Lessons of military regimes and democracy: The Turkish case in a comparative perspective

Abstract

How the nature of an outgoing authoritarian regime affects the advent of a new democracy continues to be a matter of controversy. One line of argument states that in countries which experience repressive and discredited authoritarian regimes, political actors have come to better appreciate the virtues of democracy.(1) It is presumed that gross human-rights violations, widespread state-sponsored terror, and consequent fear and insecurity under military rule might result in attitudinal changes that favor democracy. Those who criticize the democratic regime for a slow decision-making process, or for failing to improve socioeconomic inequalities, for instance, might better understand the difference between military rule and democracy in terms of the protection of basic human rights.

Similarly, disappointments caused by the military regimes in the economic and/or military spheres could shatter myths about the effectiveness of military rule or authoritarian decision-making processes. It might become clear, for instance, that the army's combat effectiveness is severely damaged under military dictatorships, or that military officers at the top might be as divided, inefficient, or corrupt as civilian politicians. Such value change, it is further assumed, helps the new democratic regime to withstand considerable strains because the alternative-authoritarian regression-is perceived to be even worse.(2) While not contradicting the idea that a repressive and/or discredited authoritarian regime might lead to a positive view of democracy, other scholars do not consider this factor as very significant. Juan Linz and Alfred Stephan, for instance, argued that the positive attitude toward democracy "as the best alternative for now and for the future, does not require a negative attitude toward the past."(3) Neither in cases of established democracies nor in recent transitions to democracy, they claim, can one find any strong evidence that rejection of the authoritarian past had taken place. Positive assessment of the past regime is not an obstacle to securing the loyalty of citizens to the democratic regime; one can prefer the democratic regime while also believing that an authoritarian regime had its own achievements. In the same vein, emphasizing new incentive structures that came into existence during the transition process as the most important variable affecting behavior of the elites, authors such as Guiseppe Di Palma and Adam Przeworski also came to similar conclusions.(4)

This article highlights the point that the nature of an outgoing authoritarian regime has a significant impact on a new democracy. It attempts to do so through discussion of the Turkish case. Turkey's long experience with constitutional and representative government stretches back to the nineteenth century. It has maintained a more-or-less democratic system of government since its first transition to democracy in 1946, despite three military interventions (in 1960, 1971, and 1980). The complex interactions of various factors have helped the Turkish military to protect itself from the damaging consequences associated with military rule. The military interludes in Turkey (1960-61, 1971-73, 1980-83) have hardly been seen by a significant number of civilians as highly repressive, nor have they been conceived as failures in political, economic, or military terms. In all formal transitions, the military has hardly been compelled to exit from power.

The thesis advanced here is that this particular experience of a military regime, of authoritarian interludes, has to be taken into account to understand the trials and tribulations of Turkish democracy. The positive evaluation of military rule was one reason why the political actors have found it difficult to regard a democratic regime as "the only game in town."(5) In other words, the Turkish experience has given rise to a conviction that the costs of abandoning democracy are not so high; therefore, in some cases, the military regime might be acceptable. This presumption has, in turn, weakened the civilian resolve to seek remedies within the democratic system. The military regime seemed to offer quick, clear-cut, and less costly solutions. The problem-solving capacity consideration that they might avoid the worst of what the others experienced, the idea that "it will not happen here," appears to have worked as a hindrance for learning in many settings. Few opponents of Allende who looked forward favorably to a military coup were able to foresee that a repressive regime was on its way given Chile's rather noninterventionist military tradition.(71) Civilians invoking a dictatorship generally consider that they might manipulate it, or minimize the possible costs. For these reasons, it would be misleading to talk about political learning as a spontaneous and natural process, or to condemn actors for failing to learn due largely to selfish short-sightedness or individual traits.

One should also stress that some perceptions of military rule are the result of careful construction. Those who value democracy should not fail to recall the painful memories of the past; on the other hand, it would be inappropriate to attribute undue weight to an artful deception. If the real experience of the people has not made them receptive to recalling such collective memories, the whole effort might be destined to remain futile.

A brief examination of military regimes and their impact on a change of values shows how complex the issues are, and how difficult it is to make straightforward inferences. A recognition of this complexity, however, does not change the fact that political learning, either through interaction or comparison, is critical for sustaining democracy.