indicates the lack of mastery and perfection. Frankenstein’s divided personality is demonstrated by the Monster who represents a projection of the inner and unconscious self of Frankenstein. Fragmentation is also exhibited through the fact that the Monster himself consists of fragments of other human beings which have been collected and assembled by Victor Frankenstein.

3.3. The Disenchanted Individual

Frankenstein discusses the crisis of the disenchanted individual in his move towards secularization. Such a move burdens the individual with more responsibilities.

¹⁶ There are many parallels between Walton and Frankenstein. Both are young, brilliant, ambitious, and socially privileged. They both want to explore profound secrets of nature for the sake of personal glory and fame.

Increasingly, the individual can no longer derive validations for his thoughts and actions from theological systems. Shedding light on this issue, Shanahan says, “[w]hen the religious trappings of the Reformation began to fade, the logic that remained had put the individual entirely on his or her own responsibility in virtually all matters. It empowered the self as an independent and self-sufficient moral agent” (68). Therefore, Walton and Frankenstein are moved forward by tendencies and inclinations that completely spring from their inner selves. What they do is morally valid only because they think so. The same applies to the Monster who creates his own system of right and wrong and behaves accordingly. In the conflict between Frankenstein and the Monster, the story puts forward a clash between two validations with no middle arbiter principles which can bring about an objective just compromise. In such context of utmost subjectivity, Mary Shelley casts doubts on the remaining system of objectivity which is represented by the law. This is exhibited in the trial and the unjust execution of the “poor guiltless Justine” (Shelley 74). Elizabeth expresses her distress and anguish at the bias she apprehends in the treatment of Justine. Referring to Justine, Elizabeth weeps and says, “everyone else believes in her guilt, and that made me wretched, for I know that it was impossible: and to see everyone else prejudiced in so deadly a manner rendered me hopeless and despairing” (Shelley 74). Frankenstein’s father, on the other hand, comforts Elizabeth and expresses his confidence in the cogency and the credibility of the justice system, saying, “[d]earest niece, dry your tears. If she is, as you believe, innocent, rely on the justice of our laws, and the activity with which I shall prevent the slightest shadow of partiality” (Shelley 74). Frankenstein describes the trial of Justine as a mockery of justice, maintaining that “[d]uring the whole of this wretched mockery of justice [he] suffered a living torture” (Shelley 75). The image of law-based justice is shattered when we learn later that Justine’s confessor threatens and forces her to a confession about the crime. Describing the circumstances of her confession, Justine says, “[e]ver since I was condemned, my confessor has besieged me; he threatened and menaced, until I almost began to think that I was the monster that he said I was. He threatened excommunication and hell fire in my last moments if I continued obdurate” (Shelley 80). Thus, the story indirectly indicates that the lack of guiding sacred principles and guidelines would lead to subjective and individual oriented validations of thoughts and actions. In such a case,

each individual would stand for his own truth, which, in most of the cases, contradicts with the truth represented by the others. Such subjectivity is also a big threat to the credibility of the institutionalized objective systems of judgement as represented by laws.

Durkheim draws attention to the immense status of religions and the systems of beliefs for individuals and societies, to the extent that the removal of such systems from social life would leave a great vacancy. According to Durkheim, religions originally came as a reaction to the weaknesses felt by people in front of the forces of nature, and they function as sources of power and reassurance in the struggle of man during his life. In Durkheim's words, "[r]eligion itself helps to give [man] that security for it is believed to arm him with broad powers over nature. In part, the rites are meant to enable him to impose his wishes on the world. Thus, far from being inspired by a sense man has of his smallness before the universe, religions have the opposite inspiration." (1995, 83). As a result of this inspired power, man "has absolutely no awareness that cosmic forces are so far superior to his own. Because science has not yet come to teach him modesty, he ascribes to himself a domination over things that he does not have, but the illusion of it is enough to prevent him from feeling dominated by them"; thus, Durkheim continues, man "believes he can tell the elements what to do: unchain the wind, force the rain to fall, stop the sun with a wave of the hand, etc." (1995, 83). The absence of such beliefs after the Enlightenment and the rise of science deprived the individuals and groups of such immense source of strength while facing the various merciless powers of nature.

Therefore, the void left after the shedding of beliefs is substantial. Unlike *Robinson Crusoe*, *Frankenstein* depicts a world in which people face the calamities of life without the intervention of Providence. When Elizabeth catches the scarlet fever, there is nothing which can be done other than attending upon her in her sickness and waiting. Triumph over the "malignity of the distemper" of Elizabeth is achieved not through prayers, but through the watchful attentions of Frankenstein's mother. Thus, "Elizabeth was saved, but the consequences of this imprudence were fatal to her preserver" (Shelley 33). Frankenstein's mother catches the fever and they all stand helplessly when "the medical attendants prognosticated the worst event" (Shelley 33).

The description of Frankenstein's feelings after his mother's death highlights the weaknesses of people against the 'evil' force of death:

I need not describe the feelings of those whose dearest ties are rent by that most irreparable evil, the void that presents itself to the soul, and the despair that is exhibited on the countenance. It is so long before the mind can persuade itself that she whom we saw every day and whose very existence appeared a part of our own can have departed forever – that the brightness of a beloved eye can have been extinguished and the sound of a voice so familiar and dear to the ear can be hushed, never more to be heard. (Shelley 34)

Frankenstein's lamentation of his mother is devoid of prayers or any invocation of divinity. He merely expresses his grief and admits everybody's helplessness in facing death.

The demise of the status of divinity resulted in the amplification of the awareness that the cosmic forces are so far superior to the forces of human beings. Therefore, in *Frankenstein*, nature dazzles the senses and the imagination. Describing the relationship between the Romantic-self and nature, Shanahan says that “the harmonic resonances between the individual and nature nonetheless afforded the solitary self an accompaniment, a connection of some kind that mitigated the disappearance of theistic underpinnings to human experience” (1992, 93). As a result, in the story, nature and cosmic forces are lifted to a grandiose and sacred status and even deified. These cosmic forces are what Walton and Frankenstein attempt to conquer in the first place. The rising science provides a promising source of power and a compensation for the sensation of weakness and powerlessness in front of the cosmic forces. Walton and Frankenstein accompany their glorification of nature with glorification of their own personal endeavours to explore and penetrate the deep secrets of the world. Walton describes the north pole as “the region of beauty and light”; there, “the sun is forever visible, its broad disk just skirting the horizon and diffusing a perpetual splendour . . . the phenomena of the heavenly bodies undoubtedly are in those undiscovered solitudes” (Shelley 3-4). Walton elevates his venture to the rank of a scientific boon which would be of benefit for many generations to come. Addressing his sister, Walton says:

I may there discover the wondrous power which attracts the needle and may regulate a thousand celestial observations that require only this voyage to render their seeming eccentricities consistent forever . . . you cannot contest the inestimable benefit which I shall confer on all mankind, to the last generation, by discovering a passage near the pole to those countries, to reach which at present so many months are required; or by ascertaining the secret of the magnet, which, if at all possible, can only be affected by an undertaking such as mine. (Shelley 4)

Being the only available and promising means which can unfold the secrets of the dazzling nature, science is exalted to the extent of sacredness. Walton describes Frankenstein as a “divine wanderer”. The acquisition of knowledge in *Frankenstein* is lifted to the status of sanctified duty which is worth to die for. The point of utmost enchantment with science is articulated in the conversation between Walton and Frankenstein. A significant scene in this respect is the one when Walton uses the language of his heart, gives ‘utterance to the burning ardour of’ his soul, and expresses his readiness to gladly sacrifice his fortune and existence for the furtherance of his enterprise, saying, “[o]ne man`s life or death were but a small price to pay for the acquirement of the knowledge which I sought, for the dominion I should acquire and transmit over the elemental foes of our race” (Shelley 17). This particular statement, which shows extreme enchantment with science, represents a compelling reason for Frankenstein to tell his story of failure with science.

Being greatly disappointed in science, Frankenstein cannot control his emotions in response to the infatuation of Walton in science. Walton comments, “[a]s I spoke, a dark gloom spread over my listener`s countenance. At first I perceived that he tried to suppress his emotions; he placed his hands before his eyes, and my voice quivered and failed me as I beheld tears trickle fast from between his fingers; a groan burst from his heaving breast.” (Shelley 17). Realizing the parallels between himself and Walton, Frankenstein pitifully responds, “[u]nhappy man! Do you share my madness? Have you drunk also of the intoxicating drougth?” (Shelley 17). Frankenstein decides to share his story with Walton the moment he realizes that it would be useful as a lesson for the young explorer in his undertaking:

I had determined at one time that the memory of these evils should die with me, but you have won me to alter my determination. You seek for knowledge and wisdom, as I once did; and I ardently hope that the gratification of your wishes may not be a serpent to sting you, as mine has been. I do not know that the relation of my disasters will be useful to you; yet, when I reflect that you are pursuing the same course, exposing yourself to the same dangers which have rendered me what I am, I imagine that you may deduce an apt moral from my tale, one that may direct you if you succeed in your undertaking and console you in case of failure. (Shelley 19)

This statement indicates that in spite of his disappointment and catastrophic experience with science, Victor Frankenstein is still considerably enchanted with science. He does not discourage Walton or really criticize his enthusiasm. Frankenstein intends his story to be a guidance for Walton in case of success and a consolation in case of failure.

In fact, Frankenstein encourages Walton and nourishes his enchantment in science. Walton says that Frankenstein “endeavours to fill me with hope and talks as if life were a possession which he valued. He reminds me how often the same accidents have happened to other navigators who have attempted this sea, and in spite of myself, he fills me with cheerful auguries” (Shelley 216). Frankenstein supports Walton through rousing the energies of the ship’s sailors with his eloquence during the time of despair on the ship. When they become surrounded by mountains of ice, the sailors see their death in this scene of desolation. Walton expects inevitable mutiny. Upon hearing the complains of the sailors, the depleted and almost unconscious Frankenstein rouses and his eyes sparkle in momentary vigour. He addresses the sailors who are on the verge of rebellion, and gives an uplifting speech which makes them unable to reply. He tells them that their voyage is glorious because it is surrounded with danger and death; and that they are brave enough to overcome their fear and despair. He reminds them that their endeavour is an honourable undertaking saying, “[y]ou were hereafter to be hailed as the benefactors of your species, your names adored as belonging to brave men who encountered death for honour and the benefit of mankind” (Shelley 217). Then Frankenstein adds encouragingly, “[b]e men, or be more than men. Be steady to your purpose and firm as a rock. This ice is not made of such stuff as your hearts may be; it is mutable and cannot withstand you if you say that it shall not” (Shelley 218). This

speech, which saves Walton and the ship, indicates that Frankenstein, and after all his sufferings and misfortunes, is still enchanted with science.

This attribution of a transcendental and sacred status to the service of science provides Frankenstein with consolation. Frankenstein sacrificed the lives of his family for a noble and sacred purpose, and he is now ready to die for his beliefs. He does not only deify nature and cosmic forces, he also consistently deifies the venture to penetrate and explore those forces. Being in a sacred mission for the sake of exploring sacred cosmic forces, the novel gives considerable divine tributes to Frankenstein. Addressing Walton, Frankenstein says, “[y]ou may give up your purpose, but mine is assigned to me by heaven, and I dare not” (Shelley 219). After all, “[t]he novel intends us to see its protagonist, Dr Frankenstein, as the modern Prometheus, stealing creative fire from heaven in order to make a creature, a New Adam” (Bloom, 2007, 7). Shelley uses the subtitle ‘The Modern Prometheus’ to emphasize the Promethean divine theme, and to summon the noble image which is associated with Prometheus in classical mythology. Moreover, such image is also emphasized by the parallels between Dr Frankenstein and the mythic figure of Aesculapius, the ancient Greek god of medicine and healing, who is slain by Zeus because he might turn human beings into immortal creatures. Accordingly, it is reasonable to say that Frankenstein is glorified and punished at the same time. This in-betweenness represents the midway position of Mary Shelley between the two extremes exemplified by her rationalist parents¹⁷ and her Romantic husband. Bloom says that Shelley’s book “is a powerful, implicit critique of the Romantic Prometheanism of her husband and the radical rationalism of her parents” (Bloom, 2007, 7). It is worth mentioning that this middle state between these two extremes is represented by the ‘refined’ Walton. Walton learns the lesson from his mentor, Dr. Frankenstein, and decides to go back to England without further risking his life and the lives of his companions on the ship.

Thus, despite the secular and Christianity-free atmosphere of the novel, the impact of beliefs is still felt through the story. The project of Victor Frankenstein is

¹⁷ Shelley’s mother is “the radical feminist Mary Wollstonecraft; her father, the radical philosopher William Godwin; and her husband, the revolutionary lyrical poet Percy Bysshe Shelley” (Bloom, 2007, p. 7)

depicted as profane. Frankenstein remarks, “I collected bones from charnel houses and disturbed, with profane fingers, the tremendous secrets of the human frame” (Shelley 45). The concealment of the project of creation gives the impression that such an endeavour is a sacrilege against some unspecified system. Frankenstein hides his gruesome secret from his professors, his family, his friends and other students. This confidential enterprise is conducted in a secret place. It is conducted “[i]n a solitary chamber, or rather cell, at the top of the house, and separated from all other apartments by a gallery and staircase, I kept my workshop of filthy creation” (Shelley 45). Deep inside, Frankenstein feels the indisposition of someone who is committing a sin when saying, “[t]he dissecting room and the slaughter-house furnished many of my materials; and often did my human nature turn with loathing from my occupation” (Shelley 45-46). Feeling of guilt haunts Frankenstein even in his sleep: “Every night I was oppressed by a slow fever, and I become nervous to a most painful degree; the fall of a leaf startled me, and I shunned my fellow creatures as if I had been guilty of a crime” (Shelley 47). The most explicit sacrilege to divinity is Frankenstein’s venture to become creator of life, and his desire to be worshiped as a father of a new species. He exceeds his limits through exploring prohibited zones, and consequently he warrants his own downfall. Frankenstein reflects, “[l]ife and death appeared to me ideal bounds, which I should first break through, and pour a torrent of light into our dark world. A new species would bless me as its creator and source; many happy and excellent natures would owe their being to me” (Shelley 45). Therefore, though secularized on surface, the novel still endorses some basic elementary forms of traditional beliefs.

However, still, the concept of sin in *Frankenstein* is presented secularly. Although Frankenstein plays god and creates a creature, his action is not specifically presented as sacrilege against divinity. The creation is more or less considered a sacrilege against morality, standards of proper scientific conduct, and acknowledged social norms. The tragic effect of the story is not ensued by Providence, it comes as a result of the revengeful and vindictive reaction of the Monster. Moreover, the intensified tragic end is determined by Frankenstein himself. He restores his dignity when he bravely and pitilessly decides to haunt the Monster and try to destroy him. As such, the novel departs from the motif of sacrilege against divinity found in classical mythology,

and addresses the issue of the social anxiety concerning the rise of science. Science is the new emerging source of enchantment and replacement of the past systems of beliefs. Thus, people are immensely apprehensive about it. The reason is that “[i]n spite of the bankruptcy of past systems of belief, it is hard to surrender our faith in system and in some wholesale belief [moreover] Because science starts with questions and inquiries, it is fatal to all social-system making and programs of fixed ends” (Dewey, 1999, 181). Therefore, the punitive consequences which afflict Frankenstein in this case can be attributed to the misconduct and abuse of the monstrous powers of science.

3.4. The Individual as a Specialized Scientist

Frankenstein uniquely refashions the idealization of individuals. This refashioning makes the idealization of Victor Frankenstein and Walton unnoticed. According to Durkheim, the formation of an ideal is a natural product of social life, and an indicator of social transformation: “A society can neither create nor recreate itself without creating some kind of ideal . . . This creation is not a sort of optional extra step by which society, being already made, merely adds finishing touches; it is the act by which society makes itself, and remakes itself, periodically” (Durkheim, 1995, 425). During times of radical social change, “there is no doubt that society sometimes hesitates over the manner in which it must conceive itself. It feels pulled in all directions. When such conflicts break out, they are not between the ideal and the reality but between different ideals, between the ideal of yesterday and that of today” (Durkheim, 1995, 425). Such historical hesitation gives the novel its uncommon variety of interpretations. The novel puts into opposition the ideal of the past which has the authority of tradition, against the coming into being ideal. On the one hand, the established collective, and religion based, ideal morality stipulates obedience and compliance with the limits of knowledge that divinity allows. It also stipulates sympathy and compassion with other fellow human beings. On the other hand, the new, science based, ideal does not acknowledge any limits on knowledge, and does not observe the old fashioned morality. Thus, while Robert Walton wants to satiate his “ardent curiosity with the sight of a part of the world never before visited” (Shelley 4), Victor Frankenstein, “with unrelaxed and breathless eagerness”, “pursued nature to her hiding

place” (Shelley 45). The fact that they both suffer (and Frankenstein is severely punished), is a response to the collective ideal of the traditional paradigm. While, at the same time, Walton`s glorification of Frankenstein and Frankenstein`s encouragement of Walton both represent the idealization of the new paradigm. When sympathizing with the Monster, Frankenstein attends to the traditional ideal of morality; and when rejecting the demand of the Monster, he attends to the morality of the scientist who considers the long term consequences of his actions, and refuses to keep working on faulty experiment. By destroying the female Monster, Frankenstein, ideally, takes full responsibility, and professionally insists upon terminating his dangerous errored research.

In fact, *Frankenstein* negotiates faith in science and the opposition of the public opinions to such faith. Durkheim emphasizes the role of public opinion when he says, “[o]pinion, eminently a social thing, is one source of authority . . . Some will object that science is often the antagonist of opinion, the errors of which it combats and corrects [but] science can succeed in this task only if it has sufficient authority, and it can gain such authority only from opinion itself” (1995, 210). As such, science is always subsidiary and dependent on social opinion. Durkheim asserts that “[a]ll the scientific demonstrations in the world would have no influence if a people had no faith in science . . . Even today, if it should happen that science resisted a very powerful current of public opinion, it would run the risk of seeing its credulity eroded” (Durkheim, 1995, 210). Thus, through the catastrophe of Frankenstein, Shelley articulates the crisis of science itself and its unceasing dependence on social opinion.

It is worth mentioning in this context that *Frankenstein* discusses the predicament of the individual who chooses science as an occupation at the beginning of the nineteenth century. Victor Frankenstein and Robert Walton are committed professional scientists who choose the search for knowledge as a vocation. In his lecture, “Science as a Vocation”, Max Weber discusses the status of science and the commitment to the scientific work in the disenchanting world. Weber`s portrayal of the situation of the professional scientists is uniquely compatible with the characterization Frankenstein and Walton in Shelley`s novel. Weber draws attention to the fact that

science has entered the realm of rigorous specialization and says, “[a]t the present time, that inner vocation, in contrast to the external organization of science as a profession, is determined in the first instance by the fact that science has entered a stage of specialization that has no precedent and that will continue for all time” (Weber, 2004, 7). In *Frankenstein*, specialization is dwelled on in more than one way. Walton and Frankenstein are specialized in science in the sense that they have no craft or vocation other than the endeavours they choose to occupy themselves with. The story, Romantically, evades the issue of financing of the protagonists` projects through providing them with the luxury of not needing a job. After all, Frankenstein is a descendant of a well off noble family and Walton is bestowed with the fortune which he suddenly inherits from his cousin.

The other way in which specialization is presented is through the branching of knowledge fields. Though quite Romantically, Walton displays concern about specialization when he shifts his interest between literature (poetry) and science. Before going into the details of his story, Frankenstein describes his journey towards specialization. Frankenstein has a desire to learn, but “not to learn all things indiscriminately”. He roughly divides knowledge into two spheres; a sphere that he does not like and a sphere that he likes. The sphere of knowledge that he does not like consists of different fields: “I confess that neither the structure of languages, nor the code of governments, nor the politics of various states possessed attractions for me” (Shelley 28). Frankenstein’s “inquiries were directed to the metaphysical, or in the highest sense, the physical secrets of the world” (Shelley 28). Still, the novel refers to a further field of knowledge that Clerval likes. Clerval “occupied himself, so to speak, with the moral relations of things. The busy stage of life the various heroes, and the actions of men” (Shelley 28). After this general delineation of the main fields of knowledge, Frankenstein goes into further specification. The science which Frankenstein has a particular ‘predilection’ for is natural philosophy; and “[n]atural philosophy is the genius that has regulated [his] fate” (Shelley 29). After the day he meets M. Waldman, the professor of chemistry at Ingolstadt university, Frankenstein becomes specialized in a particular field in the domain of natural philosophy: “From this day natural philosophy, and particularly chemistry, in the most comprehensive sense of the term,

became nearly my sole occupation” (Shelley 41). Then he proceeds into further specialization and applies himself “more particularly to those branches of natural philosophy which relate to physiology” (Shelley 42). Unlike the earlier alchemists, Frankenstein does not distort his attention and effort upon a variety of subjects. Emphasizing the significance of specialization, he says, “[a] mind of moderate capacity which closely pursues one study must infallibly arrive at great proficiency in that study” (Shelley 42). Thus, Frankenstein succeeds in arriving at the particular branch of science which serves his purpose the most.

The other characteristic of scientific vocation which Weber draws attention to, and which *Frankenstein* exceptionally depicts, is passion. Weber states:

In the absence of this strange intoxication that outsiders greet with a pitying smile, without this passion, this conviction that millennia had to pass before you were born, and millennia more must wait in silence to see if your conjecture will be confirmed – without this you do not possess this vocation for science and should turn your hand to something else. For nothing has any value for a human being as a human being unless he can pursue it with passion. (2004, 8)

Victor Frankenstein and Robert Walton have this type of intoxication in science which is viewed with pity by the outsiders. The introductory pages of the novel are mainly reserved for displaying the passion of Walton for knowledge: “I feel my heart glow with an enthusiasm which elevates me to heaven, for nothing contributes so much to tranquilize the mind as a steady purpose – a point on which the soul may fix its intellectual eye” (Shelley 4). Walton admires and pities Frankenstein because he is familiar with such passion in knowledge. Referring to Frankenstein, Walton says, “[h]e excites at once my admiration and my pity to an astonishing degree” (Shelley 17). In the same pattern, Frankenstein pities Walton and he describes the passion for science as intoxication: “Unhappy man! Do you share my madness? Have u drunk also of the intoxicating drougt?” (Shelley 17). The pity between the main characters leaves no space for pitying the Monster. Describing the passionate ardour which propelled him while creating the Monster, Frankenstein says, “a resistless and almost frantic impulse urged me forward; I seemed to have lost all soul or sensation but for this one pursuit” (Shelley 45). Passion and devotion to a specific purpose are the means towards

establishing an individualistic self in the realm of science. Weber says, “in the realm of science, the only person to have ‘personality’ is the one who is wholly devoted to his subject” (2004, 10). Walton and Frankenstein are passionately after establishing scientifically recognizable selves. For Frankenstein, the ultimate aim is supreme enough to justify the creation of a living creature without any considerations to the welfare and emotions of that creature. The same passion justifies risking the lives of the sailors on Walton’s ship among the mountains of ice in the frozen ocean.

The novel sheds light upon the scientifically hubristic individuals. The rise of the systematic scientific endeavours leads to the establishment of standard conventions which regulate the scientific work. Unlike art, science is based on progress. According to Weber, “[s]cientific work is harnessed to the course of progress” (2004, 11). Science has specific nature which makes it different from art:

A work of art that truly achieves fulfilment will never be surpassed; it will never grow old. The individual can assess its significance for himself personally in different ways . . . contrast that with the realm of science, where we all know that what we have achieved will be obsolete in ten, twenty, or fifty years. That is the fate, indeed, that is the very meaning of scientific work . . . Every scientific fulfilment gives birth to new questions and cries out to be surpassed and rendered obsolete. Everyone who wishes to serve science has to resign himself to this. (Weber, 2004, 11)

This means that “to be superseded scientifically is not simply our fate but our goal. We cannot work without living in hope that others will advance beyond us” (Weber, 2004, 11). Shelley’s novel displays awareness of the concept of progress in science. Walton is cognizant of this peculiarity of science. Although Romantically far-fetched and exaggeratedly ambitious, Walton’s aim, is scientifically dexterous. Walton wants to contribute, if his endeavour would be successful, to the movement of science through providing the useful keys, (namely, the path to the north pole and the secret of the magnet) that other generations of scientists and researchers would need in the future. Addressing his sister, Walton writes, “you cannot contest the inestimable benefit which I shall confer on all mankind, to the last generation, by discovering a passage near the pole to those countries, to reach which at present so many months are requisite; or by ascertaining the secret of the magnet, which if at all possible, can only be affected by an

undertaking such as mine” (Shelley 4). Thus, despite his illusions, Walton observes the scientific standards of his age. He has no real scientific hubris which leads to his destruction.

On the other hand, Frankenstein`s hamartia lies in his non-compliance with this eccentricity of science. Frankenstein is a disciple of the ancient alchemists whose systems and principles are out of fashion. Addressing Frankenstein, professor Krempe says, “I little expected, in this enlightened and scientific age, to find a disciple of Albertus Magnus and Paracelsus” (Shelley 36). However, Frankenstein realizes that the systems of those old authors “had been entirely exploded and that a modern system of science had been introduced which possessed much greater powers than the ancient” (Shelley 30). What he fails to recognize is that the approach of those authors was erroneous and invalid. Frankenstein abandons those authors but he imitates their methods. Like the forgotten alchemists, Frankenstein overlooks the accumulative nature of science. What he has in common with the ancient scientists is that he “always having been imbued with a fervent longing to penetrate the secrets of nature” (Shelley 30). He is not satisfied with the discoveries of modern philosophers particularly because their approach is gradual and cumulative, and consequently they fail to achieve tangible achievements and breakthroughs. Frankenstein reflects, “Sir Isaac Newton is said to have avowed that he felt like a child picking up shells beside the great and unexplored ocean of truth” (Shelley 30). Professor Waldman provides guidance for Frankenstein and emphasises the progressive nature of modern chemistry when he says, “[t]he ancient teachers of this science promised impossibilities and performed nothing. The modern masters promise very little; they know that metals cannot be transmuted and that the elixir of life is a chimera” (Shelley 38); M. Waldman, wisely, appreciates the role of the ancient chemists as contributors to the movement of science, but he warns Frankenstein that those scientists were “erroneously directed” (Shelley 39). In spite of all this advice, the dissatisfied Frankenstein “entered with the greatest diligence into the search of the philosopher`s stone and the elixir of life” (Shelley 31). He ignores the progressive nature of modern scientific research and attempts to achieve immoderate and uttermost ends, saying, “what glory would attend the discovery if I could banish disease from the human frame and render man invulnerable to any but a violent death! . . . more, far more, will I

achieve; treading in the steps already marked, I will pioneer a new way, explore unknown powers, and unfold to the world the deepest mysteries of creation” (Shelley 31-32). In spite of his erroneous approach, Frankenstein arrives at one point to the summit of his desires and succeeds in finding the secret of life. He remarks, “[a]fter days and nights of incredible labour and fatigue, I succeeded in discovering the cause of generation and life; nay, more, I became myself capable of bestowing animation upon lifeless matter” (Shelley 43). Instead of the standard procedure of declaring, and sharing the new discoveries with other researchers and colleagues, Frankenstein, proceeds with his faulty procedure and decides to create a creature:

when I found so astonishing a power placed within my hands, I hesitated a long time concerning the manner in which I should employ it. Although I possessed the capacity of bestowing animation, yet to prepare a frame for the reception of it, with all its intricacies of fibres, muscles, and veins, still remained a work of inconceivable difficulty and labour. I doubted at first whether I should attempt the creation of a being like myself, or one of simpler organization; but my imagination was too much exalted by my first success to permit me to doubt of my ability to give life to an animal as complete and wonderful as man (Shelley 44)

Frankenstein does not want to submit his discovery to other scientists to improve it and put it into proper use. Unlike the scientists of his time, he does not want to be surpassed and superseded. He does not put his transcendental aim of serving humanity into the proper channels of science. What he does not realize is that “[t]he scientific attitude is experimental as well as intrinsically communicative” (Dewey, 1999. 172). Dewey asserts that “[n]o scientific inquirer can keep what he finds to himself or turn it to merely private account without losing his scientific standing. Everything discovered belongs to the community of workers. Every new idea and theory has to be submitted to this community for confirmation and test” (1999, 170). Frankenstein’s ego diverts him from the standard procedures of scientific conduct.

In order to make his findings concrete and tangible, Frankenstein chooses to build a frame. His egotism pushes him towards the utmost limits. Blinded by his first success, he decides to create a complete human being; and this particular decision eventually leads to his own destruction. Therefore, in *Frankenstein*, Mary Shelley introduces a new type of hubris. It is scientific hubris. Frankenstein is particularly

afflicted by this type of hubris. At the personal level, he is noble, moderate, and humble. Frankenstein's monstrosity lies in his scientific pride and arrogance. Bloom says, "Victor Frankenstein, though he possesses generous impulse, is nothing less than a moral idiot in regard to the 'monster' he has created . . . He is thus at once a great Hermetic scientist, an astonishing genius at breaking through human limitations, and a pragmatic monster, the true monster of the novel" (2007, 9). Through his stereotypical approach to science, Frankenstein mercilessly views the sensible Monster as a mere outcome of a botched experiment. And in this way he brings about his own downfall.

From an opposite perspective, Frankenstein can be seen as an individual who rebels against the current status of science in his time. A careful consideration of the status of science in general, and its position in the beginning of the nineteenth century, would reveal that the dissatisfaction of Frankenstein is not without logical basis. According to Weber, the principle of progress is infinite. This means that scientists should endlessly aim at being superseded and surpassed:

This brings us to the problem of the meaning of science. For it is far from self-evident that a thing that is subject to such a law can itself be meaningful and rational. What is the point of engaging in something that neither comes, nor can come, to an end in reality? . . . What meaningful achievement can he [the scientist] hope for from activities that are always doomed to obsolescence? What can justify his readiness to harness himself to this specialized, never-ending enterprise? That question calls for some general reflection (Weber, 2004, 11-12)

These are the concerns that in fact Frankenstein originally reacts against. What is the point of engaging in something that is never finalized and that is always doomed to obsolescence? This is why Frankenstein always comes discontented and dissatisfied after studying the discoveries of modern philosophers. The same reason makes Sir Isaac Newton feel like an ignorant child beside the great and unexplored ocean of knowledge. For Frankenstein, the successors of Isaac Newton "in each branch of natural philosophy with whom [he] was acquainted appeared even to [his] boy's apprehensions as tyros engaged in the same pursuit" (Shelley 30). Frankenstein even resentfully compares the scientists of his time with uneducated peasants:

The untaught peasant beheld the elements around him and was acquainted with their practical uses. The most learned philosopher knew little more. He had partially unveiled the face of Nature, but her immortal lineaments were still a wonder and a mystery. He might dissect, anatomize, and give names; but, not to speak of a final cause, causes in their secondary and tertiary grades were utterly unknown to him (Shelley 30)

Moreover, Frankenstein discredits the education system of his time when he says, “[i]t may appear strange that such should arise in the eighteenth century; but while I followed the routine of education in the school of Geneva, I was, to a great degree, self-taught with regard to my favourite studies” (Shelley 31). He harshly criticizes the monotonously progressive nature of science which Weber refers to. Old scientists for Frankenstein are more knowledgeable because they “had penetrated deeper”; and that is why, he takes “their word for all that they averred and [he] became their disciple” (Shelley 30-31). Unlike old scientists, modern ones don’t have recognizable and instantaneously profitable aims. They seem like being trapped in a dark cave with no light to indicate the exist which leads out of this darkness. This metaphor is used by Frankenstein when he achieves his desired break through and becomes able to bestow animation upon lifeless matter: “I was like the Arabian who had been buried with the dead and found a passage to life, aided only by one glimmering and seemingly ineffectual light” (Shelley 43-44). In order to go out of the infinite circle of obsolescence and achieve the desired scientific finalization, Frankenstein uses the right means, but with faulty procedure. He uses the means and the resources of modern science, but he maintains the attitude of ancient chemists. He needs the creature to consummate his venture. He needs to eternally register his achievement in his creature. The creature would be a live testimony and authentication of Frankenstein`s discovery of the secret of life.

It is worth noting here that Frankenstein is competent in natural philosophy and chemistry; and through research in these fields he discovers the secret of life. The assembling of the creature is another task which needs different expertise. The negative effect of the out-dated and ‘exploded’ attitude of ancient chemists becomes evident particularly in the second stage of Frankenstein`s venture, in which he decides to build the human frame. In his rush towards finalization, he sacrifices perfection. He knows

that his work would be imperfect: “I prepared myself for a multitude of reverses; my operations might be incessantly baffled, and at last my work be imperfect, yet when I considered the improvement which everyday takes place in science and mechanics, I was encouraged to hope my present attempts would at least lay the foundations of future success” (Shelley 44). This means that Frankenstein’s intention is to make a prototype that can be used as a template, and can, at the same time, be improved by other, more specialist scientists and technicians. Therefore, in order to overcome the technical issues of structuring the frame, he chooses to make his human huge in size: “As the minuteness of the parts formed a great hindrance to my speed, I resolved, contrary to my first intention, to make the being of a gigantic stature, that is to say, about eight feet in height, and proportionally large” (Shelley 44). As a result, the piece of art which Frankenstein intends to create, turns out to be monstrous in shape and hideous. Thus, while he succeeded in the purely scientific part of his project, he fails in the part which requires technical skills.

Frankenstein articulates the tension between science and society at the threshold of modernity. The titular character represents an exemplification of the irresolute scientist who lives in a transitional period in the history of science. In fact, Walton and Frankenstein are both old paradigm explorers who try to establish their individuality at this critical period. While the main characters fail in complying with the new rules of scientific conduct, the public opinion also still fails in changing and adjusting with the idea that science can provide answers for all the questions. The punishment of Frankenstein and the failure of Walton are attributed to the fact that science as a path to nature is still considered as blasphemy to the ears of people at the beginning of the nineteenth century. Frankenstein is severely punished not only because he is a resurrectionist, but also because he practices anatomy and surgery. McNally, affirms that, anatomists and surgeons were despised by ordinary English people in the end of the eighteenth century. Referring to *Frankenstein*, McNally says:

the resonance of this story owed much to actual phenomena, which became points of contestation at the gallows in eighteenth-century London, as the urban crowd fought to save the bodies of the hanged from anatomists seeking to procure corpses for dissection [therefore] For the British working class, anatomists, surgeons and resurrectionists were all part of a

general conspiracy to degrade and oppress the poor in both life and death through kidnapping, murdering, grave-robbing and dissection (2011, 12).

Thus, though such practices are done for the sake of science and progress in medicine, the society still views them as transgressions against the collective norms, and signs of individual non-conformity and dissonance that require harsh punitive measures.

3.5. The Individual and the Relationship to the Collectiveness

Frankenstein also depicts the tension between the individual and the society in the beginning of the nineteenth century. The individuals become more sensitive to the heavy burdens which the society imposes upon them. The disenchanting subject who strives to achieve individualism, needs to face the strong binding force of society. Society is so strong that “in general, simply by its effect on men`s minds, undoubtedly has all that is required to arouse the sensation of the divine.” (Durkheim, 1995, 208). Society is contra individualism because it “fosters in us the sense of perpetual dependence. Precisely because society has its own specific nature that is different from our nature as individuals, it pursues ends that are also specifically its own; but because it can achieve those ends only by working through us, it categorically demands our cooperation” (Durkheim, 1995, 209). As such, society enslaves its subjects and compromises their free will:

Society requires us to make ourselves its servants, forgetful of our own interests. And it subjects us to all sorts of restraints, privations, and sacrifices without which social life would be impossible. And so, at every instant, we must submit to rules of action and thought that we have neither made nor wanted and that sometimes are contrary to our inclination and to our most basic instincts. (Durkheim, 1995, 209)

Being that coercive and demanding, social constraints preclude the establishment of the self. In other words, society is the antithesis of individualism. *Frankenstein* is a story of male individuals who resist rotation in the orbit of society. The story is told on board of a ship which moves away from societies towards the uninhabited “seat of frost and desolation . . . and out of the common pathways of men” (Shelley 3-10). The two main characters on board are both introverted and self-contained. Instead of schooling, which includes playing and socializing, Walton occupies himself with reading during his

childhood. Describing his childhood, Walton notes, “[m]y education was neglected, yet I was passionately fond of reading” (Shelley 4). Walton is self-absorbed and his interest in reading seems to be a mere excuse to avoid collectiveness. His interest in seafaring springs from the coincidental fact that his uncle’s library does not contain other subjects than histories of voyages. Addressing his sister, Walton writes, “[y]ou may remember that a history of all the voyages made for the purposes of discovery composed the whole of our good Uncle Thomas’ library” (Shelley 4). Walton spends his youth in seclusion. Still addressing his sister, Walton writes, “[a] youth passed in solitude, my best years spent under your gentle and feminine fosterage” (Shelley 8). Under the pretence of glory seeking, Walton sacrifices the life of ease and luxury to keep away from social burdens: “My life might have been passed in ease and luxury, but I preferred glory to every enticement that wealth placed in my path” (Shelley 5). The same almost applies to Victor Frankenstein. Although he goes to school, Frankenstein avoids people and stays unresponsive to other student’s socializing inclinations. Frankenstein mentions, “[i]t was my temper to avoid a crowd and to attach myself fervently to a few. I was indifferent, therefore, to my school-fellows in general” (Shelley 28). While leaving his home and enrolling at the university of Ingolstadt, Victor Frankenstein complains about missing his family and his only male friend Clerval. But, at the same time, he seizes the chance to break loose from the communal constraints of collectivity. During his two-year period of study, he shuns his fellow students and seeks solitary. He does not pay a visit to his family in Geneva, and does not even answer their letters.

Another reason of Frankenstein’s dissonance and rejection of society is that he is a Romantic aristocrat who has no place in the world of the middle class where people are equals. The industrial society does not value and recognize aristocracy anymore. Society values and estimates industriousness and scientific breakthroughs more. Victor Frankenstein is not recognized as special and different. As such he needs to establish his individuality through achieving success in his scientific endeavour. However, the course of events which includes the death of his family members also serves the self-centredness and the singularity yearnings of Frankenstein. If one views the Monster as a projection of the repressed unconsciousness of his creator, one can assume that the creature fulfils the unfelt desires of Frankenstein. For example, the killing of the younger

brother and Clerval can be seen as removal of male rivals and competitors who might affect the singularity and uniqueness of the Frankenstein. The killing of Elizabeth, on the other hand, represents the destruction of the female body which can give natural birth. It also represents a rejection of domesticity and social life. The whole course of sad events deepens the solitude of Frankenstein and enlarges the gap between him and society. Describing his attitude towards people after the death of his little brother, he says, “I shunned the face of man; all sound of joy or complacency was torture to me; solitude was my only consolation – deep, dark, deathlike solitude” (Shelley 85). In this way, the whole venture of Frankenstein contributes to further detachment from the society and implements solitude.

Like Robinson Crusoe, Walton and Frankenstein go against the will of their fathers who try to regulate the future of their sons. According to Durkheim, “[t]he group regularly produces an intellectual and moral uniformity” (Durkheim, 1995, 5). In *Frankenstein*, the inclination of the society is disclosed by the attitude of the fathers. Emphasizing the symbolic status of the father in society, Durkheim says, “[b]efore the middle of the nineteenth century, it was generally believed that the father was the essential element of the family; it was not even imaginable that there could be a family organization of which paternal power was not the keystone” (1995, 6). Walton’s father prohibits the intellectual inclinations of his son through prohibiting his future seafaring. Walton comments, “[t]hese volumes were my study day and night, and my familiarity with them increased that regret which I had felt, as a child, on learning that my father’s dying injunction had forbidden my uncle to allow me to embark in a seafaring life” (Shelley 4). In similar pattern, Frankenstein’s father instructs him not to read the old books of natural philosophy and describes them as trash. Upon discovering a volume of the works of Cornelius Agrippa, Frankenstein enthusiastically shows the book to his father. Frankenstein states, “[m]y father looked carelessly at the title page of my book and said, ‘Ah! Cornelius Agrippa! My dear Victor, do not waste your time upon this; it is sad trash’” (Shelley 29). Thus, through discarding their fathers’ wills, Walton and Frankenstein display their rejection of the collective intellectuality, and accentuate their impulse to establish an intellectuality of their own.

The father-son struggle is also metaphorically articulated in the rebellion of the Monster against his 'father', Frankenstein, who hinders the Monster's desperate ambitions to establish a recognizable self. In this way, *Frankenstein* discusses the patriarchal bindings and the attitude of individuals towards the traditional family unit.

On the other hand, human beings are social beings. Society has its own gravity and irresistible attraction. Durkheim says that "[s]ociety commands us because it is exterior and superior to us; the moral distance between it and us make it an authority before which our will defers. But as, on the other hand, it is within us and is us, we love and desire it" (2010, 28). Thus, "to love society is to love both something beyond us and something in ourselves. We could not wish to be free of society without wishing to finish our existence as men" (Durkheim, 2010, 27). This need for society explains the Monster's yearning for collective and group life. Describing his feelings after observing the warmth of domestic life of the cottagers who dwell next to his shelter, the Monster says, "[w]hat chiefly struck me was the gentle manners of these people, and I longed to join them, but dared not" (Shelley 107). The Monster learns much about the world in general, and about collectivity and social life in particular, through secretly observing and listening to the cottagers. He listens to "the instructions which Felix bestowed upon the Arabian", and becomes deeply touched by the lessons about the family structure and the social bonds which binds the individual with the others:

I heard of the difference of sexes, and the birth and growth of children, how the father doted on the smiles of the infant, and the lively sallies of the older child, how all the life and cares of the mother were wrapped up in the precious charge, how the mind of youth expanded and gained knowledge, of brother, sister, and all the various relationships which bind one human being to another in mutual bonds. (Shelley 118)

This understanding of the warmth and amiability of domestic and social life ignites the eagerness of the Monster towards familial and social domesticity. As a result, with immense grief, the Monster laments his past and his present state of desolation, saying, "[b]ut where were my friends and relations? No father had watched my infant days, no mother had blessed me with smiles and caresses; or if they had, all my past life was now a blot, a blind vacancy in which I distinguish nothing" (Shelley 118). Ironically, the Monster does not even go through physical infancy. From "[his] earliest remembrance

[he] had been as [he] then was in height and proportion” (Shelley 118). With this absolute lack of any kind of bonding, the Monster suffers from lack of identity. The Monster sadly wonders, “I had never yet seen a being resembling me or who claimed any intercourse with me. What was I? The question again recurred, to be answered only with groans” (Shelley 118). Thus, the search for domesticity and sociability for the Monster amounts to the search for identity. And while Walton and Frankenstein seek detachment and escape from the collective gravity, the Monster finds himself tremendously drawn by this immense gravity.

With the enmity between the Monster and his creator, Shelley contrives an unaccustomed rebellion against the will and the existence of the father. Frankenstein is the sole person in the world that the Monster has a connection with. In his non-concern about the welfare of his creature, Frankenstein exhibits the indifference of the collectiveness towards specific and singular individuals who do not homogenize with the standardizations¹⁸ of the group. Representing the force of the group in the figure of the father, Frankenstein assumes moral authority upon the Monster. Durkheim draws attention to the fact that the request of conformity from the individual usually take short and sharp forms of address: “a command generally takes on short, sharp forms of address that leave no room for hesitation. It is also why, to the extent that command is command and works by its own strength, it precludes any idea of deliberation or calculation, but instead is made effective by the very intensity of the mental state in which it is given” (1995, 209). In similar fashion, Frankenstein does not only use short and sharp commands to address the Monster, but also even assumes unreal physical power to overcome the physically mighty Monster. Rebuking the Monster, Frankenstein says, “[d]evil, I exclaimed, do you dare approach me? And do not you fear the fierce vengeance of my arm wreaked on your miserable head? Begone, vile insect! Or rather, stay, that I may trample you to dust!” (Shelley 94). In spite of Frankenstein’s humiliating and aggressive manner of address, the Monster shows considerable respect towards his creator, saying, “[r]emember thou hast made me more powerful than thyself; my height is superior to thine, my joints more supple. But I will not be tempted to set

¹⁸ One of the unique themes of the novel is the fact that the exclusion of the Monster from collectivity is done completely on the basis of non-conformity in form.

myself in operation to thee. I am thy creature, and I will be even mild and docile to my natural lord and king if thou wilt also perform thy part, the which thou owest me” (Shelley 95). The Monster attributes sacredness to the physical figure of his creator. It is worth noting in this context that in his rebellion against the injustice of Frankenstein, the Monster avoids any physical contact with the man who brought him to the world. Instead, he chooses to destroy him emotionally. The Monster makes his maker suffer from the same affliction that he suffers from, namely, lack of collectiveness. The Monster brings about gradual collective scarcity to the life of his creator. He eliminates the members of the small group to whom Frankenstein is connected. And in this way, he puts him in the same situation of solitude which he suffers from.

The rebellion of the Monster against the father also signifies the individual’s rebellion against the will of God. The search for God is part of the Monster’s endeavour to acquire an individual identity and to locate himself in the world of humans. The monster becomes burdened with these inquiries after learning literacy and after finding a suitcase full of variety of books about philosophy and literature. Describing the effect of these books upon him, the Monster says, “I can hardly describe to you the effect of these books. They produced in me an infinity of new images and feelings, that sometimes raised me to ecstasy, but more frequently sunk me into the lowest dejection” (Shelley 126) After becoming intellectually mature enough, the Monster strives to find logical answers for the following questions: “My person was hideous and my stature gigantic. What did this mean? Who was I? What was I? whence did I come? What was my destination? These questions continually recurred, but I was unable to solve them” (Shelley 126). Knowing about the creations of human beings, the Monster logically compares his case with the creation of Adam:

Like Adam, I was apparently united by no link to any other being in existence; but his state was far different from mine in every other respect. He had come forth from the hands of God a perfect creature, happy and prosperous, guarded by the especial care of his Creator; he was allowed to converse with and acquire knowledge from beings of a superior nature, but I was wretched, helpless, and alone. Many times I consider Satan as the fitter emblem of my condition, for often, like him, when I viewed the bliss of my protectors, the bitter gall of envy rose within me. (Shelley 127)

This comparison gives logical and moral grounds for the rebellion of the Monster against Frankenstein. The Monster comes to the conclusion that he is not created by the just and caring God who created the beautiful and well-shaped human beings. His creator is unjust and neglectful. And, as far as identity is concerned, the Monsters finds out that the only Biblical category to which he fits is the category of the fallen angel.

Within the same context, the Monster becomes capable of deciphering the papers which he had discovered in the pocket of the dress which he had taken from Frankenstein's laboratory. The papers are Frankenstein's journal of the four months that preceded the creature's creation. The Monster reads with diligence these papers which minutely describe every step in the progress of his creation. These papers represent the Bible which tells the story of the genesis of the Monster. The Monster confronts Frankenstein with these papers, saying, "[h]ere they are. Everything is related in them which bears reference to my accursed origin; the whole detail of that series of disgusting circumstances which produced it is set in view; the minutest description of my odious and loathsome person is given, in language which painted your own horrors and rendered mine indelible" (Shelley 128). Then, the Monster resentfully questions his own creator about the reason behind his creation saying, "[a]ccursed creator! Why did you form a monster so hideous that even you turned from me in disgust? God, in pity, made man beautiful and alluring, after his own image; but my form is a filthy type of yours, more horrid even from the very resemblance" (Shelley 128). The Monster notes that his situation is even worse than the situation of the Satan, because "Satan had his companions, fellow devils, to admire and encourage him, but I am solitary and abhorred" (Shelley 128). By confronting Frankenstein with the true story of the Monster's genesis, the story which comes completely at variance with the one mentioned in the Scripture, the Monster criminalizes his creator and acquires basis for his rebellion against him. The creation of Adam is a story of blessing and perfection, and the creation of the Monster is story of curse and deformity¹⁹. Thus, both Frankenstein and the Monster are rebel individuals against their fathers and creators.

¹⁹ It is worth mentioning in this context that Romanticism and the concomitant pantheistic doctrine of the early nineteenth century, which views Providence as "identical with the universe

3.6. The Hegelian Individuality in *Frankenstein*

Apart from the relationship between the individual and the society, there is an essential element which is related to the mechanism of personality formation. This element is the interaction with the 'other'. According to Hegel, individualism in the sense of self-consciousness, or the recognition of the self, is a gradual and dynamic process which becomes more implemented by the progress of history and the development of civilization. Such individualism depends upon the relationship with the 'other'. Hegel says: "Self-consciousness exists in and for itself when, and by the fact that, it so exists for another; that is, it exists only in being acknowledged" (2004, 111). According to Hegel, the mechanism of individualistic self-recognition goes as follows: "Self-consciousness is faced by another self-consciousness; it has come out of itself. This has a twofold significance: first, it has lost itself, for it finds itself as an 'other' being; secondly, in doing so it has superseded the other, for it does not see the other as an essential being, but in the other sees its own self" (2004, 111). This means that the self-recognition cannot be achieved without the existence of an 'other'. But, the mere existence of an 'other' is not enough because this movement of self-consciousness in relation to another self-consciousness is not a one sided action; rather, "this action of the one has itself the double significance of being both its own action and the action of the other as well" (Hegel, 2004, 111-112). Written at an age of individualistic self-recognition, *Frankenstein* uniquely depicts such mechanisms of personality formation.

Walton's eagerness for a friend represents yearning for self-consciousness and recognition. Expressing his need for a friend, Walton tells his sister, "[b]ut I have one want which I have never yet been able to satisfy, and the absence of the object of which I now feel as a most severe evil, I have no friend" (Shelley 7). The earnestness in Walton's tone indicates the seriousness of the issue of not having a friend, or an 'other' to identify with. Explaining the reasons behind such need, Walton says, "Margaret: when I am glowing with the enthusiasm of success, there will be none to participate my joy; if I am assailed by disappointment, no one will endeavour to sustain me in dejection" (Shelley 7). Walton also notes that the need of the friend is for the

[and] as an impersonal, unified totality" (Mc Carney, 2000, 40), both allow the application of such divinity metaphors and motifs upon mundane characters and events.

communication of feelings: “I shall commit my thoughts to paper, it is true; but that is poor medium for the communication of feeling. I desire the company of a man who could sympathize with me, whose eyes would reply to mine. You may deem me romantic, my dear sister, but I bitterly feel the want of a friend” (Shelley 7). The friend to identify with is not a random individual. He should have certain features to qualify as a suitable friend for Walton. Walton explains, “I have no one near me, gentle yet courageous, possessed of a cultivated as well as of a capacious mind, whose tastes are like my own, to approve or amend my plans . . . I greatly need a friend who would have sense enough not to despise me as romantic, and affection enough for me to endeavour to regulate my mind” (Shelley 7). Walton is anxious about not finding a friend because he still has no awareness of his own self. He needs to establish his self-consciousness through an identification with an ‘other’. Such self-awareness comes into existence only in being acknowledged. The lieutenant of the ship is a good candidate for Walton’s self-acknowledgement; for he “is a man of wonderful courage and enterprise; he is madly desirous of glory, or rather, to ward my phrase more characteristically, of advancement in his profession. He is an Englishman, and in the midst of national and professional prejudices, unsoftened by cultivation, retains some of the noblest endowments of humanity” (Shelley 8). But, for Walton, the lieutenant does not fulfil the twofold significance which Hegel refers to. Walton cannot find himself in this other being, because despite his good traits, the lieutenant of the ship “is wholly uneducated: he is as silent as a Turk, and a kind of ignorant carelessness attends him, which, while it renders his conduct the more astonishing, detracts from the interest and sympathy which otherwise he would command” (Shelley 9). Being not educated, silent, and careless, the lieutenant is not qualified as a suitable ‘other’ for Walton to identify with. In fact, Walton does not expect to find the friend which he needs in the frozen ocean or among the sailors who accompany him on board of his ship: “Well, these are useless complains; I shall certainly find no friend on the wild ocean, nor even here in Archangel, among merchants and seamen” (Shelley 8). Walton knows that the type of person that he can identify himself with is rare and difficult to find.

In a Romantic twist of fate, Walton finds Frankenstein, in a wretched condition, on a large fragment of ice in the frozen ocean. After restoring Frankenstein, Walton

removes him to his own cabin and attends on him as much as his duty would permit. After observing the speech and the manners of his quest, Walton realizes that this man is bestowed with the two types of characteristics which he wishes to find, and which are very rare to find in one person: namely, the wild madness of an explorer, and the refined gentleness of a noble man. Admirably describing Frankenstein, Walton writes, "I never saw a more interesting creature: his eyes have generally an expression of wildness, and even madness, but there are moments when, if someone performs an act of kindness towards him or does him the most trifling service, his whole countenance is lighted up, as it were, with a beam of benevolence and sweetness that I never saw equalled" (Shelley 15). Hegel classifies the process of recognition into two stages. In the first stage, one of the two individuals is "being only recognized, the other only recognizing" (2004, 113). In the novel, the first stage consists of Walton recognizing Frankenstein first. Walton says, "For my own part, I began to love him as a brother, and his constant and deep grief fills me with sympathy and compassion" (Shelley 16). Thus, Walton discerns Frankenstein first as the friend whom he seeks: "I said in one of my letters, my dear Margaret, that I should find no friend on the wide ocean; yet I have found a man who, before his spirit had been broken by misery, I should have been happy to have possessed as the brother of my heart" (Shelley 16). As a result, Walton opens his heart and uses "the language of [his] heart, to give utterance to the burning ardour of [his] soul and to say, with all the fervour that warmed [him], how gladly [he] would sacrifice [his] fortune, [his] existence, [his] every hope, to the furtherance of [his] enterprise" (Shelley 17). Walton identifies with Frankenstein and finds his self-consciousness in him. Accordingly, Walton explicitly tells Frankenstein about his need of a friend with whom he can identify and find his own self: "I spoke of my desire of finding a friend, of my thirst for a more intimate sympathy with a fellow mind than had ever fallen to my lot, and expressed my conviction that a man could boast of little happiness who did not enjoy this blessing" (Shelley 18). In this way, Walton finds his self-identity in Frankenstein and recognizes him as the good friend he was looking for.

Frankenstein, on the other hand, fulfils the double significance of the 'other' self-consciousness. After listening to Walton's account about his passion for knowledge and the desire to discover and serve science, Frankenstein also recognizes Walton as a

friend, and the mutual action of self-identification becomes complete. That is because “the movement is simply the double movement of the two self-consciousnesses. Each sees the ‘other’ do the same as it does; each does itself what it demands of the ‘other’” (Hegel, 2004, 112). Frankenstein also agrees with Walton about the importance of having a good friend saying, “I agree with you. We are unfinished creatures, but half made up, if one wiser, better, dearer than ourselves – such a friend ought to be – do not lend his aid to perfectionate our weak and faulty natures”; then, referring to Clerval, Frankenstein continues, “I once had a friend, the most noble of human creatures, and I am entitled, therefore, to judge respecting friendship” (Shelley 18). Frankenstein markedly values the role of a good friend. Using the expression ‘unfinished creatures’ in this context accords with the Hegelian claim that the self is not complete without a matching ‘other’. Frankenstein sets Clerval as a good example of a good friend and foreshadows his significance in Frankenstein’s life. Clerval was the ‘other’ with whom Frankenstein used to identify. Clerval is the good friend. Like Walton, Clerval, earlier restores Frankenstein to life after the crisis of the creation of the Monster. Praising Clerval, Frankenstein says:

Study had before secluded me from the intercourse of my fellow creatures, and rendered me unsocial; but Clerval called forth the better feelings of my heart; he again taught me to love the aspect of nature, and the cheerful faces of children. Excellent friend! How sincerely you did love me, and endeavour to elevate my mind until it was on a level with your own. A selfish pursuit had cramped and narrowed me, until your gentleness and affection warmed and opened my senses. (Shelley 63-64)

Through mentioning the merits of Clerval, Frankenstein stresses the magnitude of having a friend, or a considerate ‘other’, for the welfare of the individual.

Thus, the mere existence of an individual does not imply his completeness. Individuals become complete, or ‘finished creatures’, after being recognized by an equal ‘other’. Frankenstein’s statement about ‘unfinished creatures’ alludes to the predicament of the Monster in the novel. The Monster’s story essentially consists of accounts about incidences of recognizing without being recognized in return. After long time of watching the cottagers from his secret hovel, the Monster identifies with the De Lacey family and considers them as his friends. He has unbearable desire to be recognized by

them. He seizes the chance when everybody is absent and enters the cottage to talk with the old and blind father of the family. He explains to the old man that his only problem is the lack of friends, and that he has a desire to be recognized by some particular friends saying, "I am unfortunate and deserted creature, I look round and I have no relation or friend upon earth. These amiable people to whom I go have never seen me and know little of me. I am full of fears, for if I fail there, I am an outcast in the world forever" (Shelley 131). The blind man sympathises and agrees with him saying, "[d]o not despair. To be friendless is indeed to be unfortunate, but the hearts of men, when unprejudiced by any obvious self-interest, are full of brotherly love and charity. Rely, therefore, on your hopes; and if these friends are good and amiable, do not despair" (Shelley 131). After the tragic failure of this attempt to acquire recognition, the monster loses hopes in establishing human-human relations. The only remaining 'other' to identify with is Frankenstein, his own creator. It is worth mentioning that in his first meeting with Frankenstein, the Monster appeals for recognition at least on the basis of father-son, and creator-created ties. Thus, after being shunned and cursed by Frankenstein, the Monster says, "[a]ll men hate the wretched; how, then, must I be hated, who am miserable beyond all living things! Yet you, my creator, detest and spurn me, thy creature, to whom thou art bound by ties only dissoluble by the annihilation of one of us" (Shelley 94). Then the Monster offers a deal of double significance action of mutual self-recognition between him and his creator saying, "[d]o your duty towards me, and I will do mine towards you and the rest of mankind. If you will comply with my conditions, I will leave them and you at peace; but if you refuse, I will glut the maw of death, until it be satiated with the blood of your remaining friends" (Shelley 94). The Monster recognizes Frankenstein as a father and as a creator, but Frankenstein does not recognize the Monster as a son and as a creature. Suffering from lack of identity and integrated self-consciousness, the Monster is an 'unfinished creature'. Thus, in addition to being imperfect and deformed in shape, he also lacks the needed sense of self-contained individual. The Monster's threat for Frankenstein involves the killing of his friends, because he wants him to experience the same agony of lack of recognition and identity.

Upon the rejection of the Monster's demand, the recognition of self-consciousness of both, the Monster and Frankenstein, becomes dependant on the

negation of the objective mode of each other. In such case, the self-consciousness assumes pure abstract state, and strive to show “that it is not attached to any specific existence, not to the individuality common to existence as such, that it is not attached to life” (Hegel, 2004, 113). In their first encounter with each other, Frankenstein overlooks the great variance in size and strength between him and the Monster, and attacks the Monster, in an attempt to eliminate him. Referring to this incident, Frankenstein mentions, “[m]y rage was without bounds; I sprang on him, impelled by all the feelings which can arm one being against the existence of another” (Shelley 94). In his attempt to destroy someone who is conspicuously stronger than him, Frankenstein displays considerable indifference concerning his own life, because he completely rejects the Monster, and his only way of establishing his own consciousness is through the elimination of this particular ‘other’. The Monster, on the other hand, at this stage, displays concern about his own life saying, “[I]ife, although it may only be an accumulation of anguish, is dear to me, and I will defend it” (Shelley 95). He still values his own life because he still recognizes Frankenstein as a father and as a creator, and he entertains hopes of positive recognition if his demands would be accepted.

The destruction of the female Monster represents a turning point in the struggle between Frankenstein and the Monster. The Monster completely loses hopes of any identification with any ‘other’. In this case, the negative mode of self-consciousness recognition takes the twofold action:

action on the part of the other, and action on its own part. In so far as it is the action of the other, each seeks the death of the other. But in doing so, the second kind of action, action on its own part, is also involved; for the former involves the staking of its own life. Thus the relation of the two self-conscious individuals is such that they prove themselves and each other through a life-and-death struggle. They must engage in this struggle, for they must raise their certainty of being for themselves to truth. (Hegel, 2004, 113)

This exposition both describes and explains the nature of the conflict between the Monster and Frankenstein after cancelling the work on the making of the female partner which the Monster demands. This critical point signifies a shift in the attitude of the Monster towards Frankenstein. In spite of his hatred towards Frankenstein, the Monster had always, one sided wise, recognized him as a creator and father. After this event the

Monster terminates this recognition and addresses his creator by using the word 'slave': "Slave, I before reasoned with you, but you have proved yourself unworthy of my condescension. Remember that I have power; you believe yourself miserable, but I can make you so wretched that the light of day will be hateful to you. You are my creator, but I am your master; obey!" (Shelley 169). From this moment, the two enemies declare unstoppable war which involves the staking of their own lives for the sake of eliminating each other. For the Monster, "revenge, henceforth dearer than light or food! I may die, but first you, my tyrant and tormentor, shall curse the sun that gazes on your misery" (Shelley 170). On the other hand, describing his reaction to the threats of the Monster, Frankenstein says, "I would have seized him, but he eluded me and quitted the house with precipitation"; then he blames himself saying, "[w]hy had I not followed him and closed with him in mortal strife?"; later, Frankenstein decides, "I resolved not to fall before my enemy without a bitter struggle" (Shelley 170). It is important to note here that the two sides demonstrate readiness to sacrifice their own lives for the sake of destroying each other. Such risking of lives is, according to Hegel, also part of the strive towards establishing independent individuality; because "the individual who has not risked his life may well be recognized as a person, but he has not attained to the truth of this recognition as an independent self-consciousness" (Hegel, 2004, 114). Therefore, both enemies, put their lives on the stake in their venture to destroy each other.

For Frankenstein, death even becomes a wish, but his desire towards the negation of the opposing 'other' keeps him alive: "How I have lived I hardly know; many times I have stretched my failing limbs upon the sandy plain and prayed for death. But revenge kept me alive; I dared not die and leave my adversary in being" (Shelley 205). Hegel explains such feeling by saying, "[f]or just as life is the natural setting of consciousness, independence without absolute negativity, so death is the natural negation of consciousness, negation without independence, which thus remains without the required significance of recognition" (2004, 114). This desired significance of recognition is the fuel which motivates both sides and pushes them to extremes in their endeavours. This means that Frankenstein's biggest catastrophe at this stage lies in his failure to exterminate the Monster. Before entirely giving up and submitting himself to death, Frankenstein says, "[t]he task of his destruction was mine, but I have failed" (Shelley

220). For the Monster, on the other hand, the death of Frankenstein represents success in the elimination of his opposing 'other'. The Monster's self-awareness is confirmed through superseding his oppressor. With the death of Frankenstein, the 'daemon' has no other reason to proceed in evil and malice. Referring to the dead body of Frankenstein, the Monster says, "[t]he completion of my demonical design became an insatiable passion. And now it is ended; there is my last victim! . . . In his murder my crimes are consummated; the miserable series of my being is wound to its close!" (Shelley 222-223). Thus, after the termination of his opponent, the Monster turns into a harmless being and he promises Walton that he will not be the instrument of further mischief.

At the same time, the Monster mentions that he should soon put an end to his own life. The Monster says that for his mission to be completely accomplished, it requires his own death: "I shall collect my funeral pile and consume to ashes this miserable frame . . . I shall die. I shall no longer feel the agonies which now consume me or be the pray of feelings unsatisfied, yet unquenched. He is dead who called me into being; and when I shall be no more, the very remembrance of us both will speedily vanish" (Shelley 225). In Hegel's terms, "death is the natural negation of consciousness" (Hegel, 2004, 114). The Monster wants to put an end to his consciousness not only because of his suffering and pain, but also, paradoxical enough, because of Frankenstein's death. The death of Frankenstein represents the death of the Monster's consciousness in its alien form. Hegel explains, "[d]eath certainly shows that each staked his life and held it of no account, both in him and in the other; but that is not for those who survived this struggle. They put an end to their consciousness in its alien setting of natural existence, that is to say, they put an end to themselves" (Hegel, 2004, 114). This means that by killing Frankenstein, who is the father and the creator at the same time, the Monster puts an end to himself too. This explains the remorse and the regret which the Monster displays at seeing the dead body of his creator: "Oh, Frankenstein! Generous and self-devoted being! What does it avail that I now ask thee to pardon me?" (Shelley 222). This mourning is in fact also mourning of the self who has no other aim to achieve other than extinguishing its own self.

In this vein, it is important to explain that the novel uses the word ‘friend’²⁰ to refer to the ‘other’ whose existence is essential for the integration of the self-consciousness. As such, self-consciousness is different from the notion of sociability. Frankenstein is an anti-social character, but he identifies with his family members and his only male friend. Like Walton, he makes futile attempts to establish other levels of individuality through scientific ventures. The Monster, on the other hand, who is sociable and gregarious, lacks any form of ‘other’ to identify with; and thus, lacks the least form of individuality which is achieved through recognition. This description means that the novel can be read as a tragic strive for individuality which is doomed to failure.

3.7. The Abject and Undesired Individual

In *Frankenstein*, the Monster is a distinguished example of the abject individual. Within the context of recognition and rejection, it is important to refer to the concept of abjection which is suggested by Julia Kristeva. Primarily, according to Kristeva, abjection is the state of rejecting and jettisoning some objects and states of affair in the process of establishing the self. Through abjection, the subject sets borders between himself and the undesired other. It contributes in shaping the ‘I’ since the very early stages of a human’s life. By the process of abjection, “[t]he infant begins to separate itself from the others in order to develop borders between ‘I’ and other . . . The abject is what one spits out, rejects, almost violently excludes from oneself” (McAfee, 2004, 46). The abject itself then, Kristeva says, is “the jettisoned object [which] is radically excluded and draws me toward the place where meaning collapses. A certain ‘ego’ that merged with its master . . . It lies outside, beyond the set, and does not seem to agree to the latter’s rules of the game. And yet, from its place of banishment, the abject does not cease challenging its master” (Kristeva, 1982, 2). It includes the loathing and the repugnance felt towards a piece of filth, waste, or any other disgusting material. The abject also “hovers at the periphery of one’s existence, constantly challenging one’s own tenuous borders of selfhood. What makes something abject and not simply repressed is

²⁰ The plural form ‘friends’ is often used in the novel to refer to Clerval and Frankenstein’s family members. For example, Frankenstein says: “I thought of returning to my friends and my native town, when an incident happened that protracted my stay” (Shelley 42).

that it does not entirely disappear from consciousness. It remains as both an unconscious and a conscious threat to one's own clean and proper self" (McAfee, 2004, 46). The abject can instigate fear and horror because it does not respect the boundaries of the individual's 'I'. Thus, it beseeches and pulverizes the individual. The above characterization uniquely applies to the condition of the Monster in *Frankenstein*, where Mary Shelley uses abjection as an important Gothic and horror technique throughout her novel.

Before the creation of the abject creature, the major part in Frankenstein's study is related to anatomy and observation of dead bodies. Frankenstein spends days and nights in vaults and charnel-houses examining the cause and the progress of human body decay. Kristeva suggests that people have special type of abjection towards the human dead body: "The corpse (or cadaver), that which has irremediably come a cropper, is cesspool, and death; it upsets even more violently the one who confronts it as fragile and fallacious chance . . . in true theatre, without make up or masks, refuse and corpses show me what I permanently thrust aside in order to live" (Kristeva, 1982, 3). Shelley employs this human abjection towards the dead human body to implement dread and dismay. Frankenstein says, "[t]o examine the causes of life, we must first have recourse to death. I became acquainted with the science of anatomy, but this was not sufficient; I must also observe the natural decay and corruption of the human body . . . I saw how the fine form of man was degraded and wasted . . . I saw how the worm inherited the wonders of the eye and brain" (Shelley 42). The 'loathsome' occupation of collecting bones and dead body parts from charnel-houses and dissecting rooms, and combining them in the frame of the creature, represents the accumulation of abjection in one figure. Accordingly, abjection peaks in the story at the scene of infusing the spark of life into the creature. Graphically, Frankenstein gives a loathsome description of the newly created creature: "by the glimmer of the half-extinguished light, I saw the dull yellow eyes of the creature open; it breathed hard, and a convulsive motion agitated its limbs" (Shelley 49). Then Frankenstein adds:

How can I describe my emotions at this catastrophe, or how delineate the wretch whom with such infinite pains and care I had endeavoured to form? His limbs were in proportion, and I had selected his features as beautiful. Beautiful! Great God! His yellow skin scarcely covered

the work of muscles and arteries beneath; his hair was of a lustrous black, and flowing; his teeth of a pearly whiteness; but these luxuriations only formed a more horrid contrast with his watery eyes, that seemed almost of the same colour as the dun-white sockets in which they were set, his shrivelled complexion and straight black lips (Shelley 49)

In this description, abjection and loathsomeness are projected in more than one way. The yellow skin and the yellow watery eyes evoke the detested image of the body fluids, and particularly urine. The scarcely covered muscles and arteries, on the other hand, call forth the image of the broken skin, the state in which blood and other body fluids might leak out of the body and contaminate others. The description of the Monster's skin also calls forth the image of leprosy, the contagious skin disease which causes discolouration and lumps on the skin, and might lead to disfigurement and deformities. Kristeva mentions that chapter 13 and 14 of Leviticus "locate impurity in leprosy", because it represents "impairment of the cover that guarantees corporal integrity" (Kristeva, 1982, 101). Thus, in addition to being ugly and deformed, the Monster also evokes feelings of loathsome abjection on the basis of filthiness, infection, and impurity. In other words, people violently shun the Monster not only because he is ugly, they do so also because he exhibits contagious impurity. As such, the Monster is also a harbinger of epidemic disease and death. This adds further explanation to Frankenstein's escape from the working room. During his later encounters with the Monster, Frankenstein maintains a distance between him and the Monster and avoids closeness and direct contact. When the Monster places his hands before Frankenstein's eyes, Frankenstein flings them away from himself with violence. Abjection of the Monster is attested by Walton upon his encounter with the Monster after Frankenstein's death. Walton writes, "[n]ever did I behold a vision so horrible as his face, of such loathsome yet appalling hideousness. I shut my eyes involuntarily . . . I dared not again raise my eyes to his face, there was something so scaring and unearthly in his ugliness" (Shelley 222). This description of the Monster by the narrator of the story is a testimony and affirmation that Frankenstein's statements concerning the repugnance of the Monster's body were not exaggerations.

Frankenstein also uniquely depicts another form of abjection. It is self-abjection. The Monster is self-ject individual. In addition to his deformity and extremely ugly

shape, the Monster's broken skin, which results in the exposure of muscles and arteries, is particularly a source of self-abjection. Describing the effect of non-intact skin on the self-image, Kristeva says, "[t]he body's inside shows up in order to compensate for the collapse of the border between inside and outside. It is as if the skin, a fragile container, no longer guaranteed the integrity of one's own and clean self but, scraped or transparent, invisible or taut, gave way before the dejection of its contents" (1982, 53). Thus, the Monster feels that his body is unclean and tainted. Addressing his creator, the Monster says, "my form is a filthy type of yours, more horrid even from the very resemblance" (Shelley 128). Referring to the content of Frankenstein's papers that the Monster finds, the Monster says that they contain "the minutest description of [the Monster's own] odious and loathsome person" (Shelley 128). The Monster abhors himself and his existence. Kristeva portrays the abjection of the self in a way that uniquely invokes the characterization of the Monster in *Frankenstein*:

If it be true that the abject simultaneously beseeches and pulverizes the subject, one can understand that it is experienced at the peak of its strength when that subject, weary of fruitless attempts to identify with something on the outside, finds the impossible within; when it finds that the impossible constitutes its very being, that it is none other than abject. The abjection of self would be the culminating form of that experience of the subject to which it is revealed that all its objects are based merely on the inaugural loss that laid the foundations of its own being. (Kristeva, 1982, 5).

The Monster has a further, more abstract, reason to loath and abject himself. He becomes contaminated with crime. In his encounter with Walton, the Monster says, "now crime has degraded me beneath the meanest animal . . . Polluted by crime and torn by the bitterest remorse, where can I find rest but in death?" (Shelley 225). Therefore, the Monster in *Frankenstein* can be considered as a quintessential example of self-abjection. He demonstrates hatred towards himself in several occasions. It was a "[h]ateful day when I received life" (Shelley 128). Addressing Walton, the Monster says, "[y]ou hate me, but your abhorrence cannot equal that with which I regard myself" (Shelley 225). As a result of this self-hatred, the Monster solemnly vows to put a torturing end to his suffering: "I shall die, and what I now feel be no longer felt. Soon these burning miseries will be extinct. I shall ascend my funeral pile triumphantly and

exult in the agony of the torturing flames” (Shelley 226). The Monster’s death would be his triumph over his own abhorred self; and the exultation, which he awaits eagerly, would be a consequence of the torture he suffers with his own abject self.

3.8. The Commodified Individual in the Capitalist System

Frankenstein also depicts the predicament of the objectified individual in the industrialized world. The story has another level of meaning which implicitly revolves around the objectification and the commodification of people within the capitalist and industrialized economy. McNally, suggests that “tales of body-snatching, vampirism, organ-theft, and zombie-economics all comprise multiple imaginings of the risks to bodily integrity that inhere in a society in which individual survival requires selling our life-energies to people on the market” (2011, 3). Such literary themes, McNally continues, are indications of “body-panics” which are “cultural phenomena endemic to capitalism, part of the phenomenology of bourgeois life” (2011, 3-4). The body panics are masked in *Frankenstein*. The reason behind masking such panics is that “liberal ideology typically denies these quotidian horrors, apprehensions of the monstrosities of the market and tends to find discursive refuge in folklore [and] literature” (McNally 4). As story of monstrosity and assembled body, *Frankenstein* manifests masked anxieties about the corporeal commodification and dismemberment of the human labourer in the market economy where everything is subjected to purchase and sale. Frankenstein’s dismemberment of the dead human bodies is an assault against the integrity of the human body. It is analogous to the effect of the rising materialist economy. Objectification of human life is reflected in Frankenstein’s attitude towards his creature. Frankenstein collects the ‘materials’ for the construction of the human body from the dissecting rooms and the slaughter-houses. Life is infused by ‘instruments’, and the human body is literally treated as an object. Frankenstein says, “I collected the instruments of life around me, that I might infuse a spark of being into the lifeless thing that lay at my feet . . . it [the creature] became a thing such as even Dante could not have conceived” (Shelley 49-50). The exhibited mindlessness in the story concerning the human feelings of the Monster is a projection of the disregard of the modern economy towards the humanity of labourers.

However, a materialistic interpretation of *Frankenstein*, would always be indirect and metaphorical, because Victor Frankenstein is essentially after fame and not after material benefit. Possession in the story becomes more abstract and removed from the literal sense. According to Hegel, the person's "will, as personal and hence as the will of an individual, becomes objective in property" (1991, 77). Frankenstein attempts to confirm his individuality through the possession of scientific patent. Hegel says that "[i]ntellectual accomplishments, sciences, arts, inventions, and the like, become objects of contract; in the way in which they are bought and sold, they are treated as equivalent to acknowledged things" (1991, 74). Knowledge, sciences, and talents, Hegel adds, "are attributes of the free spirit, and are internal rather than external to it; but the spirit is equally capable, through expressing them, of giving them an external existence and disposing of them, so that they come under the definition of things" (1991, 75). This means that the creation of the Monster, is an externalization of Frankenstein's scientific knowledge. As an externalization of Frankenstein's possession of knowledge, the Monster is also a property of Frankenstein. That is why Frankenstein refuses to recognize the Monster as an independent and sovereign individual. The Monster is devoid of subjectivity because he is simply an object. He is merely a materialization of his maker's knowledge and thought.

Frankenstein and the monster have a maker-product relationship. Victor Frankenstein works hard in making the creature. He uses his labour to create it. He puts his effort and life in the creature. The creature is his product and it represents part of his own self. According to Marx, many characteristics are lined in reverse relationship between the labourer and the product of labour. Thus, "the better formed his product, the more deformed becomes the worker; the more civilized his object, the more barbarous becomes the worker, the mightier labour becomes, the more powerless becomes the worker" (Marx, 1844, 73). The deformity of the creature is a central issue in the story. Though Frankenstein works hard in making the product, he both, does not care about the form and does not work hard enough to achieve the perfection. In order to keep his own perfection, Frankenstein deforms his product. Struck by fits of the estrangement which afflict the labourer, Frankenstein disowns his own labour. Like any commodity in a capitalist system which becomes detached from its maker the moment it is finished, the

Monster and Frankenstein separate like strangers after the moment of life infusion. As far as the inverse maker-product features of civilization and barbarousness, Frankenstein keeps his civility and passes the inheritance of barbarousness to the creature. The killing of William, Frankenstein's youngest brother, which leads to the trial and execution of Justine Mortiz, indicates the cruelty of the monster. The savageness of the monster exceeds all the limits after the destruction of the female monster that Frankenstein promises to make. Concerning the reversed features of might and weakness, the maker in this case invests all his mental and physical energy in his product. Though deformed in shape, the monster is still the achievement of restless years of hard work. The result is a mighty product and a depleted powerless maker. Signs of weakness and fatigue, in addition to fits of sickness almost consistently accompany Frankenstein through the course of the story till his death; while an exceptionally extra-ordinary physical and mental power characterizes the figure of the Monster.

In addition to the transfer of potentials mentioned by Marx in the maker-product interaction, there are other transfers of capabilities between Frankenstein and the Monster. After the making of the Monster, the maker becomes almost speechless. After finishing his project, Bloom says, "Victor Frankenstein forfeits his integrity. While he becomes increasingly speechless and otherwise incapable of communicating with others, the most extreme instance of his lack of integrity is his inability to testify on Justine's behalf and, thereby, becoming responsible for her execution" (2007, 21). The more integral Monster, on the other hand, supersedes his maker in eloquence and speaking capabilities. Bloom says, "above all else, the monster develops into an eloquence, arguing persuasively and, at least temporarily, convincing Victor that he is obliged to fashion him a female companion" (2007, 22). In other words, "[i]t is as though the monster has stolen Victor's powers of articulation" (Bloom, 2007, 22). Put in Marx's producer-product reverse-wise exchange mechanism, Frankenstein infuses his own eloquence and integrity into his product. In fact, while adding life to his product, Frankenstein loses much of his humanity. Bloom says that "the monster's acquisition of human qualities appears to be at the expense of Victor's dehumanization" (2007, p. 22). Therefore, although not floating on the surface, the producer-product relationship

between Frankenstein and his creature still uniquely holds, and yields meaning when viewed from the perspective of economic theory.

Thus, in *Frankenstein*, the worker comes to face the product of his activity as a stranger. Then, with further alienation, stranger turns into an enemy. According to Marx, estrangement, alienation, antagonism and confrontation haunt the relationship between the labourer and his product of labour. Estrangement springs from the realization that the product does not belong to the worker. But, “[i]f the product of labour does not belong to the worker, if it confronts him as an alien power, this can only be because it belongs to some other man than the worker. If the worker’s activity is a torment to him, to another it must be delight and his life’s joy” (Marx, 1844, 79). This means that, after being finished, the product belongs to another man, other than its own maker, and that the product must be a source delight and joy to that other man. But to whom does the product of labour in *Frankenstein* belong? The answer to this question touches the key theme of the novel. In Shelley’s novel, the product is a man. Thus, after its completion, the product of labour belongs to the product itself. In other words, because he is a human being, the Monster belongs to his own self. As such, the Monster is a product that does not have an exchange value. Moreover, being grotesque human, the monster does not represent delight and joy to anybody. The tragic dimension in *Frankenstein* lies in the fact that the product is a torment for everybody. It is a torment for its maker, a torment for itself and a torment for others. The antagonism between the Monster and Frankenstein is the antagonism between the labourer and the product. Therefore, *Frankenstein* can be read as an allegorical exquisite depiction of the feelings and the attitudes of the worker towards his product and towards others in the capitalist world. Frankenstein is the worker who loses his reality in his product, and his product becomes his own punishment.

The novel can be seen as a literary hyperbole about industrialization. The manipulation of knowledge and technology in industry is promising. The ever progressive and innovating world of industry might one day produce human beings. Frankenstein assembles his creature in a special room which can very well become the nucleus of a future factory for making more creatures. The making of the Monster

amounts to manufacturing at an experimental level. Though the experiment fails, Frankenstein succeeds in acquiring the knowledge and the technical means which enables him to produce more creatures. This becomes evident during the story when he actually assembles the female version of his creature. In fact, the process of making the second creature takes less time and effort. But Frankenstein destroys it before its completion. As such, the story represents a fantastic portraiture of the dynamic process of commodification which accompanies the progression of industrialization and capitalism. Commodification is the transformation of labour, knowledge and people into commodities and objects. Albritton says that in a capitalist system “the commodity presents itself in its clearest and most developed form as the product of a factory-like capitalist production process.” (2012, 66). In such system commodity becomes a social construct; and even the things that are not industrially produced, become commodified through being subsumed as having a commodity-form. Total commodification, a situation in which life and reproduction of life becomes literally commodified, is a hypothetical state of affairs. This state of affairs is presented as a possible world in *Frankenstein*. To the misery of the Monster, he does not have neither exchange nor use value. His deformed shape precludes any possibility of usefulness.

3.9. The Nietzschean Free-doer and Freethinker

Frankenstein is a responsible individual, because “only individuals feel themselves responsible” (Nietzsche, 1967, 382). He has enough courage to pursue his own desires. He does not belong to the mass. The “mass, as the sum of the weak, reacts slowly; defends itself against much for which it is too weak – of which it can make no use; does not create, does not advance” (Nietzsche, 1967, 459). He is the revolutionary individual who tackles the task of pushing the process of evolution forward. He is a Nietzschean higher species who does not abide by the herd morality, but he is higher in his own way. He is an embodiment of the freethinker and free-doer individual who sacrifices himself for the sake of knowledge. When it comes to self-sacrificing, “the knowledge of truth would remain as the one tremendous goal commensurate with such a sacrifice, because for this goal no sacrifice is too great” (Nietzsche, 1997, 31). He rebels against the herd submission to the cosmic formidable forces of disease and death.

Shelley's protagonist signifies a rebellion against the herd scholars. Nietzsche says that "The scholar is the herd animal in the realm of knowledge – who inquires because he is ordered to and because others have done so before him" (1967, p. 226). Frankenstein inquires because he is genuinely curious. He does not investigate a common herd scholar issue. He investigates life itself, which is supreme and ultimate aim in itself. In fact, through his experiment, Frankenstein conquers an ultimate area of scientific research. As such, he is original and authentic individual because "[t]he individual is something quite new which creates new things, something absolute; all his acts are entirely his own" (Nietzsche, 1967, 403). Frankenstein's aspirations and ambitions are at variance with the mediocrity of the middle class.

However, Frankenstein weakens after the experiment and fails in handling the consequences of his act. He is an intellectual. The emergence of the Monster represents a level of challenge that he is not familiar with. It is essentially a moral challenge which consumes Frankenstein mentally and physically. His weakness is a retreat to the status of lower species in the Nietzschean sense. The central point of shift in this context is again the moment of deciding not to continue the construction of the female monster. It is a moral obligation to pity the Monster. It is a moral obligation to recognize his right to have a mate. It is a moral obligation to stop the direct and severe damages that the Monster causes to Frankenstein's family and closest friends. But, at the same time, the mating of the Monster would very well mean the proliferation of new grotesque and dangerous species. At this critical moment Frankenstein chooses to be immoral in order to salvage another level of morality. In other words, he becomes moral in his immorality. It is exactly the type of paradox which Nietzsche refers to when he says that "morality itself is a special case of immorality" (Nietzsche, 1967, 217). After destroying the female monster, Frankenstein claims his higher species status again. His decision to follow and kill the Monster is a brave recognition of his responsibility towards the consequences of his experiment. At this point, the more responsible Frankenstein moves from the passive defence to active attack. Thus, with such unique intellectuality and determination, Frankenstein exemplifies a Nietzschean superior and revolutionary man.

The Monster, on the other hand, is also intended to be a super human. Frankenstein's original intention in the story is to create a resistant man against diseases and other inflictions. In spite of his ugly form, the Monster is superhuman in many respects. He is super human in size. Walton talks about seeing a being "which had the shape of a man, but apparently of gigantic stature" (Shelley 13). The Monster also has superior strength and superior speed. Frankenstein says, "I suddenly beheld the figure of a man, at some distance, advancing towards me with superhuman speed" (Shelley 93). But, contrary to the super human being preached by Nietzsche, the Monster is not a guarantee for better species. He is a prototype of a deformed species, who fails in adaptation and proliferation.

Frankenstein, therefore, is a modernized nineteenth century punitive myth of the hazards of extra knowledge. Like the tree of knowledge in Genesis, modern science can bring about the downfall of its pursuer. It depicts the life of a Faustian compulsive aspirant to learning who finds the orthodox knowledge to be deficient. The novel is indicative of the metamorphoses in the *weltanschauung* towards individualism and the singular ambitions which defy the established orthodoxies of its time. Apart from negotiating different systems of collective social representations, the novel warns against the dangers of the newly rising intellectual professions and suggests that the existent system of morality cannot codify the workings of these professions. There is a need for specialized ethics to organize the proceedings of scientific research. The novel fantasizes an apex of individualism in an unconventional way. The creation of the Monster can be seen as an externalization of the destructive self. It is also an externalization of the destructive inclinations towards the social institutions of the collective body. At the same time, it signifies the strive toward autonomy and independence. Frankenstein's severe punishment reflects the prominent dominance of collective conscience over the ones who refuse to comply with the norms of society and nature.

CHAPTER IV

DRACULA: THE INDIVIDUAL VERSUS THE COLLECTIVE BODY

Dracula is one of the most prominent and canonical myths of Western civilization. “Dracula is ubiquitous . . . Bram Stoker, the Irish civil servant-turned-theatrical manager, gave the world one of the great myths of the modern era” (Lynch, 2010, vii). Published in 1897, the novel encodes a variety of themes and attitudes that give a vivid image about the end of the nineteenth century. According to Bolton, the work is historically illuminating because of “the glimpse it offers a modern reader into the anxieties that preoccupied the Victorian mind”; in fact, “Stoker’s novel holds a mirror up to Victorian culture and history, with the character of Dracula himself encoding Victorians’ fears of unbridled sexuality, of the other peoples and cultures with which their empire had brought them in contact, and of what they saw as modern science’s assault on the foundations of religion” (Bolton, 2010, 55). The story’s richness comes from the fact that, in various ways, it subsumes most of the social ramifications that accompanied the social, economic, and cultural changes in the industrialized Victorian Britain. Describing the chain-like sequence of the social crises in the Victorian period, Lois Drawmer says:

The rapid growth of industrialization and subsequent urban development in Victorian Britain irrevocably altered social organization. The challenges to orthodox Christianity and the perceived threat to patriarchy in the development of the women’s movement received a backlash in the resurgence of reactionary ideology of ‘deviant’ female sexuality, through the metaphors of infection, contamination, predatory behaviour and pathological sexual desires. Indeed, the concept of women as harbingers of infection, addiction and ultimately death, collides in social concerns as well as in symbolic form in art of the period. (2003, 21)

Ostensibly, the novel belongs to the type of art that carries adversary reactions towards the prospects of liberty and the shedding of old-fashioned attitudes. Though it discusses the possibility of rebellion and revolution, the novel “has hardly ever been taken as offering an alternative *weltanschauung* in place of the decaying Victorian ethos” (Koç and Demir, 2018, 425). In other words, while negotiating the need for renovations and reforms, Stoker also expresses grave apprehensions towards the possibility of any tangible and substantial change.

This chapter begins by noting the metamorphosis in the autobiographical expression of the empowered and authorized self. Then it discusses the predicament of the disenchanting individual at the turn of the century and the ramifications of the transition towards the spiritual vacancy as a result of the increasing adherence to science and empirical thinking. The chapter suggests that the novel invokes the longing of uncertain individuals for the certainty of an earlier stage in the history of humanity; i.e., the stage which preceded the formation of the analogue ‘I’ and the breakdown of the bicameral mind. The chapter differentiates between sincere individuals who stage sincerity to satisfy the social demand and the authentic ones who express themselves freely and consequently become alienated. The chapter also shows that Stoker’s novel signifies the dominance of the Durkheimian social body over the individuals who display dissonance and non-conformity. Further, the Hegelian opposition between the individual and the universal, the fashioning of self-consciousness, and the inevitable confrontation with the ‘other’, are examined with reference to the novel. The chapter explores the novel’s representation of the emerging corporate individual at the age of industry and capitalism, and the concomitant anxieties of the corporeal individual. And finally, the chapter reads *Dracula* as featuring the reaction of the herd mediocre morality against the stronger, the fitter, and the higher species individual.

The turn of the century signifies a transition towards modernity. “*Dracula* is a *fin de siècle* novel and deals with the turbulent paradigmatic shift from the Victorian to the modern, and Stoker, by creating the lecherous vampire and his band as the *doppelgangers* of the sexually sterile and morally pretentious bourgeois types (who are, in fact, inclined to lascivious joys), reveals the moral hypocrisy . . . of his time” (Koç

and Demir, 2018, 425). The leap into modernity requires confrontation with the past. As an embodiment of the old paradigm, the aristocratic Count assaults the current paradigm and attempts to squash it. In this confrontation, the ‘abnormal’ vampire strongly opposes the ‘normal’ bourgeois ethics and discloses the illicit duplicity and the fluctuating ethos of the supposedly stable society that intends to pass to modernity.

Unlike *Robinson Crusoe* and *Frankenstein*, *Dracula* examines the lives of multiple individuals and the experiences they go through, rather than focusing on their autobiographical confessions and the processes of self-identification and self-discovery. The characters talk about themselves and describe their feelings, but their subjective consciousness does not reflect extensively on itself. The characters in the story have more stationary, and rather settled selves. The struggle they go through is mainly external. The sole internal metamorphosis that the vampire hunters witness is the realization that what is inexplicable can be real. In fact, as far as the text is concerned, Maggie Kilgour suggests that Stoker’s multiplication of forms and voices asserts the individuality through recognition of difference; and adds that “[t]he ideal model of human identity is a textual one, represented through the text’s assimilation of distinct voices. Through writing, difference, and hence individuality, is both created and expressed” (Kilgour, 1998, 54). However, such individuality is merely textual. It often corresponds either to Stoker’s differentiation between the voice of men and the voice of women, or to the difference between the speech of learned men and the laymen. Otherwise, the main characters are considerably uniform.

Another point of divergence from *Robinson Crusoe* and *Frankenstein*, as far as individualism is concerned, is that *Dracula* depicts singularity with alarm. The story coincides with the second Industrial Revolution in England. After decades of capitalism, industrialization, and incessant individualistic struggle, the collectiveness develops serious concerns towards individuality. Essentially, the story metaphorically addresses one of the most essential questions in the discussions about individualism. It is the question about the limits of the individual’s freedom. After all, “[t]he question of how one is to reconcile the freedom of individual selves with the points at which such individual freedoms overlap and, inevitably, conflict is one of the most common themes

running through political philosophy from the time of Hobbes to the present” (Shanahan 78-79). Dracula is an empowered self. He is an individual who extends the limits of his freedom to transgress and violate the freedoms and the lives of others. During his stay in the castle, Jonathan Harker feels that the presence of Dracula neutralizes his free will and he craves freedom. Harker says, “[w]hen he left me I went to my room. After a little while, not hearing any sound, I came out and went up the stone stair to where I could look out towards the South. There was some sense of freedom in the vast expanse, inaccessible though it was to me . . . Looking out on this, I felt that I was indeed in prison” (Stoker 38). To the relief of the men in the story, Van Helsing incessantly asserts throughout the text that the powers of the individual cannot vanquish the powers of the plurality.

One of the most comforting things in the story for the vampire hunters and for the readers is the knowledge, disclosed by Van Helsing, that Dracula’s freedom is limited and not unrestricted as it seems to be at the beginning of the story. Addressing his team, and referring to Dracula, Van Helsing encouragingly says, “[h]e can do all these things, yet he is not free. Nay, he is even more prisoner than the slave of the galley, than the mad man in his cell. He cannot go where he lists, he who is not of nature has yet to obey some of nature’s laws, why we know not”. Then, still referring to Dracula, Van Helsing adds, “[o]nly at certain times can he have limited freedom. If he be not at the place whither he is bound, he can only change himself at noon or at exact sunrise or sunset” (Stoker 272). The extraordinary and supernatural abilities of the vampire represent the unrestricted individualistic freedoms which would necessarily jeopardize the freedoms and the rights of others. The intensity of the anxiety about such powers is mitigated after the realization that these capabilities have boundaries. The struggle between Dracula and Van Helsing’s team stands for the tension between the society which does its best to prevent dissonance of any singular venture, and the individual who sees the society as an evil force and an impediment to his aspirations and growth.

4.1. The Disenchanted Individual in *fin de siècle*

Like Mary Shelley's *Frankenstein*, Stoker's *Dracula* depicts the predicament of the disenchanted individual. It is the crisis of faith in the nineteenth century Britain. With the increasing influence of science and the emphasis on empirical evidence, Disenchantment is further implemented. The educated Victorians had a peculiar characteristic. Although they were completely disenchanted, they still pretended to be devout believers. Trilling asserts that "[t]he salient character-type of the Victorian educated classes was formed, we might say, in response to the loss of religious faith – the non-believer felt under the necessity of maintaining in his personal life the same degree of seriousness and earnestness that had been appropriate to the state of belief" (1972, 116-117). This explains much of the rather discrepant attitudes towards religious beliefs in the story. This statement also casts doubt on the genuineness of the characters' beliefs and explains their readiness to accept the tokens of the Catholic faith, such as the crucifix and the communion wafer, in their struggle against the Vampires.

The disenchanted Victorians suffered a vacancy: "the greatest distress associated with the evanescence of faith, more painful and disintegrating than can now be fully imagined, was the loss of the assumption that the universe is positive. The Victorian character was under the necessity of withstanding this extreme deprivation, which is to say, of not yielding to the nihilism it implied" (Trilling, 1972, 117). People were anxious about the void felt after the decline of faith. It is the same vacancy which has been noted in *Frankenstein*. The only difference is that in *Frankenstein*, the vacancy is filled with a resort to nature and grandiose scientific adventures. In *Dracula*, the situation is different. While still celebrating the status of science and its unprecedented achievements, the story tries to rationalize some aspects of the earlier faith for the sake of restoring it to fill the vacant space in the individuals' consciousness.

According to Elizabeth Sanders, the novel is an attempt to re-enchant the end of the nineteenth century. Thus, "[i]n this novel, the existence of vampires allows Stoker to re-enchant the *fin de siècle*, forcing the very modern protagonists to turn to belief as a source of comfort and help, but this method of re-enchantment necessarily alters the lived experience of that belief" (2015, 81). This alteration takes place because Stoker

relegates the inexplicable to the world of experiment and human understanding. Sanders calls this type of enchantment “practical enchantment”, and adds that “the world of Stoker’s novel at once portrays powers that seem beyond human comprehension, only to eventually reveal that human knowledge is perfectly capable of containing and even utilizing the forces of supernatural good and evil” (Sanders, 2015, 81). Through Van Helsing, Stoker introduces a compromise between the conflicting forces of empirical thinking and sacred beliefs. He utilizes the symbols of religious belief, which carry spiritual values, for purely functional values. Thus, the novel, Sanders concludes, “portrays a method of belief, a third path, that allows the late Victorian subject to exist in a world that is fairly enchanted, although not enough to threaten a late-nineteenth-century, increasingly secular, increasingly rational, notion of the self” (94). The function of the vampire in this case is to revive the beliefs of the past and compensate for the decreasing enchantment in the lives of individuals.

Moreover, Stoker uses the divine as a Gothic technique to intensify anxiety and tension. Sanders says that “one of the most frightening and memorable scenes in Stoker’s novel does not feature Dracula at all – its horror comes from its implications, not about the vampire, but about the God to whom Van Helsing and his fellow heroes continually pray, and who they assume offers some comfort and assurance in the face of such an evil force” (77). Then, she adds, “[s]cenes of religiousness provide almost as much of a thrill as scenes of vampirism, and the two very often occur as one” (93). The reference here is to the scene in which Van Helsing seeks to protect Mina, after being attacked by Dracula, from future vampire encounters by blessing her with a communion wafer. When Van Helsing touches her forehead with the wafer, Harker says:

There was a fearful scream which almost froze our hearts to hear. As he had placed the Wafer on Mina’s forehead, it had seared it... had burned into the flesh as though it had been a piece of white-hot metal. My poor darling’s brain had told her the significance of the fact as quickly as her nerves received the pain of it, and the two so overwhelmed her that her overwrought nature had its voice in that dreadful scream. (Stoker 336)

With such degree of ritualism, Stoker intensifies the Gothic impact and exploits the thrill which people often experience while witnessing the influence of the religious objects.

As far as science is concerned, Professor Van Helsing and Dr. Seward represent medicine and science and stand for the rational individuals of the late nineteenth century. Van Helsing claims that he and his team use science in their struggle against Dracula: “we have sources of science, we are free to act and think, and the hours of the day and the night are ours equally” (Stoker 270). In fact, Van Helsing challenges Dracula by assigning clinical meaning to blood in contrast to the conventional and old paradigm understanding of blood, represented by Dracula, as something mysterious which carries the secret of life. With the clinical method of blood transfusion to Lucy, Van Helsing affirms the modernized meaning of blood as a liquid that can be medically used to save the life of patients. Stephanou says:

vampire stories are also examples of the competing meaning between an older understanding of blood as invisible and thus mysterious, and a new understanding of blood as neutral medium that can be examined and manipulated within the laboratory . . . With the rise of new technologies and medical knowledge in the nineteenth century, blood enters the realm of science, no longer as a hidden property of the body, but as a visible matter that can be clinically analysed. (2014, 12)

Thus, the blood transfusion technique implicates a contrast between blood as a supernatural fluid and blood as an empirical material. It also gives prominence to the status of medicine at the end of the nineteenth century, and suggests that science can assign new meanings to mysterious phenomena.

Nevertheless, Van Helsing, at the same time, acts like a preacher and uses tokens of religion as significantly effective weapons in his struggle against vampirism. This can be better understood if one knew that in the endeavour towards science, “Western thought was not yet ready to abandon the notion that some divine influence held sway in the organization of the universe” (Shanahan 80). Moreover, this theological atmosphere in the story has an essential peculiar characteristic. The novel suggests that there are always mysteries in life, and that vampirism is one of them. For Van Helsing, the divine and the supernatural phenomena are recognized and factual, and they belong to the unexplored mysterious domains of life. The implicitly suggested message is that the mysterious phenomena should not dispel the charisma of science. But, people cannot comprehend such phenomena without believing in them first.

Van Helsing exerts considerable effort in making his point of view clear to his rationalist and sceptic friends. He begins by absorbing the rationalistic shock by phenomenizing Dracula and claiming that the vampire is one of “nature’s eccentricities and possible impossibilities” (Stoker 218). When Seward asks Van Helsing to be concise and more explicit about what he wants to say, Van Helsing explains, “[w]ell, I shall tell you. My thesis is this, I want you to believe”; and when Seward asks, “[t]o believe in what?”; Van Helsing answers, “[t]o believe in things that you cannot” (Stoker 218). The story conveys the message that the extra-ordinary might very well have a logical explanation in science if examined carefully enough.

The attitude that there must be a logical explanation for every type of phenomenon is often implemented in the narrative. For example, when noticing the comforting effect of the crucifix, Jonathan Harker does not amend his belief that such a thing is idolatrous. Rather, he resolves to find a logical reason for such effect when he has the chance saying, “[i]t is odd that a thing which I have been taught to regard with disfavour and as idolatrous should in a time of loneliness and trouble be of help. Is it that there is something in the essence of the thing itself, or that it is a medium, a tangible help, in conveying memories of sympathy and comfort? Some time, if it may be, I must examine this matter and try to make my mind about it” (Stoker 32). Another example which reflects this line of thinking is when Van Helsing asks Dr. Seward about his belief in thought reading: “Then tell me, for I am a student of the brain, how you accept hypnotism and reject the thought reading” (Stoker 217). What Van Helsing intends to say is that truth should not necessarily be based on empirical and tangible evidence. The implicit assumption in the text is that it is only a matter of time until the accelerating and ever progressive science breaks the codes of these puzzling domains. This assumption can be inferred through the speeches and conversations of Van Helsing. Still addressing Seward, Helsing says, “[l]et me tell you, my friend, that there are things done today in electrical science which would have been deemed unholy by the very man who discovered electricity, who would themselves not so long before been burned as wizards. There are always mysteries in life” (Stoker 217). Van Helsing gives a similar answer in response to Arthur’s shock concerning the idea that Lucy is Un-Dead. When Arthur asks, “Undead! Not alive! What do you mean? Is this all a nightmare, or what is it?”;

Van Helsing answers, “[t]here are mysteries which men can only guess at, which age by age they may solve only in part. Believe me, we are now on the verge of one” (Stoker 234). This tendency of recognizing divine and supernatural experiences and putting them under the scrutiny of scientific reasoning is one of the features which characterizes the emerging empowered self:

While not necessarily subscribing to the circularity of method that characterized religiously acceptable scientific explanations of the past, the newly empowered-self did make the somewhat circular assumption that the universe must be based on reasonable principles of organization and that such organization would eventually yield itself to the powers of reasonable scrutiny, allowing a fusion of cosmic and human reason to take place. (Shanahan 80)

Thus, instead of denying or ignoring the past, *Dracula* summons that uncanny and haunting past and integrates it with the present. According to Koç and Demir, Stoker “depicts the past not as the irrational foreign country of passionate villains, but as the illuminating, the transforming other that the present paradigm needs to unite with” (440). The knowledge of the past, and of other cultures is a threat to the status quo of the Western empirical system of knowledge, if not absorbed and integrated with the existing system. The overall suggested impact is that a single element is not sufficient enough to slay the vampire. It is the combination of modern science, intellectual and physical effort, spiritual beliefs, and the bonds of friendship, which make the task of destroying the vampires possible.

4.2. The Disenchanted Individual and the Longing for the Bicameral Absolutes

Disenchantment has further impact upon the psychology of the individual. In a statement which describes the crisis of the disenchanted individual at the end of the nineteenth century, Jaynes says, “as the slow withdrawing tide of divine voices and presences strands more and more of each population on the sands of subjective uncertainties, the variety of technique by which man attempts to make contact with his lost ocean of authority becomes extended” (320). Jaynes talks about a state of “longing for bicameral absolutes, away from the difficult inner kingdoms of agape to an external hierarchy reaching through a cloud of miracle and infallibility to an archaic

authorization in an extended heaven” (318-319). *Dracula* signifies such longing and attempts to contact some of the certainties which characterized the earlier mentality which preceded the collapse of the bicameral mind.

Reading the novel in terms of Jaynes` theory of bicameral mind sheds further light on the anxiety of the disenchanting individual. *Dracula* invokes the yearning for the absolutes, which according to Jaynes, belong to the duality of the cerebral hemispheres when one part of the brain used to provide undebatable guiding and admonitory wisdom to the person in the form of bicameral voices four millennia ago. Hence, “[a]s individuals we are at the mercies of our own collective imperatives [thus, there] are attempts to return to what is no longer there, like poets to their inexistent Muses, and as such they are characteristic of these transitional millennia in which we are imbedded” (Jaynes 445). Consciousness is becoming burdensome. It involves strenuous pondering, hesitation, and irritating uncertainties. When becoming a vampire, volition, planning, and initiative are organized with no consciousness. Dracula is able to control his victims and guide them according to his will. They become automaton beings who are enslaved by his voice. The world would simply happen to such persons and their action would be an inextricable part of that happening with no consciousness whatsoever. As such, Dracula stands for the bicameral divinities who used to come in the form of auditory hallucinations to tell the person what to do. The fact that he can control the “brute beasts”, such as the wolves and the rats, indicates that Dracula can put under his command only those who have no self-consciousness. Harker is astounded at Dracula`s capability to influence the behaviour of the wolves at a distance, when he wonders, “[t]his is a terrible thought, for if so, what does it mean that he could control the wolves, as he did, by only holding up his hand for silence?” (Stoker 32). Dracula can also easily control people when they are in a trance or in a state of unconsciousness.

One of the reasons which makes Lucy an easy target for Dracula is that she has an “old habit of walking in her sleep” (Stoker 82). The story informs the reader that sleep-walkers are unconscious. Mina says that Lucy`s mother “has got an idea that sleep-walkers always go out on roofs of houses and along the edges of cliffs and then get suddenly awakened and fall over with a despairing cry that echoes all over the place”

(Stoker 82). The story also reminds the reader that this specific characteristic is genetically transferred. Mina says that Lucy`s mother tells her that “her husband, Lucy`s father, had the same habit, that he would get up in the night and dress himself and go out, if he were not stopped” (Stoker 82). This suggests that sleep-walking is a genetically transferred state of trance in which the person becomes unconscious of the world around him. As such, sleep-walking can be seen as belonging to the remnant “vestiges of a previous mentality” (Jaynes 317) from the bicameral era where the analogue ‘I’ is temporarily suspended. In this state of no self-reference, the person expects guidance from the bicameral mind and consequently becomes controllable and guidable by external influences. Mina expresses her surprise at the amenability of Lucy during her sleep-walking, especially after the crash of the wreck of the Demeter and the arrival of Dracula at Whitby. Mina and Lucy spend a restless night because of the fearful storm. However,

Strangely enough, Lucy did not wake up, but she got up twice and dressed herself. Fortunately, each time I woke in time and managed to undress her without waking her, and got her back to bed. It is a very strange thing, this sleep-walking, for as soon as her will is thwarted in any physical way, her intention, if there be any, disappears, and she yields herself almost exactly to the routine of her life. (Stoker 99)

In the absence of the analogue ‘I’, bicameral voices direct the behaviour. Jaynes talks about auditory hallucinations and says, “[w]hatever brain areas are utilized, it is absolutely certain that such voices do exist and that experiencing them is just like hearing actual sounds. Further, it is highly probable that the bicameral voices of antiquity were in quality very like such auditory hallucinations in contemporary people” (86). When Mina asks Lucy if she remembers anything about her night on the seat at the East Cliff, Lucy mentions hearing voices: “I heard a lot of dogs howling. The whole town seemed as if it must be full of dogs all howling at once, as I went up the steps . . . And then I seemed sinking into deep green water, and there was singing in my ears, as I have heard there is to drowning men, and then everything seemed passing away from me” (Stoker 112). After this encounter with Dracula which leaves bite marks on Lucy`s neck, Dracula dominates Lucy`s life and drains her blood in a series of visits which lead to her death and her transformation into a vampire.

Therefore, the state of trance in *Dracula* represents the lack of the most elementary form of individuality, and that form is self-awareness. Everything that happens to Lucy happens in a state of trance. Even the state of vampirism is a trance. Explaining the case of Lucy to Dr. Seward, Van Helsing says, “[h]ere is some dual life that is not as the common. She was bitten by the vampire when she was in a trance, sleep-walking . . . and in trance could he best come to take more blood. In trance she dies, and in trance she is Undead” (Stoker 227-228). Trance is significant because it symbolizes the suspension of the most elementary sense of individuality.

However, although it is designed to instigate fear and horror, submission to vampires is still not devoid of gratification. Koç and Demir note that “Ironically, the vampire helps [the men and women] release their repressed . . . energies and lets them enjoy uncanny delights” (426). This uncanny delight results from the expectations of suspending and shedding the analogue ‘I’. The readiness to give up the analogue ‘I’ during the vampire encounters is implicitly presented as pleasurable in the novel. Describing her memories in the night when she unconsciously leaves her house and heads towards her first encounter with Dracula, Lucy talks about something very sweet that accompanies the bitterness of her experience: “I had a vague memory of something long and dark with red eyes, just as we saw in the sunset, and something very sweet and very bitter all around me at once” (Stoker 112). In a similar, semi-sleeping state, Johnathan Harker cannot hide his pleasurable and lustful voluntary surrender to the three vampire ladies who come to suck his blood:

Lower and lower went her head as the lips went below the range of my mouth and chin and seemed to fasten on my throat. Then she paused, and I could hear the churning sound of her tongue as it licked her teeth and lips, and I could feel the hot breath on my neck. Then the skin of my throat began to tingle as one’s flesh does when the hand that is to tickle it approaches nearer, nearer. I could feel the soft, shivering touch of the lips on the super sensitive skin of my throat, and the hard dents of two sharp teeth, just touching and pausing there. I closed my eyes in languorous ecstasy and waited, waited with beating heart. (Stoker 42-43)

The same applies to Mina Harker who admits that, for a while, she did not want to resist Dracula’s approaching lips towards her throat: “I was bewildered, and strangely enough,

I did not want to hinder him” (Stoker 325-326). The duality of sweetness and dread is also witnessed when the vampire hunters confront the Un-Dead Lucy outside her tomb. Dr. Seward says that Lucy advances “with a languorous, voluptuous grace” while saying, “[c]ome to me Arthur. Leave these others and come to me. My arms are hungry for you. Come, and we can rest together. Come, my husband, come” (Stoker 240). Upon this event Seward comments:

There was something diabolically sweet in her tones – something of the tingling of glass when struck – which rang through the brains even of us who heard the words addressed to another. As for Arthur, he seemed under a spell; moving his hands from his face, he opened wide his arms. She was leaping for him, when Van Helsing sprang forward and held between them his little golden crucifix. (Stoker 240)

Therefore, the characters who have a direct encounter with the vampires in the story often exhibit ambivalence and contradictory feelings. They often try to mask their readiness to give up their analogue ‘I’.

Such attractiveness of vampires goes beyond mere attraction to physical sexual appeal. Milly Williamson suggests that the vampire has his own glamour: “far from the vampire frightening us into rejecting its difference (and thus all the differences that it symbolizes), the vampire has become an image of emulation, a glamorous outsider, a figure whose otherness we find versions of (sometimes ambivalently) in ourselves” (2005, 1). In fact, Stoker pictures his titular character as physically hideous and repulsive. Describing the looks of Dracula, Harker says:

His eyebrows were very massive, almost meeting over the nose . . . his ears were pale, and at the tops extremely pointed . . . The general effect was one of extremely pallor . . . I could not but notice that [Dracula’s hands] were rather coarse, broad, with squat fingers. Strange to say, there were hairs in the centre of the palm. As the Count leaned over me and his hands touched me, I could not repress a shudder. It may have been that his breath was rank, but a horrible feeling of nausea came over me, which, do what I would, I could not conceal. (Stoker 21)

Nevertheless, Dracula has his own attractive side. Commenting on Harker’s description of Count Dracula in this scene, Carol Senf says, “[r]esembling a bat more than a human

being in this scene, Stoker`s character even smells of his unsavory habits. However, despite the gruesome physical description, *Dracula* was a turning point for the literary vampire, for Stoker`s central character is often more attractive than he is here, indeed, Stoker sometimes reveals him as no more cruel than his human opponents” (1988, 2-3). This suggests that Stoker does not intend to make his main character attractive, and that the attractiveness of the vampire is an after-effect that is generated by the overall impact of the story.

The point is that there is an embedded and indirectly expressed charm which is associated with the character of the vampire. Such charm is either indicated through the oscillation that the characters express between two contradictory feelings when describing vampire encounters, or in the coded eroticism that characterizes these encounters. Extended to the reader, the attractiveness of the vampire in Stoker`s novel established firm ground for the flourishing of the vampire myth in the twentieth century. However, what is emphasised here is that a considerable degree of the vampire`s attractiveness can be explained in terms of Jaynes`s theory of the breakdown of the bicameral mind.

The most elementary form of individualism is the subjectivity which emerges from self-consciousness. According to Jaynes, the analogue ‘I’, or the “[s]ubjective conscious mind is an analogue of what is called the real world. It is built up with a vocabulary or lexical field whose terms are all metaphors or analogs of behaviour in the physical world. Its reality is of the same order as mathematics. It allows us to shortcut behavioral processes and arrive at more adequate decisions” (55). As such, life is not impossible without such consciousness, as was the case during the phase of the bicameral mind four millennia ago. In fact, in Jaynes`s terms, “[c]onsciousness is often not only unnecessary; it can be quite undesirable” (26). Explaining this in practical terms, Jaynes exemplifies:

Our pianist suddenly conscious of his fingers during a furious set of arpeggios would have to stop playing. Nijinsky somewhere says that when he danced, it was as if he were in the orchestra pit looking back at himself; he was not conscious of every movement, but of how he was looking to others. A sprinter may be conscious of where he is relative to the others in

the race, but he is certainly not conscious of putting one leg in front of the other; such consciousness might indeed cause him to trip. (26)

Thus, self-consciousness, in this sense, can very well be burdensome for the individual and strenuous for his memory. If you “did something that you regretted in public, you tend not to see, hear, or feel things as you actually experienced them, but rather to re-create them in objective terms, seeing yourself in the setting as if you were somebody else. Looking back into memory, then, is a great deal invention, seeing yourself as others see you” (Jaynes 29-30). With the unprecedented changes in the society which accompanied the urbanization and the rise of mass population, further responsibilities burdened the spatial analogue of the world in the consciousness. Therefore, in addition to the longing for the certainties of the bicameral mind mentioned above, a further longing also develops for the preconscious state of the human mind. Accordingly, vampirism becomes attractive because it provides a fantastic framework which invokes this repressed and unfelt yearning for the trance-like state of mind of antiquity.

In *Dracula*, the strenuous nature of self-consciousness is more evident in the behaviour and the attitudes of women who carry the heavier share of the burden of society control and repression. The Victorian social order does not only restrict behaviour, it also restricts thinking and speaking. After telling Mina that she has received three marriage proposals in one day, Lucy wonders, “[w]hy can't they let a girl marry three men, or as many as want her, and save all this trouble?"; then she immediately adds, “[b]ut this is heresy, and I must not say it” (Stoker 67). Although it is a mere thought, and can very well be interpreted humorously, Lucy prohibits the thought and considers the act of saying it a sacrilege. Another example which shows the immense anxious sensitivity towards the society and the concern about the opinion of others is manifested in the scene when Lucy unconsciously leaves the house at night and Mina sets out to fetch her. After putting her shoes on Lucy's feet for the way back to the house, Mina fears that her bare feet might be noticed. Thus, she dips her feet in mud on purpose to conceal the nakedness of her feet. While returning with Lucy, Mina remarks, “when we got to the pathway outside the churchyard, where there was a puddle of water, remaining from the storm, I daubed my feet with mud, using each foot in turn on the other, so that as we went home, no one, in case we should meet anyone, should notice

my bare feet” (Stoker 105). In this scene, Mina displays extreme anxiety and concern about women’s reputations and the opinion of others:

Fortune favoured us, and we got home without meeting a soul. Once we saw a man, who seemed not quite sober, passing along a street in front of us. But we hid in a door till he had disappeared up an opening such as there are here . . . My heart beat so loud all the time sometimes I thought I should faint. I was filled with anxiety about Lucy, not only for her health, lest she should suffer from the exposure, but for her reputation in case the story should get wind. (Stoker 105)

This statement indicates the vulnerability of women’s reputations in the Victorian age and the amount of anxiety and repression that can result from the fear of infamy.

Vampirism, then, offers a fancy refuge from the toilsome apprehensions which inflict the individual. With the trance-like state of the Un-Dead vampire, self-consciousness is suspended. The individual becomes no longer accountable if he thinks or behaves in ways that the society does not approve. After turning into a vampire, the individual can express his repressed desires without becoming a person of ill repute, and without being labelled as unvirtuous. After becoming a vampire, Lucy turns into an epitome of evil and vice. Describing their first encounter with the Un-Dead Lucy, Dr. Seward says:

My own heart grew cold as ice, and I could hear the gasp of Arthur, as we recognized the features of Lucy Westenra. Lucy Westenra, but yet how changed. The sweetness was turned to adamant, heartless cruelty, and the purity to voluptuous wantonness . . . As she looked, her eyes blazed with unholy light, and the face became wreathed with a voluptuous smile. (Stoker 239-240)

Nevertheless, she is not Lucy. Van Helsing says, “[i]t is her body, and yet not it” (Stoker 242). And Seward comments, “I call the thing that was before us Lucy because it bore her shape . . . the foul Thing which had taken Lucy’s shape without her soul . . . She seemed like a nightmare of Lucy as she lay there . . . seeming like a devilish mockery of Lucy’s sweet purity” (Stoker 240-242-243). The real Lucy is still pure and virtuous. The hand which would destroy the false Lucy, “would restore Lucy to us as a holy, and not an unholy, memory” (Stoker 244). After the destruction of the unholy Lucy, Seward

says, “[t]here, in the coffin lay no longer the foul Thing that we had so dreaded and grown to hate . . . but Lucy as we had seen her in life, with her face of unequalled sweetness and purity” (Stoker 245). Therefore, vampirism comes as a make-believe framework of relief which can alleviate the heavy pressure of the Victorian social morality upon the individuals. Vampirism provides a parallel world in which the individuals can move, act, and set free their repressed desires without fear of disgrace and infamy.

Moreover, subjectivity as the most elementary form of individualism and Jaynes`s theory of the bicameral mind can shed light on the mental illness of Renfield and get nearer “to the heart of his mystery” (Stoker 68). Renfield`s condition can be diagnosed as a case of absence of subjectivity. Renfield does not have a complete sense of self-awareness. He is an individual who has vestiges of the bicameral mind of the ancient pre-conscious era.

According to Jaynes, “[w]e, at the end of the second millennium A.D., are still in a sense deep in this transition to a new mentality. And all about us lie the remnants of our recent bicameral past” (317). Such remnants of the ancient past exist in the present time in the cases of the mental hallucinatory disorders which can be subsumed under the name schizophrenia. Referring to such cases, Jaynes says:

Of immense importance here is the fact the nervous system of a patient makes simple perceptual judgements of which the patient`s self is not aware. And these may then be transposed into voices [that] take any and every relationship to the individual. They converse, threaten, curse, criticize, consult, often in short sentences. They admonish, console, mock, command, or sometimes simply announce everything that`s happening. (88-90)

Dr. Seward has a particular interest in Renfield`s case. He tries to unravel the secret of his patient`s hallucinations. Seward says, “I questioned him more fully than I had ever done, with a view to making myself master of the facts of his hallucination” (Stoker 68). In fact, Seward notices that his patient has trouble in his subjective self, and accordingly he is “a possibly dangerous man” (Stoker 69). Renfield is dangerous because he is not aware of his subjective self. Seward says that he is “probably dangerous if unselfish. In selfish men caution is as secure an armour for their foes as for

themselves. What I think of on this point is, when self is the fixed point the centripetal force is balanced with the centrifugal” (Stoker 69). In this particular context, by the word ‘unselfish’, Seward means that his patient is unaware about oneself. Seward diagnoses the case as relating to the imbalance caused by the lack of the centripetal force which shapes the self. In schizophrenia, the erosion of the analogue ‘I’ results in thought deprivation. In such cases, the patient exerts effort to combat this loss of the analogue ‘I’. The patient attempts:

to arrest this terrifying fading-off of that most important part of our interior selves. The almost sacramental center of conscious decision . . . sometimes . . . The patient in trying to keep some control over his behaviour repeats over and over to himself ‘I am’, or ‘I am the one present in everything’ . . . Another patient may use only single words like ‘strength’ or ‘life’ to try to anchor himself against the dissolution of his consciousness. (Jaynes 420).

Renfield resists the erosion of his subjectivity and seeks to anchor his conscious self through the primitive bicameral logic of life consumption. According to Renfield’s logic, the accumulative ingestion of many lives might result in a more complete and intact single life. Seward ascertains this logic after examining Renfield’s pocketbook: “I shall have to invent a new classification for him, and call him a zoophagous (life-eating) maniac. What he desires is to absorb as many lives as he can, and he has laid himself out to achieve it in a cumulative way. He gave many flies to one spider and many spiders to one bird, and then wanted a cat to eat the many birds. What would have been his later step?” (Stoker 81). Seward admires the systematic nature of Renfield’s logic and his calculating skills in recording the number of the consumed lives, and using the record in setting a criterion for determining the worth of the final individual consumer: “How well the man reasoned. Lunatics always do within their own scope. I wonder at how many lives he values a man, or if at only one. He closed the account most accurately, and today began a new record” (Stoker 81). Dracula uses Renfield’s lack of subjective consciousness and controls him. After the arrival of Dracula in Whitby, a sudden change occurs in the condition of Renfield. Seward writes in his diary, “[s]trange and sudden change in Renfield last night. About eight o’clock he began to get excited and sniff about as a dog when setting”; and when the attendant talks to him, “[a]ll he would say was ‘I don’t want to talk to you. You don’t count now. The master is at hand’” (Stoker

114). Dracula is the master. His presence fills the lacuna in Renfield's mind, and evokes his longing for a guiding voice. Seward notices the fulfilment which Renfield feels when he visits him, and describes this fulfilment as 'self-feeling'. Thus, Seward remarks, "[a]t nine o'clock I visited him myself. His attitude to me was the same as that to the attendant. In his sublime self-feeling the difference between myself and the attendant seemed to him as nothing" (Stoker 115). On the same night Renfield escapes from the asylum and heads towards Carfax, the property of Count Dracula. When Seward and the attendants follow him, they find him pressed close against the door of the house, as if talking to someone, and saying: "I am here to do your bidding, Master. I am your slave, and you will reward me, for I shall be faithful . . . Now that you are near, I await your commands" (Stoker 117). Like the people of the bicameral era, Renfield considers the presence of Dracula in his mind as divine and sacred. In one of his madness fits Renfield says, "I'll fight for my Lord and Master" (Stoker 177). Thus, Dracula exploits the lack of an intact analogue 'I' and enters the mind space of Renfield; and through him, Dracula enters the house of Dr. Seward, and consequently gains access to Mina Harker.

4.3. The Sceptical Individual and the Longing for Certainty

In addition to invoking the longing of the disenchanted individual to the certainties of the bicameral mind, the novel also exploits the yearning of the sceptic individuals for certainty as a means of intensifying thrill and tension. Jonathan Harker, Mina Harker, Dr. Seward, Arthur Holmwood, and Quincey Morris are sceptical people. Harker cannot believe his own eyes when he sees Dracula crawling down the castle wall in a lizard fashion and says, "[a]t first, I could not believe my eyes. I thought it was some trick of the moonlight, some weird effect of shadow; but I kept looking, and it could be no delusion" (Stoker 38-39). After his encounter with the three vampire women and losing his consciousness, Harker wakes up in his bed and thinks that all he saw earlier was a dream: "I awoke in my own bed. If it be that I had not dreamt, the Count must have carried me here. I tried to satisfy myself on the subject, but could not arrive at any unquestionable result" (Stoker 45). When reading her husband's journal, Mina thinks that Harker's record of the events in Transylvania are mere fever hallucinations. She reflects, "that terrible record of Jonathan's upset me so. Poor dear! How he must

have suffered, whether it be true or only imagination. I wonder if there is any truth in at all. Did he get his brain fever, and then write all those terrible things; or had he some cause for it all?" (Stoker 202). When Van Helsing explains to Seward that Lucy is Un-Dead and shows him her dead body as a proof, Seward does not believe what he has seen and casts doubts on the credibility of his best friend:

Yesterday I was almost willing to accept Van Helsing`s monstrous ideas; but now they seem to start out lurid before me as outrages on common sense . . . I wonder if his mind can have become in any way unhinged. Surely there must be some rational explanation of all these mysterious things. Is it possible that the Professor can have done it himself? He is so abnormally clever that if he went off his head he would carry out his intent with regard to some fixed idea in a wonderful way. (Stoker 231)

However, with the determination and patience of Van Helsing, scepticism is dissipated. They all stand amazed at the ritualistic display of Van Helsing when he takes from his bag a mass of wafer-like biscuits. He crumbles the wafer and works it into a dough-like whitish stuff, and uses it to fill the crevices between the door and its setting in the tomb. Seward says, "I was somewhat puzzled at this, and being close, asked him what it was that he was doing. Arthur and Quincey drew near also, as they too were curious. He answered, 'I am closing the tomb so that the Un-Dead may not enter'" (Stoker 238). When they ask him about the material he uses, Van Helsing tells them that it is The Host that he has brought from Amsterdam. Describing their reaction to Van Helsing`s answer, Seward comments, "[i]t was an answer that appalled the most sceptical of us, and we felt individually that in the presence of such earnest purpose as the Professor`s, a purpose which could thus use the to him most sacred of things, it was impossible to distrust. In respectful silence we took the places assigned to us close round the tomb" (Stoker 238-239). After seeing the Un-Dead Lucy with their own eyes, and witnessing the effects of Van Helsing`s rituals, the vampire hunters acquire certainty. The story suggests that certainty is an essential potential in the struggle against prodigious threats. Doubtful people are passive. They are not strong enough to venture into a conflict with such a powerful enemy as Dracula. The horrific predicament of Lucy brings about the transition from scepticism to certainty, and prepares the men for the sanctified mission which they will tackle.

Being the first character in the story who experiences the nightmarish encounter with Count Dracula, Jonathan Harker sheds his doubts and acquires certainty earlier than his friends. When Mina tells Harker that she has given his diary to Van Helsing to read, she shows him Helsing's response letter in which he affirms that what is written in the diary is true and not hallucinatory. This affirmation furnishes Harker with the desired certainty. Describing the empowerment that he acquires as a result of this new certainty, Harker says, "[i]t seems to have made a new man of me. It was the doubt as to the reality of the whole thing that knocked me over. I felt impotent, and in the dark, and distrustful. But, now that I know, I am not afraid, even of the Count" (Stoker 212). In addition to mentioning the positive effect of certainty, Harker also mentions the depleting and weakening effects of doubts and uncertainties. Thus, the story deliberates about the doubtfulness and the scepticism of the Victorian age and endorses an openness towards the unbelievable.

While invoking the longing for certainties and endorsing a non-sceptic frame of mind, *Dracula*, at the same time, inaugurates uncertainty in a variety of ways. With his non-native and bizarre vampire, Stoker blurs many of the well-established clear-cut distinctions of common sense and the social domain through creating a dominion of in-betweenness. One of the main culturally maintained distinctions that Count Dracula masks is the male-female gender identity. He admixes gender and sexual attributes and creates an atmosphere of disturbed binarism. Gender and the boundaries between men and women are the sources of anxiety for the Victorians. Paul Marchbank says that "[d]uring the nineteenth century [the] discussions evolved towards sexual values, which appeared more pertinent to Britain's changing situation in both national and international terms"; consequently, although it was not publically discussed, "sexuality was the leading discourse within a range of related ideologies which had been brewing for some time (2003, 31). Despite the fact that he carries all the attributes of a potent male, Count Dracula is inclusive of both genders. After all, vampires do not proliferate through the normal male-female copulation. Breeding is brought about by biting. Kim Hoelzli says that "Dracula's bite infects, and ultimately converts victims into vampires" (2003, 28). Marchbank asserts that "the vampire kiss represents the breeding of a threatening and unwanted race . . . the 'kiss' of Dracula is, as source of reproduction, an act of

penetration on both male and female victims” (2003, 35). The mouth of the vampire in the story performs double functions. It penetrates and ingests at the same time²¹. Thus, when Harker cuts himself while shaving, the fact that Harker is a man does not ward off Dracula and prevents him from assaulting Harker at the sight of the dripping blood. Describing this incident, Harker says, “at the instant I saw that the cut had bled a little, and the blood was trickling over my chin. I laid down the razer, turning as I did so half round to look for some sticking plaster. When the Count saw my face, his eyes blazed with a sort of demonic fury, and he suddenly made a grab at my throat” (Stoker 29).

Moreover, Dracula also further distorts the firm cultural assumptions through reversing the mechanism of sexuality and gender roles. Christopher Craft mentions that although the three vampire women offer Harker a feminine form of seduction, the anticipated act is reminiscent of masculine penetration. Craft adds, “Harker enjoys a ‘feminine’ passivity and awaits a delicious penetration from a woman whose demonism is figured as the power to penetrate” (Craft, 1994, 73). Marchbank considers Mina’s feeding of blood from Dracula’s breast as ‘breast feeding’ and comments that “[t]his can be viewed as an inversion of the traditional sexual roles” (35). As such, the blood in the story does not only stand for semen, it can also stand for milk. With such diversity of identity, Dracula is a paradoxical being. With his potency and the prospects of unlimited proliferation, Dracula challenges the sterility which accompanies the repressed sexuality of the Victorians. With his indeterminate and elusive nature, he both challenges and distorts the conventional gender roles and stands for the polymorphous and diversified individuals.

Another feature of in-betweenness and indeterminacy is that Dracula comes from the past to the present. Tomasz Warchol says that “[w]hen Stoker published *Dracula* in 1897, his demonic Count, whose creation and portrayal was inspired by obscure stories about the 15th century Wallachian warlord, must have been 421 years dead (since 1476)” (2003, 7). Dracula is a warrior and a state man whose past extends back to the

²¹ It is worth mentioning that the description of the vampire mouth with the protruded sharp canine teeth “over the lips, whose remarkable ruddiness showed astonishing vitality” (Stoker 21), invokes the motif of the *vagina dentata* which is associated with the fear of castration and loss of manhood. Depicting female vampires as having castrating sexuality aims at “the demonization of powerful women” (Lisa Nystorm, 2009, p. 66).

aristocracy of the middle ages. With such rich heritage, he is an incarnation of the old paradigm. He carries this outdated paradigm to the present for the sake of implementing it in the modern world. Harker himself acknowledges the power of the past when he secretly explores one wing of Dracula's castle and experiences the awe which is associated with old buildings and furniture: "It is the nineteenth century up-to-date with a vengeance. And yet, unless my senses deceive me, the old centuries had, and have, powers of their own which mere modernity cannot kill" (Stoker 40). Through Harker's statement, Stoker foreshadows Dracula's venture of re-establishing the old paradigm. When Harker describes the purchased estate, which is called Carfax, he mentions that "[t]he house is very large and of all periods back, I should say, to mediaeval times" (Stoker 26). Upon knowing this, the Count becomes happy and says, "I am glad that it is old and big. I myself am of an old family, and to live in a new house would kill me. A house cannot be made habitable in a day, and after all, how few days go to make up a century" (Stoker 27). With this statement, Dracula expresses his hostility to modernity and his attachment to the mediaeval past. Marchbank states that with Dracula's endeavour, "London would transform into a replica of Dracula's Castle" (34). Through Count Dracula, the story tries to evaluate the present through the reference to the past. Stephanou says, "[b]y returning to the past it is possible to identify the accidents, fragmented events, discontinuities, deviations and mistakes that gave birth to current events" (2014, 3). Such evaluation is achieved by eliminating the boundaries between the present and the past, where Dracula comes to haunt the present of the Victorians and even threatens their future life.

Dracula is also an unclassifiable creature. He is in an in-between state of a human and an animal. As far as the physical description is concerned, the canine teeth, the "hairs in the centre of the palm" (Stoker 21), and the extremely pointed ears, are animal characteristics. Kim Hoelzli says that Dracula is "a supernatural creature described in animalistic terms" (2003, 27). Dracula can also assume the shape of animals. "In between those animal/human incarnations, Dracula is given plenty of opportunities to manifest his psychic and truly supernatural powers" (Warchol, 3003, 8). The animalistic characteristics and transformation violate the ontological expectations more than other features of extraordinary strength. Saler and Ziegler say:

violation of ontological expectations should not be confused with what is merely unusual for the instantiation of a category. Thus, for instance, while Dracula's great strength exceeds what is usual for entities pertaining to the person category, it is not an ontological violation, since we normally expect some persons to be stronger than others, whereas Dracula's transformation into a non-human animal clearly is a violation. (3003, 19)

Therefore, with his human/animal features, Dracula blurs the distinction between the two categories and violates the popular expectations with further uncertainties.

The demarcation that Dracula further abrogates is the one which separates between life and death. Dracula "is nosferatu, neither dead nor alive but somehow both, mobile frequenter of the grave and boudoir, easeful communicant of exclusive realms, and as such he toys with the separation of the living and the dead, a distinction crucial to physician, lawyer, and priest alike" (Craft, 1994, 80-81). This alternation between the living and the dead subverts the sanctified duality of life and death.

By creating such fuzzy edges among the clear cut perceptual and conceptual structures, *Dracula* challenges binary oppositions and creates a fragmented discourse that also blurs the distinction between reality and fiction. By subverting the cultural and 'natural' oppositions, Dracula unchains the individuals and sets them free from the burdens of these divisions. Kilgour suggests that the oppositions which the vampire subverts are themselves the real monster, saying that "[t]he figure of the vampire provides a prototype for recent theories of writing as a force which subverts binary oppositions, which are themselves seen as the weapons of an ideology that is the real monster: one that drains us of our individuality and feeds upon constructed 'natural' differences between the sexes and races which artificially divide us from each other" (Kilgour, 1998, 58-59). According to Stephanou, such remodelling of structures characterizes the transition from modernity to postmodernity. Thus, "[m]oving away from the binary structures on which modernity is based and entering postmodernity's fragmented discourses, it becomes increasingly difficult to distinguish reality from artifice" (Stephanou 2). Therefore, in these particular aspects, Stoker's novel antedates postmodernity and anticipates a future world in which the juxtaposition of opposing concepts becomes a harder task.

4.4. Sincere versus Authentic Individual

Stoker's novel charts a significant characteristic in the moral life of individuals in the Victorian age. It marks the rise of the sincere individuals and the crisis of authentic individuals in society. With the development of social and civil life, sincerity acquired an essential status as a virtue which represents self-transcendence and grace. In the social contexts, sincerity refers to the "congruence between avowal and actual feeling . . . [it] is the avoidance of being false to any man through being true to one's own self" (Trilling, 1972, 2-5). As such, Trilling continues:

we can see that this state of personal existence is not to be attained without the most arduous effort. And yet at certain point in history certain men and classes of men conceived that the making of this effort was of supreme importance in the moral life, and the value they attached to the enterprise of sincerity became a salient, perhaps a definitive, characteristic of Western culture. (5-6).

But, in most of the cases, this sincerity is brought about as a fulfilment of a social demand on the social stage, and not as a genuine reflection of the personal tendencies and inclinations. In other words:

Society requires of us that we present ourselves as being sincere, and the most efficacious way of satisfying this demand is to see to it that we really are sincere, that we actually are what we want our community to know we are. In short, we play the role of being ourselves, we sincerely act the part of the sincere person, with the result that a judgement may be passed upon our sincerity that it is not authentic. (Trilling 10-11).

This description applies the team of vampire hunters led by Van Helsing. They are all sincere. Lynch says, "in *Dracula*, earnestness stands alongside sincerity and commitment as an eternal quality rather than a fleeting, baseless attitude" (2010, 163). After all, the sincerity of the characters adds credulity to the accounts they provide about their experiences and encounters. Proclaiming honesty even in presenting his thoughts in his diary, Jonathan Harker states, "[l]et me begin with facts – bare, meagre facts, verified by books and figures, and of which there can be no doubt. I must not confuse them with experience which will have to rest on my own observation or my memory of them" (Stoker 34). In addition, Harker is an earnest solicitor who takes the risk of

travelling to an unknown place for the sake of accomplishing his first professional assignment satisfactorily. The letter of Mr. Hawkins which Harker submits to Dracula attests to Harker's sincerity and earnestness. Addressing Count Dracula, Mr. Hawkins writes, "I am happy to say I can send a sufficient substitute, one in whom I have every possible confidence. He is a young man, full of energy and talent in his own way, and of a very faithful disposition. He is discreet and silent" (Stoker 20). Hawkins' description of Harker represents the Victorian presumptions about the average individual.

Harker's fiancé, Mina Murray, on the other hand, stands as an epitome of feminine sincerity and virtue for the Victorian community. She works hard not to the benefit of herself, but to be of benefit to her future husband. Mina says, "I have been working very hard lately, because I want to keep up with Jonathan's studies, and I have been practicing shorthand very assiduously. When we are married I shall be able to be useful to Jonathan, and if I can stenograph well enough I can take down what he wants to say in this way and write it out for him on the typewriter, at which also I am practicing very hard" (Stoker 60). In fact, *Dracula* is thronged with instances of sincerity and moral righteousness. John Seward earnestly attends the sickness of Lucy in spite of her earlier rejection of his proposal for marriage. When John Seward writes to his friend and master, professor Van Helsing, and asks him to come over, Van Helsing heartedly responds and expresses his readiness to aid those whom his friend holds dear. The most dominant exhibition of sincerity in the novel is the act of blood transfusion. Each of the four men, Arthur Holmwood, John Seward, Quincey Morris, and Van Helsing himself, donates blood for Lucy willingly, showing considerable degree of altruism and self-denial. However, in terms of Trilling's understanding of sincerity, these tokens of honesty and self-transcendence are part of the enterprise of presenting the self on the social stage. This sincerity is more social prestige than a personal genuine trait. It is a standard by which one is judged in the eyes of others, and a means by which one gains trust and confidence. This makes the individuals live in a state of duplicity and hollowness where they mainly care about the opinion of others. In order to win the forbearance and esteem of society, the individual sacrifices his personal tendencies and preferences.

As a reaction to the discontent with the social determination of personal worth, the concept of authenticity emerges. This concept compensates for the lack of genuineness in the concept of sincerity. Thus, in authenticity, “the character of the individual is measured, not by the extent to which he or she expresses a congruence between avowed and actual feeling as a social convention, but by the extent to which the individual experiences that congruence, regardless of society’s perceptions or interpretations” (Shanahan 98). As such, authenticity is categorically distinct from sincerity. While sincerity can be validated by others, authenticity can only be validated by the individual himself. This does not mean that others may not encounter, acknowledge, or reject the authenticity of the individual. Rather, it means that the individual himself is the final arbiter of the truth of his own experiences, and the sole determiner of his own worth. In other words, “[a]t the behest of the criterion of authenticity, much that was once thought to make up the very fabric of culture has come to seem of little account, mere fantasy or ritual, or downright falsification. Conversely, much that culture traditionally condemned and sought to exclude is accorded a considerable moral authority by reason of the authenticity claimed for it” (Trilling 11). According to such understanding of the concept of authenticity, Count Dracula stands as an authentic individual in opposition to the unauthentic sincerity of his opponents.

In case of Count Dracula, there is more genuine congruence between avowal and actual feeling. He is truer to his own self. His inclinations and tendencies are not brought about to fulfil a social demand. They spring from his own autonomic self. He does not expect positive judgement and appreciation from outside world. He does not sacrifice his own autonomy for the sake of attaining society’s esteem. Dracula is authentic even as a villain. Trilling notes that villainy does not preclude authenticity. He asserts that “[t]he word ‘villain’ as used in drama carries no necessary meaning of dissembling – it is possible for a villain not to compound his wickedness with deceit, to be overt in his intention of doing harm” (14). This characterization particularly applies to the Count. Dracula is essentially different from the dissembler villain whom we see in the Shakespearian drama where the evil nature of the villain is apparent to the audience and concealed from those with whom he interacts. In fact, the audience, and the first character who has the first encounter with Dracula, i.e. Jonathan Harker, perceive the

diabolic nature of Dracula. The hospitality with which Dracula receives Harker is not staged. It is part of Dracula's courtly manners as an aristocrat and a descendent of a royal family. Dracula does not work hard to conceal his extraordinary nature. Harker does not need exceptional wit to become aware of the non-human attributes of Dracula. Soon, Harker realizes that he is kept in the castle against his will, and that he has very little to do about it. Dracula unhesitatingly throws the shaving mirror of Harker out of the window; and he instructs Harker to write letters to his fiancé and employer, and dictates the content of the letters. Harker feels overpowered and responds. By such acts, Dracula explicitly puts his will against the will of his guest and indicates appeal to force. In other words, Dracula challenges his guest to use his resources of might, if he has any, to free himself out of this situation; and such challenging attitude is not among the traits of a dissembler villain.

Moreover, the confrontation between Dracula and the vampire hunters is more of an abstraction of warfare between two resourceful opponents, than being a mere endeavour to expose an evil dissembler. Dracula's disguising supernatural capabilities, like shape shifting and the ability to melt into thin air, are part of his resources in his strive to achieve his aims. Dracula challengingly declares his aims when he is confronted by Van Helsing and his friends in the scene in which they break into his house in Piccadilly. Before escaping, Dracula says:

You think to baffle me, you with your pale faces all in a row, like sheep in a butcher's. You shall be sorry yet, each one of you! You think you have left me without a place to rest, but I have more. My revenge is just begun! I spread it over centuries, and time is on my side. Your girls that you all love are mine already. And through them you and others shall yet be mine, my creatures, to do my bidding and to be my jackals when I want to feed. (Stoker 347-348).

This speech of the Count is pivotal in the novel. It is the only occasion in which he addresses a collection of individuals, and through them he expresses his attitude towards the whole public. Disgusted by the cowardice of these Victorian bourgeois men, and "their fabricated rules of etiquette, [Dracula] bluntly voices the fact that he has already illicitly and perversely possessed the decorous . . . and supposedly unattainable, 'virtuous' women of those 'respectable' males" (Koç and Demir, 340). In this speech, the noble and old warrior expresses his high self-esteem, and severely belittles the

braveness of his opponents. For Dracula, such opponents are not even his peers. Comparing Van Helsing and his friends to sheep, calls forth the image of the herd. With the image of the sheep, Dracula targets their uniformity and lack of individualistic identity. Therefore, Dracula is a competent, resourceful, and authentic antagonist and not a mere pretentious villain.

Dracula is a genuinely different villain not only because he is not a dissembler, but also because his aim is not to rise in social class. The villain in literature is often represented as belonging to lower class and of limited qualifications and recourses. Trilling says that “the original social meaning of the word ‘villain’ bears decisively upon its later moral meaning. The opprobrious term referred to the man who stood lowest in the scale of feudal society; the villain of the plays and novels is characteristically a person who seeks to rise above the situation to which he was born . . . In the nature of his case, he is a hypocrite” (16). Such characterization definitely does not apply to Count Dracula with his royal origin and centuries of accumulated knowledge and experience. Therefore, Dracula is authentic in spite of his villainy. In fact, Dracula’s authenticity is a revolution against the Victorian selfless, pretentious, and hypocritical sincerity.

Dracula’s authenticity contrasts with the scarcely credible sincerity of Van Helsing and his men. In fact, the non-genuineness of the sincerity of the vampire hunters is not indicated. It is only inferred. Van Helsing’s laughing scene, though hysterical and pathological enough, but still casts doubts on his sincerity and shows glimpses of his true inner self. After Lucy’s funeral, not knowing that all the men of the group had donated blood to Lucy, Arthur mentions the transfusion of his blood to Lucy’s veins and says that “he felt since then as if they two had been really married, and that she was his wife in the sight of God” (Stoker 197). As a reaction to Arthur’s speech, Van Helsing’s face grows white and purple by turns. The moment he becomes alone in the carriage with dr. Seward, Van Helsing breaks into a fit of hysterical laugh. Seward says, “[h]e laughed till he cried, and I had to draw down the blinds lest anyone should see us and misjudge” (Stoker 197). When Seward asks him about the reason behind his laughter, Van Helsing provides a long and vague explanation that does not convince Seward. Thus, Seward says, “I did not like to wound him by pretending not to see his idea, but as

I did not yet understand the cause of his laughter, I asked him again” (Stoker 198). Van Helsing gives another explanation claiming that the reason is the irony of the burial service. Still not convinced, Seward says, “[w]ell, for the life of me, professor . . . I can’t see anything to laugh at in all that. Why your expression makes it a harder puzzle than before? But even if the burial service was comic, what about poor Art and his trouble? Why his heart was simply breaking?” (Stoker 199). Then, Van Helsing confesses that the laugh is about Arthur’s thought that the transfusion of his blood to Lucy’s veins had made her truly his bride. Increasingly bewildered, Seward enquires about the funny thing in such a good and comforting idea for Arthur. In response, Van Helsing agrees that the idea is comforting and explains, “[q]uite so. But there was a difficulty, friend John. If so that, then what about the others? Ho, ho! Then this so sweet maid is a polyandrist, and me, with my poor wife dead to me, but alive by Church’s law, though no wits, all gone, even I, who am faithful husband to this now-no-wife, am bigamist” (Stoker 199). On the one hand, this statement signifies Helsing’s miserable inner self. He is officially married, but in practice his wife is dead to him. His faithfulness to her is not genuine. It is mere compliance with the regulations of the Church and the requirements of the society. In other words, there is an incongruence between avowal and actual feeling. On the other hand, Helsing’s words indicate that his sincere attendance and care for Lucy in her sickness was not authentic. He unconsciously desired her; and he entertained the metaphor of copulation implied in the procedure of blood transfusion. Moreover, this statement means that the Helsing’s sympathy and condolences for Arthur are also not truly sincere. In fact, the grief of Arthur is condolence for Van Helsing. The vigorous and youthful noble man is now wifeless, much like Van Helsing as far as the marital situation is concerned. Such negative implications are observed by Seward. Therefore, still unconvinced, he reflects, “I don’t see where the joke comes in there either!”; then he comments: “I did not feel particularly pleased with him for saying such things” (Stoker 199). As a result, Van Helsing confesses that he hides his true feelings from others, and asks for forgiveness for being ‘authentic’ for a short while during the conversation with Seward saying, “[f]riend John, forgive me if I pain. I showed not my feeling to others when it would wound, but only to you, my old friend, whom I can trust” (Stoker 199). Van Helsing’s hysterical laughing

scene is the moment of exposing the true authentic self. Laughing relieves the accumulated pressure of pretention and staging of unauthentic social sincerity.

Another instance which reveals considerable unauthentic virtue and sincerity, is Harker's encounter with the three vampire women. In this scene Harker oscillates between his genuine self and pretentious sincerity. It is worth noting in this context that the fair woman "with the great masses of golden hair and eyes like pale sapphires", is the woman of his unconscious dreams; because he "seemed somehow to know her face, and to know it in connection with some dreamy fear, but [he] could not recollect at the moment how or where" (Stoker 42). The fair woman is familiar because she is the female with the initiative whom the Victorians repress and desire at the same time. Harker's state of ambivalence between his true inner self and his ostensible sincerity is indicted through his description of two contradictory states of being: "There was something about them that made me uneasy, some longing and at the same time some deadly fear. I felt in my heart a wicked, burning desire that they would kiss me with those red lips. It is not good to note this down, lest some day it should meet Mina's eyes and cause her pain, but it is the truth" (Stoker 42). The sound of the women's laugh is like "the intolerable tingling sweetness of water glasses when played on by a cunning hand"; and their deliberate voluptuousness "was both thrilling and repulsive" (Stoker 42). Harker continues describing his contradictory feelings and says, "I lay quiet, looking out from under my eyelashes in an agony of delightful anticipation. The fair girl advanced and bent over me till I could feel the movement of her breath upon me. Sweet it was in one sense, honey sweet, and sent the same tingling through the nerves as her voice, but with a bitter underlying the sweet, a bitter of offensiveness, as one smells in blood" (Stoker 42). The use of the phrases and expressions that convey binary oppositions, such as longing and deadly fear, intolerable sweetness, honey sweet and bitter of offensiveness, discloses the swinging between two alternate inclinations; a tendency to exhibit socially staged sincerity, and a tendency to respond to the needs of the interior self. This scene reveals repression of sexuality among the Victorian individuals and their earnest effort to show themselves as virtuous and honest.

Thus, *Dracula* unravels the state of sincere and authentic individuals at the end of the nineteenth century. Having its origins in the Renaissance, sincerity peaks in the Victorian age. The novel shows that sincerity becomes an end in itself, and an object of personal quest. Sincerity becomes an essential criterion for the satisfaction of the society's demands, and determining the worth of the individual. Count Dracula, on the other hand, represents a revolution against the Victorian unauthentic sincerity which give no validation to subjectivity. Dracula represents the need for authenticity and he signifies the rise of the authentic individual of the post-Romantic period.

4.5. The Alienated Individual

In addition to being an authentic villain and authentic individual, Dracula is a forerunner of the modern alienated individual. Alienation is a consequence of authenticity. The two concepts are in direct proportional correlation. Shanahan asserts that "the moral individual who persists in the search for and the experience of authenticity becomes progressively more alienated from the social order that not only surrounds him or her but that seems to be gaining in influence and momentum" (Shanahan 99). The roots of authenticity and alienation are located in the age of Romanticism. "In fact, if all of us yearn for authenticity, as the Romantics suggest, however unwilling they may be to search for genuine satisfaction for that yearning, then by extension everyone in society experiences alienation from that society; and the greater the degree to which they pursue their desire for authenticity, the greater the degree to which they become alienated" (Shanahan 99). Therefore, in their search for authenticity, the individuals become increasingly alienated. The reason is that the society cannot tolerate the morally self-authorized and self-validated individuals. In other words, society "cannot be comfortable with the authentic self, for if the self is the sole authorizing and validating agent, society can have no basis upon which to assess the moral fiber of the individual" (Shanahan 99). As a result, the society alienates its authentic members in order to protect its integrity and dominance.

This characterization applies to the titular figure in *Dracula*. Although the story is written in the Post-Romantic era, it is still a continuation of the Gothic form which flourished in the age of Romanticism. Dracula is an alienated Romantic figure. In his

unique and multidimensional autonomy, Dracula represents individualism at its apogee. He is a fantastic depiction of the individual who does not shed any of his subjective attributes for sake of satisfying the society. He is a threat to the community because he authors his own moral code and he acts accordingly. Therefore, alienation from the society becomes an inevitable consequence.

Mirroring the social attitude, the story alienates Count Dracula in a variety of ways. He is removed in place and time from the Victorian England. As far as place is concerned, Dracula is placed in a very remote place in Europe. He is from a foreign country towards the east of Europe where people are foreign in culture, language, and beliefs. Within that country he is also removed and located in a castle in one of the remotest and least known districts of Europe. Harker says: "I find that the district he named is in the extreme east of the country, just on the borders of three states, Transylvania, Moldavia, and Bukovina, in the midst of the Carpathian mountains; one of the wildest and least known portions of Europe" (Stoker 3). The need for the Transylvanian soil after moving to England affirms the foreignness of the Count in the populated world. London is unhomey for him. He cannot survive without the imported soil. That is why Van Helsing says, "[w]e must sterilize all the imported earth . . . that he has brought from a far distant land for such fell use" (Stoker 310-338). Dracula is also alienated in time. He comes from the past. His age extends back to centuries. Van Helsing identifies Dracula as "Voivode Dracula who won his name against the Turk, over the great river on the very frontier of Turkeyland. If it be so, then was he no common man, for in that time, and for centuries after, he was spoken of as the cleverest and most cunning, as well as the bravest of the sons of the 'land beyond the forest'" (Stoker 273). Such displacement in place and time emphasizes the foreignness of Count Dracula and inaugurates his alienation.

A further source of alienation for Count Dracula is his long list of extra-human features and attributes. Dracula is a vampire, and as such, he represents a different species. Featuring the Vampire, Van Helsing says, "[t]he vampire lives on, and cannot die by mere passing of the time, he can flourish when that he can fatten on the blood of the living. Even more, we have seen amongst us that he can even grow younger, that his

vital faculties grow strenuous, and seem as though they refresh themselves when his special is plenty” (Stoker 271). Thus, the vampire does not die and does not eat. He depends on blood as an only source of nourishment. As far as Count Dracula is concerned, the list of exotic and non-human characteristics extends and we learn in the story that Dracula “throws no shadow [and] makes in the mirror no reflect” (Stoker 271). Dracula is “so strong in person as twenty men” (Stoker 269). He can also transform himself into a wolf. He can come in form of mist which he creates. He can come on moonlight rays as elemental dust. He can slip through a hairbreadth space, and he can see in the dark. On the other hand, there is a counter list of limitations and weakness. For example, Dracula can change form only at specific times, and he constantly need the Transylvanian soil to regain his strength. He is afflicted by garlic, wild flowers, and sacred symbols such as the crucifix. These features of supremacy and might, together with the features of limitation and weakness, essentially have the function of alienating Dracula from the society which he deals with.

Dracula is not only detached from the society, he is also detached and alienated from the culture. Senf explains the reaction of Dracula to the religious and cultural symbols such as the crucifix and the garlic by saying that “[t]he aversion to culturally important symbols reaffirms the vampire’s rebellion against authority and, therefore, against the symbols of that authority” (1988, 9). In this novel, such idiosyncrasies dissociate the protagonist from the society and the culture and give another shape to the alienated Gothic figure. With this degree of estrangement, added to his self-validating individualistic morality, Dracula represents a threatening foreign object within the body of the society; and the society does its best to get rid of it. Therefore, the story of Count Dracula can be read as signifying what Shanahan calls “the alienating process” which characterizes “the post-Romantic period [when] one can trace the beginnings of the bitter fruit of social alienation almost to the very moment at which the seeds of individualism began to flower” (102). This alienation process is instigated by society against the individuals who exhibit off-limits authenticity and not observe the uniformity which the society stipulates. According to such reading of the novel, Dracula is a conjectured exemplification of the exceedingly empowered and authentic individual of the Post-Romantic period. Dracula suffers the complete alienation which accompanies

the process of secularization. For the Romantics, nature is kept as a main point of reference for the empowered selves. The subscription of the Romantics to the belief in the mystical powers of nature served as a point of reference for the individual and helped in avoiding the bleakness and gloom that characterize modern alienation. But in the Post-Romantic era, and as a result of the technological revolution and the dominance of the mass societies towards the end of the nineteenth century, “the vision of a benevolent natural order begins to evaporate, leaving the individual thoroughly alienated from the social order, but without the redemption afforded by such things as the categorical imperative or the spiritualizing effect of nature” (Shanahan 104). It is noteworthy to mention in this context that this reading of the novel provides a plausible explanation for Dracula’s motivation to move to London and join collectiveness. Count Dracula suffers from lack of existing reference. He tries to fill, at least partially, this void of alienation by venturing the move to London in an attempt to use society as a point of reference. But society refuses him and identifies him as an alien, immanent, and imminent danger.

4.6. The Individual Versus the Durkheimian Collective Body

While Robinson Crusoe and Victor Frankenstein migrate from the society, Count Dracula migrates to the society; or, in fact, he conquers the society. He attacks the firmly established rules of the community and demolishes them. Dracula is a rebel. In his eccentric individuality, he represents a historical necessity for revolutionary social development and change at a transitional historical period. Stoker’s novel puts the eccentric individualism of Dracula as a scale to measure the readiness of the Victorian society for the historical change. According to Durkheim, the degree of individualism can very well be used as an index of social development and reform. Thus, particularly in lower societies, “[t]he lesser development of individuality, the smaller scale of the group, and the homogeneity of external circumstances all contribute to reducing the differences and variations to a minimum” (Durkheim, 1995, 5). Society naturally opposes individualism and constantly strives to minimize the variations and unify the intellectual and moral attitudes of its members:

The group regularly produces an intellectual and moral uniformity . . . Everything is common to everyone. The movements are stereotyped; everyone executes the same ones in the same

circumstances; and this conformity of conduct merely translates that of thought. Since all consciousnesses are pulled along in the same current, the individual type virtually confounds itself with the generic type” (Durkheim, 1995, 5)

As far as the fear of individuality and the adherence to uniformity are concerned, the Victorian society is not much different from the lower societies which Durkheim describes.

For the sake of analysing *Dracula* in terms of Durkheim’s theory of society which views society as the seat of moral life, the characters of the novel are classified according to their relationship to the society into three categories. The English characters, including Quincey Morris, who is American, are in the first. Van Helsing is in the second. And Count Dracula is in the third category. The minimization of differences and variations, and the uniformity of intellectual and moral attitudes, are exhibited in the characterization of the English characters. Dr. Seward, Johnathan Harker, Arthur Holmwood, Quincey Morris, and Mina Harker are uniform characters. They are invariable to the extent that Stoker is sometimes criticized as not being able to furnish his characters with sufficient characterization. Lynch says that “Bram Stoker’s *Dracula* can offer only serviceable prose and wooden characterization” (2010, 55). They are viewed as ‘wooden’ because they are homogeneous. They are all noble. In fact, according to Lucy, all men are noble. In her letter to Mina, Lucy writes, “[m]y dear Mina, why are men so noble when we women are so little worthy of them?” (Stoker 66). In a similar pattern, men also idealize women. Such idealized uniformity makes these characters faceless.

Such uniformity is expected in the urban concentrations of masses. The novel signifies the prominence of mass men, where the “Mass man is always less real than the individual, only a statistical average [and] easily becoming the victim of modern authoritarianism” (Ellwood, 1999, 51). The English characters cannot resist the social drive which compels them to conformity with the mass-mindedness of the herd. They are all conformists. They hold in contempt any attempt to disobey or break the social norms. When Van Helsing tries to explain to Arthur that Lucy is Un-Dead, and that he needs his permission to destroy her dead body, Arthur answers, “if it be anything in

which my honour as a gentleman or my faith as a Christian is concerned, I cannot make such a promise. If you can assure me that what you intend does not violate either of these two, then I give my consent at once” (Stoker 232). With such unquestioned conformity, the English characters in *Dracula* are predictable and commonplace.

This uniformity and facelessness can be better understood in terms of Durkheim’s positivist theory of society which views the social domain as consisting of a constellation of objective phenomena that can be examined outside the subjective life of the of the individuals. In *Dracula*, the English characters, including the American Quincey Morris, are personifications of collectiveness. They are typical Durkheimian individuals. Peristiany says that “[t]he Durkheimian individual is a *homo duplex*, both ‘I’ and ‘We’. This is a polarity, not an antithesis, which is deeply rooted in his conception of society and of its moving forces” (2010, x). Being members of a society, these characters have moral life, and this moral life is the morality of the group. According to Durkheim:

Moral life begins with membership of a group, however small the group may be . . . Each people at a given moment of its history has a morality, and it is in the name of this ruling morality that tribunals condemn and opinion judges. For a given group there is a clearly defined morality . . . there is a general morality common to all individuals belonging to a collectivity” (2010, 19-26).

Thus, when the English characters react, answer, or behave, they perform these acts in accordance with the morality of the Victorian society of the late nineteenth century. They live in collective harmony. They disagree and argue with Van Helsing, but they do not disagree or argue with each other. The uniformity of attitude and the predictability of their response are the results of a shared common collective ideal, because “[t]o be a member of the society is . . . to be bound to the social ideal” (Durkheim, 2010, 26). Adherence to such common ideal enhances collective uniformity among the individuals through creating a generic type; and, it also creates solidarity among the society members and keeps them attached to each other:

Attachment to a group implies a necessary, if indirect, attachment to individuals. when the social ideal is a particular form of the ideal humanity, when the type of citizen blends to a

great extent with the generic type of man, it is to man as such that we find ourselves bound. This explains the moral character which is attributed to feelings of sympathy between individual and the acts which they inspire. It is not that they themselves constitute the intrinsic elements of the moral temperament, but they are so closely bound to the most essential moral attitudes that we may take their absence as very probably an index of lesser morality” (Durkheim, 2010, 26)

By creating collective ideals, the society subjugates the personal ideals of its members and gives prominence to the collective ones: “If man conceives ideals, and indeed cannot help conceiving and becoming attached to them, it is because he is a social being. Society moves or forces the individual to rise above himself and gives him the means for achieving this. Through the very awareness of itself, society forces the individual to transcend himself and to participate in a higher form of life” (Durkheim, 2010, 49). This explains the characters` lack of distinct personal attitudes, the closeness and the sympathy with each other, and the readiness to provide assistance and support to each other.

Therefore, the English characters are uniform, close to each other, and predictable because they obey ideal and authoritative moral rules that transcends them and commands their action. This greatly contributes to the lack of peculiarity and personal traits among these characters. It is worth mentioning that the adherence to the social duties does not only becomes obligatory, it also becomes desirable and worthy of self-sacrifice. The conformist individual feels that he is indebted to the society:

From society derive all the essentials of our mental life . . . It is to society that we owe the power over matter which is our glory. It is society that has freed us from nature. Is it not then to be expected that we think of it as mental being higher than ourselves from which our mental powers emanate? This explains why it is that when it demands of us those sacrifices, great or small, that make up our moral life, we bow before its demands with deference (Durkheim, 2010, 37-38).

This desire to perform the duty and the readiness to sacrifice the self for the sake of a collective superior purpose explains the volunteering spirit and the fervour with which the vampire hunters struggle with Dracula. And above all, it explains the self-sacrifice of Quincey Morris which represents the culmination of enthusiasm and bravery. Such

culmination takes place in the final scene which leads to the destruction of Count Dracula. In fact, in this scene both Jonathan Harker and Quincey Morris display unique bravery and prowess. Describing the final battle, Mina says:

In the midst of this I could see that Jonathan on one side of the ring of men, and Quincey on the other, were forcing a way to the cart. It was evident that they were bent on finishing their task before the sun should set. Nothing seemed to stop or even to hinder them. Neither the levelled weapons nor the flashing knives of the gypsies in front, nor the howling of the wolves behind, appeared to even attract their attention (Stoker 425).

But, while “Jonathan’s impetuosity, and the manifest singleness of his purpose” (Stoker 425), is understandable, because the destruction of Dracula would save his wife’s life, the prowess of Quincey Morris is essentially fuelled by the transcendental collective ideal which he is attached to. Thus, Mina continues:

Mr. Morris had had to use force to pass through his side of the ring Szgany. All the time I had been breathlessly watching Jonathan I had, with the tail of my eye, seen him pressing desperately forward, and had seen the knives of the gypsies flash as he won a way through them, and they cut at him. He had parried with his great bowie knife, and at first I thought that he too had come through in safety. But as he sprang beside Jonathan . . . I could see that with his left hand he was clutching at his side, and that the blood was spurting through his fingers (Stoker 425)

While Jonathan’s knife shears through Dracula’s throat, Quincey’s bowie knife plunges into the heart. Dracula crumbles into dust and Quincey falls on the ground holding his bleeding wound. After holding his hand, Mina mentions, “[h]e must have seen the anguish of my heart in my face, for he smiled at me and said, ‘I am only too happy to have been of service! Oh, God’ he cried suddenly, struggling to a sitting posture and pointing to me. ‘It was worth for this to die!’” (Stoker 427). Quincey asserts that the superior end is worth the self-sacrifice. Quincey happily dies and his heroism is commemorated by naming Harker and Mina’s child after him. Therefore, the ardour with which the men pursue their combat with Dracula is not merely attributed to the platonic and brotherly love to Lucy and Mina as the story often suggests. The men fight for the collective moral ideal that transcends their individual personal interests and

tendencies. They perform selflessly because they are mere constituents in a superior and powerful entity. They are members in a robust collective body which is called society.

However, without Van Helsing, the characters are often passive and have no initiative. They are not tempered to handle extraordinary challenges and threats. They need foreign guidance to react properly. This lack of initiative is compensated for by Van Helsing who represents the second category of individuals in the story. Van Helsing is an incarnation of the archetypal father figure²². He provides the parental guidance. The novel systematically eliminates the parents of the characters leaving Van Helsing as the only guardian and trustee for the young group of men and women. Lucy loses her mother and Arthur loses his father. Harker loses his second father, Mr. Hawkins; and Mina “never knew either father or mother” (Stoker 179). Van Helsing is the father who knows best. The violation of his orders might lead to catastrophic results. When Lucy becomes subjected to Dracula attacks, Van Helsing attends and places garlic all over the room. He himself, fatherly enough, fixes the wreath of garlic round her neck, and warns her saying, “[t]ake care you do not disturb it, and even if the room feel close, do not tonight open the window or the door” (Stoker 150). Digioia draws attention to the fact that “Van Helsing’s work to protect Lucy is doubly undermined by his absence and a female maternal figure [i.e., Mrs. Westenra]” (2017, 65). The removing of garlic and the opening of the window by Mrs. Westenra, brings about catastrophic results. As such, Mrs. Westenra’s behaviour represents disobedience and violation of the father’s orders.

In this way, the novel nominates Van Helsing to fill the vacancy of fatherhood. But, at the same time, with his potency and vigour, Dracula also presents himself as a prospective father for the fatherless group. Thus, the novel suggests a competitive struggle between two patriarchs. The essentially sterile Van Helsing stands for the virtue and the righteousness of the community. The vigorous and potent Dracula stands for moral corruption and degradation. The potency of Dracula is the subject of the major concern for Van Helsing. Dracula’s wooden boxes represent incubation and the soil

²² Van Helsing is also a personification of the archetype of the sagacious and helpful old man who frequently appears during difficult times in dreams and mythical narratives: “The old man always appears when the hero is in hopeless and desperate situation from which only profound reflection or a lucky idea can extricate him” (Jung, 1980, 217-218).

inside them represents fertility; and the multiplicity of these boxes represents propagation. This explains the use of the word ‘sterilize’ by Van Helsing when referring to the earth in Dracula’s boxes. Van Helsing says, “[w]e must trace each of these boxes, and when we are ready . . . we must, so to speak, sterilize the earth, so that no more he can seek safety in it” (Stoker 274). Dracula’s potency has the danger of awakening the hibernated sexuality of the young men and women²³. And accordingly, it threatens the status quo of the morality of the Victorians. Such danger necessitates the presence and the interference of Van Helsing to play the role of the caring and protective guardian for the young generation.

Although “Van Helsing stands as the protector of the patriarchal institutions” (Craft, 1994, 80), he still signifies a metamorphosis in the characterization of patriarchy. Unlike the hegemonic and monolithic patriarchy of the father figure in *Robinson Crusoe*, Van Helsing does not assume supremacy of his own person. Van Helsing’s hegemony originates from his extra-ordinary knowledge. What Van Helsing and the earlier archetypal patriarchies have in common is that they are all anxious about the uncontrolled female sexuality. But, while traditional patriarchs repress, condemn, and punish female desire, Van Helsing ‘pathologises’ the desire and deals with it as a special type syndrome which has its own symptoms and methods of cure. The concept of vampirism provides this pathological framework and gives license to use all the possible means to eliminate such sickness and safeguard the community from its evils. Agreeing with such suggestion, Stephanou says that “[t]hrough the discourse of race and sexuality the female vampire is pathologised and marginalised, subjugated and finally eliminated in order to protect the security, the purity of blood and well-being of the bourgeois family” (Stephanou, 2014, 14). Thus, in *Dracula*, Stoker expands the concept of the guardian patriarch and implies that he does not have to be a biological parent. Knowledge and wisdom are the essential criteria that qualify the man for the role of the father. The man of the multidisciplinary mind is entitled to play this leading role as the nemesis of Dracula. The modernized father is “[a] doctor, lawyer, scientist, and

²³ The suggested sequence of moral degradation in the novel is that Dracula triggers the sexuality of women and makes them voluptuous. Then, the voluptuous women will seduce the virtuous men and consequently bring about the moral corruption.

philosopher, [who] seems the ultimate man of logic and reason. He holds many degrees and is well-versed in in the latest discoveries. He uses logic and the scientific method to uncover the clues and solve the mysteries” (Cavelos, 2004, 1). Van Helsing is tyrannical, but the tyranny of the *fin de siècle* father originates from the inviolable certainties of science.

Van Helsing is not a rebel. He is a reformer. He puts forward the idea that an individual, if adequately qualified, can bring about considerable adjustments in the system of morality to suit the continuously emerging challenges to the welfare of the society. This is not an easy task because “[i]n the sphere of morality, as in other spheres of nature, individual reason has no particular prestige as such” (Durkheim, 2010, 33). Van Helsing uses the only available means that Durkheim mentions for the sake of implementing his desired reform. He uses science and impersonal human reason: “The only reason for which one can claim the right of intervention, and of rising above historical moral reality in order to reform it, is not my reason nor yours; it is the impersonal human reason, only truly realized in science” (Durkheim, 2010, 33). In this way, Van Helsing puts himself in a position to order the course of moral life. He is approved because his intervention is scientific; and “[t]he intervention of science has as its end, not the substitution of an individual ideal for the collective, but the substitution of an equally collective ideal which expresses not a particular personality but the collective itself more clearly understood” (Durkheim, 2010, 33). Van Helsing is accepted because he merely suggests an amended collective ideal and not individualistic one. In fact, Van Helsing affirms the society and does not, by any means, try to loosen its grip. He rationalizes the tyranny of the society to the individuals. The suggested moral reforms that he advocates are suppositional and putative. In practice, he merely suggests that the morality should be loose enough to allow the exhumation of tombs and the mutilation of dead bodies.

Van Helsing, the father figure, who stands for the society, comes to rescue the threatened system. His suggested pseudo reforms include valuing the glorious past while maintaining and defending the current capitalist system. Van Helsing invokes the pious and sacred past in response to Dracula’s invocation of barbaric and profane past.

In the third category comes the revolutionary rebel, Count Dracula. Dracula does not intend to reform or even to violate the rules; he intends to eliminate them and demolish the current social system. To begin with, it is important to explain, in terms of Durkheim's theory, why Dracula migrates to society and not from it. Dracula is a figure of hypothetical utmost individuality and independence. Nevertheless, he seems to have longed for company and communal life. When talking to Harker, Dracula refers to his books as "companions" and says that these books "have been good friends to [him], and for some years past, ever since [he] had the idea of going to London, have given [him] many, many hours of pleasure" (Stoker 23). Then, still addressing Harker, Dracula adds, "I long to go through the crowded streets of your mighty London, to be in the midst of the whirl and rush of humanity, to share its life, its change, its death, and all that makes it what it is" (Stoker 23). After centuries of secluded life, Dracula goes through society deprivation; "deprive man of all that society has given him and he is reduced to his sensations. He becomes a being more or less indistinct from an animal" (Durkheim, 2010, 27). After all, there is no individualism without the domain of the *sui generis* force of collectivity, which, unlike the forces of nature, is intelligent and moral:

Left to himself the individual would become dependent upon physical forces. If he has been able to escape, to free himself, to develop a personality, it is because he has been able to shelter under *sui generis* force; an intense force since it results from the coalition of all the individual forces, but an intelligent and moral force capable, consequently, of neutralizing the blind and amoral forces of nature. This is the collective force. The theoreticians may demonstrate that man has the right to liberty, but, whatever the value of these demonstrations, it is certain that this liberty can become a reality only in and through society. (Durkheim, 2010, 27).

Therefore, although he exceptionally depends on physical forces, and successfully neutralizes the blind forces of nature, Dracula realizes that his individualism is fragmented and lacking without being located within a specific collectivity.

But the problem is that Count Dracula is a master. He is a master for centuries and cannot be viewed or treated as less than a master. In other words, he cannot be a mere individual and submits to the compelling rules of the collectivity. Dracula displays

great concern towards the idea of being equal to others if he moves to London. Addressing Harker, Dracula says:

Here I am noble. I am Boyer. The common people know me, and I am master. But a stranger in a strange land, he is no one. Men know him not, and to know not is to care not for. I am content if I am like the rest, so that no man stops if he sees me, or pauses in his speaking if he hears my words, 'Ha, ha! A stranger!' I have been so long master that I would be master still, or at least that none other should be master of me (Stoker, 23-24)

Therefore, instead of complying with the imposing and dominant rules of the collective body, Dracula revolts against the collective body in order to deconstruct its morality. He intends to establish a completely different alternative system that has much in common with the feudal system of the earlier centuries when he had his glory and dominance.

The deconstruction of the Victorian morality would also imply the freedom from its tyrannical stipulations. Commenting on Harker's encounter with the three vampire women at Castle Dracula, Christopher Craft says, "[i]mmobilized by the competing imperatives of 'wicked desire' and 'deadly fear', Harker awaits an erotic fulfilment that entails both the dissolution of the boundaries of the self and the thorough subversion of conventional Victorian gender codes, which constrained the mobility of sexual desire and the varieties of genital behaviour" (1994, 73). While Harker awaits a kiss that he never gets, the vampire kiss brings about a profound change in the behaviour of Lucy: "Dracula's authorizing kiss, like that of a demonic Prince Charming, triggers the release of this latent power and excites in these women a sexuality so mobile, so aggressive, that it thoroughly disrupts Van Helsing's compartmental conception of gender" (Craft, 1994, 84). In other words, Dracula revives the repressed desire for freedom. By turning people into vampires, Dracula bestows the bodily freedom of the discarded past upon the repressed Victorians. He liberates them from the heavy burden of the restrictive collective morality. McGrath says that "[t]he vampire kills its victim's soul and introduces her to a condition of moral licence, a pre-Oedipal paradise where all appetites can be unstintingly gratified without thought for consequences" (1997, 470). According to Lisa Nystrom, Mina and Lucy have two opposite responses to this bestowed freedom: "Her faithful devotion to the rules enforced by this phallogentric society results in Mina's ultimate refusal of the freedom and power she is offered by vampirism. While

Lucy succumbs to Dracula's thrall and ultimately welcomes the transformation" (2009, 68-69). In addition to freedom, Dracula also brings about equality among people. As far as he is the sovereign, all other vampires are equal. Considerations of rank, class, wealth, or social status, dissolve and become meaningless.

The suggested metaphorical bond among the individuals in Dracula society is sanguinity. Blood is the symbol of kinship and the vessel of identity; and sanguinity is one of the most ancient and valued ties which can combine the individuals inside the collective body. Stephanou says that "[b]lood creates kinship and collective identity, and this is related to the idea that blood symbolises life and thus produces and reinforces the role of an individual within a community" (2014, 9). Dracula's sanguine community is a kind of pseudo-genealogy that is based on blood as the only indicator of the common identity. The three vampire women are described by Harker as the "weird sisters" (Stoker 54), though there is nothing in particular to indicate their kinship to each other. When the three sisters 'materialize' before the eyes of Van Helsing and Mina, they try to win over Mina to their side by saying, "[c]ome, sister. Come to us. Come!" (Stoker 416). The ritualized nature of the blood exchange with Mina indicates Dracula's aim at the establishment of a new communal bond that involves commitment. Reporting the incident, Mina says that after sucking his share of her blood, and before feeding her his own, Dracula says, "[a]nd you, their best beloved one, are now to me, flesh of my flesh, blood of my blood, kin of my kin, my bountiful wine-press for a while, and shall be later on my companion and my helper" (Stoker 326). The sanguine bond that Dracula intends to make includes unquestioned commitment that can undermine all other types of commitments and bonds that one has with the community. Thus, continuing his ceremonial speech to Mina, Dracula says, "[n]ow you shall come to my call. When my brain says 'come' to you, you shall cross land or sea to do my bidding" (Stoker 326). Mina is loved by all the male members of the group. As such, she represents the centre of the structure which combines the members of the team together. By attacking Mina, Dracula targets the centre of the structure of this small group which, in its turn, stands for the whole society.

Van Helsing realizes that Dracula's design is revolutionary, and that it aims at uprooting the current morality and installing a different one. Realizing the role of sanguinity in binding individuals in small communities, Van Helsing also creates blood bond among the members of his team. The currently evolving clinical technique of blood transfusion provides the suitable means for such purpose. By donating blood to Lucy, the blood of four men becomes combined in one female body²⁴. By establishing this sanguine bond, Van Helsing creates an *ad hoc* smaller group for the purpose of confronting the imminent danger that threatens the whole social structure. Thus, Van Helsing, Arthur Holmwood, John Seward, and Quincey Morris become sanguinely connected through Lucy Westenra. Mina is already a close friend to Lucy and they are 'like sisters'. Addressing Arthur Holmwood, Mina says, "I loved dear Lucy . . . She and I were like sisters" (Stoker 260). At the same time, Harker and Mina are associated with a matrimonial tie; and consequently, after Lucy's death, Mina takes Lucy's position as the centre of the small network of bonds that gives shape to what Christopher Craft calls "Van Helsing and his Crew of Light" (1994, 74). By attacking Lucy and Mina, Dracula targets the centre of the sanguinary network. The centrality of the two girls for the group is asserted when Dracula addresses the men and says, "[y]our girls that you all love are mine already. And through them you and others shall yet be mine" (Stoker 348). Thus, Van Helsing's Crew of Light can be seen as miniature English society with reinforced bonds among its members. Craft describes the small group of vampire hunters as the "little English community [with] cement communal" (1994, 80). This small community has an idealized solidarity. The togetherness of Van Helsing's team is a call to the revitalization of the collective social bonds in order to be able to curb any possible rebellion of singularity.

Paradoxical enough, according to Emile Durkheim, the rebellion against the force of society further affirms the idea of society. "Society is something more than a

²⁴ The clinical method of blood transfusion represents a convenient framework for moral promiscuity. The three suitors of Lucy Westenra, and Van Helsing himself, infuse their blood in her body. The procedure metaphorically fulfils the desire of each of the four male characters; and the multiplicity of the male donors fulfils the rhetorical wish of Lucy when she wonders: "Why can't they let a girl marry three men, or as many as want her, and save all this trouble" (Stoker 67). Van Helsing refers to such implication when he says: "Then this so sweet maid is a polyandrist" (Stoker 199).

material power; it is a moral power. It surpasses us physically, materially and morally [therefore] The principle of rebellion is the same as that of conformity. It is the true nature of society that is conformed to when the traditional morality is obeyed, and yet it is also the true nature of society which is being conformed to when the same morality is floated” (Durkheim, 2010, 33). *Dracula* can be seen as an articulation of this Durkheimian postulation. The emergence of Dracula strengthens the society and necessitates the establishment of the protection crew. Dracula succeeds in penetrating the group; “[f]or once Van Helsing begins his series of . . . transfusions, the blood that Dracula withdraws from Lucy is no longer hers, but is rather that already transferred from the veins of the Crew of Light” (Craft, 1994, 77). In this way, Dracula establishes sanguine bond with Lucy and the four men who donated blood to her. Through the blood exchange with Mina, Dracula adds the matrimonial union of Mr. and Mrs. Harker to the polyandrous union of Lucy and the four men. In fact, Dracula materializes the social contract which Van Helsing earlier initiates with the Harkers through the shaking of hands and the mutual oaths of eternal friendship. After the blood exchange with Mina, Dracula completes the circle of sanguine unity in Van Helsing’s symbolic system and elevates the bond among the members to the level of kinship. This unity of blood is signified by the birth of the Harker child, Quincey. Harker and Mina acknowledge that their child is the product of the sanctified sanguinity and blood share among of all the members. Referring to the little Quincey, Harker says, “[h]is mother holds, I know, the secret belief that some of our brave friend’s spirit has passed into him. His bundle of names links all our little band of men together. But we call him Quincey” (Stoker 428). The ‘bundle of names’ refers to the unified and solidified collective body which eventually incarnates in the new Quincey. Harker’s child announces the victory of the fortified collective power and the restoration of the normal reproductive order. With the destruction of Dracula, Van Helsing restores the traditional clear-cut demarcations that Dracula intended to distort. “As the ‘legitimate’ offspring of Jonathan and Mina Harker, Little Quincey may arrive as little more than a name, a coded patronym, but his appearance on the scene has the force of an annunciation: the ‘natural’ order has been restored, conventional gender roles have been rectified. Little Quincey’s official genesis, then . . . resoundingly affirms the reproductive order” (Craft 103). The collective body

after Dracula is stronger than the collective body before Dracula. Thus, Dracula is not only the reason behind the establishment of this small community, he also, himself, contributes to the strengthening of the ties which combine the members together.

As such, Dracula can be seen as a fabricated figure in a further sense. He is made in order to be destroyed. The story communicates an unstated concern about a crisis in morality. Van Helsing is conscious about the signs of degradation and moral debasement in the society during the current age. Van Helsing's exaggerated idealization of Mina is based on the scarcity of such a woman in such corrupt age. Referring to Mina, Helsing speaks, "[s]he is one of God's women, fashioned by his own hand to show us men and other women that there is a heaven where we can enter, and that its light can be here in earth. So true, so sweet, so noble, so little an egoist, and that, let me tell you, is much in this age, so sceptical and selfish" (Stoker 213). Standing for the society, Van Helsing feels that the traditional morality is shaken. Old obligations and duties are losing their power due to the rapid and non-stop changes that accompany the move towards the end of the nineteenth century. Society anticipates opposition and anarchic individualistic tendencies. Dracula is the scapegoat upon whom are projected all the anxious anticipations of the era. People should feel the pressure of the moral rules as they were felt in the past. The traditional ideals need to be periodically revived during the periods of change. Such historical revival requires the fabrication and the execution of an invincible and decadent enemy.

Durkheim contends that the "ideals could not survive if they were not periodically revived" (2010 48). The novel revives the collective ideals through designing an enemy who targets the very structure of the group. The text threatens the communal individuals by suggesting a hypothetical society collapse, and consequently creates a fictional moment of ferment:

at such moments of collective ferment that are born the great ideals upon which civilizations rest. The periods of creation or renewal occur when men for various reasons are led into a closer relationship with each other, when reunions and assemblies are most frequent, relationships better maintained and the exchange of ideas most active . . . At such moments this higher form of life is lived with such intensity and exclusiveness that it monopolizes all

minds to the more or less complete exclusion of egoism and the commonplace” (Durkheim, 2010, 48)

The revival of the old values is celebrated through the destruction of Dracula. To counterbalance the moment of ferment, the text creates a moment of exaltation through staging a fabricated victory. Overpowering the gypsies with their Winchesters, the ‘Crew of Light’ brutally butcher the somnolent and defenceless body of Count Dracula. Mina describes this moment of culminated collective enthusiasm saying, “I shrieked as I saw [Jonathan’s great knife] shear through the throat. Whilst at the same moment Mr. Morris’s bowie knife plunged into the heart” (Stoker 426). The savagery of the method of the vampire destruction is a message of no tolerance towards idiosyncrasy and individualist non conformity. Once the moment of utmost crisis has passed, the moment of exaltation recedes. The social life resumes its ordinary course with more solidarity.

Dracula dies, but the period of fecund upheaval lives. The moment of victory survives only as a memory. In order to retrieve the memory of the glorious event of the vampire destruction, the members of the Crew of Light, seven years later, make a journey to Transylvania. Harker writes, “[i]n the summer of this year we made a journey to Transylvania, and went over the old ground which was, and is, to us so full of vivid and terrible memories. It was almost impossible to believe that the things which we had seen with our own eyes and heard with our own ears were living truths. Every trace of all that had been was blotted out” (Stoker 428). The memories of the earlier struggle keep Van Helsing’s symbolic community intact and un-penetrable. The story ends and the holistic collective body succeeds in annihilating an unwanted constituent. But while the members of the Crew of Light do not exist outside of their instantiation in the whole, Dracula existed and disappeared as an individual with his own totality.

4.7. The Individual and the Hegelian ‘Other’ in the Novel

Viewing the struggle between Dracula and Van Helsing’s team as a conflict between two consolidated and coherent units is compatible with G. W. F. Hegel’s metaphysics which considers that the structure of things is fundamentally holistic. Such metaphysics argues that “the world contains concrete objects which cannot be treated as compounds of more fundamental atomistic entities, and that these objects have a unity

which is not properly analysable into a plurality of self-subsistent and externally related parts” (Stern, 1990, viii). According to Hegel, the individual exists as a given totality: “the individual is an irreducible substance, and this irreducibility is explained by virtue of its being of such and such a kind; for as such the individual object is not a mere combination of properties, or a bare particular in which these inhere, but the manifestation of a universal substance-form which confers unity upon it” (Stern, 1990, 4-5). Reading *Dracula* according to this perspective reveals a sharp contrast between the two opposing forces in the story. On the one hand, Dracula is one integral unit and one individual. He is not only irreducible into atomistic entities, in fact, he himself reduces, into his own self, considerable number of abstract and concrete components such as history, gender, identity, and shape. The other unit, on the other hand, though consisting of a multiplicity of individuals on outward appearance, these individuals have no value outside the consolidated unit. If a member of Van Helsing’s group is detached from the unit, he or she becomes vulnerable. In the novel, attacks take place when the group is un-convened. A separate constituent is passive and incapable of taking counter action. When Dracula attacks Harker and Mina, he puts Harker in a ‘stupor’, and Mina easily submits and receives the vampire action. With the mere presence of Dracula, Mina says, “I felt my strength fading away, and I was in a half swoon” (Stoker 326). This shows that the members of the unit have no plurality and self-subsistent existence outside the whole.

The Hegelian outlook illuminates the status of the individual in the novel through shedding light on the internal logic according to which the characters interact with each other. The reason is that “Hegel holds a doctrine of internal relations . . . To adequately understand anything, what it really is, its essence, we must understand its relationship to other things, the whole, the absolute” (Kain, 2005, 4). The individual consciousness is shaped by different variables. Kain states that “Hegel wants to argue that individual consciousness cannot hold up without cultural consciousness and that cannot hold up without absolute [i.e., unchangeable or universal] consciousness [therefore] Hegel sets out as many forms of consciousness as he can. He lays them out from the simplest to the most complex” (4). The move from one form of consciousness to another is prompted by a constant search for adequate paradigm.

In his *Phenomenology of Spirit*, Hegel gives an account of the development of the human consciousness starting from its lowest level. The “movement or evolution goes through various necessary stages . . . At each stage, consciousness has a particular conception of itself and/or the world, and when this conception turns out to be inadequate or incoherent, a higher conception evolves” (Stern, 43). This journey of consciousness is propelled by:

a tension between the categories of universal and individual, which [as consciousness moves on] it tries to resolve. This tension is generated because consciousness often turns out to be using these two principal categories in an inadequate way, leading it to oppose the universal on the one side to the individual on the other. It is only when this opposition is overcome, and the individual is seen to exemplify the universal, that absolute knowledge is attained (Stern 44)

Dracula depicts a spectrum of Hegelian self-consciousness states. It also explicates the tension between the individual and the universal in a variety of ways. To begin with, *Dracula* eccentrically sketches the old paradigm consciousness of the master. Count Dracula comes from the past; and as such, he is an exemplification of the master individual in Hegel’s master-slave dialectic. According to Hegel:

The master is the consciousness that exists for itself; but no longer merely the general notion of existence for self. Rather, it is a consciousness existing on its own account which is mediated with itself through an other consciousness, i.e. through an other whose very nature implies that it is bound up with an independent being or with thinghood in general. The master brings himself into relation to both these moments, to a thing as such, the object of desire, and to the consciousness whose essential character is thinghood. (Hegel, 2001, 67)

In the master-slave dialectic, “self-consciousness is led into contradiction because it cannot recognize that it shares a universal essence with other individuals: instead, it tries to assert its own unique individuality in the face of the other self-consciousness, while at the same time needing the other to acknowledge its own essential nature” (Stern 45). Viewing the story from this perspective, the source of tension with the universal in the novel is that Dracula is a master. Dracula asserts his stature as a master repeatedly while talking to Harker (Stoker 23-24). The master-slave relationship is also affirmed by Renfield’s hallucinatory speech when he says, “I am here to do your bidding, Master. I

am your slave” (Stoker 117). Dracula refuses to recognize that he shares a universal essence with other human beings. He tries to assert his unique nature against the other opposing self-consciousness. He assumes that he supersedes others in status and adeptness. Addressing Mina and referring to the men of the group, Dracula says, “[w]hilst they played wits against me, against me who commanded nations, and intrigued for them, and fought for them, hundreds of years before they were born, I was countermining them” (Stoker 326). With the mutual countermining between the two opposing forces in the story, Stoker recreates a historical point of tension between the individual and the universal. It is the considerably outdated point in history in which the master, inadequately, undermines the status of others and enslaves them.

Dracula needs the others in order to prove his existence. He desires the others because only by negating them, he can affirm his self-consciousness. The reason is that:

self-consciousness is only assured of itself through sublating this other, which is presented to self-consciousness as an independent life; self-consciousness is Desire. Convinced of the nothingness of this other, it definitely affirms this nothingness to be for itself the truth of this other, negates the independent object, and thereby acquires the certainty of its own self, as true certainty, a certainty which it has become aware of in objective form (Hegel. 2001, 63)

This master desire to assure the self, through negating the self-consciousness of others, stands as a plausible reason behind Dracula’s design to abandon his unfrequented castle and move towards an inhabited area. Hegel’s master-slave dialectic can also contribute to explaining Dracula’s preference of women over men. The Count prefers the ones who are already dominated and enslaved because they have more disposition to give up their individuality and affirm their negativity. According to Hegel, the master-slave relation consists of two moments; “[i]n these two moments, the master gets his recognition through an other consciousness, for in them the later affirms itself as unessential [in other words] the other consciousness cancels itself as self-existent, and, *ipso facto*, itself does what the first does to it” (Hegel, 2001, 67). Thus, Dracula’s encounters with Lucy and Mina involve double significance. On the one hand Dracula affirms his lordship, and on the other, his victims affirm their unessential and negative self-conscious.

By negating the independent consciousness of the other, this other merely becomes a negated object of desire. In a description which has considerable metaphorical parallels with Dracula's vampirism, Kain compares the subordinate other with food; "in satisfying desire, we often negate the object we desire. If we desire food, we want to consume it. We want to assimilate it. We transform otherness into oneness, difference into identity. Only in negating the object – its independent otherness or difference – do we affirm ourselves" (Kain 45). In a similar vein, Dracula explicitly indicates that Mina is an object for the satisfaction of his desire when he tells her, "[f]irst, a little refreshment to reward my exertions. You may as well be quiet. It is not the first time, or the second, that your veins have appeased my thirst" (Stoker 325). Thus, Dracula negates the objects of his desire and consumes them. He eliminates the identity of his victims and assimilates them into a uniform state. He transforms their otherness into his oneness.

At the same time, *Dracula* also condemns and destroys an advanced stage in the development of self-consciousness. It is the stage which Hegel entitles, "The Actualization of Rational Self-Consciousness Through Its Own Activity" (Hegel, 1977, 211). At this stage, the individual tends to free himself from the bondage of morality and give prominence to the satisfaction of his own individualistic pursuits and desires. For such type of individuality, Hegel predicts the same fate that Stoker foreshadows and implements in *Dracula*. For the actualization of rational self-consciousness, "Hegel suggests that this utterly free hedonistic individualism collapses into the fated death of the individual, who in death gives up his individuality to universality" (Stern 49). The destruction of Dracula is the collapse of the individual who follows what Hegel calls "The law of the heart and the frenzy of self-conceit" (Hegel, 1977, 221); and, at the same time, it is a victory for the universality. Thus, both Hegel and Stoker, anticipate the deconstruction of the completely free individual.

The men and women in *Dracula*, on the other hand, are exemplifications of Hegel's 'unhappy conscious'. They are contradictory and dual-natured. "Unhappy Conscious is the consciousness of self as a dual-natured, merely contradictory being" (Hegel, 1977, 126). The unnoticed unhappiness and the confusing duality are the results

of the presence of a double-consciousness, one standing for the personal self, and the other for the universal self:

This unhappy, inwardly disrupted consciousness, since its essentially contradictory nature is for it a single consciousness, must for ever have present in the one consciousness the other also; and thus it is driven out of each in turn in the very moment when it imagines it has successfully attained to a peaceful unity with the other. Its true return into itself, or its reconciliation with itself will, however, display the Notion of Spirit that has become a living spirit, and has achieved an actual existence [in other words] The Unhappy Conscious itself is the gazing of one self-consciousness into another, and itself is both, and the unity of both is also its essential nature (Hegel, 1977. 126)

Therefore, the unhappy conscious is in constant strive to overcome the contradiction within itself. Stern says that “[t]he unhappy consciousness tries to overcome this contradiction by denying its own individuality, by surrendering its finite bodily form, and seeking to rise to universality” (47). This designation explains the lack of individualistic personality among Van Helsing’s friends. They sacrifice their personal self-consciousness for the sake of peace with an ideal universality. However, with his assortment of incongruous features, Dracula offers a hypothetical alternative universal to occupy the position of the ‘other’ in the double-consciousness of the ‘unhappy’ characters. The submission to the vampire bite is the moment of reconciliation and peaceful unity with the other. The vampire bite offers a rise to a type of universality that does not deny the primordial and unrefined desires. Therefore, along this line of thinking, the main source of anxiety in the novel is the coexistence of two universalities opposing for the position of the ‘other’ in the unhappy conscious of the characters.

In the desperate attempt to surpass the tension between the individual and the universal, the unhappy consciousness resorts to a mediator or a priest. Briefly restating Hegel’s view about the mediator, Robert Stern says that the “unhappy consciousness can only overcome the desperation of individual and universal by putting in place a mediator or priest, who can mediate between these two extremes” (48). The mediating priest between the individual and the universal in *Dracula* is Van Helsing. Hegel’s description of the mediation mechanism sheds light on the real function of Van Helsing in the novel. Hegel says:

In the mediator, then, this consciousness frees itself from action and enjoyment so far as they are regarded as its own. As a separate, independent extreme, it rejects the essence of its will, and casts upon the mediator or minister (priest) its own freedom of decision, and herewith the responsibility for its own action. This mediator, having a direct relationship with the unchangeable Being, ministers by giving advice on what is right. The action, since it follows upon the decision of someone else, ceases, as regards the doing or the willing of it, to be its own (Hegel, 1977, 136-137).

Van Helsing is a *fin de siècle* mediating priest. With his knowledge and the variety of scientific degrees he owns, Van Helsing does not only have a special relationship with the ‘unchangeable Being’, but he himself is entitled to determine the applicability or the non-applicability of the universal laws. Van Helsing legitimizes discourses and actions that are otherwise illegitimate and even profane. He carries the responsibility of decision. He prescribes the ‘good’ course of action and thus, frees the consciousness of his friends from any sense of guilt. Van Helsing mediates in establishing the desired reconciliation between the individual and the universal through abstracting the domain of the individual. By abstracting the repressed personal impulses and yearnings of his friends, Van Helsing elevates these impulses to the level of universality and consequently bestowing upon these impulses a license. For example, the blood transfusion technique provides a suitable framework to Van Helsing for the displacement of the act of penetration. The blood in this case is a convenient replacement for other body fluids. With the multiple blood donations to Lucy, Van Helsing, allegorically, fulfils the belated and unstated desire for promiscuity which is implied by Lucy’s reception of three marriage proposals at the same time, and her question when she asks, “[w]hy can’t they let a girl marry three men, or as many as want her” (Stoker 67). Van Helsing also mediates in legitimizing and fulfilling “a violent fantasy under the guise of civility . . . In *Dracula* the vampire body is dismembered. The eradication of vampires is conveyed in moral terms that legitimize brutality as the text shifts between discourses of science, superstition, magic and religion” (Wynne, 2013, 62-64). With his abstractions and mediations, Van Helsing alleviates the unhappiness of the unhappy conscious and creates a fictitious moment of peace between the individual and the universal; and thus, his friends feel as being part of unified totality.

However, Van Helsing's reconciliation between the individual and the universal is contrived and unreal. And as such, it implies further surrendering and shedding of individuality than a construction of it. According to Hegel, the acceptance of the mediation of the priest brings negative results. The stage of the mediating priest merely leads to another inadequate standpoint of the consciousness in its journey towards the unified and individual spirit. Summarizing Hegel's opinion about this stage, Robert Stern says, "although the individual can achieve a step towards universality by putting himself under the sway of the priest, this is more a negative loss of self than a positive acceptance of certain universal principles as his own, and so does not really signal the synthesis of individual and universal" (48). Thus, in fact, Van Helsing hinders²⁵ the journey of the self-consciousness towards its actualization through creating a false moment of peace with a fabricated universal.

Accordingly, Van Helsing is Bram Stoker's individualized personification of the Hegelian idealized universal. Sinph and Mohapatra say that "the Hegelian absolute is never a lifeless universal as a bare statement of an aim of philosophical work. Hegel demands that the universal, the general and the abstract must be constantly shaped by a living particular, a rich concretion" (2008, 5). In other words, Van Helsing is a concrete and tangible approximation of a supposed universality. Such universality is explicated through Dr. Seward's description of Professor Van Helsing as having extraordinary generic and comprehensive attributes:

we must accept his wishes. He is a seemingly arbitrary man, this is because he knows what he is talking about better than any one else. He is a philosopher and a metaphysician, and one of the most advanced scientists of his day, and he has, I believe, an absolutely open mind. This, with an iron nerve, a temper of the ice-brook, an indomitable resolution, self-command, and toleration exalted from virtues to blessings, and the kindest and truest heart that beats, these form his equipment for the noble work that he is doing for mankind, work both in theory and practice, for his views are as wide as his all-embracing sympathy. (Stoker 128).

²⁵ It is worth mentioning in this context that Van Helsing hinders the actualization of individuality in further other way. The individuals seek a paradigm that would be "able to establish the nature of the self in a way that would allow the individual to feel fully confident about his or her assessment of truth" (Shanahan 110). Van Helsing, in fact, destabilizes the confidence of his friends by casting doubts upon the validity of their assessments. He suggests that they cannot be independent arbiters of truth.

This universality considerably explains Van Helsing's volunteering spirit and his exaggerated benevolence which is often viewed as hypocritical. Like the heroes of epics, Van Helsing is self-appointed; but, Stoker's hero is not merely motivated by a desire to challenge and defeat a mysterious and extremely powerful force. Van Helsing acts in accordance with his very nature as a living concretion of a hypothetical universal.

Reading *Dracula* in terms of the Hegelian of reciprocal relations between the individual and the 'other', would reveal that Van Helsing and his friends also use Dracula as an 'other' through whom they affirm their own selves. The novel signifies a desire for an 'other' because the desire for an 'other' is constant and essential for the attainment of self-certainty:

what Hegel calls 'self-certainty', is achieved through negating the other, then that means that my self-certainty depends on this other. It means that this other must be there for me to negate. And so I cannot simply negate it and be done with it. I will desire it again and again, so as to be able to negate it again, so as to continue to shore up my self-certainty. Desire desires the existence of the other as much as its negation. Desire, then, shows self-consciousness that there is an other and that this other has an independence that cannot easily be eliminated (Kain 46)

This means that as an 'other', Count Dracula is designed to gratify a need. It is the need for self-certainty and identification which are diminishing due to the cultural tensions. Hurley says that "[u]nderstandings of human identity underwent a radical transfiguration at the fin de siècle" (1996, 9). *Dracula* is written at a period of cultural stress. Under such Victorian cultural stress "were arrayed a variety of more specific anxieties, including but not limited to the retrenchment of empire, the spread of urban slums, the growth of criminal classes, the proliferation of deviant sexuality, the rise of decadent art" (Arata, 1996, 2). There was an unseen nervous tension and distress. Kilgour notes that in *Dracula*, there is a "struggle to stay sane in an insane world [and that this is] most clearly represented by the background of Seward's asylum" (55). In fact, Kilgour argues, all the characters have the potential to become mad; "Renfield is already mad, while Seward sees the hypersensitive Lucy as a curious psychological study. Seward himself worries about going mad, while Van Helsing, whose wife is locked up in an asylum, on more than one occasion seemingly succumbs to rather bizarre hysteria" (Kilgour 55).

This suggests that the cultural stress considerably affects the mental stability of individuals; and as a result, the need for self-certainty and identification arises.

The characters of the story go through what Philip Brown calls the state of the “collapse of confidence”. Brown notes that “[t]he optimism did not last as individualism resulted from application of science and technology. A process that was expected to result in unlimited improvement, actually led to urban slums where many workers were far worse off than unenlightened peasants of feudal times” (Brown 56). As Shanahan notes, the thought of the age “completely eliminated, once and for all, the possibility that human existence came with any supernatural guarantees of certainty” (Shanahan 82). Thus, in addition to the cultural stress, the people of the age suffer from cultural disappointment and they seriously doubt that the universe would conform to their rational expectations.

In response to such escalating crises of the period which disrupt the individual’s identity and certainty, *Dracula* engages in a task of remaking of the human subject. In fact, according to Hurley, this task is handled by the Gothic of the *fin de siècle* in general:

I will situate the *fin de siècle* revival of the Gothic, in its new avatar as a genre centrally concerned with the horrific re-making of the human subject, within a general anxiety about the nature of human identity permeating late Victorian and Edwardian culture, an anxiety generated by scientific discourses, biological and socio-medical, which served to dismantle conventional notions of ‘the human’ (Hurley 5).

Thus, in *Dracula*, Stoker creates a challenging ‘other’ who seems, for a while, impossible to negate. All the supernatural and extraordinary features of *Dracula* have the function of de-familiarization, and estrangement, and accordingly asserting his otherness. According to Edwards, the otherness of *Dracula* is attested for all the members of the team in the confrontation which takes place in Piccadilly. The “contrasting positions . . . find their counterpart in relations of similarity and difference, or the familiar and the alien, underlining the contradictions in the portrayal of the Count. When he confronts his pursuers at his house in Piccadilly, his otherness is emphasized” (Edwards, 1998, 97). In this scene, describing *Dracula*’s entry into the room, Seward

says, “[s]uddenly with a single bound he leaped into the room. Winning a way past us before any of us could raise a hand to stay him. There was something so panther-like in the movement, something so unhuman, that it seemed to sober us all from the shock of his coming” (Stoker 346). Such a degree of estrangement in picturing the other, amounts to the degree of the cultural stress and anxiety of the Victorians.

However, in spite of the intended great deal of de-familiarization, Dracula, is still recognizable and not completely unfamiliar. After all, he still possesses considerable human attributes. Koç and Demir affirm that “Stoker reverses the clichéd conception of the past as a dead, foreign country. The ancient Dracula is far more alive, and far more familiar than the modern Victorians” (2018, 427). Hence, Dracula is still recognizable and familiar to the Victorians because “[h]e is both a figure from the past, yet eerily modern; an aristocrat with bourgeois traits; a foreigner who wants to pass a native in England; both living and dead. Worst of all he is a force of evil whose origins are disturbingly good” (Kilgour 53). To illustrate Dracula’s good origin, Kilgour refers to Van Helsing’s tribute of Dracula’s past when he explains his origin and says, “[t]he Draculas were . . . a great and noble race . . . there have been from the loins of this very one great men and good women, and their graves make sacred the earth where alone this foulness can dwell. For it is not the least of its terrors that this evil thing is rooted deep in all good, in soil barren of holly memories it cannot rest” (Stoker 273). This indicates that Dracula belongs to a past that the Victorians recognize as good and sacred. It is worth mentioning that the familiarity of the vampire is expressed in one of the most mysterious junctures in the novel. In his encounter with the three vampire ladies, Jonathan Harker recognizes one of them, but he cannot remember how or where saying, “I seemed somehow to know her face, and to know it in connection with some dreamy fear, but I could not recollect at the moment how or where” (Stoker 42). The fair lady is familiar and recognizable because she is not passive. She initiates the action towards the passive Jonathan Harker. As such, she stands for the idea of the ‘new woman’ which lurk deep in the mind of the Victorian men and women. The she vampire is the feared ‘new woman’ which Mina mentions. The she vampire is the genderized ‘other’. Hence, Dracula, and the female vampires in general, are de-familiarized commonplace figures.

In other words, the vampire, encapsulated in Count Dracula, is not discontinuous 'other'. He is a type of 'other' that the Victorians can identify with.

Adding to the anxiety of the Victorians, Count Dracula is an invasive 'other'. According to Arata, the story is a fantasy of reverse colonization; "*Dracula* enacts the period's most important and pervasive narrative of decline, a narrative of reverse colonization" (Arata 162). The anxiety in the story lies in that "this narrative expresses both fear and guilt. The fear is that what has been represented as the 'civilized' world is on the point of being colonized by 'primitive' forces [in such reversal of roles] the colonizer finds himself in the position of the colonized, the exploiter becomes exploited, the victimizer victimized" (Arata 162). The fantasies of reverse colonization "are more than products of geopolitical fears. They are also responses to cultural guilt. In the marauding, invasive Other. British culture sees its own imperial practices mirrored back in monstrous forms" (Arata 162). Viewing *Dracula* as a narrative of decline that implicates reverse colonization complicates the foreignness of Count Dracula as an invasive 'other'.

In addition to his invasive nature, Dracula is also an epitome of the degenerate 'other'. Davison says that "Bram Stoker's stroke of narrative genius in *Dracula* lay, in part, in the fact that his portrait of a spiritually and physically decadent vampire, tapped into and combined the two foremost fears of his day: invasion of the body and the body politic by a degenerate 'other'" (Davison 28). As such, the vampire signifies the profound apprehensions about the degeneration of the moral and spiritual traditions of the Victorians.

Therefore, with such features, Dracula qualifies for the role of the Hegelian 'other' who is desperately needed in moments cultural anxiety and stress. He is the one who must be negated in order to reconstruct the Victorian tremulous self-certainty. The Hegelian mechanism of interaction between the individual and the 'other' has much in common with course of events in *Dracula*. Thus, "[i]f I cannot gain self-certainty by negating the other, if I cannot even succeed in negating the other, then, Hegel suggests, self-consciousness must take a different task: the other must negate itself. It must submit, recognize me, and deny itself" (Kain 46). But Count Dracula is not amenable to

negation. Dracula has “been so long master that [he] would be master still” (Stoker 24). In such case, the Hegelian formula states, that the subjugation of the ‘other’ would be achieved “by defeating the other in combat” (Kain 46). According to Hegel, self-consciousness attempts to demonstrate that “its essential being is not just being, not the immediate form in which it appears, not its submergence in the expanse of life, but rather that . . . it is only pure being-for-self” (Hegel, 1977, 114). To achieve this, the individual must risk his life in the struggle with the ‘other’, because “it is only through staking one’s life that freedom is won” (Hegel, 1977, 114). This means that the Hegelian life-and-death struggle between Count Dracula and the vampire hunters is inevitable. Thus, toward the moment of the lethal battle, the combat between the two sides begins. At any rate, Kain says, “two such self-consciousnesses begin to fight. These two must risk their lives; they must choose recognition, prestige, and honour over mere life. Each self-consciousness takes itself to be real and important, not the other, and demands this recognition from the other” (47). The real act of hostility against Count Dracula begins when the men start sterilizing his lairs without which he cannot sustain himself.

Again, a key scene in the conflict is the Piccadilly confrontation. In this scene, Stoker gives voice²⁶ again to Dracula after a long duration of silence just to announce that the attempts to negate him are futile. In fact, in this short speech, he severely negates them and destroys their being-for-self. Dracula maintains an absolute-master discourse when he says:

You think to baffle me, you with your pale faces all in a row, like sheep in a butcher’s. You shall be sorry yet, each one of you! You think you have left me without a place to rest, but I have more. My revenge is just begun! I spread it over centuries, and time is on my side. Your girls that you all love are mine already. And through them you and others shall yet be mine, my creatures, to do my bidding and to be my jackals when I want to feed. Bah!” (Stoker 347-348)

²⁶ In fact, Count Dracula has no real voice of his own in the novel. His speeches are reported in the writings and the expositions of others. “Dracula is a vampire with no voice of his own, existing derivatively, as he is reproduced in reading, listening, and writing of others” (Gordon, 1997, 96-97).

In this speech, Dracula nullifies the self-certainty of his opponents and lowers them to the status of dependent animals. Sheep symbolize cowardice and submission; and jackals stand for lack of dignity. In fact, the men's passivity during Dracula's speech gives considerable credence to his belittling evaluation towards them. When Dracula leaves, Van Helsing's comment tries to recover what is left of his men's dignity saying, "[w]e have learned something... much! Notwithstanding his brave words, he fears us. He fears time, he fears want! For if not, why hurry so? His very tone betray him, or my ears deceive me" (Stoker 348). Interesting enough, in this scene, it is Van Helsing's own tone which betrays him, not Dracula's. In this statement, Van Helsing, echoically, tries to attribute to his enemy the very feelings of fear, uncertainty and hesitation that he and his friends suffer from.

However, with the success of Van Helsing's team in sterilizing his lairs, Dracula, the ancient warrior, does not submit, he merely withdraws. The men succeed in impeding his project, but fail in negating him. Therefore, they follow him to his homeland. During the long journey after Dracula towards Transylvania, the team split into three groups and they all try to give the impression that they are risking their lives for the sake of achieving the desired self-certainty. The real risking of life comes in the scene which leads to the destruction of Count Dracula. Jonathan Harker and Quincey Morris risk their lives in the combat. Morris loses his life and Dracula is demolished. Ironically enough, in the strict Hegelian terms, the men fail in achieving the real desired aim, which is in this case, the subjugation of a strong 'other'. Dracula does not surrender. He merely loses the battle. What the individual really seeks in the life-risking combat is that "the other must finally back away from the threat of death, prefer life . . . and submit to the winner" (Kain 47). In other words, "[i]f the combatants die, nothing happens. Even if one dies, it does not work. I cannot get recognition from a corpse. Life, then, we come to see, is just as important as the risking of life" (Kain 47). Thus, the victory of the vampire hunters is ephemeral. Dracula does not even have a corpse for them to use as a substantiation of their victory. The need for an opposing 'other' sustains. All they have now is a memory of an opposing strong 'other'. That is why they go, seven years later, to visit the place of their victory. The purpose is to recover some of the self-certainty that they acquired at the big event. Only to see that "[e]very trace of all

that had been was blotted out” (Stoker 428). Van Helsing and his friends risk their lives. They sacrifice one life. They vanquish impending danger. But the self-certainty that they earn, is the one which they give to each other because they all witnessed each other risking their lives.

The significance of Van Helsing’s group as one collective body ends with the end of their foe. The end of Dracula is their end. After all, Dracula carries inside him a portion of each member’s blood. He carries the alien form of their own consciousness. He is the doppelganger of each of his opponents. He is their evil twin, and by putting an end to him, they put an end to themselves too. This characterization of mutual elimination is also incorporated in the Hegelian mechanisms of conflict with the opposing other. “Death certainly shows that each staked his life and held it of no account, both in himself and in the other; but that is not for those who survived this struggle. They put an end to their consciousness in its alien setting of natural existence, that is to say, they put an end to themselves” (Hegel, 1977, 114). Therefore, like the struggle between the Monster and Frankenstein where the Monster puts an end to himself through putting an end to Frankenstein, the vampire hunters extinguish their own alien self-consciousness through the destruction of their opposing other.

4.8. The Corporate and the Objectified Individual in the Age of the Capitalist Industrialization

Dracula is a multifaceted figure and his story is rich and informative. The paradoxes that are depicted in the novel mirror the turbulence in the intellectual atmosphere of the public. Marchbank says that “*Dracula*, as novel and as character, is necessarily as synthesis of fin-de-siècle sexual, social and pathological theories, which are used to highlight contemporary issues on race, class and gender” (35). Thus, in the age of industrialization and capitalism, the story metaphorically documents the emergence of the objectified and consumed individual. From the orthodox Marxist perspective, the vampire might very well stand for the capitalist and the victims stand for the consumed labour. According to Karl Marx, a capitalist is a personification of a lifeless capital whose sole aim is to absorb the living labour; “[a]s a capitalist, he is only capital personified. His soul is the soul of capital. But capital has one sole driving force,

the drive to valorise itself, to create surplus-value, to make its constant part, the means of production, absorb the greatest possible amount of surplus labour”; as such, capital qualifies to the analogy that Marx draws between the capital and the vampire when he says, “[c]apital is dead labour which, vampire-like, lives only by sucking living labour, and lives the more, the more labour it sucks” (Marx, 1976, 342). Marx uses the metaphor of blood in clarifying the activity of labour absorption by the capitalists:

Constant capital, the means of production, only exist . . . in order to absorb labour and, with every drop of labour, a proportional quantity of surplus labour. In so far as the means of production fail to do this, their mere existence forms a loss for the capitalist, in a negative sense, for while they lie fallow they represent a useless advance of capital. This loss becomes a positive one as soon as the interruption of employment necessitates an additional outlay when the work begins again. The prolongation of the working day beyond the limits of the natural day, into the night, only acts as a palliative. It only slightly quenches the vampire thirst for the living blood of labour (Marx, 1976, 367)

Marx also compares the greed of the capitalist with the voraciousness of the vampire. Thus, in terms of the contract in which the worker sells his labour-power to the capitalist, the worker “was free to dispose of himself. But when the transaction was concluded, it was discovered that he was no free agent, that the period of time for which he is free to sell his labour-power is the period of time for which he is forced to sell it, that in fact the vampire will not let go while there remains a single muscle, sinew or drop of blood to be exploited” (Marx, 1976, 215-216). Drawmer says that “[t]he metaphor of vampirism used by Marx is striking, as it structures much of his dialectical analysis, focusing on concepts of consumerism, commodity fetishism, and even using the dramatic symbolism central to vampire lust, of blood circulation, by arguing that capitalist profit-impetus can be seen to drain the life-blood of the workers (2003, 22). Vampirism is a convenient allegory of capitalism because they both denote unbalanced modes of mutual interaction in society where one side is parasitic and monstrous, and the other is debilitated and helpless.

Thus, vampires already have associations with capital and the commodification of biological life. Stephanou says that in vampire stories, “[h]uman individuals are reduced to things to be exploited for blood and money. Vampires` insatiable hunger for

blood reflects their status as voracious consumers in a capitalist economy that invents and reinvents new methods of producing blood and satisfying the vampires' needs" (Stephanou 19). Therefore, according to Stephanou, "blood is not only a metaphor for capitalist circulation, fluidity and liquidity in the network society but also a product that circulates like any other commodity" (138). *Dracula* was written at a period of capitalization peak, and whether intended or not, images of consumption and commodification are present in the work.

The theme of blood has associations with money and goods. Houston asserts that "Victorians strongly associated blood circulation with national and international circulation of credit and goods" (118). Thus, blood provides the suitable context for summoning the images of consumption and commodification of human life in *Dracula*. Pointing to "the bag which [Dracula] had thrown upon the floor, and which moved as though there were some living thing within it", one of the three vampire women asks, "[a]re we to have nothing tonight?"; for an answer, Dracula "nodded his head. One of the women jumped forward and opened it. If my ears did not deceive me [Harker speaks] there was a gasp and low wail, as of a half smothered child. The woman closed round, whilst I was aghast with horror. But as I looked, they disappeared, and with them the dreadful bag" (Stoker 44). Like purchased commodity, the child is in a bag. The bag contains a 'living thing', which is ready to be consumed at the same night.

From the same perspective, blood stands for the labour's effort. In *Dracula*, the objectification of human life is based on the commodification of blood which is the essence of life. The story asseverates that blood is life. Describing the effect of blood transfusion on Lucy, Seward says, "[a]s the transfusion went on, something like life seemed to come back to poor Lucy's cheeks" (Stoker 140). Similar assertion also comes through Renfield when, after attacking Seward and injuring Seward's wrist, he repeats the Scriptural phrase: "The blood is the life! The blood is the life!" (Stoker 161). This essence of life, and by extension life itself, is materialized via presenting a species which consumes blood as the only means of sustainment. This is asserted by Van Helsing when saying, "[t]he vampire live on, and cannot die by mere passing of the time, he can flourish when that he can fatten on the on the blood of the living. Even more, we have

seen amongst us that he can even grow younger, that his vital faculties grow strenuous, and seem as though they refresh themselves when his special pabulum is plenty” (Stoker 271). The process of blood consumption can be slow and gradual. Like the process of worker exploitation in the capitalist systems, the consumer acquires flourishing and repletion, and the victim becomes depleted and eventually dead.

In the age of capitalism, Count Dracula can very well also personify capital itself. Dracula’s privilege of shape-shifting is one of the attributes which characterizes capital. In his *Grundrisse*, and in a further comparison to vampires, Marx contends that capital takes different forms saying, “[c]apital posits the permanence of value (to a certain degree) by incarnating itself in fleeting commodities and taking on their form, but at the same time changing them just as constantly . . . But capital obtains this ability only by constantly sucking in living labour as its soul, vampire-like” (Marx, 1973, 646). Like a vampire, capital operates without a real soul. The monetary nature of Dracula’s corporeality is suggested in the scene when Harker engages in a direct combat with Dracula and deploys his knife against him. Harker “made a fierce and sudden cut at him. The blow was powerful one. Only the diabolical quickness of the Count’s leap back saved him. A second less and the trenchant blade had shorn through his coat, making a wide gap whence a bundle of bank notes and a stream of gold fell out” (Stoker 347). The implicated image is that Dracula’s body bleeds money. Gordon supports such view and suggests that Dracula’s corporeal transparency²⁷ provides him with the abstraction that makes him legible for the comparison with capital. Thus, “[e]ven when he is not hoarding or haemorrhaging gold, Dracula’s remarkable porosity is much like that which Marx attributes to capital” (Gordon, 1997, 106). Therefore, the corporeal transparency, elusiveness, and haemorrhaging of gold are abstraction features and images which elicit parallels between Dracula and capital.

²⁷ The porous and see-through nature of Dracula’s body is exemplified in different junctures in the novel. For example, in one occasion en route to the castle, Harker can still see the blue flame when Dracula (disguised as the couch-man) stands in sight obstructing position between Harker and the blue flame. Startled, Harker says, “[o]nce there appeared a strange optical effect. When he stood between me and the flame he did not obstruct it, for I could see its ghostly flicker all the same” (Stoker 15).

As far as economy is concerned, the Count designates the divided individual between two modes of economies: the land based feudal economy and the capital based industrial one. According to Gordon, this is particularly the paradox of the British nobility whom Dracula often mirrors: “the Count is trapped between two economies: that which deploys a reserve ‘currency’ as a general equivalent (an empty carrier or facilitator of exchange) and another value system, entirely dependent upon ancestral earth (which restricts his mobility in modern world)” (Gordon 106-107). Dracula seems to realize the empty nature of currency and its function as a mere facilitator of transactions. The money and the valuable metals in castle Dracula are neglected and covered with dust and rust. Harker says that “[t]he only thing [he] found was a great heap of gold in one corner, gold of all kinds, Roman, and British, and Austrian, and Hungarian, and Greek and Turkish money, covered with a film of dust, as though it had lain long in the ground . . . there were also chains and ornaments, some jewelled, but all of them old and stained” (Stoker 53). The Renaissance aristocrat favours ‘earth’. When he moves to the centre of the industrial world, Dracula does not invest his money in a project that would bring him more money. He buys estates. The heavy fifty boxes of earth emphasize the value of land. Land is a better carrier of value than the empty currency. But the dominating bourgeois community has a different opinion. Land is static. It restricts the circulation of capital. Mobility is essential in the new dynamic world. The attachment to earth, symbolically signified by the heavy boxes of Transylvanian earth, restricts Dracula’s movement and contributes to his defeat. The victory of the vampire hunters is achieved through the flexibility and the unrestricted portability of their actions. Their success is a triumph for the bourgeois attitude which advocates the value of currency over the value of land.

Dracula marks the rise of the corporate individual who functions and interacts, but does not have real personality. The first allusion to the corporate individual in the novel is Jonathan Harker who visits Castle Dracula on behalf of his law firm. According to Houston, the corporate personalities in the novel represent the banking system; “[i]n *Dracula* bankerization is all but complete when banks became ‘corporate personalities’ and the human body is drained of personality and life-blood” (Houston 24). In this context, Dracula himself can stand for the banking system which in one way or another

compels people to deposit their money in it. As such, *Dracula* is a reminder of a prevalent fear of personal bankruptcy. According to Houston, “Victorians were being trained to have faith in fiscal credit. If, to Victorians, economic panic was nightmarish condition that augured personal bankruptcy, they kept on banking, for in increasing numbers Victorians deposited their money in the bank rather than under the proverbial mattress” (15). Submitting one’s savings to a corporate body amounts to the loss of individual personality. In this respect, Houston says, “[a]s a kind of fictional ‘corporate personality’ who subliminally focuses attention on the bankerization of modern life, *Dracula* also spearheads what I call bankerization panic – the unrelenting fears about bankerization itself and the concomitant increasing loss of individual personality” (15). Thus, vampirism can very well be an expression of the Victorian anxiety and panic²⁸ concerning economic fluctuations and the fear of bankruptcy.

As an incorporated individual, Count *Dracula* is one and a multiplicity at the same time. Houston says, “*Dracula* is not only the name of an individual shareholder but also the designation of his corporation, as it were. The term ‘*Dracula*’ is itself an amalgamation, naming an individual person; an amalgamated corporation of vampires of which he is the brains; a process or procedure of (capitalist) infinite circulation (of the commodity of blood)” (117). The ethereal nature of *Dracula*’s body supports such outlook. The Count vanishes into thin air, casts no shadows, and has no reflections on mirrors. On the other hand, Van Helsing and his group are also one corporative body which can be labelled in this context as ‘the Van Helsing’s’. This hybrid group attempts to bankrupt the incorporated personality of *Dracula*. Accordingly, the novel can be viewed as a struggle between two non-substantive entities who compete for the sake of substantiating their own corporative existence. Houston holds such view and sees *Dracula* as a struggle between two corporate fiscal personalities; “Stoker’s tale figures two incorporated entities (*Dracula* and his vampires and Van Helsing and his followers), competing to the death for a complete monopoly on circulation and consumption. In both groups the focus is not on the individual desiring subjectivity but on the meaning

²⁸ Houston notes that “Bram Stoker often experienced economic panic. Despite Stoker’s long-time success at managing Henry Irving’s books, the author of *Dracula* was hardly masterful in the fiscal accounts of his own chosen profession, writing” (Houston 46).

and power of the consolidated group” (Houston 117). From this stand point, Dracula is the foreign investor who migrates to England in order to put his hoard of money and gold in motion. And, in the process, he attempts to overthrow the native competition and becomes dominant.

The English corporation works on bankrupting Dracula’s corporate personality. By recording and controlling his properties and transactions, they target the documents that authenticate his corporate existence. The aim is to maintain British ownership and supremacy. Houston draws attention to the fact “that the Van Helsing group’s documentation of Dracula’s bankruptcy both conceals and authorizes Arthur’s consolidation of his own estate with Lucy’s inheritance” (Houston 129). According to Houston, “Arthur’s consolidation of fiscal and landed property from his father and from Lucy ensures that English nobility and England will remain the supreme corporate personality – they will have their will and their way” (129). In such reading of the story, the sterilization of Dracula’s lairs designates the expropriation of his properties. This meaning is implied in Van Helsing’s comment when he says that Dracula “does not know that such a power exists to us as can sterilize his lairs, so that he cannot use them as of old” (Stoker 331). Van Helsing means that he and his friends have the authority to confiscate Dracula’s properties and prevent him from using them. Thus, the destruction of Dracula’s corporate personality facilitates the destruction of his corporeal one.

It is worth noting here that from Marx’s stand point, *Dracula* signifies the antagonism between the communal and the individualistic approaches to life. Shanahan says that Marx “represent[s] a conscious and distinct reversal of the individualistic tradition that preceded him” (112). The community approach holds that real singular consciousness is the consequence of the interaction with the community, rather than the experience of a singular individual. Thus, opposing the society is counter-natural; and, sooner or later, such opposition is doomed to failure. Van Helsing and his friends stand for the society which holds Dracula’s singular approach to life as invalid. Validity lies in the community’s assessment of the truth. Dracula’s individualistic endeavour fails, because it does not interact positively with the community’s version of the truth.

4.9. The Nietzschean Higher Individual and the Mediocre Morality of the Herd

Reading *Dracula* from the Nietzschean perspective sheds further light on the nature of individuality in the *fin de siècle* period. Michaud suggests that Stoker and Nietzsche talk about the same things but only from different prospects: “While Nietzsche was writing his philosophical works, Stoker was writing his story . . . Both Nietzsche and Stoker wrote about God, death, and the afterlife”, but, Michaud wonders, “whose work has proven to be far more popular, far more influential – the writing of a man who believed that humanity should seek to lift itself up to the highest possible levels, or a story about how very evil it is to be better than humans?” (Michaud 100). Stoker’s narrative is more beloved, Michaud answers, because it affirms the importance of righteousness and the dangers of power. While *Dracula* is favoured because it provides excuses for the individual to be pathetic, Nietzsche is viewed as harsh because he writes about the individual’s ability to overcome his weakness and becomes powerful.

Dracula can be read as a conflict between two wills to powers. Nietzsche says that “[t]he victorious concept ‘force’ . . . still needs to be completed: an inner will must be ascribed to it, which I designate as ‘will to power’, i.e., an insatiable desire to manifest power; or as the employment and exercise of power” (1967, 332-333). In the struggle between Dracula and Van Helsing’s group, Dracula displays the characteristics of the strong in the Nietzschean terms: “The stronger drives others away; it does not want to perish in this manner; it grows and in growing it splits itself into two or more parts . . . the greater the impulse towards variety, differentiation, inner decay, the more force is present”; and, on the contrary, Van Helsing’s team is the weak because “[t]he greater the impulse toward unity, the more firmly may one conclude that weakness is present” (Nietzsche, 1967, 346). Count Dracula is a fictional incarnation of the robust and victorious individual who successfully manages to overcome most of the weaknesses that afflict humanity. His singularity is itself a designation of his superiority and courage. As a basic principle, Nietzsche says, “only individuals feel themselves responsible. Multiplicities are invented in order to do things for which the individual lacks the courage” (Nietzsche, 1967, 382). Van Helsing and his friends, on the other

hand, are the weak and fragile who unite with one another to gather and build up their fragmented power.

As such, then, Count Dracula is a stark reminder that the ordinary human beings are weak and vulnerable. *Dracula* is a story about the destruction of this reminder. According to Michaud, “[h]umans tell stories about those who lack humanity’s many weaknesses . . . makes monsters of them, and then executes them” (99-100). Thus, for Michaud, the novel is a distraction which obscures an underlying pathetic attitude. Michaud says, “I can think of no more pathetic recourse than – rather than lifting oneself up – to seek to drag one’s betters down. What is *Dracula*, if not one more human expression of delusion? What a marvellous distraction! . . . Telling oneself that a small cadre of ‘righteous’ humans could hunt and kill an immortal lion – Count Dracula?” (Michaud 100). The story disguises the envy for Dracula’s will to power: “This power is something that everyone wants, but not everyone can have. It’s the power Dracula had and Van Helsing envied” (Michaud 102). Thus, *Dracula* is an exemplification of Nietzsche’s empowered individual whom the weak and mediocre humans envy and attempt to eliminate.

Count Dracula belongs to the type of men whom Nietzsche calls “the higher types [or] the lucky strokes of nature” (Nietzsche, 1967, 363). Listing a number of Dracula’s superhuman attributes, Van Helsing says:

The nosferatu do not die . . . he is only stronger, and being stronger, have yet more power to work evil. This vampire which is amongst us is of himself so strong in person as twenty men, he is of cunning more than mortal, for his cunning be the growth of ages . . . he can within his range, direct the elements, the storm, the fog, the thunder, he can command all the meaner things, the rat, and the owl, and the bat, the moth, the fox, and the wolf, he can grow and become small, and he can at times vanish and come unknown. (Stoker 269)

In fact, Koç and Demir suggest that Dracula even has a superior philosophy and planning skills, and that he is inquisitive about the crumbling ethos of the Victorians. In other words, Koç and Demir add, “[a]s he has developed an unempirical philosophy for life by means of his evolution throughout the ages into an androgynous being, he is already aware of the ambivalence in human nature, and is thus superior to the

temporality and narrow-mindedness of the Victorians” (430-431). With such characteristics, the noble Count qualifies to the status of an extra-ordinary superior being at a variety of levels.

The story manipulates the *fin de siècle* anxieties concerning evolution and the descent of man. Hoelzli says that “[t]hese were the anxieties plaguing the Victorian mind when Bram Stoker published *Dracula*. *Dracula* symbolized the Victorian fear that man was not a divine creature formed by the hands of a Supreme Being. He was a supernatural creature described in animalistic terms” (27). The other source of anxiety is the paradox that the stability of convenient existence is attained through change. The theory of evolution “proposed that organisms gradually adapt to the changing environment. Changes take place slowly over several generations” (Hoelzli 27). The implied assumption in Van Helsing’s characterization of his foe is that Dracula has been evolved and adapted to the circumstances of the world through his centuries-old period of existence in this world.

A higher man, according to Nietzsche, “has indeed a certain right to feel thus, insofar as he feels himself elevated above the surfeit of ill-constituted, sickly, weary and exhausted people” (Nietzsche, 1989, 43). This means that Count Dracula has the right to feel and experience his superiority. This characterization adds further extent to Dracula’s feeling of superiority and masterhood. The Count is not only a master in the aristocratic sense, he is also a master as a well evolved higher species. This explains his disparaging attitude towards Van Helsing and his friends when he compares them with ‘sheep’ and ‘jackals’ (Stoker 347-348). Dracula despises their fear and cowardice. He does not only look at them, from the master perspective as slaves, he also considers them as lower mediocre species.

The higher and stronger man does not only have the right to feel thus, he also has the right to act accordingly. Strength has a quantum that necessarily gives a quantum to drives, wills, and acts. Hence, “to demand of strength that it should not express itself as strength, that it should not be a desire to overcome, a desire to throw down, a desire to become a master, a thirst for enemies and resistances and triumphs, is just as absurd as to demand of weakness that it should express itself as strength” (Nietzsche, 1989, 45).

This means that Dracula's venture to conquer the urban world is natural and even inevitable. The Count is motivated by a drive to express his strength. A drive for confrontations and challenges. It is the desire of the victorious warrior to live the golden hour of victory again and again. Dracula qualifies as a Nietzschean strong man. The strong man is "one [who] emerges again and again into the light, one [who] experiences again and again one's golden hour of victory – and then one stands forth as one was born, unbreakable, tensed, ready for new, even harder, remoter things" (Nietzsche, 1989, 44). As an old warrior, the Count has yearning to victories and new remoter lands to conquer.

Dracula is the individual who has a particular historical function to perform. Burnham says that "Nietzsche often gives a historical analysis suggesting that the appearance of individuals is cyclical, a historical function of human life in its progression. The idea is this: human life grows during certain historical periods without any need for individuals. It is during periods of corruption that individuals emerge as a broadly revolutionary force" (Burnham 184). Thus Count Dracula, as a non-collective, and morally decadent individual, is needed to level the plateau of culture up at this particular critical period. Decadence is a crucial element at this stage in the cycle of history. Burnham asserts that "[i]t is precisely the decadence of moral culture that leads to autonomous individuals, who then possess the far-sightedness for the creation of new modes of life that is normally found in only peoples or states as a whole" (Burnham 185). But, in Stoker's novel the autonomous and independent individual is repressed by the collective body. The repression of the singular individual and the dominance of the collective body as exemplified in the novel do not lead to progress; rather, it leads the society towards what Nietzsche calls 'inherited stupidity' (1996, 107). Progress is achieved through the unfettered and the wrongful individuals who are incarnated in the novel as the vampires. It is "the more unfettered, uncertain and morally weaker individuals upon whom spiritual progress depends in such communities. It is the men who attempt new things and, in general, many things" (Nietzsche, 1996, 107). Within this reading of Stoker's work, the destruction of Dracula signifies the repression of the creative and innovating singularity, and the maintenance of the current state of affairs. The defeat of the Count hinders the historical cycle of betterment; that is because

Dracula's endeavour considerably approximates the effect which Nietzsche calls "Ennoblement through degeneration [where] It is precisely at this injured and weakened spot that the whole body is as it were inoculated with something new; its strength must, however, be as a whole sufficient to receive this new thing into its blood and to assimilate it" (Nietzsche, 1996, 107). This mechanism has much in common with the pattern of affairs in the novel. Dracula 'inoculates' the seeds of change into the communal body, but the body is still not ready to 'assimilate' the seeds of change.

Having superior and higher species features, Dracula can very well stand as a Nietzschean 'overman'. An overman is a stage beyond the stagnant current state of mediocre human beings. The stagnant stage must be overcome. All "creatures so far created something beyond themselves [thus, the stage of] Human being is something that must be overcome" (Nietzsche, 2006, 5). Evolution goes through a stationary stage, and it needs to be pushed forward for the sake of human continuity. Accordingly, through his Zarathustra, Nietzsche preaches, "I teach you the overman" (Nietzsche, 2006, 5). The 'overman' is a hypothetical sophisticated human stage. Human beings are just a bridge towards that stage; "[w]hat is great about human beings is that they are a bridge and not a purpose . . . Mankind is a rope fastened between animal and overman – a rope over an abyss" (Nietzsche, 2006, 7). Count Dracula is the evolved overman and the rope which extends over a long period of his existence in this world, where he crossed the abyss of centuries victoriously. Davison says that "Dracula proved to be a highly industrious and adaptable aristocrat who recognised the survival potential in relocation, a good blood transfusion, and inter-breeding" (Davison 23). The Count is a remarkable survivor. He was already superior in his earlier existence as an alive human being. He "had a mighty brain, a learning beyond compare, and a heart that knew no fear and no remorse . . . there was no branch of knowledge of his time that he did not essay" (Stoker 343). The most significant achievement is that Dracula survived death and managed to evolve and develop. In him, "the brain powers survived the physical death. Though it would seem that memory was not all complete. In some faculties of the mind he has been, and is, only a child. But he is growing, and some things that were childish at the first are now of man's stature. He is experimenting, and doing it well" (Stoker 343). However, Dracula is a distorted overman. He is distorted by the priestly attitude of Bram Stoker which is

embodied in Van Helsing. Van Helsing and his friends are the ‘good’ and Dracula is the evil. According to Nietzsche, “[t]he good must crucify the one who invents his own virtue . . . they crucify the one who writes new values on new tablets” (2006, 171). But, by crucifying the overman, “they sacrifice the future to themselves – they crucify all future humanity” (Nietzsche, 2006, 171). In this way, the novel masks its hatred toward higher and stronger singular individuals. The ‘goodness’ of the herd is sustained and rewarded, and the innovative ‘evil’ individual is severely dismembered and vanquished.

To conclude, this chapter shows that *Dracula* charts the shape of the individual in the *fin de siècle* in an anticipation for potential revolutions concerning gender distinction, sexuality, race, and colonization. As far as the authorized and empowered individual is concerned, the story acknowledges the multiplicity of perspective through giving voice to multiple characters. But, at the same time, the narrative pictures singularity with alarm through exhibiting serious concerns about the limits of the freedom which might be granted to the individual. With the receding role of Romanticism and the concomitant fascination with nature as a filler of the void resulting from the disenchantment, a need for re-enchantment emerges. Standing for both, science and traditional religious beliefs, Van Helsing emerges to fulfil this need.

At the same time, the vampire emerges and puts forward an alternative paradigm that promises liberty to the uncertain and disenchanting individuals. The novel masks the appeal of the revolutionary vampire and builds a robust collective body for the sake of vanquishing the singular who violates the community standards and blurs the borderlines which determine the community’s distinctions and binary oppositions. Within the atmosphere of anxiety and frustration, the potent Count comes to revolutionize the system. Being passive for centuries, the charismatic and egocentric Count signifies the fear of extinction. He has longed for conflict and warfare. The brave medieval warlord sets the British Empire as a target and aims at squashing its patriarchal and gender-relation system. The vampire bite renovates the strictly gendered bourgeois stereotypes and turns them into anomalous individuals. The unstated vampire message is that real and genuine metamorphosis cannot be attained without deconstructing the fabricated bourgeois ethics and the Victorian superstructure. The vampire dissolves the collective

social body and frees its constituent individuals from orbiting around its social nucleus. The vampire bite offers an alternative paradigm (new, and at the same time archaic) that guarantees both, liberty from the burdens of the current repressive and hypocritical Victorian ethos, and freedom in expressing and experiencing the primordial yearnings and impulses of individuals. The deviant and perverse vampire in Stoker's canonical work is the *doppelgänger* of the illicit and unadmitted Victorian unconscious of the *fin de siècle*. As an anthropomorphic archetype, Count Dracula posits a variety of dualities that disturb the well-established bourgeois binary distinctions and destroy the normalcy upon which the culture is based. As such, Stoker's monster embodies the Dionysian surreptitious inclinations which come to harass and destabilize the unauthentic Apollonian paradigm for the sake of creating moral anarchy. The vampire attacks the uncertain and impotent stereotype individuals of the British Empire upon whom the utilitarian Victorian system depends. However, the novel does not go beyond bringing the Victorian perturbations to the front. The British Empire is an invincible enemy. The robust collective body triumphs over the vampire. The defeat of the Count signifies the abortion of the new paradigm which he stands for. The destruction of the Count signifies the indestructibility of the authoritarian bourgeois spirit. The collective body perpetuates the Victorian staggering paradigm and subdues the optimism about the birth of new system. In fact, through the metaphor of vampirism, the novel strongly opposes the change and suggests that the spread of the new paradigm is analogous to the spread of a venereal infectious disease. And, in this way, the vampire also symbolizes the syphilitic individual who threatens and disrupts the urban civil life.

The novel discusses the predicament of the rationalist and disenchanted individual who finds himself confronted with an assortment of magical and mysterious forces which defy his capability to comprehend. The modernized and civil individual is also confronted with the savage and troubled past through the ghostly resurrection of the undead noble warrior and through locating him within the still feudal and menacing Transylvania. Being an amalgam of rational, irrational, savage, and noble powers, the discarded medieval past represents a further challenge to the rationality of the disenchanted metropolitan individual. The evil insurrection of the medieval vampire

represents the invigoration of the past which sharply contrast with the sterility of the present.

Van Helsing and his associates represent the microcosmic uniform society which embraces the prevailing bourgeois *Weltanschauung*. Upon the influence of their well-informed and experienced Dutch mentor, the band of men reveal that they are not less venal and ruthless than the Count whom they go against. They go to the extreme in defending the ethos which guarantees men`s complete hegemony over female bodies. The band of men stand for hypocritical and in-genuinely sincere decorum individuals who are predisposed to conceal their furtive and sinful carnal desires, while Dracula stands for the authentic individual who unhesitatingly exposes his inner self yearnings. The vampire fighters stand for the rootless and faceless bourgeois individuals who cannot properly function independently in isolation from the group; while Count Dracula stands for the unique and resourceful aristocrat who has deep roots in history, and who, individually, has enough initiative and courage to threaten the whole British Empire.

Although Count Dracula fails and eventually crumbles into dust, his mission is not completely fruitless. The monstrous vampire, who exceeds reality at a very positivistic age, emerges to explore the possibilities of change in the centre of civilization at the time of heralding transition to a new paradigm. Evolution takes ages to be noticeable, and the vampire at least implants the seeds for future metamorphosis. When they all share blood with Dracula, and consequently have sanguine bond with him, the characters (and, by extension, also the readers) come to recognize that the vampire is even more familiar and that he has correspondence to their repressed individual tendencies. The novel`s naturalization of the supernatural contributes in implementing such awareness. Hence, the characters do evolve. They evolve towards better understanding concerning themselves and the world. They realize the weaknesses of the human nature and the need for accepting human biological needs.

In *Dracula*, the dissonant individual is pictured as decadent and evil ‘other’ with whom the collective body must battle if the later wants to survive and have recognizable identity. By destroying Count Dracula, the higher species individual who successfully survived and evolved through centuries, the collective body expresses his envy and hate

towards the superior individuals. By the brutal mutilation of the somnolent and defenceless bodies of the vampires, the collective body stages a fabricated victory for the sake of glorifying the herd morality and celebrating the mediocracy of the faceless mass men.



CHAPTER V

CONCLUSION

This study demonstrates that *Robinson Crusoe*, *Frankenstein*, and *Dracula* are akin to what Ian Watt calls the myths of Western individualism when he refers to the original Renaissance tales of Faust, Don Quixote, and Don Juan. They all depict restless single-minded pursuits by dissonant and alienated individuals who, alone, defy the established orthodoxies and wage bitter wars against various social and cultural assumptions. While Watt's Renaissance myths are indicative of the status of individualism in the Renaissance, the present study takes *Robinson Crusoe*, *Frankenstein*, and *Dracula* as expressive narratives about the fashioning and metamorphosis of Western individualism in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. While the tragic fate of the Renaissance protagonists is attributed to the Counter-Reformation effects, this study shows that the punitive consequences which the heroes of the modern Western myths suffer from are attributed to immanent fear of individualism.

Chapter One demonstrates that Robinson Crusoe, Victor Frankenstein, and Count Dracula are the individuals who promise salvation from the abyss of the faceless mass man who prevails as a result of the condensation of people in urban centres. The three heroes set forth to accomplish solitary victories that singular mass man dreams about, but they have no courage and potential to initiate such a venture. Thus, the three novels are endeavours to depart from the social to the individual.

The three novels affirm the singular selfhood through demonstrating different modes of solitude. Crusoe's island, Frankenstein's laboratory, and Castle Dracula are the symbols of solitude. While the solitude of Frankenstein and Dracula are Romantic, Crusoe's solitude is practical and functional. Solitude, in the three works, is an emblem of personal independence and autonomy. One symbolic mishap of autonomous solitude

is the fear of extinction. Such masked fear necessitates different modes of independent propagation in the three novels which are at variance with the natural pattern which requires the presence of a woman. In the novels, individualist autonomy is depicted as a masculine trait. The three works suppress the role of the female for the sake of highlighting alternative and counter-natural modes of masculine proliferation. Chapter One suggests that such modes of autonomous proliferation imitate the mechanisms of money and capital increase. In the age of capitalism, finance plays an essential role in shaping the social, cultural, and intellectual aspects of life. Money has the special characteristic of being able to reproduce and yield out of its own accord. Such characteristic has parallels with the fantasies of proliferation and increase in the three novels. In *Robinson Crusoe*, the protagonist himself is a symbol of capital which flourishes and prospers alone. The story charts in numbers and figures the constant increase of Crusoe's wealth and properties in time. For Crusoe, lack of wealth amounts to extinction. Thus, the exponential proliferation of wealth in this case is the only means of affirming self-existence. In *Frankenstein*, the medieval theme of alchemy which promises to procure wealth by turning cheap metals into gold is replaced by the theme of modern science which promises to turn useless dead body parts into a living human being. The creation of the Monster is a masculine procreation. In the capitalist world, if capital breeds capital, then it is probably possible for man to breed man: but the deviant breeding procedure of Frankenstein gives birth to a monstrous offspring. In a parallel pattern, in *Dracula*, the vampire's perverse and undetermined sexuality obliterates the orthodox breeding procedure. Count Dracula proliferates through the vampire bite which symbolizes both male and female potency. In fact, this particular potential of deviant propagation is the most threatening danger to the orthodox world of Van Helsing. Robinson Crusoe, Victor Frankenstein, and Count Dracula are the symbols of single masculine prodigious greed. They all strive to evade an unexpressed figurative extinction; and they all venture to affirm and maintain their self-existence by different modes of deviant proliferation.

Viewing *Robinson Crusoe*, *Frankenstein*, and *Dracula* as modern myths of Western civilization makes them valuable sources of knowledge about the patterns of thinking and behaviour of the culture that they represent. As such, this means that

although they express fictitious accounts, the three novels carry their own order of reality. Therefore, it is useful to prove that these works have much in common with mythology.

The first obstacle for such an endeavour is sacredness. Myths are often defined as sacred narratives, and the three eighteenth-and nineteenth-century novels examined here are completely worldly and non-religious. Chapter One of this study proves that sacredness is not a necessary condition for the narrative to qualify as mythical. It also shows that the religious aspects in the three novels belong to the social and cultural domains. Crusoe uses religion to fill the lacuna resulting from his solitude on the island. He uses the Scripture to impose meaning and order upon an otherwise meaningless and arbitrary course of events. His belief is superficial and intermittent. For him, any phenomenon is divine until he finds a logical explanation for it. In the case of *Frankenstein*, on the other hand, the tale itself stands as a prominent and strong evidence that the myth of creation does not have to be sacred. *Frankenstein* is a tale of a completely secular “Genesis”. As far as *Dracula* is concerned, the divine merely belongs to the deep rooted social tradition. The religious in Stoker’s novel belongs to Van Helsing’s idealized virtuous paradigm, and this paradigm is an amalgam which consists of a pious and more Catholic past, added to a present of refined rationalism. Van Helsing devises this worldview to stand against Dracula’s degenerate and vitiated medieval paradigm. Moreover, in *Dracula*, the religious themes and motifs are parts of Stoker’s configurational techniques of Gothic writing. As such, these themes and motifs have technical Gothic functions rather than theological ones. Therefore, the three novels are mythical, but not sacred. They are secular tales featuring mundane figures.

Further, this chapter argues that the mythical core of the three novels is masked by the rational discourses of the literary texts. Such mythical core can be retrieved if one removes the elaborations, digressions, conversations, scenic descriptions, and secondary characters from the text. Chapter One applies this procedure and reduces each novel into concise two-statement propositions that represent their mythical skeletons. It is through this compressed form that myths survive through time and transfer through cultures.

Such forms are often not subject to change when the myth becomes subject to adaptations, elaborations, and amendments.

Like the heroes of a monomyth, the three protagonists have considerable uniform characteristics. For example, they are exceptionally gifted in different ways. The gifts of the modernized heroes often include exceptional intellect. Robinson Crusoe and Victor Frankenstein are earthly and mundane heroes. Nevertheless, they still enjoy certain exceptional gifts. They are both gifted with a special mind. Crusoe is a talented learner. His survival is not attributed to his physical strength; rather, it is attributed to his exquisite calculations and competent use of his brain. In *Frankenstein* the gifts are entirely intellectual. Frankenstein is an exceptionally gifted scholar, and his Monster is an exceptionally gifted learner. As far as Count Dracula is concerned, although he enjoys many supernatural and extra-human capabilities, he is still described by Van Helsing as having a mighty brain.

Moreover, they all suffer from a symbolic deficiency that they strive to gratify. They make extensive and life-consuming journeys in order to provide for the deficiency which they themselves, or their world, suffers from. Crusoe's essential deficiency is wealth. The boon he seeks is material prosperity. Frankenstein, on the other hand, belongs to a prosperous and noble family. His world suffers from disease and death. The boon he tries to find is 'the elixir of life'. As the doppelganger of the protagonist, the Monster is also agonized by a deficiency; he suffers from lack of collectiveness. His restless wandering is for the sake of populating his world. Much like Frankenstein's Monster in this respect, Count Dracula migrates from solitude to the peopled world. The boon which Dracula carries to the modern world is his own version of the medieval world. Much like the heroes of classical myths, the protagonists of the three novels engage in ceaseless and strenuous journeys for the sake of filling certain lacunae in their worlds.

However, the present study notes a divergence from classical mythology as far as heroism is concerned. Unlike the formidable heroes who oppose formidable forces in ancient myths, the protagonists of these three novels are non-formidable individuals who go against formidable forces. Robinson Crusoe, Frankenstein, and Count Dracula are far

from being absolute and monolithic. They are more prone to the physical world; they have fears, anxieties, and weaknesses. There are many passages in Defoe's novel entirely devoted to describing Crusoe's fears and anxieties. Crusoe's heroism lies in his autonomous essence, prudence, and perseverance. Frankenstein is physically weak, often depleted and sick. The heroism of Frankenstein is Promethean. He is a vulnerable tragic hero who is punished for stealing the fire, which can be interpreted as knowledge, from the gods. In *Dracula*, Stoker ascribes heroism to Van Helsing and his friends, and they are all mundane and commonplace people. Count Dracula, on the other hand, whom the author describes as an invincible antihero, is also non-formidable. His overwhelming and extraordinary powers are counterbalanced by a long list of limitations and weaknesses.

Another point of convergence between the three novels and classical mythology is the relation of the characters and events in these narratives to historicity. In the backgrounds of myths, there are often original stories or real world characters. Myths disconnect those stories from their concrete historical roots and distort them. The historical details are often buried and the distorted versions remain. Such versions themselves become subject to further distortions through time, leading to further, non-stop corrosion of historicity. Thus, like classical myths, the three stories, more or less, have roots in history. In the case of *Robinson Crusoe*, there is strong evidence that Defoe's account is a distorted version of the predicament of the Scottish castaway Alexander Selkirk who was found in 1709 after being marooned on Juan Fernandez Island for four years and four months. *Frankenstein* is a Romantic version of the sixteenth century legend of Faust, which is itself a distorted version of the biography of the German doctor and theologian Dr. George Faust who lived between 1466 and 1541. Like Faust, Frankenstein makes a pact with the devil (the Monster in this case). If he creates a female monster, he will gain, in return, life-long safety and peace for himself and his family. As far as Count Dracula is concerned, he is Stoker's distortion and mythification of the cruel Wallachian prince, Vlad III, who lived and ruled during the fifteenth century. Thus, the titular characters in the three novels have roots in real history, and these roots are blurred by mythification.

Akin to classical myths, the three narratives have authority. They boast of a compulsion quality that convinces and moves the audience. The three novels have truth claims and persuasive powers. Through their narrative techniques, Daniel Defoe, Mary Shelley, and Bram Stoker uniquely succeed in implementing realistic presentations of their fictitious accounts; and consequently, they succeed in producing the credibility and the authority which the classical myths enjoy within the cultures in which they sprout. *Robinson Crusoe*, *Frankenstein*, and *Dracula* have persuasive power and claims for truthfulness in spite of their secularity and in spite of the disenchanting world in which they flourish. The autobiographical, epistolary, journal and diary forms together with the nested narrative technique are among the means which the authors of the three works use to achieve authorial credibility. In addition to his insistence that his novel is a tale of a real person and real events, Defoe's realism and his instructional (or even didactic) presentation of the methods and techniques of survival provide immensely for the credulity that his work boasts. Shelley uses framed narrative voices and sublime settings to make her tale an authentic account of reality. Unlike Defoe, Shelley maintains an outsider objective stance and does not commit herself to the truthfulness of her exposition. She creates an internal network of verification mechanisms in which the characters themselves testify for the truthfulness of what each other claims. In case of *Dracula*, on the other hand, Stoker grounds much of his authorial credulity upon a lax and indeterminate vision of science. He also manipulates the fact that the scientific discourse of his time has fictional characteristics when representing the world through theories or through scientific writings. By the theme of vampirism, he blurs the boundaries between reality and fiction and creates an atmosphere of quasi-science for his tale. With the realism associated with the minute descriptions, Stoker creates an amalgamation between the realistic normal and the paranormal; and thus, he makes his rational reader experience the state of compulsive uncertainty and suspense which the characters go through as a result of their inability to interpret the supernatural phenomena. In addition, through putting his narrative in episodic diaries, letters, newspaper excerpts, and memoranda, Stoker also gives voice to a variety of narrators, and consequently provides an atmosphere of immediacy and authenticity to his very improbable affairs. Through the agreement in the propositional content of the various

diaries and letters, the author creates a situation in which each discourse testifies for the truthfulness of the other. Thus, by such techniques, the three authors furnish their mythical narratives with sufficient authorial credibility and persuasive power.

Therefore, *Robinson Crusoe*, *Frankenstein*, and *Dracula* possess the necessary features that justify describing them as modern Western myths. Since they all give primacy to the individual and portray different modes of struggle against the opposing forces of society and culture, these works are more entitled to reveal the metamorphoses in the characterization and status of the individual in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. In spite of the divergent motifs and themes, the unifying leitmotif in the three works is the myth of the emerging Western individualism.

Chapter Two shows that *Robinson Crusoe* asserts the primacy of the individual through the text itself. The complete dedication of the text to the exposition of the experiences of a singular ordinary man marks the significance of the individual. In addition, the autobiographical form grants authorial rights to the self and marks the rise of the authorized individual in the beginning of the eighteenth.

As far as his relationship to the society, Crusoe devalues the social ties and shows non-conformity with the traditional community assumptions. Social stereotypical representations are reduced in Crusoe's father figure who stands for the old paradigm. The disobedience of the social norms amounts to filial disobedience. The sense of guilt splits the personality of Crusoe into two, a confessional self which negatively values the dissonance and the individualist aspirations, and a practical self which realizes that conformity does not yield any utilitarian benefit. Crusoe follows the injunctions of the later self, and in a state of denial, he attributes his decision to follow the disobedient self to a cogent and compelling 'ill-fate'

Chapter Two notes that the novel signifies a metamorphosis in the sacred collective and individual representations. In fact, *Robinson Crusoe* depicts the predicament of the Post-Reformation eighteenth century individual with the complete absence of any church or priest mediation with divinity. It is the case in which the individual is left alone so that he becomes the ultimate arbiter of truth. This situation represents the significant stage which preceded the secularization which would later

accompany the progression of capitalist industrialization. The novel exhibits the new attitude towards divinity through re-enacting a considerable number of Biblical motifs and themes. Through a variety of sacred prophetic incarnations, the novel sanctifies the emerging individual and puts him in parallel lines with consecrated figures.

The Calvinist doctrine of predestination and election plays a significant role in moulding Robinson Crusoe. Crusoe is the chosen individual who attains salvation and atonement of his sins through toiling labour. The narrative ascertains the spiritual integrity of Crusoe through demonstrating evidence for the certainty of his election. The island stands for the Garden of Eden, but it is the worldly paradise of the capitalist individual; and Crusoe is chosen to invest his efforts in this island and turn it into an English paradise.

As far as the validity of the adopted morality is concerned, Crusoe does not merely affirm his singular identity and existence through thinking. For him to think is not enough to exist. He painstakingly negotiates the validity of his own thoughts and passes judgements upon them. Moreover, the novel puts forward a more relaxed system of beliefs. Crusoe is disobedient, greedy, and covetous, and still he is blessed. This system allows acts such as the plundering of ships and the selling of slaves as far as they yield material profit.

Chapter Two examines the fashioning of Crusoe's self-consciousness on the island from the Hegelian perspective. The chapter reads *Robinson Crusoe* as a display of the Hegelian journey of the self towards the formation of subjectivity and the 'spirit'. It is the story of the evolution of consciousness where the shipwreck stands for a new birth which is immediately followed by the most elementary form of self-consciousness that is related to the recognition of the immediate world. The chapter explains Crusoe's longing for others in spite of his distinctive autonomy. On the island, Crusoe needs others for two reasons. On the one hand others are indispensable for the fashioning of integrated self-consciousness, because the existence of an 'other, in the Hegelian sense, is essential for the formation of subjectivity. On the other hand, Crusoe needs others in order to assume his superiority and masterhood. For both types of purpose, Crusoe favours the others whose self-consciousness is easily negated. Thus, Friday is a perfect

other for Crusoe. In other words, Friday has a double function for Crusoe; first, he contributes in reconstructing Crusoe's shattered subjectivity as a result of many years of solitude, second, he becomes the necessary slave that Crusoe needs to subjugate in order to be recognized as a master. Paradoxical enough, the chapter argues, the master is more dependent on the slave than the other way around. The slave is necessary for self-recognition. In fact, the sojourn on the island fulfils Crusoe's eagerness for recognition. During his stay, he assumes the role of a king, master, leader of army, and governor.

Crusoe is the prototypical individual who subsumes the characteristics of the emerging industrious and earnest stratum of the English population which is called the bourgeoisie class. This class is characterized by determination, perseverance, thrift, prudence, self-reliance, and competence. For this class, labour is symptomatic of grace. The passion for work in this class is essentially kindled by the Puritan spirit. Hard work is sacred. The sanctified nature of labour is emphasized in the novel through suggesting that it is only with toil that salvation and atonement of sins can be gained. It is this spirit of earnestness and devotion which was implanted in the middle class that kindled the industrial revolution. Thus, Crusoe displays the spirit of the people of England who succeeded in achieving a perfect mastering of the crude and hostile environment. He is the type of individual who competes to raise his head above the heads of the masses. It is this type of man in particular who laid the foundations of the industrial empire.

Crusoe is the *homo-economicus* man who stands for the capitalist ethos and economic individualism. As such, Defoe's novel can be read as an early forerunner of the economic theories which tackled capitalism. Represented by property and material wealth, capital has positive connotations in the beginning of the eighteenth century. *Robinson Crusoe* unhesitatingly celebrates the accumulation of wealth. Chapter two suggests that the adverse effects of capitalism that Marx talks about later in the nineteenth century, lurk in the background of some scenes in the novel. For example, the mutiny on the British ship echoes the hidden and anticipated fear of rebellion by the working class. Another adverse effect of capitalism is the commodification of the human beings which is exemplified by the selling of Xury.

One of the reasons which makes *Robinson Crusoe* a prolific literary work for the economists is the fact that the protagonist is the capitalist and the worker at the same time. As such, in Marxist terms, Crusoe does not suffer the plight of alienation from his products, and what he produces always belongs to him. This explains his exceptional attachment to his belongings and properties. This chapter examines the novel from the economic perspective and suggests that in his first novel, Defoe does what Marx would do later. Both of them lay out anthropological visions of the history of human economy.

Finally, Chapter Two argues that Crusoe can very well be seen as a Nietzschean higher rank individual who sets a superior aim for himself. Crusoe refuses the subjugation of the lower rank morality of the weak herd. Crusoe's father's speech represents the voice of the herd instinct. The father's preference of the 'middle station' in life stands, in fact, for the herd's glorification of mediocrity. Thus, Crusoe is not merely motivated by a desire for adventure. He is motivated by a spirit of individualist freedom that rejects the enslavement of society and seeks exceptional status.

Crusoe is a Nietzschean hero because he is not afraid of his own immorality. He does not deny his strong drives for the sake of observing traditional community morality. As far as evolutionary superiority is concerned, Crusoe passes all the tests that nature puts him through and proves that he is a survivor and a higher type that can perfectly fit in the emerging competitive world.

Therefore, through his titular character, Defoe moulds different templates of individualism and announces the dawn of an age in which the singular man can tackle huge responsibilities. The shipwreck is the wreck of the old paradigm and the life on the island is the construction of the new paradigm of autonomy and individualism. The individualist aspirations of Crusoe are tolerated and deemed as benign to the collective body. That is why after paying dearly for his dissonance and disobedience, he is bountifully rewarded.

In Chapter Three, *Frankenstein* is presented as a remarkable exemplification of the Romantic vision of individualism. The reason is that it flirts with the Romantic splendour of the individual's free working of the mind. Walton and Frankenstein enjoy the joy of free thinking which gives extra meaning to their singular existence.

Romanticism elevates the empowered individual to a higher level. While *Crusoe* becomes the final arbiter of truth about the affairs on the island, Walton and Frankenstein postulate and validate truths about the whole world. On the other hand, *Frankenstein* shows that Romanticism is still compassionate towards the society and its established axioms and postulates. The novel does this through the demonization of science and through the embedded hostility towards the individual who takes the risk of transgressing the permitted limits of knowledge.

Chapter Three shows that like *Robinson Crusoe*, *Frankenstein* also marks the prominence of the empowered individual through self-authorization. The only difference is the narrative technique. Although the elucidations of Frankenstein and the Monster are reported speeches, they are still autobiographical and completely self-revealing.

Shelley's novel sheds light on the plight of the fragmented and compartmentalized individual of the early nineteenth century. Uncertainty, hesitation, and disorientation are the symptoms of the fragmentation of Walton and Frankenstein. Walton's indeterminacy and ambivalence become evident from the very beginning of the novel. Walton neglects his school and prefers reading the voyage books in his uncle's library. He becomes a poet for a while, and later decides to lead an expedition to explore the North Pole. The fragmentation of Frankenstein is manifested in his loss in the clash between the old paradigm of science and the newly emerging one. The fragmentation of the Monster, on the other hand, is literal. After all, he consists of fragments and pieces of other human beings that have been collected and assembled in one composite body.

The novel also portrays the predicament of the disenchanting individual who can no longer derive validity of thought and action from the existing theological systems. Such an individual is left alone to tackle the burden of being singular self-sufficient moral referee. In such an atmosphere of unrestrained subjectivity, Walton, Frankenstein, and the Monster are moved by their inner tendencies. What they do is morally valid only because they decide that this is the case. In this way, the novel rings a warning bell concerning the rise of this type of subjective individualism which might very well lead to the corrosion of neutral objectivity. However, the most severe setback of complete

disenchantment is that the individuals are left alone to face the calamities of the universe without any intervention of Providence. Such lack of sacredness is compensated for in the novel by the glorification of the cosmic forces and the sanctification of nature. Being the only available and promising means of unfolding the secrets of nature, science itself is also consequently sanctified. In other words, *Frankenstein* signifies enchantment in science and suggests that this new enchantment is disappointing and catastrophic. It is worth mentioning that, strictly speaking, the punitive consequences of Frankenstein's scientific endeavour is not instigated by Providence as a result of exceeding the limits of knowledge. The punishment is ensued by a vindictive Monster as a reminder of the monstrous consequences of the misconduct and abuse of the powers of science.

Shelley's novel signifies the historical hesitation of the society in moulding the ideal individual during the times of radical social changes. Walton and Frankenstein are the ideals of the present who are rebuked and punished by the ideal of the past. They are ideals of the present because they both endorse the idea that modern science should not adhere to certain limits. They are also ideals of the present because they do not observe the old paradigm morality of sympathy and compassion. By sympathizing with the Monster, Frankenstein departs from the technical attitude and attends to the traditional morality of sympathy. When calculating the probable consequences of creating a female monster, Frankenstein adheres again to the scientific ideal and bravely shoulders the complete responsibility of his faulty research. The new paradigm is only idealized through Walton's glorification of Frankenstein and through Frankenstein's encouragement of Walton. Otherwise, the novel takes the side of the traditional ideal; Walton fails, and Frankenstein is mercilessly tortured and then put to death.

Chapter Three suggests that the novel portrays the fashioning of the specialized individual who chooses a specific branch of science as a vocation. Walton and Frankenstein have the devotion of those who choose their endeavours as occupations. The chapter also suggests that Frankenstein is only scientifically hubristic; otherwise, he is noble and humble. He, on purpose, disregards the maxim of modern scientific research which stipulate that scientific fulfilments should be presented to other specialized scientists, who might be able to improve these fulfilments.

Methodologically, Frankenstein follows the path of the medieval alchemists who attempt to reach ultimate and fixed ends that others cannot supersede.

Like Robinson Crusoe, Frankenstein and Walton are individualists in the sense of singularity and solitude. They emigrate away from society. As far as Frankenstein is concerned, he has another unstated reason for society's rejection. He is a Romantic aristocrat who does not fit in among the faceless and equal members of the middle class. As a projection of Frankenstein's unconsciousness, the Monster fulfils his creator's innate desire for solitude through eliminating the ones who represent domesticity in Frankenstein's life. The irresistible gravity of society, on the other hand, is represented by the Monster who emigrates towards the society and yearns for the warmth of collective life.

Shelley's novel represents in fiction the Hegelian mechanisms of individual self-recognition and identification with the 'other'. Individuals are 'unfinished creatures' without a recognizing 'other'. This chapter explains Walton's eagerness for a friend from the Hegelian perspective. In a Romantic turn of events, and in the middle of the wild ocean, Walton finds Frankenstein, the specifically desired type of friend whom he can identify with. Frankenstein in his turn, fulfils the requirement of the double significance recognition and identifies with Walton. From this standpoint, the Monster's narrative essentially consists of recounting unfortunate incidences of recognizing without being recognized in return. And as far as his relation to Frankenstein is concerned, the Monster recognizes Frankenstein as a father and creator, but Frankenstein does not recognize the Monster as a son and as a creation. Thus, in addition to being physically deformed, the Monster suffers from lack of identity and integrated self-consciousness.

Upon the failure of mutual recognition, the encounter between Frankenstein and the Monster assumes another mode of Hegelian endeavour to acquire recognition. Self-recognition becomes dependent on the negation of the objective existence of each other. Thus, they both seek a confrontation with each other in which they both put their lives on the stake for the sake of eliminating the other. Frankenstein dies and the Monster wins the desired self-integration.

Chapter Three also argues that the novel masks the culture's corporeal panic and the anxiety about the commodification of the individual in the industrialized and capitalist world. The dismemberment of dead human bodies and the assemblance of a human body casts doubts concerning the integrity of the human body in the new world. The story also disguises a producer-product relationship between Victor Frankenstein and the Monster in which the maker invests part of his own self in his product, and in which, the producer becomes alienated from his product at the moment of its completion.

Finally, the chapter views Frankenstein as a free doer and freethinker in the Nietzschean terms. He is the revolutionary individual who seeks authenticity and ultimate ends. He is superior because he does not belong to the masses and does not comply with the mediocre morality of the middle class herd. He is the Nietzschean individual who sets for himself an aim and sacrifices himself for the sake of attaining it. In spite of his deformity, the Monster is also intended to be a super species who can resist human illnesses and survive ordinary causes of death. He is also superior in terms of size, strength, speed, and even mental faculties. However, in *Frankenstein*, Shelley takes the side of the mediocrity morality of the middle class and pitilessly destroys the two individuals who have the potential of representing different mouldings of the Nietzschean higher species.

Chapter Four demonstrates that the first metamorphosis in the moulding of the individual in comparison with *Robinson Crusoe* and *Frankenstein* is that *Dracula* depicts multiple characters whose self-consciousness is already fashioned and settled. The characters are in stable condition as far as morality and basic religious beliefs are concerned. Unlike the discourse used in the earlier two novels, the characters' expositions are not autobiographical and confessional in the Augustinian fashion. The multiple distinct voices of the characters in *Dracula* do not exercise deep self-reflection and do not ponder extensively about their self-identification and self-discovery. In their variety of speeches, the characters essentially give accounts to situations and events, and describe their feelings towards them. As far as individuality is concerned, the novel

disguises anxious concerns about personal freedoms. Stoker's tale celebrates collectiveness and pictures the singular and autonomous individual with great alarm.

Dracula tackles the crisis of the disenchanting individual in *fin de siècle* and the search for alternative enchantments to compensate for the suffered vacancy in belief. While enchantment in science is discredited and condemned in *Frankenstein*, in *Dracula*, science is presented as a strong candidate for filling the spiritual void. Nevertheless, Van Helsing also strongly recommends a re-enchantment and a return to an earlier form of faith, if the individual wants to face the formidable forces of the world. The function of the vampire is to prove that the mere enchantment in logic and science is not sufficient in facing the extraordinary and inexplicable forces of the universe. An amalgam attitude of enchantment in modern science and re-enchantment in the sacredness of the past, which includes a recourse to ritualism, is the recipe which Van Helsing prescribes for the community at the turn of the century.

Written at an age of uncertainty and burdensome collective morality, the novel masks the individual's longing for certainty and anxiety-free state of mind. This chapter suggests that vampirism provides a fanciful frame for soliciting the covert human yearning for the absolutes of the bicameral stage in the history of humanity. The compliance with Victorian morality is toilsome. The vampire bite puts the individual in a state of trance in which he is liberated from his own strenuous consciousness and from the mercies of his own collective imperatives. When becoming a vampire, volition is merely organized by the instincts and tendencies which are repressed and condemned in normal life. Thus, vampirism promises liberty from the constraints of the 'analogue I' and a return to the lost paradise of the trance-like state of human mind of the bicameral era. This expected liberty which is associated with the suspension of the tiring self-consciousness explains much of the appeal which the vampire figure enjoys and the pleasurable submission of the victims to the vampire bite. Moreover, after the vampire bite, the victims become no longer responsible for what they do. The vampire victims explicitly show their repressed illicit desires, but they are not deemed as ill reputed and unvirtuous.

In *Dracula*, Stoker depicts the predicament of the sceptic individual and his journey towards certainty. Van Helsing's friends are sceptical. Stoker's story line excessively strains their scepticism through their confrontation with the supernatural vampire. Stoker also strains the scepticism of the characters and the readers through implementing indeterminacy and in-betweenness. This is achieved by blurring the boundaries which constitute the basis for shaping a variety of cultural and social distinctions and binary oppositions. Count Dracula destabilizes the firm Victorian male-female binarism. The gender which the vampires signify belongs to their status in the previous life. After becoming a vampire, gender loses significance because vampires do not proliferate through male-female copulation; rather, they increase through the vampire bite which involves both penetration and ingestion. Dracula also challenges the distinction between the past and the present. He comes from the medieval past to haunt the present. Furthermore, Dracula eludes animal-human classification by virtue of his many animalistic features. In addition, he abrogates the borderline between life and death; and he subverts the distinction between reality and fiction.

Dracula documents the rise of the sincere individual and the plight of the authentic individual. Van Helsing and his friends are sincere, earnest, and morally righteous. Benevolence, altruism, and self-denial are all culminated in the act of blood donation to Lucy and the valorous death of Quincey Morris. However, Chapter Four argues that all the tokens of self-transcendence exhibited by Van Helsing and his friends are part of the enterprise of presenting the self on the Victorian social arena. Such sincerity is often not a genuine personal attribute; rather, it is staged for the sake of gaining good reputation and appreciative social approval. In sharp contrast to such pretentious sincerity, Count Dracula emerges and stands for the authentic individual who does not sacrifice his personal genuine instincts and desires for the sake of others. For the authentic individual, personal worth is not measured and substantiated by the society, rather, it is substantiated by the individual himself. Count Dracula is a culmination of the authorized and authentic self who appoints himself as an arbiter of his own ultimate truth and the sole determiner of his own worth. It is worth mentioning in this context that Dracula is authentic even as a villain. His characterization is a departure from the dissembler villain who diligently conceals his evil intentions. The diabolic

nature of the Count becomes apparent to Jonathan Harker and to the reader at an early stage in the narrative. The conflict between Dracula and Van Helsing's team is more of a warfare between two opposing powerful peers rather than a mere struggle of a righteous force to expose a dissembling evil. Dracula's inexplicable disguise and shape shifting capacities are not tokens of duplicity or cowardice, they are part of his war tactics against his foes. In fact, it is the duplicity of the Victorians which he deplores the most. Thus, Count Dracula is true to himself and authentic even in his villainy. While the vampire hunters are inauthentic in their virtue and righteousness, the Count is authentic in his own immorality and decadence.

A significant and inevitable consequence of authenticity is alienation. The more authentic attributes the individual is in possession of, the more alienated from the social order he becomes. The society has no forbearance for limitless self-authorization and self-validated morality; thus, it alienates the authentic individual. Stoker's novel alienates Count Dracula because he is the author of his own moral codes. Dracula is foreign and alien in terms of place and time. He is also alienated by virtue of his various extra-human, and sometimes animal-like, features which make him tantamount to a different species. Unlike the empowered individuals in *Frankenstein* who have science and nature as points of reference, Dracula is the Post-Romantic empowered individual who is alienated to the degree of being cut from any point of existing reference.

The relationship between the individual and the society witnesses a drastic shift in *Dracula*. Unlike Robinson Crusoe and Frankenstein who depart from society, Count Dracula ventures into penetrating the society. Dracula is the culmination of the lurking Victorian fears of otherness and apprehensions towards the imminent social reforms and changes.

Van Helsing's friends are samples of the faceless and uniform Victorian mass individuals. They represent the mass-minded herd which diligently submits to the compelling social drive. Chapter Four shows that Van Helsing's friends are typical collective Durkheimian individuals to whom the 'I' is not separable from the 'we'. Their collective harmony derives from their adherence to collective ideals and moralities which transcend them. For such individuals, conformity and compliance with the

community ideals is not only obligatory, it even becomes desirable to the degree of readiness for voluntary self-sacrifice. The culmination of altruistic self-sacrifice for the sake of collective body is exemplified by the gallant death of Quincey Morris in the final combat against Dracula.

However, Van Helsing's friends are passive, hesitant, and doubtful. They are in desperate need for sagacious guidance. Van Helsing is the wise and knowledgeable father and mentor. He is a remodelling of the monolithic father figure in *Robinson Crusoe*. The hegemony of Van Helsing is always justifiable; and it is always in the interest of the hegemonized. Like the traditional archetypal patriarchies, the issue of utmost concern for Van Helsing is the unrestrained female sexuality. The point of divergence from the traditional paternal archetype is that instead of condemning and denouncing female desire, Van Helsing pathologizes such desire before exterminating it in a merciless way. The tyranny of Van Helsing is licenced by his knowledgeability. He is the social reformer who recommends amendments to the moral code and collective ideals to make the society more immune to the emerging dangers and threats.

Count Dracula, on the other hand, is the revolutionary rebel. He does not intend to reform. He intends to demolish the whole existing moral system. He migrates to society because he suffers from social deprivation. The main issue in Dracula's relationship with collectivity is that the noble Count is a master. He cannot tolerate the position of a mass commoner who submissively complies with the stipulations of the collective codes. Thus, he ventures to deconstruct the existing system for the sake of establishing a new one that abides by his own rules. The vampire bite signifies the transition to the new system and the freedom from the restrictive and burdensome Victorian morality.

Ironical enough, the series of blood transfusions and vampire bites create a situation in which Van Helsing, his friends, and Count Dracula become all connected by sanguinity, which is one of the most basic bonds that combine individuals within collective bodies. Signifying kinship and identity, the blood bond among the characters creates a mini collective body. In this minimized community, the group rises against the rebel member and destroys him. In fact, Dracula unintentionally strengthens the bonds

which combine the members of the group together. The solidarity of the small community after Dracula is more than the solidarity before Dracula. This confirms the Durkheimian hypothesis, as discussed in Chapter Four, which asserts that the rebellion against the society strengthens the society. Thus, as a literary prominent figure, the vicious vampire has a historical function. He is the revolution which the Victorians anticipate and which they eventually manage to curb. He is invented in order to be destroyed. He is the scapegoat who is sacrificed for the sake of asseverating the social bonds and asserting that the existing social and moral systems are robust and stable.

From the Hegelian perspective which views the individual as a given totality, Chapter Four argues that, in the struggle between Dracula and Van Helsing`s team, it is only Dracula who enjoys the individualistic totality and the irreducibility into atomistic constituent entities. In fact, he himself reduces many extra-human cosmic traits into his totality. The other side, on the other hand, is analysable into a quantity of externally related components that are, as far as the struggle with Dracula is concerned, not even self-subsistent. In other words, Van Helsing and his friends have no efficacious value and potent conflict worth outside the collective body. The members are un-detachable from the holistic body and they have no real existence out of it.

Using Hegel`s theories, Chapter Four examines the network of relationships in *Dracula* which contribute in shaping the consciousness of each individual. The novel provides illustrations of various forms of Hegelian evolutionary states of human consciousness which change in accordance to the individual`s perception of the unchangeable universal. Count Dracula displays the consciousness of the old paradigm master who cannot perceive the fact that he shares universal essence with other individuals. He needs slave `others` because it is only through negating their self-consciousness that his master consciousness can affirm itself. Such urge for self-recognition explains the Count`s scheme to abandon his desolate castle and migrates towards population. The master-slave Hegelian dialectic also explains Dracula`s preference of women over men. The Victorian women are easy targets because they are already subjugated by the collective morality and thus more prone to the negation of their subjective consciousness. Dracula does not only need otherness in order to attain

recognition of his master subjective self, he also consumes otherness and assimilates the differences into oneness. The vampire consumption of otherness and the reduction of different identities into a whole oneness is alluded to by Renfield's ingestion of live creatures.

In addition to the outdated master-consciousness stage, Count Dracula also exemplifies one of the most advanced Hegelian stages of self-consciousness. It is the stage in which the rationality of the self is actualized through liberating the self from the confinement of morality and giving license for the pursuit of personal inclinations and desires. Hegel predicts the collapse and the doomed fate of such individuality; and Stoker fulfils this prediction by the destruction and annihilation of the empowered and self-authorized vampire figure.

Van Helsing's friends, on the other hand, are representatives of the Hegelian 'unhappy conscious'. Their concealed unhappiness results from the contradiction which characterizes their dual selves, where one self stands for the personal consciousness and the other stands for the universal one. They are in constant struggle to overcome the contradiction by denying their personal selves and seeking ideal universal transcendence. In their strive to resolve the ensuing tension between the two modes of consciousness, Van Helsing's friends become in desperate need of a mediator (or a priest) who can bridge the gap between the individual and the transcendental universal. Chapter Four suggests that Van Helsing is the fin de siècle Hegelian mediator to whom the unhappy-conscious individuals resort in order to resolve the tension of their duplicity. Van Helsing shoulders the responsibility of making the decisions which ordinary and unauthorized people cannot make. He validates actions and modes of thinking for his friends that are otherwise morally illegitimate. In fact, Van Helsing bestows upon his friends a fabricated ideal universal with which they have a false moment of reconciliation. With such historically temporary moment of peace with the universal, Van Helsing postpones the evolution of the self-consciousness of his friends and maintains the status quo. He prevents the actualization of the empowered and authorized self which Count Dracula stands for.

In addition to being the invasive 'other' who signifies the nightmare of the reverse colonization, Dracula is also the de-familiarized 'other' with whom the Victorian characters need to affirm their precarious self-certainty and identification. In spite of his exaggerated estrangement, Dracula is still a familiar 'other' that the Victorians can identify with because he represents the familiar potent and noble past. At the time of cultural anxiety, such a de-familiarized, decadent, and formidable 'other' fulfils a historical needed. According to the Hegelian mechanism of self-assertion, the negation of such 'other' would reconstruct the self-identity of the individuals who do the negation. But Count Dracula is not amenable to negation. In such case, the Hegelian formula stipulates a lethal combat with the 'other' in which both sides risk their lives for the sake of eliminating the other. The culmination of life-risking is exemplified at the final combat when Quincey Morris loses his life and when Dracula is completely eliminated. However, Dracula merely loses the battle. He does not surrender. Thus, the reconstruction of the Victorian selves becomes ephemeral because Dracula is not subjugated and negated. The need for an antagonist 'other' remains. With the destruction of Dracula, Van Helsing and his friends merely destroy their doppelganger, they merely destroy their alienated selves.

Written during the time of the capitalized Second Industrial Revolution, *Dracula* is necessarily influenced by the ramifications of industrialization and capitalism. Accordingly, the vampire figure can very well be a personification of the soulless, parasitic, and monstrous capital which absorbs the live human labour and turns it into an accumulation of dead labour. The victim, on the other hand, signifies the crisis of the depleted, objectified, and consumed individual.

Within the same context of economy, Count Dracula stands for the divided Victorian noble individual between the outdated estate-based feudal mode of economy and the modern money and capital based one. Dracula himself seems to endorse the view that money is a mere carrier of value with no inherent worth in itself. He favours 'earth' and estates. However, in the dynamic world of currencies and transactions, properties suffer from the problem of mobility. Dracula's boxes of 'earth' are extremely heavy. The Count's attachment to earth restricts his movability. Van Helsing and his

friends, on the other hand, who represent the modern pecuniary paradigm, move flexibly and freely without restriction. Thus, the triumph of Van Helsing's team represents the dominance of the capitalist paradigm over the estate-based paradigm.

Chapter Four suggests that *Dracula* signifies the rise of the corporate individual who is drained of human personality. In addition to standing for the emerging banking system which imbibes the money from the pockets of the bankruptcy-anxious Victorians, Dracula also represents the incorporated individual who is one and all at the same time. He is the mastermind who acts on behalf of the corporation of the other vampires. The vampire hunters, on the other hand, are the opposing corporative body who act on behalf of the Victorians and the whole of humanity. Thus, the conflict in the novel can be seen as a competition between two ideational incorporated entities who seek the bankruptcy and collapse of each other.

Finally, Chapter Four argues that *Dracula* is anti-individualistic because it glorifies the mediocrity of the herd and severely assails the Nietzschean powerful superior individual. While Nietzsche celebrates the nobility of the endeavour to become better and stronger than ordinary humans, Stoker attacks such courageous nobility and provides excuses for the pathetic cowardice of the mob. In Nietzschean terms, and apart from the partisanship of the novel in favour of Van Helsing's team, the narrative can be seen as a struggle between the strong and the weak. Count Dracula is the one who manifests unappeasable desire to exhibit power. He is the singular who splits into parts to perform different tasks. He is diverse in spite of his singularity. Van Helsing and his friends are the weak and fragile who have propensity towards gathering because they lack the courage to face danger individually. They envy Dracula's singular strength and immortality. With his potency, Dracula affirms the sterility of the Victorians. In his strength, he is a reminder of human weaknesses and infirmities. Thus, he is executed to appease the fear and the envy of the mediocre masses.

With his extra-human characteristics, Dracula is an incarnation of the Nietzschean higher type. In his eternity and ample capabilities, he is superior to the Victorian temporality and limitedness. Like the heroes of epics, he is potent and competent enough to enjoy big challenges. That is why he goes against the British

Empire. In brief, the centuries-old Count is a culmination of the *fin de siècle* disquietude about evolution, adaptation, and the descent of man.

From the Nietzschean perspective, Dracula is historically essential because he provides the necessary decadent atmosphere for development and for the rise of the autonomous and revolutionary individuals. Thus, the squashing of Dracula is an anti-progress venture and hindrance of the historical circle of social advancement. By the destruction of Dracula, the Victorian community exhibits its firmness and resistance to change and crucifies the 'overman' who signifies progress and freedom.

To conclude, the analysis of the three novels shows the metamorphosis in the presentation of the individual through time. As modern Western myths, they open channels to the unconscious of mass man and expose the rearrangement of the archetypes in the collective minds during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. *Robinson Crusoe* presents the individual as uniquely autonomous, independent, and self-sufficient in spite of all the cultural, social, and natural counter forces. Even morality is lax and mouldable to serve the purpose of Crusoe. In *Frankenstein* and *Dracula*, on the other hand, society, history, and morality have determinative roles on the lives of individuals. This change indicates regression in believing in the autonomous individual, and an implementation of the view that the individual is inseparable from the larger communal system. Therefore, autonomous singularity in *Frankenstein* and *Dracula* is reprimanded, demonized, and eventually mercilessly punished.

In opposition to the singularity of the protagonists in *Robinson Crusoe* and *Frankenstein*, in *Dracula*, the key to success, as far as Van Helsing's team is concerned, lies in the collaboration among the members of a diverse crew. The suggested and encouraged anti-individualism virtue in the novel is that one should not fight for himself only, and that he should not fight alone. He should join a band of likeminded comrades, if he wants to achieve substantial results. Although *Dracula* dismembers the individual and represses the potential to develop personal ideals, still, the safety and the welfare of the society depends on the heroism of specific individuals. In Stoker's novel, only few men and two women tackle the noble task of confronting the invincible Count, while the rest of the people, or the other mass-men, are completely unaware of the potential

danger. The concept of duty is emphasized. In *Dracula*, not everyone is responsible for everyone, only a few people are responsible for everyone.

Unlike Frankenstein, who is eventually pitied even by his own foe, Dracula is demonized and presented as an unredeemed villain with no single good act or positive attribute that can be laid to his charge. With such absolute evil of different types and shades, Stoker justifies the pitiless punishment of Dracula and, at the same time, sends corrective messages to his audience about the fate of those who defy the established orthodoxies of the community.

Therefore, apart from their mythical characteristics mentioned so far, the three novels are also myths in the sense that they all can be read as fables which are made for the sake of a moral. Further, they all show that unmitigated individuality is an unattained aim. Real and absolute individuality is itself a Western myth. The individual is bound by the society. The three stories are read as Western myths of different forms of individualism. Robinson Crusoe, Frankenstein, and Dracula are motivated by the same individualistic drives. They strive to go on their own way, regardless of others. The three protagonists dare venture to use their free will. But they are all confronted with counter ideological forces which severely and mercilessly penalize them. While Victor Frankenstein and Count Dracula are doomed beyond redemption, Robinson Crusoe is the one who is eventually redeemed and granted the atonement which turned all his toil and suffering into material wealth.

As suggestions for further research, this study suggests that the charting of the history of the Western individualism through the analysis of fiction can be further illuminated through examining other literary works in terms of the framework suggested in this study. For example, another informative image about the construction of the Victorian individual can be obtained from Robert Louis Stevenson's *Dr. Jekyll and Mr. Hyde*, which was published in 1886. This novella depicts the duplicity of the subject and the repression of the private self for the sake of maintaining the communal personality. The divided and conflicted subjectivity in this case results from the lack of congruence between the already sophisticated sense of the self and the suppressive pluralist community. Unlike Count Dracula, who reveals his deviance, the double consciousness

in Stevenson's story conceals the individual's immoral inclinations from people's scrutiny. Like the case between Victor Frankenstein and the Monster, Dr. Jekyll is threatened by his own inner antithesis which is represented by Mr. Hyde. The denial of Mr. Hyde by Dr. Jekyll has parallels with the denial of the Monster by Frankenstein. In both cases, it is a denial of one's own destructive and repressed self-consciousness. Like the individual after the vampire bite in *Dracula*, Mr. Hyde is free from the bondage of social and moral obligations.

Furthermore, the individuality of women in the nineteenth century can be expounded by analysing the works which primarily depict the suffering and the struggle of female characters. In this respect, Charlotte Brontë's *Jane Eyre* (1847) represents a prominent example. Written in an autobiographical form, Brontë's bildungsroman gives voice to its female narrator who carries the intensity of will of its author. As such, the novel signifies a rise of the authorial female self in the first half of the nineteenth century. The individualist protagonist in this work is a woman of personal initiative who affirms her subjectivity and feminine identity through resisting and opposing the repressive and restrictive forces of collectiveness. Lacking family, Jane experiences contact with different hostile small collective bodies, such as her aunt's house, Lowood school, and Rochester's residence, which represent samples of the oppressive society. Confronting a variety of social challenges, the heroine develops her self-awareness and affirms her independence and free will.

The scope of time can be extended to include the examination of individuality in further literary works in order to cover other historical periods. The attitude towards autonomous and authorized Western singularity at the beginning of the Edwardian period can be examined through analysing the literary works which depict single-mindedness such as Joseph Conrad's *The Heart of Darkness* which appeared first as a complete novel in 1902, and which marks the finale of the nineteenth century and the prelude of the twentieth century. Conrad's novel depicts the engagement of the evolved and enlarged Western selfhood with the pluralistic communities which have autochthonous elementary subjectivity. Being an individual who is completely confident that his assessment of truth is valid, Kurtz, Conrad's key character, elevates himself to a

god-like status and constructs a reality which orbits around his own singular and irreducible self, signifying the primitive urges in the individual.

The twentieth century witnessed substantial change of perspective towards individualism. Instead of repressing the individual, twentieth century modernists tried to penetrate into the subjectivity and psychology of the individual. The enlargement of personal subjectivity, both in size and degree of complexity, and the flourishing of the Freudian and Jungian psycho-analyses triggered interest in understanding the nature of the self. Instead of condemning, discouraging, and demonizing individualistic aspirations, the twentieth century witnessed attempts to fathom the depths of human consciousness in order to reveal the secrets of its workings. Within this trend, the analysis of the works of the Modernist authors who portray interior monologues and streams of consciousness, such as James Joyce and Virginia Woolf, can shed light on the patterning of individualism in the Modernist period. In the second half of the century, the interest shifted from the character to the author and the style of writing in re-evaluating the individual and his sense of subjectivity. The author, in the postmodern literature, became the locus and the determiner of truth.

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