Özet:
Turkey's eight years between 2008 and 2016 has been dominated by Ahmet Davutoglu's vision of foreign policy, which was derived from his multi-edition book Strategic Depth (2000). In order to be able to present itself in its larger periphery as a pro-active, trustworthy actor, Davutoglu argued, Turkey needed to change the foreign-policy paradigms with which it was stranded. As the Strategic Depth vision unfolded, it drew explicit parallels between modern Turkey and the Ottoman neighborhood policy. Turkey-Syria relations since 2008 had been providing the seekers of neo-Ottomanist tendencies in the contemporary Turkish foreign policy with abundant examples, because Syria, once an Ottoman territory and always a challenge to modern Turkey, came to be the first poster country in the shift towards Turkey's imperial awakening. In the post-Davutoglu era, however, the rhetoric and practices of the past eight years seemed suddenly to disappear from the use of the Turkish agents of foreign policy; the new code of terms and actions to replace the Strategic Depth version is yet to be decided. This study seeks to pin down the neo-imperialist character of Turkey's foreign-policy discourse of the aforementioned eight years and contribute to discussions of the Turkish aspiration of neo-Ottomanism with focus on the Syrian crisis through the Justice and Development Party's re-invented peace discourse. In doing so, it aims to find out and elaborate on the current tendencies of Turkish foreign policy, which are no longer as explicit and articulated as they were during Davutoglu's ministry and prime ministry. As Turkey's cross-border operation to Syria - the Euphrates Shield - ends and another one in Idlib begins, a discursive analysis stretching from Davutoglu's diplomatic "zero problems" with Damascus to the military use of ground troops and air force is timely. Such an endeavor would be essential in understanding the spectacular swing from one edge to the other in Turkey's inclination over a phantasmagorical empire.
